05000440/FIN-2010002-02
From kanterella
Revision as of 19:39, 20 February 2018 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Make an Accurate Immediate Operability Determination |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to make an accurate immediate operability determination (IOD) based on the actual plant conditions and the available information to provide reasonable assurance of operability. Specifically, on February 15, 2010, through wall leakage was identified coming from a welded elbow connection of an instrument line associated with the \'B\' Emergency Closed Cooling (ECC) system supply to the \'B\' control complex chiller heat exchanger. This instrument line is an American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)Section III, Class 3 piping system, and the licensees IOD declared the \'B\' ECC system operable without the degradation mechanism being discernable from visual examination (such as external corrosion or wear) or having substantial operating experience (site specific) with the identified degradation mechanism in the affected system. No violation of regulatory requirements occurred, and the issue was entered into the licensees CAP. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance-Availability, Reliability, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding was of very low safety significance because a loss of system safety function, or the actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its TS-allowed outage time did not occur, and the finding does not screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding had a safety culture cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, related to the Operating Experience component for not implementing and institutionalizing operating experience through changes to station processes, procedures, equipment, and training programs per IMC 0310 (P.2(b)). Specifically, the requirement for the degradation mechanism of through wall leakage on ASME Section III, Class 2 and 3 piping, to be readily apparent from visual examination in order to support an operable IOD, was not completely understood by operations personnel. This finding did not involve a violation of regulatory requirements. |
| Site: | Perry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000440/2010002 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Marshfield D Melendez-Colon W Slawinski R Baker J Cameron T Hartman P Smagacz |
| CCA | P.5, Operating Experience |
| INPO aspect | CL.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - Perry - IR 05000440/2010002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Perry) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (Perry)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||