ML20206P469
| ML20206P469 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/11/1998 |
| From: | Collins S NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Roe J NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206P326 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9905180239 | |
| Download: ML20206P469 (2) | |
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/8 1 December 11, 1998 MEMORANDUM TO: Jack W. Roe, Acung Director D vision of Reactor Program Management FROM:
Omos of Nudear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
TASKING MEMORANDUM FOR STAFF FOLLOWUP ON DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL VIEWS REGARDING THE OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS RESPONSE EVALUATION PROGRAM By memorandum dated November 4,1998, the ad hoc panel on the consolidated Differing Professional Views regarding the cancellation of the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation program forwarded their report to me. That report contained the following recommendations:
- 1. a. Dedicate specific resources to satisfying the commitment in the g/27/96 memo "to reconcile ... the differences between facilities with security plans which are consistent ,
with 10 CFR 73.55 (b) through (h) and which may not protect against the DBT for j radiological sabotage..." l 1
' testing and exercises."
- c. Determine Mother to proceed to correct difficulties through order or through the normal rule making process, including consideration of 10 CFR 50.10g requirements."
- 2. "OSRE should be terminated pending resolution of the first recommendation The l inspection program should then be adjusted, if applicable." j i
- 3. a. Inspection Procedure 81700 (which references equipment testing as part of the .j normal program to be done by headquarters with contractor assistanos) should be
're examined in view of Regulatory Guide 5.44 (October 19g7) on testing. l
- b. Terminate equipment testing by NRC or its contractor (refers to 7/14/92 memo from Drector, NRR, to all Regional Administrators, and inspection Procedure 81700).
I have adopted these recommendations, wnh the excepuon or items 2 and ab. The OSRE i program has been reinstated and the equipment testing portion of the Regional Assists wili i remain in piece. l To o ry oM m ,ecomm.nd.nons of m ,.nei, m. M.n is k.d io o m oono.ing: l
- 1. consnue wah the eNorts of the Safeguards Performenos Assessment (SPA) Task Force I to examine the reeutstory basis for puformance tesung at sooneses'securny programs !
and make recommendssons as to how the NRC shouW aonduct puformance testing in !
the future. l
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,' The SPA Task Force should consider whether a changes in reguistions, inspection procedures, and/or agency policies are appropriate to address this issue. In this
- process, the enam should consider the requirements in 10 CFR 73.46 for Category 1 Econsees to conduct periode exercises of twir contin 0*ncy piens and whether mose requirements have a bearine on me need for power reactor reactors to test their contingency response plans
- 2. Worldne with OGC, he team should examins me issue of compliance with seguirements and the expectation met kansees' security programs we be able to defend against the design basis tweet. This examinstion should consider whether;
- a. Econsees are legalty required to be able to defend against the design basis threat (73.55(a)) and to demonstrate that capabaty when called upon to do so by a representative of the NRC (73.55(b)(4)).
- b. a heensee can be cited for violations of 73.55(a) when mey fall to successfully demonstrate the capability to defend against the design basis treet, even when it can be shown that the licensee is in compliance with applicable reguistens and commitments,
- c. some NRC action other than a Notice of Vloistion is appropriate and legally supportable when a heensee fails to comply with 73.65(a)
- 3. Reconcile the dWorences between inspecten Procedure 81700 and Regulatory Guide 5.44 with respect to NRC conducted equipment tests end, if there are actual
{_ differeness, determine the appropriate means of resolvin0 mem.
I note that the spa Task Force has already made considerable progress in answering these questions and that a report detalline the Task Force's recommendatens is M.ssJ..g. The Task Force should accelerate its efforts in his regard and prepare recommendations to be forwarded to the Commission by the end of December 1998.
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POLICY ISSUE January 22.1999 SECY-99-024 FOR: The Commissioners FROM: Wi!!iam D. Travers Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SAFEGUARDS PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT TASK FORCE (WITS 199800188)
PURPOSE:
To advise the Commission of recommendations reached by the Safeguards Performance Assessment (SPA) Task Force for the evaluation of licensees' tactical response capability at nuclear power plants.
BACKGROUND:
In June 1998, NRR recommended, and the Executive Council agreed, that the Operational Safeguards Respor:se Evaluation (OSRE) program be eliminated by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 1998. The goal of the OSRE program was to evaluate licensees' contingency response capability and interface between safety and safeguards (SECY-92-418, December 18,1992).
Another assessment program, Regional Assists, provides support to the regions for testing the performance of the licensees' perimeter intrusion detection and alarm assessment systems (also described in SECY-92-418), but it does not evaluate the licensee's ability to meet the design basis threat.
The OSRE program conducted site visits at nuclear power plants between 1991 and 1998 and observed force-on-force exercises conducted by the licensees. The program identified a number of minor weaknesses and some significant weaknesses in licensees' observed i
Contact:
R. Rosano, NRR 301-415-3282 Attachment 5 f?/00r?'l-0 1,
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1; 1 2-performance.' Corrective actions for those weaknesses were implemented; however, not all security plans were revised to incorporate these corrective actions, a step that would have ,
made them regulatory commitments subject to later inspection and enforcement.
1
' Eliminating the OSRE program in FY 1998 left 11 power plant sites unevaluated under OSRE.
(A list of these sites appears in Attachment 1.)' This step generated extensive attention and comments from the media and certain members of Congress, stemming in part from the perception that the OSRE program was the only mechanism that the Commission had in place to evaluate licensees' ability to counter terrorism.2 Two differing professional views (DPVs) j were filed by NRC Headquarters and regional safeguards staff members who objected to I elimination of the OSRE program. A panel was convened to review these DPVs and the panel issued its report and recommendations on November 4,1998 (Attachment 2).
The staff responded to numerous inquiries from the media and Congress and briefed the Chairman and certain Commissioners on the OSRE program. These briefings included a -
- discussion of possible alternatives to the OSRE program to support NRC's future validation of licensees' tactical response capabilities. The Chairman instructed the staff to reinstate the
- OSRE program and to accelerate the efforts of the task force formed to review safeguards performance issues. The Chairman further instructed the task force to report its findings and re' commendations to the Commission by the'end of Calendar Year 1998.
The task force that was formed in October 1998, now called the Safeguards Performance Assessment (SPA) Task Force, studied the let. sons teamed from the OSRE program to develop recommendations for tactical response evaluations in the future. This paper summarizes the recommendations of the SPA Task Force.
DISCUSSION:
' Section 73.55(a) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations requires licensees to establish a
- physical protection system and a security organization with the objective of providing high assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.
The physical protection system is required to protect against the design basis threat (DBT) of
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radiological sabotage (as defined in 10 CFR 73.1) and to " include, but not necessarily be limitad to, the capabilities to meet the specific requirements contained in paragraphs [73.55) (b) through (h).*
1 Licensees were allowed to carry out the ' exercises during OSRE visits using more response force personnel, and sometimes additional equipment, than are committed to in the approved security plans. During future OSREs, licensees will be limited to the response force personnel and equipment that are specified in their security plan commitments.
8 The Differing Professional Views and media reports about the elimination of the OSRE program referred to it as a counter-terrorist and/or anti-terrorist program. In fact, the OSRE program was actually focused on the broader concept of radiological sabotage, in accordance
~ with 10 CFR 73.1,
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' Licensees are required to develop physical security plans (PSPs) in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(a) to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.5S(a) and (b) through (h). These plans are submitted to the NRC for approval before implementation. Changes to approved PSPs that do not decrease the effectiveness of the plan can be made through 10 CFR 50.54(p) and can be implemented without prior NRC approval; changes that do decrease the effectiveness of the l plan are made under 10 CFR 50.90 and require NRC approval before implementation.
l 4 l NRC's regional security inspections are designed to evaluate comphance with commitments I made in approved PSPs and to assess the capabilities of the licensees' security programs.
Although these commitments are intended to ensure that the security organizations are able to i protect against the DBT, the inspections carried out to evaluate compliance with these commitments did not provide for performance testing of tactical response capabilities or l evaluating the effectiveness of these commitments to protect against the DET.
The OSRE program, which is performance-based, was designed to enhance regional inspection efforts by using force-on-force exercises conducted by licensees as a method of evaluating their response capabilities and it included the validation of licensees' target sets. A l target set consists of interrelated equipment or a single component that if disabled or destroyed l could prevent the reactor from being maintained in a safe condition. The OSRE team works j with the licensee to reach a consensus on appropriate target sets. The scenarios are then i given to the licensee's mock adversary force to carry out during the exercises. NRC Headquarters and regional personnel, the NRC contractor, and the licensee's team of observers oversee the exercises and evaluate the performance of the security force. OSRE f
visits were conducted at 57 sites between 1991 and 1998. During these visits, OSRE teams l
identified weaknesses a.t 27 plants; some of these weaknesses related to failures to prevent mock adversary forces from gaining access to vital equipment. These weaknesses have been corrected by the licensees.
l l Licensees have always tuen responsible for identifying vulnerabilities in their programs, including security. However, licensees' ability to identify vulnerabilities in their tactical response capability has been enhanced by NRC's OSRE program. Although the end result was a higher confidence in the effectiveness of security programs throughout the industry, the SPA Task Force concludes that the industry can assume more responsibility for performance assessment of tactical response capability, thereby reducing the NRC's role in the assessment while preserving the same level of confidence in the final product.
To achieve this goal, the SPA Task Force recommends that:
- 1. The regulations be modified to require power reactor licensees to identify target sets, l- develop protective strategies, and exercise these strategies on a periodic basis. The exercises would be subject to NRC inspection and observation. The rulemaking would also consider regulatory changes necessary to require licensees to maintain the effectiveness of their contingency plans and to upgrade their security plan commitments whenever these exercises reveal weaknesses in their ability to protect against the design basis threat.
- 2. The staff develop a regulatory guide to outline the process for developing target sets and sabotage scenarios, as well as to detail acceptable means of conducting the exercises.
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- 3. The staff develop changes to the existing inspection program and procedures to identify the inspector's role in observing tactical response exercises and documenting the findings. The NRC Enforcement Manual should be revised to de. scribe actions to take as a result of inspection findings related to licensee-run exercises.
- 4. The staff consider developing a training module to enhance security inspector knowledge of tactical response exercises and abilities in carrying out the responsibilities of the new or revised inspection procedure (s).
All of these actions will be coordinated with the Nuclear Energy institute, industry representatives, and other public stakeholders. The actions described in item 3 above will be coordinated with the reactor oversight process improvements currently under development.
The SPA Task Force believes it is feasible to develop a schedule providing for a new rule to be published for public comment by the end of May 1999 and the attendant guidance and inspection procedure (s) be published in final form by the end of October 1999. Final resource and schedule estimates will be provided in the rulemaking plan that will be forwarded for Commission approval within 60 days of approval of the recommendations contained in this paper. The SPA Task Force recommends that OSRE visits continue while the rulemaking is underway and that the cycle of OSRE visits be allowed to conclude before any new program of performance assessment is implemented. However, if recommendations that emerge from this effort represent a significant departure from, or improvement to, the OSRE program, a more immrodiste shift to the new program may be warranted.
On December 11,1998, Samuel J. Collins issued a Tasking Memorandum for Staff Followup on Differing Professional Views Regarding the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation Program, to consider the recommendations of the DPV panel (Attachment 3). The recommendations of the DPV panel have been incorporated into the SPA Task Force recommendations, with one exception, viz., the Chairman's instruction to the staff to immediately reinstate the OSRE program superceded the panel's recommendation that the program be terminated pending resolution of other issues.
RECOMMENDATIONS-That the Commission approve the SPA Task Force recommendations outlined in the Discussion section above and allow the staff to begin work on a rulemaking proposal that would address these recommendations.
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.9 5-COORDINATION:
The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this recommendation and has no legal objections to its content.
4%
William D. Travers Executive Director for Operations Attachments: As Stated Commissioners' completed vote sheets /coments should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by COB Tuesday, February 9, 1999.
Commission Staff Office comments, 4.f any, should be submitted to the Commissioners.NI.T February 2, 1999, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary. If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
DISTRIBUTION:
Commissioners OGC OCAA OIG OPA OCA ACRS CIO CFO.
EDO REGIONS SECY
l Power Reactor Sites Without an OSRE Visit As of November 1 1998 {
Clinton Comanche Peak )
Davis Besse )
Ginna j Limerick t Perry Quad Cities ,
Seabrook i St. Lucie Susquehanna Watts Bar i
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- k UNITED STATES
- 5
" g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t WASHINGTON, D.C. enamoanni
.....[ November 4, 1993 MEMORANDUM TO: Samuel J. Collins, Director ONice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM:
Frank P. Gillespie, Chair [N 4 Ad-Hoc Review Panel
SUBJECT:
DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL VIEW CONCERNING TERMINATION OF THE OPERATIONAL SAFEGUARDS RESPONSE EVALUATION PROGRAM in memoranda dated August 7,1998, August 21,1998, Thomas W. Dexter, A. Bruce Eamest, Dennis W. Schaefer and David N. Orrik forwarded to you the differing professional view conceming termination of the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation Program (OSRE).
The primary concem of the submitters was that the current regulations, as implemented, are deficient in assuring the leve! of protection required by NRC's Design Basis Threat (DBT) for radiological sabotage at nuclear power plants. Therefore, the on site reviews and exercises done as part of the conduct of an OSRE and the licensees' voluntary modifications, which have preceded or proceeded the OSRE, have become the vehicle f.or ensuring the needed level of protection. One submitter did raise the additional concem that following an OSRE, some licensees have discontinued the increased measures needed to meet the OSRE objectives.
Additional concems were developed during the Panel's review. All concems are discussed in the enclosed report; Your memorandum dated September 1,1998, designated that an ad-hoc panel be formed to review this differing professional view. The members of the Ad-Hoc Review Panel were Frank P.
Gillespie as Chair, Arthur B. Beach as a management member, and Elizabeth Q. Ten Eyck ,
as a staff member as recommended aind agreed upon by all submitters.
Enclosed is the Panel's report with its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. I
Enclosure:
As stated O
A#,.h ed 2.
F
AD-HOC REVIEW PANEL REPORT ON THE DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL VIEW THOMAS W. DEXTER, RIV A. BRUCE EARNEST, RIV DAVID N. ORRIK, HQ DENNIS W. SCHAEFER, RIV h 2 Frank P. 'Gillespie ilA air' U
Ad-Hoc Review el
- k. h Elph Q.' TMyck, MemtsF Ad-Hoc Review Panel 6
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' Arthur B. Beach, Member Ad-Hoc Review Panel
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TABLE OF CONTENTS l I. PANEL REPORT i
II. RECOMMENDATIONS III. ATTACHMEbTfS
- 1. (SEC.-91-052) Commission Paper dated February 26,1991
- 2. ~ (SEC.-92-418) A subs _equent paper dated December 18,1992
- 3. A memorandum from the Director of NRR to all Regional Admmistrators dated July 14,1992
- 6. Office ofInspector and Auditor Repon dated April 24,1987
- 7. Examples ofOSREs IV. REFERENCES l 1. OriginalDPVs
- 2. Additional comments for submitters
- 3. DPV Related Information 4
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X l PANEL REPORT i
The panel has met to review and develop recommendations conceming the consolidated D.P.V.
L which strongly disagrees with the decision ofNRC management to clinunate the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) program and what the submitters see as fundamental questions on the agency's approach to safeguards regulation for power reactors. The D.P.V.
panel held a meeting on September 11,1998, which included all the submitters by telephone except Mr. Orrick who was out of the office. The submitters supplemented their initial written package at this meeting with additional material relevant to their concerns.
A panel member supplied insights and subsequent information relevant to the international considerations, domestic considerations and internal consistency of the NRC's approach to performance testing of security equipment and security force response between fuel facilities and reactors. This additional information bears directly on the questions raised in the D.P.V.
Following the meeting subsequent discussion between the panel members has occurred resulting in this draft set of recommendations for panel consideration.
The primary concern of the subminers was that the current regulations, as implemented, are deScient in assuring the level ofprotection required by NRC's Design Basis Threat (DBT) for radiological sabotage at nuclear power plants. Therefore, the on site reviews and exercises done as part of the conduct of an OSRE and the licensees' voluntary modi 6 cations, which have preceded or proceeded the OSRE, have become the vehicle for ensurmg the needed level of protection. One submitter did raise the additional concern that following an OSRE, some licensees have discontinued the increased measures needed to meet the OSRE objectives.
During the discussions several considerations were surfaced which bear on the conclusions reached and the recommendations for subsequent actions. The foremost consideration deals with the relationship within 10CFR73.55 between the requirement to submit a secunty plan which ensures the facility can protect agamst the DBT and the approved plans which meet as a mimmum the technical requirements of paragraphs (b) thru (h). The current NRR inspection program for the most part inspects against the requirements of the security plan at a facility and not necessarily against the facility's ability to protect against the DBT as demonstrated during an OSRE.
Enforcement guidance has been issued that indicates that the sole basis for security enforcement action is the facility security plan. This has led most facilities to be in compliance with applicable requirements in the security plan, but not necessarily being able to demonstrate that they can protect against the DBT; the concern raised by the submitters. In discussions with the submitters, they recognized the corrective steps being taken by the licensees to the performance-based OSRE inspections as usually beyond the current requirements if based solely on the existing security plans, but witlun the scope of the NRC requirement to protect against the DBT. These extra security measures were viewed by the submitters as voluntary in nature.
The issues related to the effectiveness of safeguards requirements were documented in an OfBee ofInspector and Auditor report dated April 24,1987 (ATTACHMENT 6 ), Regulatory
( Effectiveness Reviews for Operating Power Plants. The Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER) program proceeded the OSRE program This report addressed both the problem of plant specific
[
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backfit from each review and the need to re-examine the regulations and licensing basis of licensees for potential backfit requirements. This review was positive in its characterization of the RER assessments for evaluating safeguards effectiveness. This was the first of a number of documents reviewed which address the fundamental question raised by the submitters.
l In a conunission paper dated February 26,1991 (SECY-91-052) (ATTACHMENT 1) which ,
discussed the RER program, the question of backfit and the inconsistency mentioned above were '
briefly touched upon. ' Backfit and the relationship of the RER, now OSRE, to the security plan is specifically addressed on page 3.
"The staff has analyzed the results of the past RERs and concluded that, in general, I performance weaknesses have not resulted from weaknesses in the related regulations of the NRC. Most of the significant weaknesses identified during RERs involve capability specifically re quired by 10CFR73.55. Primarily the weaknesses have occurred because the licensee's secirity systems had not been evaluated for performance using the design basis threat as a benchmark."
This conflict between the approved security plans potentially not resulting in a security program which can protect against NRC's DBT requirement, the cautions on the backfit implications, and the assertion that the rules were sufficient was not reconciled in the February 26,1991 commission paper. In a subsequent paper dated December 18,1992 (SECY-92-418)
(ATTACHMENT 2), the transition from the RER to the OSRE program is described, as well as, a summary of the benefits that have accrued from conducting the assessments. In this paper, the same conflict is described, as the results of all assessments are referred to as weaknesses to be corrected by licensees in recognition that the findings were beyond enforceable requirements.
Finally, in a Memorandum to the Director of NRR from the Chief of the Safeguards Branch dated September 27,1996, the question of the need to address the inconsistency of security plan and the DBT through rule making was addressed. On page 4 of that memorandum it states:
" All four regions expressed a need for rule changes. These included rules to require improved planning for defending the plant, periodic response drills, improved training for armed response officers, changes to Appendix C Part 73, Contingency Plans, and changes to allow adversary interdiction within vital areas, consistent with OSRE methodology. We intend to revisit an earlier plan to ask the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research to replace the highly prescriptive training and qualification requirements in Appendix B of 10CFR Part 73 with performance-oriented requirements that would enable licensees to tailor their training and qualification programs to the specific needs to their site-specific defensive strategy We will also consider whether a sufficient basis exists to request the other rule changes suggested by the regions. We will also evaluate the possibility of issuing a generic communication or other documentation in response to Region III and IV recommendations to better communicate acceptable performance standards for security response, training, and performance testing."
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3 This previous commitment to revisit the need to correct what appears to be a significant inconsistency remains vahd. In addition, the consistency in approach to the safeguards regulations between the Office of Nucles Materials Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) and NRR on the topic of response ims and exercises should also be addressed NMSS addressed this issue in 10CFR73.46 as it relates to fuel facilities, by requiring certain exercises and the reporting of schedules to the NRC so that observation of the exercises by the NRC could be factored into the j routine inspection program A regulatory basis is also provided in 10 CFR 73.20 which requires NMSS licensees to maintain the ability to protect against the DBT. j The Safeguards Branch was asked to provide some perspective on the differences between the requirements of a facility security plan and OSRE results. Recognizing this is a force on force exercise, the differences were weJcnesses in the numbers of guards and their response strategy.
Attachment 7 is the material supplied and does provide a perspective on the range of differences. l While additional rigor is need for a rulemaking or backfit analysis the changes that might evolve appear to be bounded. '
. RECOMMENDATIONS
- 1. Specific resources should be dedicated to satisfying the commitment in the September 27, 1996, Memorandum to the Director of NRR to reconcile as soon as possible the differences between facilities with security plans which are consistent with 10CFR73.55 (b) through (h) and which may not protect against the DBT for radiological sabotage as demonstrated by OSRE and RER results. In doing so, reconcile the differences in approach between NRR and NMSS as they relate to response testing and exercises. Based on their findings, a determmation should be made whether to proceed to correct difficulties through order or through the normal rule making process, including consideration of 10CFR50.109 requirements as applied to backfit !
considerations.
- 2. Upgrades implemented by licensees to their security programs to demonstrate their ability to 3
protect against the DBT for radiological sabotage as a result of the OSRE program may represent '
a backfit. OSREs should be terminated pending resolution of the first recommendation. The mspection program should then be adjusted, if applicable.
- 3. The regional assist or equipment testmg efforts which are not connected with the force on force exercises appear to he ? css a question of backfit and more a question of responsibility for testing. If a parallel is dr m :o other areas in the NRC i=~ don program, performance testing should be completed by the aicensee and observed by NRC. If the testmg requirements are consistent with guidance contained in Regulatory Guide 5.44 (ATTACHMENT 5) and committed to by the licensee in their security plans, a case for independent NRC testing has not been established. A memorandum from the Director of NRR to all Regional Administrators dated July 14,1992 (ATTACHMENT 3), on testing appears to remain valid and should be enforced. This is
- referenced in Inspection Procedure 81700 Physical Security at Power Reactors.
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l 4 "The guidance pnmarily applies to performance testing of security equipment. First,
- inspector requests for licensees to conduct equipment performance tests should be limited to tests specified in the licensee's security plan or tests normally performed by the licensee.
Requests by inspectors for licensees to conduct such tests should be made as part of the l preparation for an announced inspection. Second, regional inspectors should not conduct j performance testing as part of routine inspections. There may be special circumstances i
appropriate for inspectors to conduct performance testing, such as follow up to an event.
In those cases, approval should be obtained from the Director, Division of Reactor l Inspection and Safeguards, NRR, Regions are encouraged to make use of the headquarters regional assist capability, which includes contractor support, when there is a L determined need for the NRC to conduct performance testing of security equipment."
In this memorandum, the need for independent testing must first be established by the region L before requesting assistance from NRR. This guidance was modified in April,1994 through the i updating ofInspection Procedure 81700 (ATTACHMENT 4) which incorporated performance l' testing as part of the normal program to be done by headquarters with contractor assistance every
! fourth inspection cycle. This change to the procedure and the need for NRC staff or contractors L to conduct the test should be re-exammed in view of the October 1997 Regulatory Guide 5.44 on i testing.
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k August 7,1998 l
MEMORANDUMTO: SamuelJ. Collins,Dierector Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation !
l FROM: David N. Orrik, Capt USN(Ret),
l Security Specialist, NRR/DRPM/PSGB 1
SUBJECT:
DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL VIEW REGARDING NRC ABANDONING ITS I ONLY COUNTER TERRORISM PROGRAM.
This Differing Professional View pertains to the NRC's's plan to eliminate Operational Safeguards Response Evaluations and Regional Assists, as currently described in the NRC Inspection Manual as, respectively, procedures 81110 and 81700.
SUMMARY
- The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission has had a security program since 1991 focused on the ability ofnuclear power plant security forces to protect against a terrodst attack aimed at causing radiological sabotage, with equivalent consequences of Chernobyl. The heart of this program is secudty force demonstrations of their armed response capability in onsite force-on-force exercises. Weaknesses were identified in 47% of the plants evaluated to date. There is no other NRC counter-terrorism inspection or oversight effort. The NRC is canceling this program September 30,1998. This action is ill-advised. The government and the public have placed a high priority on countering the perceived increasing threat of terrorism on U.S. soil. Nuclear plants are a key part of the American infrastructure. The nuclear power industry continues to demonstrate an inability to prepare to protect their plants without
- NRC oversight / pressure, i.e., "self-regulation" is a failure in plant protection.
- 1. THE PROBLEM-a Protectino nominst violent seennit-NRC has only one - small - program to ensure that the 60+ nuclear power plants are able to '
protect against a terrorist attack aimed at causing radiological sabotage, i.e, an "American Chernobyl". The program tests and evaluates their armed response force to respond to a specific threat capability, regardless ofits likelihood. The threat capabilityis specified in 10 CFR 73.1(I),
which defmes a design basis threat for radiological sabotage. Essentially,it is a small group of well-trained, well-equipped (weapons, explosives, etc.), dedicated terrorists with insider knowledge / assistance making a "detennined violent external -* ."
This program is now scheduled to be eliminated on September 30,1998 (end ofFY98).
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k;. - E NRC & COUNTER-TERRORISM .
b- Protecting at'ainst attaa hv stealth-i This same program also assists NRC regional inspections by performing a second type of performance evaluation (ofperimeter detection and acceu control equipment) to ensure that nuclear power plants can protect against one or more individuals attempting to surreptitiously penetrate into the plant in order to cause radiological sabotage. This " attack by stealth"is also part of the design basis threat (10CFR73.1(I)).
This part of the program is now scheduled to be eliminated on September 30,1999 (end of FY99 c Implications for USG poliev and public immet-There has been, and will be, no formal announcement or noti 5 cation of any kind to anyone. An internal-NRC program willjust end. However, this action puts the USNRC in the unique position of being the only government agency to end its active involvement in counter-terrorism when both the executive and legislative branches of the government are increasing the emphasis (and funding) for counter-terrorism for (other) government agencies.
Also, the public, when advised, could perceive this as the NRC placing private profit before public and environmental heahh & safety.
- 2. THE COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAM-This program is small, employing 3 NRC headquarters personnel (out of 3000 total NRC),
assisted by contractors at a cost of $90K/ year. The program consists primarily of onsite performance evaluations of a plant's security force and equipment. The heart of these
- evaluations, called Operational Safeguards Response Evaluations (OSREs), are onsite force-on-force (FOF) exercises with mock terrorists attacking the plant. The " terrorist" force in these exercises varies from a single amateurish individual to a team with the capabilities of the NRC design basis threat. The typical exercise lasts only a few minutes; either the mock terrorists have reached all of their target equipment or they have been interdicted by anned responders who have deployed to key defensive positions with appropriate weapons. This program is almost identical to the one used by DOE for hs facilities, except that the NRC was on a much slower frequency, i.e. an OSRE once every 7 years The contractors, who assist both NRC and DOE, are exceptionally well qualified and trained for this program's efforts.
The second type orperformance evaluation, ca!!ed Regional Assists, conducted by the OSRE team is to physically test the perimeter barriers and alarm systems, CCTV alarm ===><==*at
. systems, and access control equip ==* (i.e, X-ray and metal detectors). Byjumping, crawling, climbing, etc. the team attempts to defeat the alarm systems and make undetected penetrations into the plant. (Note: Plant personnel are always present so the tests are not confused with actual
(. alarms.) Both individual (i.e., the " lone wolf' terrorist) and team penetration methods are used.
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NRC & COUNTER-TERRORISM This efort also is almost identical to the one used by the DOE for its facihties.
~ 3. PLANT PROTECTION CAPABILTTY- AS DEMONSTRATED -
The evidence over the last seven years from 55 OSREs is that, prior to preparing for an OSRE, plants would not have been able to demonstrate an assured abliity to protect their plant against a I terrorist attack. They were unprepared. Why? Regulations do not require nuclear power plants to conduct onsite contingency exercises. (However, category I fuel facilities are required by regulation to conduct contingency exercises onsite and, at least once a year, for observation by NRC.)
In preparing for their OSRE, ALL plants: conducted a vulnerability analysis; developed a new protective strategy; trained trainers; gave new training to their largely inexperienced, civilian guard force in response weapons and tactics; exercised aU 3,4, or 5 shifts in onsite FOF exercises in the new strategy and tactics; added new delay or denial barriers in intruders' likely paths, and added protected /ballinie defensive positions for responding c5cers. The estimated real cost to a plant, most ofit one-time capital expenditures for delay / protection modi 5 cations, has been $140k to S800k.
Furthe ,52 of 55 plants determined in their pre-OSRE work-up that they needed an average of 80% more armed responders than they had committed to in their security plan if they were to
" pass" the OSRE. Only when they had to demontrate their protection capability to the NRC did they arrive at a realistic number based on real performance data. Only one plant had to hire additional security o5cers; the other plantsjust assigned response duties to more o5cers already on shift and then train them.
However, despite 6-l2 months advance scheduling, an unvarying design basis threat and list of test-events, and much, intense preparation,26 of 55 (47%) plants still demonstrated significant
' protection weaknesses during their OSRE. Further, seven plants had such egregious weaknesses that a return OSRE was scheduled to test the corrective measures. Examples of these weaknesses are when a plant's response force failed to interdict the mock terrorists in all of the onsite exercises, or when a mock-terrorist " success-scenario"is predictable. (Six of these plants have since antisfactorDy corrected their w+sm; the seventh will be retested in August.)
. After an OSRE, aD plants have relaxed their training / exercising program from the pre-OSRE period. This has meant, in some cases, the end ofany formal training or exercising program, no onsite exercises, little or no F0F exercises (which normaUy requires additional, overtime personnel, e.g., " shadow" shift and exercise controllers), reduction ofresponse team size (to the plan-commitment level), and assignment ofresponse o5cers to other duties (e.g., fire watch) preventing those o5cers from being able to meet their response " time-lines".
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Additionally, in thirty-six Regional Assists, the OSRE team has identi5ed 117 perimeter intmsion
- detection sensor weaknesses by physical testing. The team limits testing to the capabilities ascribed to the NRC design basis threat. The test couples this with knowledge of the sensor systems to devise and execute plausible penetratit.1 methods. However, in many cases the penetration method, the weakness, lies beyond the plan commitment. -
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- 4. OTHER NRC SECURITY EFFORTE-i These two evaluations are the onlyNKC security evaluations that are performance based. They i I
were begun in 1991 to focus on the armed response and perimeter protection weaknesses being identi5ed in Regulatory Effectiveness Reviews (RERs), which evaluated the effectiveness of safeguards programs, detennining if security regulations, as translated into security plans, were effective. The RERs identi6ed 644 weaknesses; the majority were beyond plan commitments and had, therefore, never been previously identified. AD were corrected.
i' The other, current security inspections are regionaDy based and evaluate a plants' compliance with
~ its security plan, not if the plan works. The OSRE program's benchmark is the NRC's design basis threat. Only the OSRE program physically tests the functioning of the plants total l
program's abiUty to protect against the threat. The regional inspectors are, in fact, neither ;
authorized, nor trained, nor physicaDy quali5ed to do this kind of testing. NRC regional I inspectors cannot require or enforce correction of any observed weakness that is beyond '
commitments in the security plan. However, there has been no correlation bm a plant's OSRE performance and either (1) its compliance with commitments in its security plan or, (2) hs periodic security quality ratings by NRC, tyhich is derived from, among other things, regional inspection results. In other words, a plant can be in compliance with its security plan and still be unable to protect, with "high assurance", against the design basis threat.
This lack of correlation can become critical. In only 2 plants, of the 26 plants that had response weaknesses identified in an OSRE, were plan violations an issue. In one recent Regional Assist, the perimeter alarm system was penetrated without alarming in 8 places, but in 6 of those locations the penetration method was beyond plan commitments. This was not unusual. NRC inspectors cannot enforce correction ofweaknesses that are beyond plan commitments. Further, a plant can reduce its response force to its (minimum) plan commitment with impunity since that reduced number is in the NRC-approved plan. However, the OSRE muidy has caused corrections to be made to weaknesses that appear beyond plan commitments. Of course, the weaknesses are demonstrated; they were real, signi5 cant, and obvious, once identified. Only 3 plants have ever chaDenged RER/OSRE-findings and, for various reasons were unsued1 Again, all weaknesses have been corrected.
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- 5. PROGRAM OUALTTY-l The OSRE team has consistently received praise from plant / utility management for their professional conduct and the beneScialimpact of the OSRE experience on the plant's protection capability. (More speci5cally, it's been the plants' preparations for the OSRE that has had the salutary impact.) The high quality and impact of the OSRE, and the team, can be veri 5ed by questioning the security directors and plant managers of the nuclear power plants that have undergone an OSRE as to their capability before and after the OSRE and the OSRE experience in general.
Additionally, this NRC program has become the model for other govemment nuclear agencies. 4 Foreign government nuclear ofEcials have observed OSREs or Regional Assists in the last 2-3 years. As a result, parts or all of the program are being copied or used as models in Russia, t
K=nh an, Ukraine, Japan, and Gennany. At Russia's request, NRC is conducting an OSRE seminar in Russia this August. DOE personnel have also observed an OSRE, and as a result, DOE is planning on devoting one day ofits 1999 International Physical Protection Training Course to a presentation ofNRC's OSRE and Regional Assist Methodolcay. Ofcourse, NRC will have canceled it by then. By what criteria willit have been cariceled? Cost? Effectiveness?
Need in America today?
- 6. SIGNIFICANCE OF IDEM u mo WEAKNEEEEE-
- a. Only the capabilities of the NRC design basis threat was used. Therefore, the plants should be able to protect against it. At all times. (Actually, the capabilities used in OSREs are somewhat LESS THAN those speci5ed in 10 CFR 73.1.) The threat has been the same in all OSREs and RERs.
- b. Many weaknesses were identi5ed; some were severe,
- c. The weaknesses were neiether identi5ed by other NRC inspections nor by the licensees..
- d. The weaknesses were predominantly beyond security plan commitments (e.g.,in personnel levels and response team w:xercising).
- e. The weaknesses were not identi5ed, or at least not corrected, by the power plants until pre-OSRE preparations. Industry self-regulation failed /is failing.
i Economic pressure to cut back, reduce personnel (e.g., to plan commitments)is already severe at nuclet.r power plants. Einting the OSRE program will eliminate any countervailing pressure to this economic pressure to reduce plant security forces Reductions have already
- been ident15ed by regional m' spectors.
- 3. OSREs have identi5ed some plants where the onsite, F0F exercises indcated that ' reductions in the actual response team size could be made. The team stipulates only that the plant validate the reductions (with analysis and exercises) and then notify NRC.
- h. This program is the ONLYNRC active counter-terrorism effort. It has been effective; plants are correcting signi5 cant weaknesses in their protection capability.
( i. Armed response weaknesses at power plants regulated by NRC are not new. The GAO t
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. 1 NRC & COUNTER-TERRORISM identiSed this in 1977 in a report titled, " Security at Nuclear Powerplants - At Best, l
Inadequate." On page 11, the report noted that "... studies conclude that security at nuclear powerplants could not counter sabotage forces ofseveralindividuals that were armed and had i knowledge of the plant."
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- 7. IMPACT OF CANCFT LATION-Cancellation of the OSRE program means that 11 plants will not have had an OSRE by the end of FY98. Evidence from the first 55 OSREs is that ONLY those plants that prepare for an OSRE will be prepared to protect the plant against radiological sabotage. Plant security plans have failed -
to do this. Industry self-regulation has failed to do this. This is as true in 1998 as h was in 1991.
Therefore, to the extent that these plants have not prepared for an OSRE, the evidence is clear that these plants will not be capable ofprotecting against the design basis threat for radiological sabotage.
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Funber, security managers admit - volunteer - that, without the specter of a return OSRE visit, they would find it impossible to justify continuing extemal-threat analysis and shift training to plant /utiiity management. This is especially true since there is no current regulatory requirement for nuclear power plants (unlike fuel facilities) to exercise their shift response teams onsite, or anywhere. This is a result of utility pressure to reduce costs. Therefore, it isjust a matter of time before all or most response forces will have stopped realistic, or any, onsite exercising. Without exercising, the OSRE experience is that these response team's quality willinevitably deteriorate to an inadequate level.
Further, the strong and increasing pressure for nuclear power plants to downsize is especially signi5 cant sinpe all plants commit to a speciBe response force size in their security plans to counter radiological sabotage. (These plans were approved by NRC before the plants went on-line.) However, in 52 of the 55 OSREs, the plants used an average of 80% more responders than they committed to and, therefore, are required -by regulation- to have. The industry's priority has been shown to be, understandably, economic survival then economic profit. Security is a non-productive overhead cost. Plants in all regions are already reducing or planning on reducing security force size, and concomitantly, response force size. Without OSREs (m' some form) to evaluate these reductions, to require plants to demonorate capability with these reduced numbers, NRC will have no recourse but to accept the reduced numbers. This, despite the fact that it was the licensees themselves that determined that they needed the larger number of responders to
" pass" an OSRE, whose sole criteria was the NRC design basis threat. Therefore, nuclear power plants will inevitab!y have an insufficient number ofresponse officers to counter the NRC design i basis threat. ,
l It must be emphasized that the NRC design basis threat does not rely on any probabilistic estimate
( of the likelihood of a " violent external assauh." It is a capability, not an intention. Unfortunate!y,
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NRC & COUNTER-TERRORISM effort will inevitably weaken plant protection to levels unable to protect against the design basis threat capability. "Self-regulation" has clearly failed. It has only been the " threat", i.e.,
scheduling, of an OSRE that prornpted utihties to adequately protect public health and safety.
The money they spent preparing for their OSRE in the immediate pre-OSRE period is evidence of this.
There has also been a faihre within the NRC to agree upon and ensure that a regulatory basis exists that ensures that power plant licensees (like fuel facilities) can (demonstrably) protect against the NRC design basis threat. It is not an extraordmary capability. Relying on licensee plans," signed" to pro e roven ti"'a mory.
David Onik, Capt USN(Ret) cc:
J. Roe,NRR R. Rosano, NRR MModes, RI GBelisle, RH JCreed, RID BMurray, RIV
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August 21,1998 MEMORANDUM TO: Samuel J. Collins, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Thomas W. Dexter /s/
Senior Physical Security Specialist, Region IV Dennis W. Schaefer /s/
' Physical Security Specialist, Region IV j
A, Bruce Earnest /s/
Physical Security Specialist, Region IV '
SUBJECT:
DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL VIEW REGARDING NRC TERMINATION OF ITS COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAM FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 1
1 The attached Differing Professional View pertains to NRC announcing its termination of the '
! Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) program.
We strongly disag,4e with NRC's management decision to eliminate the OSRE program.
Instead, we recommend that this highly successful, performance-based program be continued.
The NRC cannot afford to eliminate (abandon) its only counter-terrorism program.
l The defense of a nuclear plant against a terrorist attack is only as good as the execution of the i
defensive plan. The OSRE program is NRC's single measure of licensees' ability to adequately defend a plant against an attack by a terrorist group.
As a result of the OSRE program, nuclear power plants have developed into hardened" targets.
Elimination of the OSRE program will cause a " softening" of nuclear plant security.
l The NRC OSRE program is essential in todays hostile environment because:
it causes nuclear plants to successfully demonstrate their ability to defend against a terrorist attack aimed at causi g radiological sabotage.
l The nuclear industry has failed to self-regulate in the design-basis threat area.
Frequently, nuclear plants have not begun to finalize effective defense strategy until announcement of the OSRE program at the site. Occasionally, even with 68 months advance notification, licensees have " failed" their initial OSRE. Dering reevaluation, all j bconsees have successfully passed the OSRE.
'The nuclear industry continues to challenge the existence of a nuclear" threat" and the
(; need for protecting against the desigrrbasis threat. The OSRE program has caused the
, threat to become real. Terrorist acts in the United States and ongoing world tensions have re;cJorced the need to continually protect sigainst the desigrybasis theat.
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A successful attack on a single nuclear plant will adversely effect the entire nuclear industry. The public will immediately perceive that all nuclear plants are unsecure and, l therefore, unsafe. !
l in past years, nuclear power plants have not been a likely target for terrorist groups. However, ,
this philosophy is changing. The FBI reports that a lesson from terrorist attacks in recent years, l domestic and intemational, has proven that there is no such thing as an unlikely target.
From an economic and safety standpoint, termination of the highly effective OSRE program is l lil-advised. A successfut
- hit" upon a nuclear plant by a terrorist group would have a ripple
! effect through the nuclear industry. In tum, this would have a devastating economic effect upon i the NRC and the country.
l The continued success of the NRC OSRE program could very well determine the future successful operation of the nuclear industry. Likewise, the effects of eliminating the OSRE l program could initiate a downturn in the nuclear industry.
The nuclear industry has stated that the OSRE program is expensive and has encouraged the NRC to eliminate the OSRE program. Elimination of the NRC OSRE program demonstrates that NRC and the nuclear industry have placed industry profits ahead of public health and
, safety.
This memorandum and its attachment do not contain safeguards information.
Attachment:
As stated cc: (via e-mail) l E. Merchoff, Regional Administrator, RIV J. Dyer, Deputy Regional Administrator, RIV l
A. Hewell, Director, DRS, RIV l .
B. Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch, RIV J. Roe, Acting Director, Division of Reactor Program Management, NRR R. Rosano, Acting Chief, Safeguards Branch, DRPM, NRR M. Modes, Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch, RI '
G. Belisle, Chief, Special Inspection Branch, Rll l J. CreMuf, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1, Rill I
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. ATTACHMENT i l
DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL VIEW REGARDING NRC TERMINATION OF ITS l COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAM FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Background l On August 17,1998, Sam Collins, Director, NRR, advised a group of NRC security managers and inspectors (from NRC headquarters and all four regions) that NRC senior management had oecided that effective September 30,1998, the NRC OSRE program would be eliminated.
Since 1991, the NRC has been conducting Operational Safeguards Response Evaluations
- (OSREs) at nuclear power plants. To date, OSREs have been conducted at approximately 95 percent of all nuclear power plants. The OSREs have successfully evaluated the ability of nuclear power plants to protect themselves against a terrorist attack aimed at causing radiological sabotage. There has been no other program that measures licensees' ability to defend against a terrorist attack. I i
Differina Professiona! View i
l We strongly disagree with NRC's management decision to eliminate the OSRE program. i instead, we recommend that this highly successful, performance based program be continued. I Federal Bureau of Investiaation l
On August 18,1998, representatives from Headquarters, FE;l addressed a group of NRC security managers and inspectors and stated the following: )
(1) In the past years, nuclear plants have been a *hard" target and as such, were not a likely target for a terrorist group. However, this philosophy is changing. A lesson from terrorist attacks in mcent years, domestic and international, has l
proven that there is no such thing as an unlikely target. 1 (2) . That a defensive plan (at a nuclear power plant) is only as good as the execution of this plan. A plan by itself is of little value.
(3) That " soft" targets are more vulnerable to a terronst attack than "hard" targets.
(4) That security officers carrying weapons at nuclear power plants provide a visible and significant deterrent to a terrorist attack.
The OSRE Proerem The OSRE program is NRC's single measure of bconsees' ability to adequately defend against the (10 CFR 73.1) desigr4 asis threat and aga% an attack by a terrorist group.
[ The NRC cannot afford to eliminate its only performance based counter-terrorism program.
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Execution of the OSRE program is described in NRC Inspection Procedure 81810.
The centralized OSRE program at NRC Headquarters has insured that regulatory i
requirements are applied consistently. The conduct of an OSRE requires a minimum of 5-7 personnel. Regions do not have sufficient resources to conduct OSREs.
1 As a result of the OSRE program, nuclear power plants in the United States have developed into " hardened" targets. Elimination of this program will cause a " softening" of nuclear plant security.
The NRC OSRE program has become the model for other govemment nuclear agene.ies and for other foreign govemments.
Nuclear Industrv Has Failed Self Raoulation in DesiorwRacis Threat Area i
Since the initiation of the OSRE program in 1991, several nuclear plants have demonstrated an inability to self-regulate and adequately defend its plants. Examples are d'oeumented in several OSRE reports on file.
For initial OSREs, licensees have normally been provided 68 months advance notification. Wrthout exception, if advance notifications were not provided, licensees' l ability to defend the plant would be limited. Even with advance notification, some licensees (in all regions) have failed their initial OSRE. The
- failed" licensees demonstrated that they could not provide a sufficient number of responders,
, appropriately armed and equigiped, in protected positions, in time to interdict the mock adversary force. During reinspection, sillicensees successfully passed the OSRE.
On numerous occasions, security officers at nuclear plants have stated to the inspectors that the OSRE caused their plant to adopt a realistic and viable defense plan. Prior to the scheduling of the OSRE, the plants' defensive plan and their ability to protect against a small group of armed terrorists, was inadequate.
On July 30,1998, a supervisor at a Region IV plant stated that the rumored elimination of the NRC OSRE program will make it difficult to implement additional security defense modifications at the plant.
General Public Gives Nuclear industry Only One Chance The consensus of NRC security inspectors is that a successful attack on any single nuclear plant will have an immediate and adverse effect upon the entire nuclear industry.
Public opinion following a successful terronst attack at a nuclear plant wilingt support i
the rebuilding of that plant and will no longer support the continued production of nuclear power at any nuclear plant. As a resuit of one plant being successfully* hit," the general public willimmediately perceive that all nuclear plants are unsecure and, therefore, unsafe.
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4 et The OSRE program provides a valid performance base for evaluating licensees' ability to defend plants against a terrorist attack. The continued success of the NRC OSRE program could very well determine the future operation of the nuclear industry.
Likewise, the effects of eliminating the OSRE program could initiate a downturn in -
- the nuclear industry.
Economics and Public Health and Safety From an economic and safety standpoint, termination of the highly effective OSRE program is ill-advised. The NRC cannot afford to eliminate (abandon)its only counter-terrorism program.
Licensees have often reported that preparation for an OSRE is very expensive. Plants that incur tremendous expenses in OSRE preparation are normally those plants that have waited until announcement of the OSRE to begin their preparation.
The nuclear industry has encouraged the NRC to eliminate the expensive OSRE program. Elimination of the OSRE program demonstrates that NRC and the industry have placed industry profits before public health and safety.
As discussed above, the successful" hit" upon a nuclear plant by a terrorist group would have a ripple effect through the nuclear industry. In tum, this would have a devastating economic effect upon the NRC and upon the industry.
Securitv/ Terrorist Threat is Often Not Understood bv Members of the Nu&ar Industrv Licensees (non security) staffs have routinely challenged the existence of a threat to nuclear plants, and the need for protecting against the desigrFbasis threat. In response, licensees have been continually advised that just because you *can't see" the enemy, does not mean that the enemy (or the threat) is not real. The OSRE pr'agram has caused the threat to become real; however, in some cases, licensees have envisic,ned NRC as "the threat." Without exception, licensees have drastically improved their defensive plans as a result of the OSRE program.
In most cases, "the threat' remains invisible until it is to late. On August 7,1998,"the threat" became real (and visible) after the 4 story U.S. Embassy building in Nairobi was badly damaged by a large vehicle bomb. Previously, in the United States, bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, made the threat very real and visible.
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