The inspectors identified a self-revealing non-cited violation of
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, Procedures and Programs when the 23 chiller failed to start on January 22, 2008.
PSEG personnel did not start the 23 chiller and verify proper operation before removing the 21 and 22 chillers from service. This resulted in the plant operating for five hours with all three chillers out of service. The inspectors determined that the procedure for chiller operation was inadequate because it did not provide sufficient guidance to operators when removing two chillers from service.
PSEGs corrective actions included revising the chiller operating procedure and replacement of the solenoid valve that caused the 23 chiller not to start. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute of the
Initiating Events cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, unavailability of all three chillers increased the likelihood of a loss of control air. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance using the Salem plant-specific Phase 2 pre-solved worksheets in accordance with
IMC 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations. This performance deficiency has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because
PSEG personnel did not effectively communicate human error prevention techniques, such as holding pre-job briefings, self checking, and peer checking, and these techniques were not used commensurate with the risk of the assigned task
H.4(a). Specifically,
PSEG personnel did not verify the proper operation of the 23 chiller before removing the 21 and 22 chillers from service. (Section 1R15