05000313/FIN-2009002-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Information to the NRC Following a Plant Trip |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR 50.9, Complete and Accurate Information, because the licensee provided inaccurate information to the NRC following a reactor trip. Specifically, while making a 10 CFR 50.72 report (for a site fire, which had prompted a manual reactor trip) the licensee informed the NRC headquarters operations officer (on a recorded line) that all control rods had fully inserted into the core. On the contrary, one control rod had failed to fully insert, although the reactor was in a shutdown condition. Operations personnel had failed to use 3-way communications when discussing the control rod positions during the event. After the licensee determined the actual control rod position, the information was not provided directly to the NRC. The information was considered material to the NRCs informational needs because the NRC may have initiated different short term response measures had the NRC known that one control rod was partially out. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports ANO-1-2009-0260 and ANO-1-2009-0281. The finding was more than minor because the information was material to the NRCs decision making processes. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, the violation was subject to the traditional enforcement process because 10 CFR 50.9 violations impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. Using the Enforcement Policy, Supplement VII, Miscellaneous Matters, the inspectors characterized the violation as a Severity Level IV violation because it did not meet the Severity Level I, II or III criteria. NRC management reviewed the finding and determined that it was of very low safety significance (Green). Because the violation was of very low safety significance and was entered into the corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy,Section VI.A. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance (Work Practices component) because operations personnel failed to utilize human error prevention techniques (3-way communication) when gathering information to provide to the NRC H.4(a) |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2009002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2009 (2009Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Miscellaneous |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | K Clayton A Sanchez J Josey J Clark S Rotton |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2009002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2009Q1
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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