ML20206P401
| ML20206P401 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/21/1998 |
| From: | Dexter T, Earnest B, Schaefer D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Collins S NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206P326 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9905180223 | |
| Download: ML20206P401 (11) | |
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ARUNGTON. TEXAS 76011 8064 August 21,1998 x
MEMORANDUM TO:
Samuel J. Collins, Director b
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation CC'. U b FROM:
Thomas W. Dexter ert/4*-
0 Senior Physical Security pecialist, Re 'on IV Dennis W. Schaefer Physical Security Specialist, R ion y A, Bruce Earnest MI Physical Security dp egion IV
SUBJECT:
DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL VIEW REGARDING NRC TERMINATION OF ITS COUNTER-TERRORISM PROGRAM FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS The attached Differing Professional View pertains to NRC announcing its termination of the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) program.
We strongly disagree with NRC's management decision to eliminate the OSRE program.
Instead, we recommend that this highly successful, performance based program be continued.
The NRC cannot afford to eliminate (abandon) its only counter-terrorism program.
The defense of a nuclear p! ant against a terrorist attack is only as good as the execution of the defensive plan. The OSRE program is NRC's single measure of licensees ability to adequately defend a plant against an attack by a terrorist group.
As a result of the OSRE program, nuclear power plants have developed into "hardenef targets. Elimination of the OSRE program will cause a " softening" of nuclear plant security.
The NRC OSRE program is essentialin todays hostile environment because:
lt causes nuclear plants to successfully demonstrate their ability to defend against a terrorist attack aimed at causing radiological sabotage.
The nuclear industry has failed to self regulate in the design basis threat area.
Frequently, nuclear plants have not begun to finalize effective defense strategy until announcement of the OSRE program at the site. Occasionally, even with 6-8 months advance notification, licensees have "failef their initial OSRE. During reevaluation, all licensees have successfully passed the OSRE.
The nuclear industry continues to challenge the existence of a nuclear " threat" and the need for protecting against the design basis threat. The OSRE program has caused the threat to become real. Terrorist acts in the United States and ongoing world tensions have reinforced the need to continually protect against the design basis theat.
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A successful attack on a single nuclear plant will adversely effect the entire nuclear industry. The public willimmediately perceive that all nuclear plants are unsecure and, therefore, unsafe.
l In past years, nuclear power plants have not been a likely target for terrorist groups. However, j
this philosophy is changing. The FBI reports that a lesson from terrorist attacks in recent years, l
domestic and international, has proven that there is no such thing as an unlikely target.
From an economic and safety standpoint, termination of the highly effective OSRE program is ill advised. A successful" hit" upon a nuclear plant by a terrorist group would have a ripple effect through the nuclear industry. In turn, this would have a devastating economic effect upon the NRC and the country.
j The continued success of the NRC OSRE program could very well determine the future successful operation of the nuclear industry. Likewise, the effects of eliminating the OSRE program could initiate a downturn in the nuclear industry.
The nuclear industry has stated that the OSRE program is expensive and has encouraged the i
NRC to eliminate the OSRE program. Elimination of the NRC OSRE program demonstrates that NRC and the nuclear industry have placed industry profits ahead of public health and safety.
This memorandum and its attachment do not contain safeguards information.
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Attachment:
As stated cc:(via e mail)
E. Merchoff, Regional Administrator, RIV J. Dyer, Deputy Regional Administrator, RIV A. Howell, Director, DRS, RIV B. Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch, RIV J. Roe, Acting Director, Division of Reactor Program Management, NRR R. Rosano, Acting Chief, Safeguards Branch, DRPM, NRR M. Modes, Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Safeguards Branch, RI G. Belisle, Chief Special inspection Branch, Ril J. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1, Rill I
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I, ATTACHMENT DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL VIEW REGARDING NRC TERMINATION OF ITS
- COUNTER TERRORISM PROGRAM FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Backaround On August 17,1998, Sam Collins, Director, NRR, advised a group of NRC security managers and inspectors (from NRC headquarters and all four regions) that NRC senior management had decided that effective September 30,1998, the NRC OSRE program would be eliminated.
- Since 1991, the NRC has been conducting Operational Safeguards Response Evaluations
-(OSREs) at nuclear power plants. To date, OSREs have been conducted at approximately 95 percent of all nuclear power plants. The OSREs have successfully evaluated the ability of nuclear power plants to protect themselves against a terrorist attack aimed at causing radiological sabotage. There has been no other program that measures licensees' ability to defend against a terrorist attack.
Differina Professional View We st'rongly disagree with NRC's management decision to eliminate the OSRE program.
Instead, we recommend that this highly successful, performance based program be continued.
Federal Bureau of Investiaation
. On August 18,1998, representatives from Headquarters, FBI addressed a group of NRC security managers and inspectors and stated the following:
(1)
In the past years, nuclear plants have been a "hard" target and as such, were not a likely target for a terrorist group. However, this philosophy is changing. A lesson from terrorist attacks in recent years, domestic and iniernational, has proven that there is no auch thing as an unlikely target.
(2)
' That a defensive plan (at a nuclear power plant) is only as good as the execution of this plan. A plan by itself is of little value.
(3)
That " soft" targets are more vulnerable to a terrorist attack than "hard" targets.
(4).
That security officers carrying weapons at nuclear power plants provide a visible and significant deterrent to a terrorist attack.
The OSRE Proaram
. The OSRE program is NRC's alngle measure of licensees' ability to adequately defend aga_ inst the (10 CFR 73.1) design-basis threat and against an attack by a terrorist group.
The NRC cannot afford to eliminate its only performance-based counter-terrorism -
program.
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Execution of the OSRE program is described in NRC Inspection Procedure 81810.
The centralized OSRE program at NRC Headquarters has insured that regulatory requirements are applied consistently. The conduct of an OSRE requires a minimum of f
5 7 personnel. Regions do not have sufficient resources to conduct OSREs.
As a result of the OSRE program, nuclear power plants in the United States have developed into " hardened" targets. Elimination of this program will cause a " softening" of nuclear plant security.
The NRC OSRE program has become the model for other government nuclear agencies and for other foreign governments.
Nuclear Industry Has Failed Self Reaulation in Desian-Basis Threat Area Since the initiation of the OSRE program in 1991, several nuclear plants have demonstrated an inability to self regulate and adequately defend its plants. Examples are documented in several OSRE reports on file.
For initial OSREs, licensees have normally been provided 6-8 months advance notification. Without exception,if advance notifications were not provided, licensees' ability to defend the plant would be limited. Even with advance notification, some licensees (in all regions) have failed their initial OSRE. The " failed" licensees demonstrated that they could not provide a sufficient number of responders,
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appropriately armed and equipped, in protected positions, in time to interdict the mock adversary force. During reinspection, all licensees successfully passed the OSRE.
On numerous occasions, security officers at nuclear plants have stated to the inspectors that the OSRE caused their plant to adopt a realistic and viable defense plan. Prior to the scheduling of the OSRE, the plants' defensive plan and their ability to protect against a small group of armed terrorists, was inadequate.
On July 30,1998, a supervisor at a Region IV plant stated that the rumored elimirotion of the NRC OSRE program will make it difficult to implement additional security r;efense modifications at the plant.
General Public Gives Nuclear Industry Only One Chance The consensus of NRC security inspectors is that a successful attack on any single nuclear plant will have an immediate and adverse effect upon the entire nuclear industry. Public opinion following a successful terrorist attack at a nuclear plant wili ng.t support the rebuilding of that plant and will no longer support the continued production of nuclear power at any nuclear plant. As a result of one plant being successfully" hit,"
the general public willimmediately perceive that all nuclear plants are unsecure and, therefore, unsafe.
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The OSRE program provides a valid performance base for evaluating licensees' ability to defend plants against a terrorist attack. The continued success of the NRC OSRE program could very well determine the future operation of the nuclear industry.
Likewise, the effects of eliminating the OSRE program could initiate a downturn in the nuclear industry.
Economics and Public Health and Safety From an economic and safety standpoint, termination of the highly effective OSRE program is ill advised. The NRC cannot afford to eliminate (abandon) its only I
counter-terrorism program.
Licensees have often reported that preparation for an OSRE is very expensive. Plants that incur tremendous expenses in OSRE preparation are normally those plants that have waited until announcement of the OSRE to begin their preparation.
The nuclear industry has encouraged the NRC to eliminate the expensive OSRE program. Elimination of the OSRE program demonstrates that NRC and the industry have placed industry profits before public health and safety.
As discussed above, the successful " hit" upon a nuclear plant by a terrorist group would have a ripple effect through the nuclear industry. In tum, this would have a devastating economic effect upon the NRC and upon the industry.
Securitv/ Terrorist Threat is Often Not Understood by Members of the Nuclear Industrv Licensees (non security) staffs have routinely challenged the existence of a threat to nuclear plants, and the need for protecting against the design basis threat. In response, licensees have been continually advised that just because you "can't see" the enemy, j
1 does not mean that the enemy (or the threat) is not real. The OSRE program has caused th's threat to become real; however, in some cases, licensees have envisioned NRC as "the threat." Without exceptien, licensees have drastically improved their defensive plans as a result of the OSRE program.
' in most cases, "the threat" remains invisible until it is to late. On August 7,1998, "the threat" became real (and visible) after the 4 story U.S. Embassy building in Nairobi was badly damaged by a large vehicle bomb. Previously, in the United States, bombings of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, made the threat very real and visible.
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a DPV PANEL REGARDING THE ELIMINATION OF THE NRC OSRE PROGRAM Opening Remarks:
As stated in the DPV, we strongly disagree with the decision of NRC management to eliminate the OSRE program. Instead, we recommend that this highly successful, performance-based program be continued. Additionally, we feel that the elimination of the OSRE Program is definitely not in the best interest of the NRC, Do.1in the best interest of the nuclear industry, and also Delin the best interest of the public.
As we noted, the OSRE Program is the agency's only anti-terrorism program. This is the gnly means that we have to adequately measure licensees' ability to defend nuclear plants against an attack by a small number of terrorists.
We feel strongly that the nuclear industry will get only one chance to defend against the DBT. A successful attack on any single nuclear plant by a terrorist group will have an immediate and adverse effect upon the entire nuclear industry. If gna plant is successfully
- hit," the general public will immediately perceive that all nuclear plants are unsecure and unsafe. For this reason, eliminating the OSRE Program could initiate a downtum in the nuclear industry. Continuation of the OSRE Program is our galy means of evaluating licensees ability to defend their plants.
(1) Need for the OSRE Proaram. We have heard the objection that there is no need for the OSRE Program, because the routine security program adequetely reviews licensees' ability to defend against the DBT, and that nuclear plants are an unlikely target because they are
" hardened." We contend that the routine security program as currently designed for nuclear
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plants, is not required to evaluate the security program against an overt attack by a hmall group i
of terrorists. This is evaluated only during an OSRE inspection.
We have also heard that there is no need for the OSRE Program because nuclear plants are well defended. In August 1998, a representative from FBI Headquarters told a group of NRC security managers and inspectors that in the past years, nuclear plants were not a likely target for a terrorist group, because they were hardened facilities. The FBI representative also told this group that lesson.s leamed from recent terrorist attacks, domestic and infomational, has proven that there is no longer any such thing as an unlikely target. Additionally, the FBI stated that a
. defensive plan is only as good as ino execution of that plan.. a plan by itself is of little value.
We have also heard that there is no need for the OSRE Program because the industry can self-'
regulate in this area, in this regard, we noted in our DPV that even with 6-8 months advance notification, several plants in the country have failed their initial OSREs. These plants were unable to defend against the DBT. The industry's self-regulation in this area has failed.
(2) Regulatory Basis. We have heard the objection that the OSRE Program has no legal regulatory base.
The most fundamental reactor security requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 73.55(a) requires that licensees security programs be designed to protect against the Desion Basis Threat. In this regard, alllicensee's Security Plans include a commitment to pdect against the design basis theat, as defined in 73.1(a). Additionally, many plant Physical Security Plans require that the licensee be able to demonstrate their i
p ability to meet this requirement. For example, the Contingency Plan for South Texas Project requires the licensee to demonstrate the ability of security force personnel to L
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2 perform their assigned duties and responsibilities upon request by NRC representatives.
This requirement includes demonstrating that the contractor personnel are capable of performing their assigned duties under NRC regulation, the security plan, contingency plan, and T&Q plan.
73.55(a) also requires that licensees establish and maintain an onsite security system and organization that provides high assurance that activities do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. Since 1991, several OSREs have demonstrated that plants had an ineffective tactical response plan. In effect, by poor performance in their OSREs, these plants did not provide the required *high assurance."
In these instances, the licensees performance to protect the plants violated these regulatory requirements.
Additionally, all security plans require that in the event of radiological sabotage, armed security officers are required to interpose themselves between vital areas and any adversary attempting the acts, and to intercept such adversary.
Security plans also have commitments such as "Through testing and maintenance of the security system as a whole, training and periodic drills of the security force and LLEA support personnel and the provision for redundancy and diversity, plants are afforded protection and high assurance against successful sabotage."
The concept of protecting a nuclear power plant is essentially based on four key
. elements:
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1 Deterrence of potential adversary action through the rhysical barriers and high Aibility of armed security forces.
- 2. Detection and assessment capabilities or unauthorized entry into protected and vital areas.
- 3. Security's ability to rapidly respond to unauthorized entry or activities.
- 4. At least delay any attempted intrusion by barriers and the security response force until the arrival of the LLEA.
(3) Part of the Insnection Proaram. There has been an objection that the OSRE Program was not part of the inspection program, which caused it to appear to be a " consultant" process.
On July 1,1997, inspection Procedure 81110, titled: Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation, was published. This procedure incorporated the OSRE Program into the NRC inspection program.
(4) Terrorist Threat? We have continually heard the objection from /ndustry AND from inside the NRC that the OSRE Program is not needed because "there is no real terrorist threat in the United States."
The terrorist threat, both intemational and domestic is very real. Our American society is extremely vulnerable in several areas, one of which is nuclear power reactors. A successful attack on a nuclear plant would be devastating to the morale of the American public.
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l During the past month, the FBI has formally notified the entire country of the need for heightened security awareness. If you nctica the August 27* NRC advisory message to all nuclear plants NO LONGER states that there is "no credible theet to licensed facilities." Additionally, on September 4,1998 (less than 1 week ago), the NRC published information Notice 98-35, titled:
Threat Assessment and Consideration of Heightened Physical Protection Measures. The Threat is Real.-
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- 5) Excense of the OSRE Proaram to the industrv. We have heard the objection that the
- OSRE Program is expensive to the industry.
In August 1998, a Region IV 1:censee successfu!!y completed an OSRE inspection.
' However, one year earlier ( in August 1997) this same licensee had failed their initial l
l OSRE inspection. Inspectors were told that it cost the licensee in excess of $500,000 to prepare for both OSREs. In this example, the licensee had waited 14 years to implement l
an adequate defensive plan. During this time, even a licensee securitv shift suoervisor l
' had oreviousiv alleoed that the olant could not defend aoainst the DBT. Only after an OSRE inspection was it determined that this security shift supervisor had been correct in
' his earlier evaluation - that the plant could not defend against the DBT.
On the other hand, in November 1994, an Entergy plant successfully passed their initial
- OSRE. The security manger stated that the total expenditures for OSRE preparation was "less than $1,000." When asked how he kept the costs so low, he stated that, "our l
defense plan was good and we were prepared."
r' Plants that incur tremendous expenses in OSRE preparation are normally those plants l
that have waited until announcement of the OSRE to begin their preparation.
The point to be made is that the elimination of the OSRE Program may save nuclear i
plants large sums of money, however, it will demonstrate to the public that industry profits have been placed before public health and safety, (6) The OSRE Proaram Must Be Eliminated Because or NRC Budget Cutal We have heard that the OSRE program must be eliminated because of NRC budget cuts.
The NRC's cost to administer the OSRE Program is minimal. We have maintained 3 FTE at Headquarters for this program.
We feel that elimination of the OSRE Program could have a severe economic impact l
upon the NRC and upon the entire nuclear industry. From a pure economic standpoint, the nuclear industry must be able to continually demonstrate that they can successfully defend against the DBT. The loss of a single nuclear plant to a group of terrorists would cause an immediate loss of all public support for nuclear power.
Closing Remarks:
(1)
The OSRE Program is essential in todays hostile environment because it causes nuclear plants to successfully demonstrate their ability to defend against a terrorist attack aimed at causing radiological sabotage. A defensive plan is only as good as the execution of that plan -- as stated by the FBI.
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(2)
The OSRE Program is essential today because the nuclear industry has failed to self-
. regulate itself in defending against the DBT.
(3)
Through the years the nuclear industry has continually challenged the existence of a nuclear " threat" and the need for protecting against the DBT. Terrorists attacks are real, j
they are not make-believe.
(4')
Elimination of the OSRE program, as explained by Jim Creek, Branch Chief in Region Ill, 4
(in his memo to Sam Collins) can be equated to " throwing out the baby with the bath water." We go one step further -- we feel that the elimination of the OSRE Program demonstrates that the NRC and the industry have placed industry profits before public health and safety.
(5)
The effects of eliminating the OSRE Progr :n wuld initiate a downtum in the nuclear industry. Likewise, on a positive note', we feel that the continued success of the OSRE Program could very well determine the continued successful operation of the nuclear industry.
l (6)
As we stated earlier, we feel very strongly that the nuclear industry will get only one chance to defend against the DBT. A successful attack on any single nuclear plant by a terrorist group will have an immediate and adverse effect upon the entire nuclear industry.
If gna plant is successfuity " hit" the general public will immediately perceive that all nuclear plants are unsecure and unsafe. Continuation of the OSRE Program is our only
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means of effectively evaluating licensees ability to defend their plants.
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Recommendation.
Having said all this about the retention of the OSRE Program, we add the following recommendations:
That each plant receive an OSRE each 3 years, and that the administration of the OSRE Program be identical to that of EP Exercises. This includes administering the OSRE drills and exercises, formally evaluating and critiquing the drills and exercise, and submitting a formal inspection report to the licensee (similar to the current OSRE inspection reports).
This should also include what is currently called " Regional Assists,"in which the OSRE staff performance-tests licensee access control and perimeter detection aids equipment.
We slag recommend that Part 50 be amended to include a requirement for the OSRE exercises --- similar to the Part 50 requirements for EP Exercises.
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DPV Related information C
InternationalConsiderations 1
INFCIRC/225, "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Maters'is currently undergoing intemational review and modification. The current revised draft includes the provision to ensure that physical protection measures are maintained in a condition capable of meeting the State's regulations and of effectively responding to the design basis threat. The State's competent authority (NRC in this case) is to ensure that evaluations are conducted by facility operators, i
l and reviewed by the State's competent authority, that includes exercises to test the training and readiness of guards and response forces.
Domestic Consideration's As part of the govemment's efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear, biological, or i
L chemical material to use in a weapon of mass destruction, the FBI plans to conduct exercises with many of our nuclear facilities to coordinate and evaluate response capabilities.
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NRC Consistency NMSS, in 10 CFR 73.46(b)(9), requires Category I fuel cycle facility licensees to conduct tactical response team and guard force exercises to demonstrate the overall security system effectiveness and the ability of the security force to perform response and contingency plan
. l responsibilities and to demonstrate individual skills in assigned team duties. An exercise must be carried out at least once every four months for each shift, one third of which are to be
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force-on-force. Each year NRC must observe one of the force-on-force exercises. A j-comparable requirement does not exist for power reactor licensees l
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