05000298/FIN-2008002-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Establish Adequate Procedures for Maintenance of Emergency Diesel Generator Electrical Connections |
| Description | Two examples of a self-revealing apparent violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a were identified regarding the licenseei12s failure to establish procedural controls for maintenance of electrical connections on essential equipment. In the first example, the licensee failed to include amphenol connections within the scope of existing periodic electrical connection inspections to identify loosening connections. In the second example, the licensee failed to incorporate internal operating experience into work control procedures to ensure that diesel generator-mounted amphenol connections were solidly attached following maintenance. These failures to establish adequate procedural controls led to the trip of Diesel Generator 2 during testing on January 15, 2008. This issue was entered into the licenseei12s corrective action program as Condition Report CR-CNS 2008-00304. The finding affected the mitigating systems cornerstone and is more than minor because it is associated with the cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The Phase 1 worksheets in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, were used to conclude that a Phase 2 analysis was required because the finding represents an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time (7 days). A Phase 2 risk analysis was conducted using the guidance of Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. Entering the site-specific pre-solved table with an assumed exposure time of greater than 30 days yielded a result of red, or very high significance. A Phase 3 analysis conducted by a risk analyst preliminarily determined the finding to be of white, or low to moderate significance. The cause of the finding is related to the corrective action component of the crosscutting area of problem identification and resolution in that the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective actions for a 2007 NRC inspection finding which identified inadequate maintenance procedures for checking the tightness of diesel generator electrical connections (P.1(d) |
| Site: | Cooper  |
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| Report | IR 05000298/2008002 Section 1R19 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2008 (2008Q1) |
| Type: | Violation: White |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Rice D Chamberlain D Livermore R Deese R Smithm Runyann Taylor P Elkmann D Chamberlain M Chambersd Chamberlainm Chambers M Runyan N Taylor P Elkmann |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Cooper - IR 05000298/2008002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cooper) @ 2008Q1
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