An apparent violation (
AV) of
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, having a preliminary low to moderate safety significance (White) was identified as a result of the inspectors review of a January 30, 2004,
scram event. Water intrusion into the
high pressure coolant injection (
HPCI) system turbine steam supply line occurred as a result of the
scram and rendered the
HPCI system
inoperable. The inspectors determined that the licensee implemented extended
power uprates on Unit 2 in 2001 and Unit 3 in 2002, but failed to verify the adequacy of design for the implementation of extended
power uprate to respond to changes in post-scram
reactor vessel water level to prevent water intrusion into the
HPCI steam supply line. The finding was determined to be greater than minor because it impacted the
mitigating systems cornerstone. The finding was preliminarily determined to be of low to moderate safety significance following the performance of a case-specific Phase 3
SDP evaluation. Corrective actions taken by the licensee included modifying the
feedwater level control system post-scram level setpoints and dynamic modeling of the reactor vessel level response.