05000247/FIN-2005006-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Adequately Evaluate and Correct Nitrogen Gas Migration and Accumulation in Portions of the Safety Injection System |
| Description | An apparent violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Action) and station procedures were identified associated with the failure to evaluate and correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, the condition adverse to quality involved the leakage of water from the No. 24 safety injection accumulator past several closed valves, allowing water containing absorbed nitrogen to reach other portions of the safety injection emergency core cooling system (including the common suction supply piping for the safety injection pumps and the 23 safety injection pump casing). As the water moved from a higher to lower system pressure, the nitrogen gas was released from the water, thereby challenging the performance of the safety injection pumps. In addition, Entergys initial evaluation of this condition did not appropriately consider available industry operating experience relative to gas migration into emergency core cooling system piping. This issue is greater than minor because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigation Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstones objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The Significance Determination Process (SDP) Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3 were used to determine that this issue represented a finding with preliminarily low to moderate safety significance. The analysis used the NRCs best functionality estimates for the three safety injection pumps over a 17-day period when it was judged that adverse gas accumulation conditions existed. Specifically, the 23 safety injection pump was not functional due to the pump casing being filled with gas. The team concluded that the 21 and 22 pumps, given the accumulated gas in the pump suction piping, would not have functioned 75% of the time (assigned a 75% failure probability) for high flowrate and low discharge pressure conditions in response to a medium break loss of coolant accident; and 25% of the time for low flowrate and high discharge pressure conditions in response to other initiating events. The Phase 1 screening identified that a Phase 2 analysis was needed because the 23 safety injection pump train was not functional for longer than the technical specification allowed outage time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Given the uncertainty in the Phase 2 analysis, a Phase 3 analysis was necessary to improve the accuracy of the result. The Phase 3 analysis for internal and external initiating events, using the above assumptions and licensee risk information, identified an increase in core damage frequency of approximately 1 in 900,000 years of operation (low E-6 per year range); and an increase in large early release frequency of approximately 1 in 3,000,000 years of operation (low E-7 per year range). |
| Site: | Indian Point  |
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| Report | IR 05000247/2005006 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2005 (2005Q2) |
| Type: | Violation: White |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Bloughb Mcdermott L Doeflein S Pindale W Schmidtb Holiand Holody K Farrar L Doerflein P Bonnett S Collins |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Indian Point - IR 05000247/2005006 | |||||||||
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Finding List (Indian Point) @ 2005Q2
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