05000237/FIN-2006010-05
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Finding | |
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| Title | |
| Description | The inspectors identified an unresolved item regarding the performance of DOA 1900-01, Loss of Fuel Pool Cooling, Revision 14. DOA 1900-01, step D.1.c. can not be performed under a loss of AC power coincident with a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) conditions. On January 18, 2006, during testing of the 2A fuel pool cooling pump, per DOA 1900-01, heat exchanger tube side relief valves 2-1999-279 (A relief valve) and 2-1999-280 (B relief valve) lifted. On January 20, 2006, during testing of the 2B fuel pool cooling pump, per DOA 1900-01, both A and B heat exchanger tube side relief valves (2-1999-279 and 2-1999-280) lifted. The 2A fuel pool cooling pump was tested again on January 20, and both A and B relief valves lifted. Following each of the incidents, DOP 1900-01, Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Startup, was utilized to reseat the relief valves and return the system to a stable condition. The licensee concluded that after a fuel pool cooling pump trip, the pump can not be re-started without operator manual actions in the reactor building. On January 20, 2006, the licensee determined that DOA 1900-01, step D.1.c. can not be performed under a loss of AC power coincident with loss of coolant accident (LOCA) conditions. Step D.1.c. provides guidance on how to start a fuel pool cooling pump in case access to the reactor building is not possible. This condition affects Unit 2 and likely affects Unit 3. These events were documented in IR 444332. The inspectors challenged the licensee as to whether the condition of Unit 2 (and potentially Unit 3) fuel pool cooling system should be an operator workaround or challenge. The licensee initiated IR 528541 to address the inspectors concern. Also, the inspectors inquired as to whether any compensatory actions were in place and if there was an alternate success path to accomplish the re-start of the fuel pool cooling pumps under a loss of AC power coincident with loss of coolant accident (LOCA) conditions. The compensatory action in place directed operations personnel to take actions to ensure DOA 1900-01, step D.1.c. is not used on either unit until a solution to the problem is implemented. At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was still evaluating if there is an alternate success path to accomplish the re-start of the fuel pool cooling pumps. The inspectors considered this issue to be an unresolved item pending evaluation efforts. |
| Site: | Dresden  |
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| Report | IR 05000237/2006010 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2006 (2006Q3) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Jandovitz J Cassidy D Melendez-Colon M Sheikh W Slawinski C Phillips R Schulza Klettt Ploski J Jacobson B Dickson L Ramadan D Melendez-Colon M Sheikh W Slawinski C Phillips S Orth R Schulz M Gryglak W Snell A Barker E Bonano |
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Finding - Dresden - IR 05000237/2006010 | |||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Dresden) @ 2006Q3
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