05000298/FIN-2008007-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate POST-FIRE Safe Shutdown Procedures |
| Description | An apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, was identified for failure to ensure that some steps contained in Emergency Procedures at Cooper Nuclear Station would work as written. Inspectors identified that steps in Emergency Procedure 5.4POST-FIRE, Post-Fire Operational Information, and Emergency Procedure 5.4FIRE-S/D, Fire Induced Shutdown From Outside Control Room, intended to reposition motor operated valves locally, would not have worked as written because the steps were not appropriate for the configuration of the motor starter circuits. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V was not met because these quality related procedures would not work to allow operators to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition in the event of certain fires. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in Problem Identification and Resolution, under the Corrective Action Program attribute, because the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the 2004 NRC violation to address causes and extent of condition. (P.1.c - Evaluations) This finding is of greater than minor safety significance because it impacted the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to external events (such as fire) to prevent undesirable consequences. This finding affected both the procedure quality and protection against external factors (such as fires) attributes of this cornerstone objective. This finding was determined to have a preliminary Greater Than Green safety significance during a Phase 3 evaluation using best-available information. This problem, which has existed since 1997, involves risk factors that were not dependent on specific fire damage. The scenarios of concern involve larger fires in specific areas of the plant which trigger operators to implement fire response procedures to place the plant in a safe shutdown condition. Since some of those actions could not be completed using the procedures as written, this would challenge the operators ability to establish adequate core cooling. Upon identification of this issue, the licensee took immediate compensatory actions to notify operations of the procedural problems, establish a roving fire watch, issue a night order to communicate to all operating crews, and change the procedures. Both emergency procedures have been revised to assure correct valve alignment. Therefore, this finding does not represent a current safety concern |
| Site: | Cooper  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000298/2008007 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2008 (2008Q1) |
| Type: | Violation: White |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Loveless J Mateychick L Smith N O'Keefem Chambersn Salgado N Taylor |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Cooper - IR 05000298/2008007 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cooper) @ 2008Q1
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