ML20207C853
| ML20207C853 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/03/1998 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ASB-300-570, NUDOCS 9906030126 | |
| Download: ML20207C853 (164) | |
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ORGINAL O OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
PUBLIC MEETING WITIl NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUE Case No.: $ hi=,
5 0 5!
Work Order No.: ASB-300-570 E '3 3 E 3e LOCATION: Rockville, MD DATE: Thursday, December 3,1998 PAGE 1 - 159
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1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
() 2 3
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4 PUBLIC MEETING WITH NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE 5 ***
6 7 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8 Two White Flint North, Auditorium 9 11545 Rockville Pike 10 , Rockville, MD 11 12 Thursday, December 3, 1998 13 14 The above entitled meeting commenced, pursuant to
'15 notice, at 9:01 a.m.
16 17 PARTICIPANTS:
18 CARL PAPERIELLO, NMSS 19 LIZ TEN'EYCK, NRC/FCSS 20 BILL BRACH, NRC/FCSS 21 DREW PERSINKO, NRC 22 GARY COMFORT, NRC/NMSS 23 HEATHER ASTWOOD, NRC/FCSS 24 ROB LEWIS, NRC 25 KATHRYN WINSBERG, NRC
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2 l 1 PROCEEDINGS 2.' [9:01 a.m.]
3 MR. SHERR: Good morning. I'd like to welcome you 4 all to our meeting today on the Part 70 developments. My 5 name is Ted Sherr. I'm chief of the Regulatory and l 6 International Safeguards Branch in the Division of Fuel 7 Cycle Safety and Safeguards, i 8 There's a lot of familiar faces here, and I think ,
I 9 we all know why we're here. But just in case there's 1 10 somebody here who hasn't been here before, the purpose of 11 this meeting is to provide an opportunity to further discuss 12 the amendments to 10 CFR Part 70 to place the regulations on 9 13 a more risk-informed basis.
14 It might be useful to quickly review some of the 15 background. Staff efforts on the revision of 10 CFR Part 70 16 commenced in 1993, and so we've almost been working on this 17 for six years. So it started in '93. At the request of the 18 Commission in 1995 staff's preliminary draft rulemaking 19 package was provided for public review, and at that time the 20 industry indicated they did not support the proposed '
21 approach and the' rule at that time.
22 Subsequently the Nuclear Energy Institute at a 23 Commission meeting in 1996 proposed an approach for 24 rulemaking, and at the encouragement of the Commission, NEI 25 submitted in September of '96 a petition for rulemaking on O
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3 1 Part 70.
() 2 3
In June '97 the staff proposed to the Commission a resolution'of the petition for rulemaking, and identified --
4 they recommended a number of features for the proposed rule.
5 This was contained in a Commission paper, SECY-97-137. The 6 staff recommendations included some elements of the petition 7- for rule that had other elements as well.
8 In August of '97 the Commission approved staff's 9 proposal and requested that a rulemaking-package be provided 10 to the Commission for its consideration by July 1998, which 11 is now nearly five months ago, 7 guess. And the staff did 12 provide such a package to the Commission in July. This was 13 in the form of SECY-98-185, and it was a draft proposed rule 14 for its consideration.
() 15 A month later there was a Commission meeting on 16 August 25, 1998, where NRC staff briefed the Commission on 17 the rulemaking package, and also NEI provided a briefing to 18 the Commission and indicated in there preliminary views on a 19 number of the issues raised in the rule.
20 On that same day there was another public meeting 21 with the executive director for operations, and at that i 22 meeting it was decided that another public meeting would be ,
23 useful to further discuss issues relating to the proposed 24 rulemaking. And subsequently, approximately a month later, ;
25 September 29, we had a meeting in this room, I think -- no, i
i I
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4 1 it wasn't -- where various' matters were discussed, and there
( 2 were presentations by NRC staff on the proposed rule and the 3 standard review plan, and presentations by NEI and the 4 industry on a number of related issues.
5 At that time both NRC and the industry 6 representatives identified a number of issues that required 7 further discussion, and we agreed there was a need for an 8 additional meeting. And today's meeting is in response to 9 that need.
10 And finally in the sequence of events, just this 11 week, on December 1, the Commission issued a staff 12 requirements memorandum on the Part 70 rulemaking, and this 13 will be discussed under the first agenda item.
14 The agenda for today's meeting has been
() 15 distributed, and it's included in your packet. Arrangements 16 have been made to allow two days for discussion of the 17 issues covered by the agenda.
18 The Nuclear Energy Institute has submitted written l
19 comments in relation to the second agenda item, that is, i 20 chemical safety, and a third agenda item, standard review 21 plan issues. Copies of this correspondence is included in 22 the packet of information.
23 In addition, NRC staff have identified some 24 questions relating to the NEI comments, and these have been 25 provided to NEI, and these are included in the packet as g ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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5 1 well.
I'D 2 We had anticipated receiving written comments on d
3 issues relating to nuclear criticality. We understand that 4 these comments are still forthcoming, and will involve a 5 number of detailed technical issues. An additional meeting 6 is being scheduled tentatively at this point in mid-January 7 to discuss the detailed technical comments concerning 8 nuclear criticality issues. We will still discuss nuclear 9 criticality today, but in terms more general issues.
10 Before we begin I would like to make some 11 introductions: Carl Paperiello, Director of NMSS; Liz Ten 12 Eyck, Director of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards; Bill 13 Brock, Deputy Director of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards.
14 And then there's what we call the Part 70 task force. This
()
15 task force has been established to provide a dedicated 16 effort to work on the various Part 70 issues and to develop 17 the rulemaking package for the Commission within the 18 prescribed schedule. And the leader of the task force is 19 Drew Persinko. And the members are Gary Comfort, Heather {
20 Astwood, Rob Lewis, and our legal adviser is Kathryn f l
21 Winsberg. '
22 So before we begin, a few administrative 23 announcements. The agenda doesn't include times for agenda 24 items, basically because we really don't have a very good 25 idea how long and how much time we're going to take on each
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6 1 agenda item. But I think we have enough time, 2 days, to
() 2 3
cover it, and we're not too concerned. We anticipate we'll cover at least the first four agenda items today.
4 On each agenda item there's opportunities for 5 questions and discussion, and I'd like to remind all 6 speakers to be sure to use the microphones when they make 7 any statements, to assist our recorder of the meeting make 8 sure he has a complete record.
9 We plan on a short break around 10:15 or whenever 10 it seems to fit in with the agenda, and break for lunch at 11 12 or thereabouts, and then we reconvene an hour later and 12 continue until 4:00 o' clock, possibly with a break in the 13 afternoon as well.
14 We are scheduled to begin tomorrow at 9:00
() 15 o' clock. There's the usual restrictions for no smoking, 16 eating, or drinking in this room, and the rest rooms are 17 right outside the doorway there. As I mentioned before, 18 this meeting is being recorded.
19 We can begin, unless there are any questions. Oh, 20 I'm sorry. We did the introductions. Felix, if you would 21 please do the industry introductions.
22 MR. KILLAR: I think I'll let each individual 23 introduce themselves. That way I won't mispronounce their 24 last names. So I know them as Brian and Charlie and Wilbur 25 and what have you. But I'm Felix Killar. I'm the director
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2 MR. SILVERMAN: I'm Don Silverman. I'm with 3 Morgan, Lewis & Bockius.
4 -MR.'VAUGHAN: Charlie Vaughan, GE Nuclear Energy.
- 5. MR. GOODWIN: Wilbur Goodwin, Westinghouse, 6 Columbia, South Carolina.
7 MR. ELLIOTT: Mark Elliott, BWX Technologies in 8' Lynchburg, Virginia.
9 MR. SHARKEY: Bill Sharkey, ABB Combustion 10 Engineering, Hematite, Missouri.
11 MR. KIDD: Brian Kidd, BWX Technology.
12 MR. EDGAR: Jim Edgar, Siemens Power Corporation, 13 Richland, Washington.
14 MR. SHERR: Thank you. We'll proceed to the first
() 15 agenda item, which is the next steps in the development of 16 the revised 10 CFR Part 70.
17 As I mentioned in the introductory comments, the 18- Commission issued.this week the staff requirements 19 memorandum in relation to the proposed rule package that was 20 provided to the Commission last July, and a copy of that SRM 21 is included in the packet of information that you have. The 22 SRM indicates that the Commission disapproved publication of 23 the proposed rulemaking and requested that staff continue to 24 discuss all relevant documents with stakeholders in the 25 public forum including the use'of Internet, and submit a
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v-8 1 revised proposed rulemaking to the Commission for approval
/V '} 2 in six months. That's six months from the date of the 3 issuance ~of the SRM.
4 The Commission indicated that staff should 5 consider the insights from the public discussions as well as 6 a number of issues that1they identified in the SRM in 7 developing their revised proposal.
8 In terms of the process for public comments, as 9 indicated, the Commission indicated that we should use a 10 public forum, including the Internet. As I mentioned 11 earlier, we have scheduled another meeting to deal with 12 nuclear criticality safety issues in mid-January. We plan 13 as the primary mechanism for providing related rulemaking 14 information and posting a rule on SRP options under
( ) 15 consideration to use the website or Internet for this 16 purpose and as a means for soliciting public comments on 17 these posted information.
18 The website has already been established. The 19 public announcement for this meeting had identified that.
20 It presently includes the transcripts of past meetings, the 21 proposed rulemaking, that is, SECY-98-185, the Nuclear 22 Energy Institute comments on chem safety and the standard 23 review plan, and staff questions concerning these comments 24 and in fact the agenda for this meeting.
25 In the future we will post the transcript of this
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r 9
1 meeting as well as any other future meetings as well the
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b 2 rule on SRP options which will include selected draft text 3 for public comment.
4 When we post the informdtion on the website in the 5 future,_we plan to provide notifications to all individuals 6 who have identified an e-mail address on the signup sheet 7 when they came into this room, and to any other individuals 8 who express such interest. So if you neglected to sign in 9 or provide an e-mail address and you're interested in being 10 notified when we put things on the website, please do so.
11 In your packet there's more information concerning 12 the contents of the website and directions how to access it.
13 Barry Mendelsohn, who is sitting in the third row here, he's 14 managing the input to the website for us, and if you have
[- 15' any questions, please contact him. If you want to do it by
(
16 e-mail, his e-mail address is BTM1#nrc. gov.
17 As I mentioned in the third item here, the SRM 18 identifies a deadline of six months to provide the 19 Commission a proposed rule package. We have worked out a 20 schedule of activities needed to satisfy this thing, and it 21 means that at some point or other we have to freeze comments 22 that we can consider in order to get the package put 23 together and through the concurrence process within NRC.
- 24 And based on our current schedule we see a deadline for 25 comments on-the rule in the mid-February time frame, and on
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10 1 the SRP in the early March time frame.
2 And we plan to be posting the rule options on the
}
3 website through the end of January, so there would be about 4 a two-week time period to react to those, and the SRP 5 options through mid-February, again allowing two to three 6 weeks to comment on those.
7 MR. KILLAR: Ted, if I can ask a question here.
8 Is there anything you can do to improve upon that schedule?
9 Looking at mid-February for the rule and mid-March for the 10 SRP, question whether we have adequate time. I know your 11 suspense date in the SRM is May 19, and if you back off a 12 month from that, that's say April 19, you've got to cut off 13 at mid-March, which is basically a whole month. Not that 14 I'm trying to make you guys overwork or anything, but it
() 15 16 seems like you've got too much room in your schedule here.
Can we cut some of that down so we have more time for 17 interactions and to get this thing right?
18 MR. SHERR: Well, we'll take a look. I mean, 19 we're -- actually my problem is I think this is more 20 optimistic than -- we'll look at it, and we haven't done all 21 the detailed scheduling aspects, which could throw it one 22 way or the other actually, but it's our interest to extend 23 it as long as possible, and we will try to do that. And I 24 think there's also the possibility that comments we receive 25 after a date -- we may be able to reflect them depending on C ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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11 1 to what: degree.they deal with that, and to the degree that
() -2 3
we can't deal with them in a rulemaking we might just deal with it in the Commission paper itself saying subsequent to l 4 the deadline for comments,'which could be factored into this 5 thing, we received these things on this issue. j i
6 But as a general matter we would hope that we 7 could in fact be responsive to all comments received in the 8 actual proposed rule to the Commission and will try to 9 extend it as possible, but I-would also at the same time 10 encourage you to try to get your comments in as early as 11 possible.
12 MR. KILLAR: A related question. You say you're 13 going to put on the website options for either I guess parts 14 of the rule or the directions rules could go as well as
() 15 options in the SRP. Is there going to be any clear 16 indication as to which is your preferred alternative, 17- because we may look at option A and say hey, that's exactly 18 the way we feel it should go, while you guys are sitting 19 there and looking at option B and saying yes, that's exactly I 20 the way we're going to go, but we'll throw A out there.
21 MR. SHERR: I think in general that we would l
22 expect that. We would indicate what our preferred 23 alternative is but what other ones could be considered. In 24 looking for comments on that where in fact we're looking at 25 the comments to help us decide what the preferred ;
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12 1 alternative is, we may not indicate that.
2 DR. PAPERIELLO: I'd like to comment on that.
(} I 3 would say where we believe we have a preferred option, 4 either because the staff prefers it or we've had interaction 5 with the Commission and the Commission is the scene of the 6 SRM, we're going to have very close liaison with the 7 Commission as we develop the rule, as this thing evolves.
8 So if we have issues that come up, we can get a quick 9 readout from the Commission where they stand, and where 10 there is a preference and whose preference it is we will 11 indicate. There may be cases where there is no preference, 12 and we'll indicate that also. I think that would be the 13 best way to be fair to everybody and also know, you know, 14 just be the most efficient way to do it.
() 15 MS. EYCK: I'd just like to make one comment 16 regarding the schedule, and I think it's important that 17 people realize how these packages are put together.
18 First off, we need to focus on finalizing the 19 rule, and until we finalize the rule language, it's very 20 difficult for us to finalize the standard review plan. So 21 one builds on the other. And then we have a regulatory 22 analysis to complete that has to be built on the final rule 23 and standard review plans, so that is something that I think 24 is important to recognize. And then we have the entire 25 statement of considerations to put together to explain the
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13 1 whole entire rule packet. So it isn't something that we
[~) 2 have an end date and then all of a sudden we can put all
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3 this stuff together. One builds on the other, and that I 4 think is what we've tried to take into consideration in 5 looking at the schedule and how long it's going to take to 6 do those different steps that build on various foundations.
7 So that's I think the reason that we talked about 8 and backing out through a time chart that that was the dates 9 that we would need to do to be able to complete all the 10 additional tasks that go with the rulemaking package by the 11 due date established by the Commission.
12 MR. SHERR: Any other questions?
- 13. Okay. Then we can proceed on to agenda item 2, 14 which is chemical safety, and NEI and the industry will be r
( 15 providing their presentation on that question.
16 MR. KILLAR: Bill Sharkey will be providing the 17 presentation.
18' MR. SHARKEY: Good morning. I'm Bill Sharkey, 19 from ABB Combustion Engineering. This morning I'm going to 20 give a brief presentation on chemical safety. This is one 21 of the areas where I think we're pretty close to some kind 22 of agreement, and hopefully by then this workshop will have 23 this behind us and we can go forward into the other areas.
24 I'm going to cover a little bit on the proposed 25 rule, the major changes, the existing standards that we are O ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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14 l' all covered under currently, our industry proposal, and a 2 conclusion.
3 The proposed rule, 10 CFR 7060, has some -- hang 4 on one second -- covers chemical hazards resulting from the 5 processing of licensed radioactive material, adds some 6 Appendices A and B that add two new terms new to us and some 7 more acronyms, AEGLs, ERPGs -- AEGL, acute exposure 8 guideline limits promulgated by EPA and the National Academy
- 9. of Science, and then ERPGs, emergency response planning 10 guidelines, promulgated by the American Industrial Hygiene 11 Association. Also add a new definition regarding chemical 12 -safety for significant damage to property.
13 There's numerous existing standards for chemical 14 safety. EPA has promulgated a rule in Part 40. One of the 15 biggest aspects that's just starting to take effect for the
'16 -fuel industries is the risk-management plan. In the 17 risk-management plan there's typically a threshold value 18 above which you need to go into the risk-management planning i i
19 phase, and for most of the fuel facilities, we have one or j 20 two systems currently that are subject to risk-management 21 planning, typically ammonia and for some facilities 22 hydrogen, I 23 OSHA, of course, is primarily responsible for l
24 chemical safety, numerous standards on chemical safety 25- covering most aspects of chemical safety. And again they p/
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15 1 have a similar rule to the risk-management plan that was 2 ,v omulgated several years ago, and that's a process safety 3 management standard. And again typically the same chemicals 4 are covered for our facilities under the PSM rule as for the 5 risk-management plan, and those typically are ammonia, 6 hydrogen. The process safety management rule, when you do 7 your hazards evaluations, the process is very similar to 8 ISA, and most of us have gone through --
9 DR. PAPERIELLO: Stole if from.
10 MR. SHARKEY: Exactly. Copied. So a lot of us 11 have experience already in the methodologies of ISA by doing 12 the hazards evaluations under OSHA rules.
13 In 1988 OSHA, NRC signed a joint memorandum of 14 understanding, and this MOU highlighted four areas of 15 regulatory jurisdiction I guess may be the right word. The 16 first three are within the NRC domain: radiation risk 17 produced by radioactive material -- obviously that one was a 18 no-brainer; chemical risk produced by radioactive material; 19 plant conditions which affect the safety of radioactive 20 material, for instance, a fire, explosion, could interfere 21 or spread contamination, potentially cause criticality.
22 Those are the. kind of things that were considered under that 23- MOU.
24 I think we've kind of expanded that a little bit 25 lately in our thinking, that if you had a chemical release
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16 1 and it interfered with an operator who was relied upon for
[
2 safety, that would be under the NRC's regulatory 3 jurisdiction. And then purely chemical risks covered 4 entirely by OSHA in the rules that are currently 5 promulgated.
6 November 4 NEI sent a letter to the NRC with some 7 proposed changes to the chemical safety rule as written in 8 the SRP, and the changes were not real substantial, but 9 included some minor definition changes. We've redefined 10 hazardous chemicals to hazardous chemicals produced from 11 radioactive materials, removed the phrase cause significant 12 damage to property, and don't really think it's appropriate 13 to have the AEGL and ERPG tables in the rule itself. The 14 guideline values listed in those tables are subject to
() 15 change by those regulatory agencies. The vast majority of 16 these. chemicals are things that we're totally unfamiliar 17 with in the fuel facility, have never used, probably will 18 never use, and it doesn't seem appropriate really to have 19 these Appendices A and B in the rule itself.
20 DR. PAPERIELLO: So you effectively would just 21 have us reference some -- those things.
22 MR. SHARKEY: Yes.
23 DR. PAPERIELLO: Gotcha.
24 MR. SHARKEY: In the language there there was some 25 reference to issuing direct rulemaking if they changed, but ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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17 1 it seems more appropriate that you do direct rulemaking if
() 2 there's exceptions, if the standards change and we don't 3 want them, then we do some kind of rulemaking.
4 Not included in our November 4 letter, we had some !
5 discussion yesterday about the timing of how you apply these 6 ERPGs and AEGLs. The table itself says it's for a one-hour 7 time period. These are the periods of time that if you were 8 exposed at this concentration for one hour, the average 9 person would not be expected to suffer any consequences, 10 irreversible consequences or death.
11 The way -- if you take the tables out without that 12 footer on the top of it, it's not really clear. The analogy 13 I would use would be a radiation exposure rate. We don't 14 regulate radiation exposure rates. We regulate a dose. In (A./ 15 this case we had some concern with the concentration values.
16 We could foresee a situation where somebody walks into a 17 room, smells real bad, turns around, their exposure duration 18 was seconds, you go back later in respiratory protection, 19 take a sample of the air. You find out that the 20 concentration was above AEGL or ERPG values, and it puts you 21 into violation space. So there needs to be some 22 consideration for kind of the time-weighting average 23 philosophy that OSHA uses, though that's probably not 24 totally appropriate for this situation either, because 25 there's probably concentrations over, you know, a minute or
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18 1 so at levels greater than ERPG could cause irreversible
() 2 3
consequences.
So' essentially what we believe is the OSHA-NRC MOU 4 provides appropriate foundation for the rule, the four items 5 there.
6 In our November 4th letter, we applied the 7 principles to the rule and the SRP.
8 At this point I will take any questions on 9 chemical safety or I can go back there and we can answer 10 them as a collective group, but that concludes my 11 presentation on chem safety.
12 DR. PAPERIELLO: I have a question and I just 13 asked to see where in the rule we had the question of 14 property damage with chemicals.
() 15 Is there anybody who can tell me where you would 16 have property damage and not threaten human health or life 17 from a chemical?
18 MR. SEARKEY: You could have a storage area where 19 maybe'the purely chemical's present in the storage area 20 where if you had corrosion it could cause a leak, property 21 damage, to a vessel, footings, and not expose an individual 22 to hazards.
23 DR. PAPERIELLO: I guess I distinguish between two 24 things.
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19 1 property -- something off your site and there's two aspects.
2 There
( The other thing has been pointed out to me.
3 is a provision in the Atomic Energy Act that part of our job 4 is to protect not only life but we used to protect property 5 but I know there is a tension, there's been a tension 6 historically as to whether or not we should be concerned 7 about whether or not licensees protect their own property 8 and I don't want to get in the middle of that argument, but 9 I am really thinking right now of offsite -- beyond your 10 property, your boundaries, the issue and question of whether 11 we need the particular phrase in the rule because of that 12 aspect of the whole thing.
13 That is why I am trying to raise the question is 14 it offsite? -- if I deal with just offsite property right
() 15 16 now, is there any case where I can affect offsite property and not affect health or life, because it might be moot 17 issue.
18 It's something I am going to pursue outside of 19 this.
20 MR. PERSINKO: We provided questions meant to have 21 a discussion on the various issues prior to the meeting. It 22 is included in the handout.
23 In the chemical area we see the question as being 24 most clarifications.
25 I wonder if we could get your responses to
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20 1 questions so far.
. J
) 2 MR. SHARKEY: Could you read the question back?
.3 There were two questions?
4 MR. PERSINKO: There were five questions.
5 MR. SHARKEY: Five?
6 MR. PERSINKO: Yesterday was the first time we 7 took a look at the questions.
8 In the area of chemical safety is it not real easy 9 to draw some of the distinctions we are trying to draw here.
10 The first question, NEI proposes removing 11 reference to accidents causing property damage -- and Carl, 12 that was your quescion there -- is property damage, I guess 13 from chemical safety events, covered by the Atomic Energy 14 Act?
( ) 15 I-am not sure -- we just pulled up the reference 16 yesterday. I don't think it is clear in our minds whether 17 it is or not.
18 -Question (B) -- In every instance in the NEI 19 letter and its attachments where NEI uses the term 20 " radioactive material," doesn't NEI actually mean licensed 21 material?
22 Licensed material probably is a better term than 23 radioactive material. We agree with that.
24 Question (C) -- NEI comments identified those 25 chemicals added to, used in, and recycled from radioactive
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21 1 materials as beyond NRC's purview. Use of these phrases
() 2 3
could be confusing, e.g., chemicals used in radioactive material are within NRC purview, while mixed similarly, oil 4 required to lubricate an item relied on for safety seems to 5 be within NRC's purview and let's stop there with that 6 question.
7 I guess the oil itself they would use for an item 8 relied on for safety, the. chemical hazards of that are not 9 what we would consider subject to the NRC's purview.
10 The safety function of the oil if we relied on a 11 certain type of oil to fulfill its safety function, an item 12 relied on for safety, and we used something else and it 13 wasn't adequate, then I think that would be in the NRC 14 space, but not the chemical hazards or anything associated 15 with that oil.
16 DR. PAPERIELLO: I guess I have got a question 17 from my staff.
18 Would we consider oil used as a lubricant in a 19 safety application, its chemical risks, to be within our 20 purview?
21 MR. LEWIS: I don't think that is the question. I 22 think the question is that the wording was confusing by 23 using the term "added to, used in, and recycled from" oil j 24 might be a bad example, but I think it should only be 25 thought of as an example. I don't think we are trying to j l
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22 1 say we would regulate the chemical hazards of the oil, just 2 that it would be within our purview.
l)T 3 MR. SHARKEY: I guess maybe if I tried to clarify 4 what we meant by "added to, used in, and recycled from" with 5 some real examples it may be able to clarify that.
6 A chemical that would be added to nitric acid for 7 instance to dissolve uranium before it goes into the process 8 has no radiological significance. That chemical would not 9 be regulated by the NRC.
10 The nitric acid used in the process, not 11 regulated.
12 " Recycled from" could be ion exchange eluants. A 13 lot of us capture hydrogen fluoride now and sell it as a 14 commercial product. We have release criteria for that
() 15 hydrofluoric acid. When we capture that hydrofluoric acid, 16 as long as we are within the release limits, that is not 17 subject to NRC purview.
18 Those are the kind of examples we were thinking of 19 for those terms.
20 MR. SHERR: My reading of your comments -- I think 21 you were suggesting that when the chemical is mixed with the 22 NRC licensed material, then it is within the NRC purview.
23 Is that correct?
24 MR. SHARKEY: I think that is probably correct, 25 but then there's some uncertainty in that term. We will
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23 l
1 take the nitric acid example again.
(
rm 2 If you take nitric acid and mix it with uranium,
}
3 you geu uranal nitrate. Uranal nitrate is corrosive. Would l
4 the NRC if somebody got a burn on their skin, are they 5 worried about the chemical safety consequences of the uranal 6 nitrate?
7 Now if the uranal nitrate could cause a 8 consequence of concern, a large release of uranium or j 9 criticality because of its chemical form, I guess we would 10 consider that within the NRC's purview, but I am not so sure 11 about just the chemical hazards of uranal nitrate.
12 Would the NRC be inspecting us to the material 13 safety datasheets? If the material safety datasheets were 14 inadequate or if you were missing one, and we all know that
(~))
(, 15 that never happens in our facility, but if it did would that 16 be subject to regulation? Those are some of the questions I 17 have on my mind for your regulation in that area, so I don't 18 think the " mixed with" is totally clear but I think as a I I 19 general rule of thumb, yes, when the chemical is mixed with 20 licensed material that it is regulated by the NRC. ,
)
21 MR. SMITH: Hi, Bill. Can I ask a question?
22 MR. SHARKEY: Sure, Garrett.
23 MR. SMITH: Part C or Section C in the MOU clearly 24 states if a chemical could affect the safe handling, i.e., a l 25 fire or explosion. The oil example would be a good example
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24 1 where PT.;ntially it could cause a fire. Your anhydrous HF
() 2 3
or ammonia tanks at CE could potential go back to safe handling especially with material, nitric acid added. i 4 Wouldn't these fall under the MOU?
5 MR, SHARKEY: If their leak or spill could lead to I 6 a consequence of concern, yes. If it doesn't cross those 7 thresholds, then, no. The chemical itself, the 8 concentrations, no.
9 MR. KILLAR: If I could add to that a little bit, 10 certainly when you are doing your integrated safety 11 assessment, you are going to look at the storage tanks, 12 whether it is ammonia or it is hydrogen or what have you, 13 and look at what could possibly -- what kind of adverse 14 events could possibly happen at those, whether it be a fire,
() 15 explosion, leaks, what have you, and then see how that 16 impacts operations and the safety of the facility as far as 17 nuclear material. !
18 If that hydrogen tank is located far enough from l 19 the facility that if it blew up and blew away, but none of '
20 the shrapnel penetrating the buildings or any of the 21 radioactive material, then it would have no NRC 22 jurisdiction.
23 It would certainly fall under the jurisdiction of 24 OSHA and things on that line but not the NRC, 25 On the other hand is if that tank is sitting next i
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2E l' to a building and you can somehow envision an eruption of 2 that tank that would penetrate that building and then impact 3 the operations within that building, then it would have an 4 impact and it would fall under NRC jurisdiction, so, yes, it 5 has to be taken into consideration but the events and the
'6 sequences have to be taken into consideration to determine 7 whether there is truly an NRC jurisdiction or not. Bill?
8 MR. BRACH: I believe you comment, Felix, is on j 9 the right path. I think you really can't answer the 10 question which chemicals are in or are not included without 11 going through the ISA to look at the consequences.
12 I think if you look at the item C or the third 13 item in the NRC-OSHA MOU and, Bill, you mentioned this in 14 your overview, it does talk about the impact of chemicals in 15 the process area or at the facility, the consequences of 16 which could --'or potential consequences of which could I
17 impact the ability of operators to carry out their nuclear i 18 operations or the ability of the licensee to maintain their 19 safe nuclear operations -- to maintain safe operations.
20 I believe what you need to do is go through your 21 ISA and through that you will identify which chemicals are 22 of concern, the consequences of which could impact the 23 ability to maintain safe nuclear operations and those that 24 are -- the answer to that is yes -- would fall under Item C 25 of the OSHA MOU and then would fall under the purview of the A ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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i 26 l 1- regulatory scheme that we are discussing today.
1.
2 Those that fall out, and I think Felix's example, 3 the allusion to a Back 40 type of activity, if there is no I 4 impact of those chemicals at the facility on the ability to j i
5 maintain safe nuclear operations, they would fall under the i j 6 fourth item, which on your overhead was identified as OSHA 1
7 area of responsibility.
8 I don't believe you can answer that question a i
i 9 priori and say these chemicals are in or these are out 10 without having gone through the ISA analysis to see what the 11 potential impact or consequences is of those chemicals at l 12 .the facility.
13 MR. SHARKEY: I think we agree with that.
-14 MR. VAUGHAN: Just a couple of thoughts that may 15 be just a little redundant, but I think if you look at the )
I 16 MOU a little different way and you look at what our 17 discussions have been, it's pointing the direction of the 18 NRC to focus on the nuclear aspects of the facility and it 19 recognizes that as a part of doing that the relationship 20 that chemicals have with that process and the safety of that 1
21 process have to be considered.
l 22 In fact, in the ISA concept we have clearly 23 identified the fact that chemicals and their effect on 24 safety have to be evaluated, and if they have a detrimental 25 effect on the nuclear or the safety of the process then they O ANN RILEY-& ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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27 1 come in this purview but we are not saying that a little 2 nitric acid burn or stain on somebody is not a nuclear -- is 3 not in the nuclear arena, so that is the distinction that we 4 are trying to get worked out in words, and you are right, 5 Bill, the whole secret to this thing is to go through the 6 ISA and determine what the chemical sensitivities are for 7 each piece of the process, and then you have got the answer.
8 MR. SHERR: Can I seek a clarification?
9 It's clear I think what Bill was addressing, but 10 where a chemical accident or chemical release, a potentially 11 initiating event that potentially causes a radioactive 12 explosion, and it's clear --
13 I think the real issue is in the area where the 14 chemical toxicity exposure -- okay, sorry.
15 The real issue is where the performance 16 requirements deal with the chemical toxicity effects. I 17 think there is pretty much agreement that the chemical 18 toxicity associated with NRC licensure like soluble uranium 19 or the chemical toxicity associated with the reaction, 20 chemical reaction, of NRC licensed material is something 21 else, like the HF problem is clearly or is within the NRC 22 bailiwick, and in fact it'was the second issue that led to 23 the MOU being developed.
24 I think the point that I would like to get some 25 clarification here is to the degree to which-there is any i
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28 1 other chemical toxicity exposure that you feel is within NRC
() 2 jurisdiction and I asked the question earlier about when the 3 chemicals are mixed with the NRC licensed material are we
<4 then concerned about the chemical toxicity potential effects 5 of those chemicals that happen to be commingled with the NRC l
6 licensed material or do you view that as an OSHA 7 responsibility?
8 MR. VAUGHAN: I think we pretty well believe that 9 that is in NRC space.
10 MR. SHERR: Okay.
11 MR. SHARKEY: Going on to (D) I guess, NEI 12 proposed changing the 70.60 chemical consequence limit for 13 the public in addition to the worker, which would not be 14 protected by OSHA but presumably by EPA under 40 CFR Part
() 15 68.
'16 NEI's basis for all the suggested changes appear 17 to be the NRC-OSHA relationship as defined in the MOU. What 18 is the basis for the changes to the public consequence 19 limits?
20 MR, SILVERMAN: I thought I would take a crack at 21 that one.
22 The NRC is correct in pointing out the distinction 23 'between OSHA. coverage of worker safety and public safety.
24 _The OSHA MOU really just implements the statutory authority 25 of the agency and it is a way of describing in a little bit
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29 1 more detail the statutory authority of the agency and we
() 2 continue to think that even with respect to public exposures 3 the agency doesn't have the statutory authority to be 4 regulating purely chemical hazards.
5 So what we talk about, the OSHA-MOU, a lot as sort 6 of a shorthand phrase, we are really going back to the 7 statute, so we think it is the same rules and principles 8 would apply to public exposures as to worker exposures.
9 MR. SHARKEY: Okay, then, moving on to (E), how 10 exactly does NEI's proposal address the NRC-OSHA MOU Item 11 (C), i.e., plant conditions which affect the safety of 12 radioactive materials and thus present an increased
'13 radiation risk to workers?
14 I think we covered that already and agree that
() 15 those increased radiation risks, chemicals that would 16 increase radiation risks, would be subject to the NRC.
17 MR. MENDELSOHN: Can I go back to (C) for a 18 second, just want to get some clarification.
19 Again talking about the uranal nitrate, as I 20 understand -- correct me if I am wrong, but I understand 21 that if a worker was burned by the nitric acid before it 22 goes into the process, it's clearly not NRC jurisdiction, 23 but if they're burned by the uranal nitrate, that is NRC?
24 MR. SRARKEY: That part isn't clear to me either.
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30 1 at whether that consequence to that individual incapacitated
() 2 3
that worker and affected the safety of the operation.
MR. SHARKEY: I think --
4 MR. KILLAR: Irrespective of that, the injury to 5 the worker is not something that we regulate.
6 I may be talking a little bit out of school but I 7 think it's a clear case and if radioactive material is 8 involved, if it is in the form of UNH, the NRC has 9 jurisdiction.
10 If a worker gets burned with UNH, uranal nitrate, 11 what happens is the first thing you have to worry about is 1
12 the burn, but if you have to send that individual off to a 13 hospital, you-have to worry about contamination as well, in 14 which case there is no question the NRC has
() 15 responsibilities.
16 I think in my perspective the answer to your 17 question, Barry, is if he's burned with nitric acid before 18 there is radioactive material involve, it's strictly an OSHA 19 . issue, but if he is burned with that UNH afterwards, then it 20 is an NRC issue.
21 MR. VAUGHAN: Let me just comment on what happens 22 in the real- world now, and that is in those cases -- let's 23 use the uranal nitrate case -- if we have an employee that 24 suffers a chemical burn from handling that uranal nitrate, 25 solution, it first is a chemical concern under the OSHA
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31 1 regulations, and there~is a complete system for all of the
() 2 3
recording and reporting of that.information to OSHA.
Because there is nuclear material there, there is 4 also a potential for.that, and there are internal procedures 5 in NRC space for how to deal with the radiological aspects 6 of that particular injury in terms of the person, his 7 surroundings, and any transport and additional handling that 8 has to take place, so the real world, right this minute, is 9 a little bit fuzzy.
10 It seems to work but it's -- if you get to a point 11 like that, it's not always clear-cut even with the words in 12 the MOU.
13 MS. EYCK: May I ask a question? If that 14 individual was identified as providing an administrative
. ,).
(O 15 control, say, for criticality or whatever, and the impact, 16 the chemical impact on him and affecting his ability to do 17 his job in performing that function as part of that control, 18 what would your position be in that case?
19 MR. SHARKEY: I think if he is relied on for 20 safety,-then that is subject to the NRC's review -- purview.
21 MR. VAUGHAN: Yes, and I mean I guess you could 22 get in a' position where a single individual performing a 23 single function was associated with a key criticality or 24 radiological control, but that scenario is very unlikely.
25 There's aren't very many of those positions around.
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32 1 MR. COMFORT: I have got a question on (C) also,
() 2 which basically is if you determine a chemical could impact 3 an NRC licensed material through let's say an explosion, 4 does that mean that NRC or do you believe that NRC would be 5 responsible for regulating the whole, all aspects of that 6 chemical or let's say that the chemical could also cause 7 some kind of occupational exposure which wouldn't impact, 8 and so would they not be regulating towards those 9 occupational? -- just the safety impact from the explosion.
10 MR. SHARKEY: You would not be regulating the 11 chemical aspects of the exposure, but if an explosion or 12 fire could cause a consequence of concern, then, yes, that 13 would be within the NRC's purview.
14 MR. COMFORT: Not the exposure?
) 15 MR. SHARKEY: Not the exposure itself, unless the 16 individual exposed was relied on for safety and prevented 17 him from his performing his safety function and, as Charlie 18 said, those kind of controls for the most part don't 19 exist --
a single operator being totally relied on for 20 safety.
21 MS, GALLOWAY: Bill, I have a question.
22 Theoretically this definition -- I guess I am 23 wondering though how these various events could be viewed by 24 NRC in a precursor sense?
25 If we have one event that, as our definitions ANN RILEY &-ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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- 1. discussed here today are clearly within OSHA space, wouldn't 2 that though perhaps have some implications for NRC further
[~)'T 3 down the line as far as an indication of an increased 4 incident that might be in NRC space?
5 As a corollary to that, how -- well, answer that 6 first, if you will.
7 MR. SHARKEY: I'm not sure that I really 8 understood what your --
9 MR. KILLAR: Maybe I can give a quick answer.
.10 First, one event would not be an indication of 11 anything until you did the root cause analysis to determine 12 what was the reason for that event, and then if that event 13 .was a potential -- could occur again, you would go and take 14 whatever protective steps you need to take to make sure that (bj 15 doesn't. occur in the future.
16 But lightening striking a tank and causing a tank 17 _to rupture is not necessarily a precursor to other future 18 events.
19 MS. GALLOWAY: Okay, but suppose you have the 20 example where there are perhaps programmatic issues such as
- 21: training or procedure deficiencies which he could have a 22 relationship with the OSHA-specific event and the 23, NRC-specific. event?.
-24 MR. SHARKEY: I guess the approach we would 25 -take~-- let me describe the way we envision, the way we are ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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34 1 going it now is that while you are doing your ISA you look
() 2 at these initiating events and if one of these initiating 3 events could cause a consequence of concern you would take 4 some action to reduce the risk and by that risk reduction 5 you would be looking at your systems to ensure that you 6 have -- if training is part of it, then you would identify 7 that training as important to safety and provide adequate 8 training, but we are not proposing that we generate 9 programmatic chemical safety requirements.
10 I think we envision that the ISA will determine 11 what is important to safety and that we'.1 address it 12 according to the results of the ISA.
13 Now if a program were important and that is the 14 way we decided we were going to handle it, then that would A
( ,/ 15 be the item relied on for safety, I guess.
16 MS. EYCK: And that sounds fine, but it would seem 17 to me that it's not as clear-cut differentiating.
18 I would like to say here that there may be given 19 an event a need for NRC to take a look at it to determine 20 whether or not there are generic implications that we are I
21 concerned about.
22 MR. VAUGHAN: If I can make a comment on this 23 subject, the events that we were just discussing are clearly 24 precursor events. There's no question about that, but the 25_ simple event doesn't tell you enough to understand what the
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35 1 significance is and the significance of it can only be (nv; 2 developed in the context of the operating plant and 3 therefore the licensee needs a management system that 4 captures all of these precursor events whether they are 5 nuclear or not, but related events, and those get evaluated, 6 investigated, root cause determined, periodically reviewed 7 for significance and corrective action, but that needs to 8 happen at the facility in the context of the operation with 9 the information that puts it into the proper format to be 10 used.
11 Obviously I think the NRC would probably he 12 interested in the licensee's program to do that, but in 13 terms of just reporting those kinds of events and labelling 14 them in some way precursor I am afraid creates a false (Q) 15 impression about the usefulness of that information. ;
i 16 MR. PERSINKO: Let me ask you, what is the 17 practice right now with your facilities when you investigate 18 and do a root cause analysis of a chemical accident 19 incident? I 1
20 Do your procedures have a specific clause in there '
21 to look for programmatic, larger, bigger picture issues, or 22 just -- such as nuclear?
23 MR. VAUGHAN: I can comment on our procedures, but 24 I can't comment on others.
25 Our management system requires the recording and i
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36 1 reporting of all unusual events and the operations people
()
4 2 initiate those forms and they prescribe or identify what 3 actions they think are appropriate.
4 It is also reviewed independently by the 5 environmental health safety group, and they may call for 6 additional actions to be taken. Some of the simple'ones are 7 just an operations-led review, and they define their 8 corrective actions and do it, right up to a full-blown 1 9 independent root cause -- you know, tap root, root cause 10 analysis.
11 All of the corrective actions go into a management 12 tracking system and are tracked through and our safety l 13 council or safety committee. As one of the things that that 14 committee does is periodically look at the sequence of
() 15 unusual events and incidents we have had over the last 16 period and look at those primarily to see if root cause work 17 has been effective and corrective action has been effective 18 or is there indication of a more widespread problem that 19 really hadn't been addressed by looking at the individual 20 incident. That is what we do.
21 MR. PERSINKO: Is that common among all the 22 facilities?
23 MR. VAUGHAN: Yes.
24 MR. GOODWIN: That is very similar to what we do 25 at' Westinghouse, but I do want to underscore the fact that l' ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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37 1 we do not just look at the specific incident, as Charlie
() 2 3
said. We try to look at if'it happened on a particular process line, we look at all the other process lines with 4 similar types of equipment.
5 We also look at administrative controls, 6- management controls, you know, anything that could have any 7 bearing on the situation whatsoever, so it is a broad-based 8 root cause analysis approach process.
9 MR. SHARKEY: I guess root cause is, in our system 10 it's one of'the tools, and so when you get to significant 11 issues you go into the root cause.
12 You can do problem solving without doing root 13 cause, a formal root cause analysis, so there is kind of a 14 graded approach based on the significance of the occurrence,
() 15 so in ABB's case it is similar to what Charlie described.
16 We all have systems in place.
17 MR. ELLIOTT: These types of management control 18 systems are also required by our license.
19 DR. PAPERIELLO: I have a question. If I take a 20 look at the November 4th letter to me from NEI, with the 21 proposed words for your views on chemical safety, I would j 22 like to ask the people across the room -- Do you all support 23 this? Is there somebody -- anybody there who disagrees with 24 what was sent.to me?
25 [No response.]
'~'
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38 1 DR. PAPERIELLO: My concern right now is this was 2 represented to me as the industry's position.
) I just wanted 3 to make sure that is, because let me tell you what I' heard 4 today, and I want to kind of wrap up where I stand on this, 5 and I do want to talk to the Commission about it. We got to 6 where we are today for a variety of historic reasons. I 7 want to consider what I was told. I would like to know more 8 about what OSHA and EPA have in place. I would like to know 9 what the rules are. I want to know what the practices are.
10 I would like to probably have OSHA take a look at 11 the words you have presented to us to see what they think
- 12' about how that affects the MOU and then consult with the 13 Commission, and, of course, consult with my own staff, just 14 to see where we come out. I just want to make sure that I
() 15 don't find out at a later date that I don't really have the i 16 industry support for the words that are in the NEI 17 submittal. ,
18 MR. GOODWIN: I think certainly I can speak for l
19 Westinghouse, we are in full agreement with the letter that 20 was submitted to you.
21 DR. PAPERIELLO: Okay.
22 MR. GOODWIN: And my understanding, we have 23 consensus on that. I will let someone else, you know, speak 24 for themselves. .
1 25 MR. VAUGHAN: GE feels the same way. l ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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39 1 MR. EDGAR: I think Siemens does, too.
[d
'\ 2 3
MR. ELLIOTT:
MR. SHARKEY:
We are okay with it.
ABB, we support it, although, 4 personally, I don't agree with a lot of things, but as a 5- company --
6 DR. PAPERIELLO: Yeah, I --
7 MR. SHARKEY: I think, in the back, Garrett and 8 Don could attest to that'. We have had a lot of debate on 9 what is covered and we have got a long history of paper, 10 too, between us in the chemical safety area. But, as a 11 company, I think we are supportive. j 12 DR. PAPERIELLO: I frequently have my staff at the 13 Commission convince me of the righteous of something I don't 14 originally agree with, so I know how that stands. Okay.
() 15 Unless there's anything else, why don't we move 16 on.
17 MR. GOODWIN: If I may digress just a moment and 18 make one clarifying comment. In the section or the slide 19 where we were talking about the industry's proposal for 20 removing the guideline tables from the rule, the other 21 suggestion was to add the one hour duration to that. I 22 might point out that in the proposed rule, in the definition ,
23 section, the one hour limit was included for the ERPGs, but 24 it was not for the AEGLs, and I believe -- I suspect that 25 was just an oversight.
]
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40 1 DR. PAPERIELLO: Probably.
2 MR. GOODWIN:
(} So all we are saying is put the one 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> duration in both cases there.
4 DR. PAPERIELLO: Good. I think it was very 5 useful.
6 MR. SILVERMAN. I apologize to belabor it. One 7 more just real clarifying comments, i
8 DR. PAPERIELLO: That's fine.
]
l 9 MR. SILVERMAN: We gave a lot of proposed changes l 10 that were suggested. They are very repetitive. It is just 11 the same sorts of language you are seeing over and over 12 again as being modest changes in'the rule. The real central 13 part of this was the listing in the rule of the 14 concentrations of concern.
() 15 As the rule was written before, it appeared to us 16 that a concentration of concern, subject to NRC 17 jurisdiction, could be construed to be a purely chemical 18 hazard. It had no relation to radiological safety at all.
19 And, really, what we were trying to do, in large measure, 20 was -- and that is the fourth category, item D under the 21 NRC-OSHA MOU, that is what we were trying to remove. So l
l 22 when you see our language, particularly in Section 70.60(b), )
1 23 consequences of concern, that is really what we are trying 24 to accomplish, is to make it clear that that is the one area '
25 that is not covered by NRC.
i l
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41 1 MR. SHERR: If there are no more comments, I
[ 2 suggest that we take this opportunity to take our break and 3- we will reconvene in 15 minutes, 10:20 according to my 4 watch.
5 (Recess.]
6 MR. SHERR: The next agenda' item is Standard 7 Review Plan Issues and, as I had indicated earlier, one.of 8 the -- NEI has provided us detailed comments on the views on 9 that, and Felix will covering the issue, j
10 MR. KILLAR: Thank you. Before I start to talk 11 about the Standard Review Plan, I do want to take just a few )
12 minutes to provide a little bit of a response for the 13 pregnant pause that went on a little earlier when Carl asked 14 the question -- Do the members sitting at the table support l 15 the letter that NEI sent in?
16 NEI,~as any association, works on a consensus 17 process. We put a group together, develop a response to an 18 issue, a position from the industry. We that position 19 together, send it back out to the members to get their
'20. concurrence and support of that position. And then, with i l
21 that concurrent support, we send it in the to the NRC. l 22 Now, there is, typically, something that someone 23 doesn't quite agree with, although they agree with the 24 principle, but they may not necessarily agree with one minor !
25 aspect of it, but they are willing to go along with it for hv ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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42 1 the good of it all, so to speak. I think part of the reason
( ) 2 why they didn't step up and say, yes, we support that letter 3 is because they are looking for NEI to do that, and I was 4 sitting here looking for them to say, yes, I support the 5 letter that NEI sent it. So, it was not a reflection of, 6 no, they don't support our letters and we go out and send 7 .these letters in arbitrarily, it was just a matter of who is 8 going to take the lead in responding. And so don't -- it is 9 not indicative that they don't support the letters that NEI 10 sends in.
11 Okay, with that, I would like to go ahead and move 12 into the Standard Review Plan Issues. And what this came 13 out of was the September meeting, the question came up about 14 the Standard Review Plan. We indicated that there was a lot
() 15 of programmatic requirements in there that we felt may be 16 going beyond what was in the rule and, also, we questioned 17 some of the basis for those requirements. We requested --
18 put together some of the issues and we kind of. identified 19 sort of what was our top 10 of these.
20 And of the basic or fundamental problems we had 21 with the Standard Review Plan as currently drafted is that 22 the Standard Review Plan doesn't take into consideration, l
23 when you look at the various programs, how those programs 1 24 relate to the ISA. And this has always been a contention 25 with the industry, back, oh, probably four, five years ago, l
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43 1 when we started to just do a review of the Standard Review
[')
U 2 Plan for Part 70, before we even thought about the 3 Integrated Safety Assessment.
4 We had a series of meetings with the staff where 5 we brought up questions on typical parts of the Standard 6 Review Plan, quality assurance, fire protection and what 7 have you, and we pointed out to the staff at the time that 8 you need to pool all these together. You need to have that 9 integration. Just having requirements for a quality 10 assurance program, or requirements for a fire protection 11 program or a chemical safety program, without having the 12 relationship to other programs and the operations of the 13 facility is not very meaningful. And what we are seeing in 14 this Standard Review Plan is we are seeing that that Sr.ill
() 15 has not been conveyed in the Standard Review Plan. Maybe it 16 is in the minds of the NRC staff, but from our review, it 17 isn't.
18 And, so, what I am saying here in the first bullet 19 here is the need for the programs must be identified. Why 20 do you have to have a chemical safety program? Why do you 21 have to have a fire safety program? Things on that line.
22 Then, secondly, once you identify, through ISA 23 process, and you have to have a fire, or a chemical, or a 24 training program, or something along that line, what is the 25 depth of that program? You know, do you need a program that fi
\m,/
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n 44 1 goes a whole nine yards, or do you just need a basic program
[~h 2- just to cover the basics, because that is the only thing
\s) 3 that you are worried about?
4 Once again, we don't see that the Standard Review 5 Plan has taken that into consideration.
And, so, what we 6 are saying down here is that the Standard Review Plan 7 prejudges a need for the programs because it does not give 8 the link back to the ISA and the requirements identified in 9 the ISA for the program.
10 Secondly, the Standard Review Plan prejudges the 11 depths of the requirements for the program. The acceptance 12 criteria, in a lot of instancas, are acceptance criteria 13 which is up here, where maybe, from the ISA, you only need 14 acceptance criteria that is down at this level here. And so
() 15 what we need in the -- from the overview of the Standard 16 Review Plan, and looking at these various programmatic 17- requirements, is that they be7 integrated with the Integrated 18 Safety Assessment, and the needs or the depths of that 19 program be identified through the ISA.
20 And, basically, what the balance of this is is 21 just the examples of what we are saying.
22 The SRP 11-3 quality assurance criteria. The 23' draft' includes the criteria for the licensee to have program 24 requirements similar to ISA -- NOA-1. NQA-1 certainly is 25 applicable if you have something that is such a safety
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45 1 consideration that you have to have detailed quality 2 assurance program requirements on it, but for the vast
( ')
3 number of our requirements, the number of our operations, 4 the full NQA-1 requirements are not going to be applicable.
5 By having this established in the Standard Review 6 Plan, you have now started with the bar up here that the 7 licensee has to meet, because the reviewer is going to be 8 looking for something sitnilar to an NQA-1 type program, and 9 an NQA-1 program will not be needed in any of these areas, 10 and the ISA has identified that. But without that link to 11 the ISA, the reviewer will be now looking for something 12 along these lines.
13 In training qualifications, we have sort of two 14 issues here. First, the issue that they are looking for a
() 15 systems approach to training. Once again, a systems 16 approach to training may be required if you have a lot of 17 training requirements for your operators, to assure the
-18 operations, and you want to -- you need to do a systems 19 approach to training. But if you make your systems and 20 design your systems such that you have minimal operator 21 intervention, then detailed training would not necessarily 22 be needed for the operators. But by establishing the bar at 23 the level of having -- or mentioned a systems approach to 24' training, now, the licensee has an obligation to come up 25 with some type of training program, or explain why he
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46 1 doesn't need that level of depth of a training program.
() 2 3
There is another issue with this that I didn't put on the slide, and this is at the -- they also talk about the 4 qualifications and training of the operators for design and
- 5. construction of the facility. Once again, the design and 6 constraction of the facility and training of the people for 7 doing that would not be something that.would normally be 8 under the purview of the NRC, and we question why that would 9 be in the Standard Review Plan. That goes beyond what the 10 basic requirements of the regulation are.
11 And fire safety, once again, this is an 12 indication, where you talk about the fire protection 13 program, fire hazards analysis and developing specific 14 pre-fire plans. Certainly, you are going to do -- as far as
-() 15 your Integrated Safety Assessment, determine what the fire 16 requirements are and hazards analysis for fire are. But do 17 you need to go into the detail that is established by these 18 various programs? And, so, once again, the bar has already 19 -been set up high here for what is needed in a fire safety 20' program and then it will be up to the licensees to justify 21 why something less than that is needed. And we feel that 22 the obligation that the Standard Review Plan, by having 23 things like that in there, go beyond the rule and they 24 actually make it difficult for the licensee, and you get 25 into a lot of discussions that need to be done..
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47 1 On decommissioning we have a different, a little i 2 bit different issue here, in that we are questioning what 3 the intent of this part of the Standard Review Plan is. If 4 you look at 70.25,-the requirements, current requirements, 5 as part of the license application, you have to provide a I 6 decommissioning funding plan that is supported by a cost 7 analysis.
8 However, if you look at what is in the Standard 9 Review Plan, they are looking for more things that are 10- analogous to 70.38, which deal with license termination, and 11 we are not terminating a licensee right now, a are just 12 beginning to operate the facility. To try and do a detailed 13 decommissioning plan now, according to 70.38, and the 14 various Reg. Guides that are supported by it, is -- well, it O
g 15 is beyond reason at this point in time.
16 If the facility is 20 to 30 years from closure, 17 doing a detailed decommissioning plan and going through the 18 cost and analysis to do that type of decommissioning plan 19 doesn't make a whole lot of sense. Certainly, doing a 20- decommissioning funding plan and a cost analysis that 21 supports that funding plan is appropriate and we feel that 22 is reasonable. But, certainly, not the requirements as 23 currently put in the SRP 10 dealing with decommissioning.
24 Once again, this is back to the earlier points on 25 the human system interface. Certainly, human system
'O d
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48 1 interface is important. The importance of it, though, is
(}
k/
2 going to be dictated by the Integrated Safety Assessment.
3 Do you need to have a formal evaluation process for the 4 human system interface if you have minimal human systems 5 interfaces that occur?
6 Secondly, this goes once again, also, to some of 7 the design and operations of the facility and maintenance of 8 the human system interface. Once again, if the Integrated 9 Safety Assesament dictates that you need'such a program, 10 then you would put such a program in. However, to have this 11 identified as the preferred program or the acceptance 12 criteria in the SRP, you have established a bar that the 13 licensee should not have to go over that bar. And so you 14 have put the level -- or unleveled the playing field from
() 15 the perspective of the licensee.
16 Emergency management. Once again, this is 17 similar. The biggest concern we have here is that currently 18 the licensee is obligated to make sure that any off-site 19 response teams are knowledgeable of the facility and unique 20 hazards. What has happened in the draft SRP is that you are 21 now going on to specific training requirements for the 22 off-site response team.
23 You know, we certainly can help them and work them 24 as far as developing training that they feel is appropriate, 25 but to do the specific training for them, you know, we may
[]
()
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e-49 1- do something that, because of a unique hazard that may be
/~'s 2- involved, that they may not encounter, but most response --
3 off-site response teams have their own training programs and 4 do cover all the issues. The only other thing -- and even 5 radiation today is not unique, because of the transportation 6 issue and stuff. So, to have the licensee do training and 7- training requirements for off-site response teams is not 8 within reason.
9 On this one here, we are kind of at a confusion 10 factor. Configuration management, and here what we are 11 concerned about is the idea to reconstitute the designs.
12 When you do your ISA, you are constituting the design, so 13 there isn't going to be a design to reconstitute, because 14 you have already put it together when you did the ISA. And,
() 15 so, we are not exactly sure what the expectations of the 16 reviewer would be for the required reconstitution of the 17 design.
18- And, once again, it is going to be an issue 19 between the licensee and the NRC reviewer to try and define j 20 what that is and what you are trying to do there. The ISA 21 will provide you the complete design for the facility and 22 all the safety applications, so there isn't any design to 23 reconstitute or reconstruct.
24 Once again, this is another one where the bar is 25 higher than we feel it should be. When you talk about ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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50 1 maintenance and the maintenance program, the maintenance
[
2 ' program that is required to support the safety systems will 3 be defined through Integrated Safety Assessment. If you 4 find that testing your ratchet rings on an annual basis and 5 maintaining the level of them, or what-have-you, is 6 appropriate,-then an annual maintenance program will be 7 ' dictated for those through the ISA, similar to a pump or 8 some other system in the facility.
9 If the reliability of that pump or system is such 10 that it must be available a certain number of hours per year 11 or what-have-you, the maintenance program will be designed 12 to it. However, to go in here and talk about doing 13 functional testing requirements and things on that line, 14 regardless of whether -- the safety significance of the
() 15 equipment, it causes concern in trying to develop a program 16 that isn't linked and developed through the Integrated 17 Safety Assessment.
18 Organization and administration. Once again, a 19- similar concern, and this goes mainly, once again, to the 20 design'and construction of the facility. Certainly, we will 21 put together the appropriate teams for doing that, and the 22 Integrated Safety Assessment will do the evaluations of what 23 is appropriate for the design and construction of the 24 facility and the safe operations of it. But do we need to 25 get into this kind of detail in the Standard Review Plan,
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51 1 particularly for facilities that are up and operating?
2 So these are the basic concerns we have, is the 3 height the bar has been started at in the SRP and the lack 4 of the integration of the various -- all these various 5 programs linking that back to the Integrated Safety 6 Assessment.
7 The last one I wanted to talk about, and I will 8 use this as an opportunity to lead into the next topic, and 9 that is-the criticality safety issue. And the issue we have 10 here is that the-criticality safety program goes, as defined 11 in the Standard Review Plan, goes beyond and is inconsistent 12 with the American National Standard ANSI-8.1. The concern 13 is that the NRC, through the Standard Review Plan, is 14 propagating new standards and requirements that are beyond
() 15 16 the norm for the industry, as well as for the nation, as the ANSI standards are followed by DOE as well as the licensees.
17 Before we go on to discuss criticality safety in ]
18 detail, I thought I would take a few minutes to answer any ,
19 questions you may have about the various Standard Review 20 Plan points we raised on the discussion. Yes, ma'am.
21 MS. EYCK: I would just like to make a couple of 22 comments regarding what our philosophy was in developing 23 these SRP and how it relates to the issues that you have 24 mentioned. Basically, our approach was to base it on the 25 ISA and that the ISA would identify the items it relied on ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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52 1 for safety, and then the SRP -- and the ISA would identify 2 what measures needed -- you know, what the items relied on 3 for safety, and then the measures that were in place would 4 support the availability and reliability of those items.
5 Now, recognizing that the ISAs for each facility 6 will vary, and the risks of the items that are relied on for 7 safety,. or the risks that they are protecting against also 8 varies, we developed the SRP to address the high risk items, 9 because, recognizing we are going to be grading it, we 10 couldn't come up with graded criteria that would identify or 11 be appropriate for all the strata that may be representative 12 of the various risks that were developed through the ISAs of i
13 the facility. And we.tried to explain that in the j 14 introduction of the ISA -- I mean of the SRP.
() 15 16 And I would just to read a couple of things that reflect your comments that the SRP is not linked to the ISA. '
17 On page 2 of the ISA -- I mean of the SRP, I'm sorry, it 18 says, "The applicant's Integrated Safety Assessment is the 19 central focus for the selection of design and operational 20 safety measures,"'now, these are the things that you have 21 been referring to, "and the management control systems that 22 assure the availability and reliability of those measures.
23 It is the ISA that provides a comprehensive evaluation and 24 presentation, useful to both the applicant and the NRC, of 25 the distribution of risk among the many activities ongoing O ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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53
'1 at a fuel cycle facility.
( ) 2 "The NRC expects to be able to use the ISA results 3 to focus its resources on the dominant risks of facility 4 design and operation, and the safety controls and assurances 5 necessary to assure that those controls remain available and l 6 reliable.
7 "Accordingly, staff reviewers will conduct a ,
8 coordinated review of the ISA and will focus on the ISA 9 results applicable to each of the technical areas treated in 10 ~ the chapters of the SRP. The acceptance criteria in each of i 11 the SRP chapters are the criteria that apply to the dominant 12 risks of operation. The applicant has the opportunity to 13 justify lesser criteria for those design and operational 14 features that can be shown to represent lesser risks than
) 15 the accident or failure sequences that pose the dominant 16 risks."
17 Our focus here was to say that these measures that 18 you have identified are not to apply across the board. They 19 are only to apply on the items that are relied on for safety 20 and that the licensees are given the opportunity to provide 21 the graded measures that they feel are appropriate based on 22 their ISA.
23 Now, maybe we didn't articulate that well enough, 24 and I am looking to ask you to tell me why you didn't, when 25 reading this, get the focus that we are linking the SRP to O ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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54 1 the ISA findings, and that we couldn't provide criteria that 2 would grade every application. And so what we did was we (V)
3 put the criteria that would apply to the high risk items, 4 for any program that could be used for any facility, whether 5 it is a current facility, whether it is LEU, whether it is 6 HU, whether it is a new activity that we would be licensing, 7 but the recognition that these were just criteria that would 8 be, you know, used from a review point of view.
9 It also says in the introductory, it says, "The 10 acceptance criteria delineated in this SRP is intended to 11 communicate the underlying objectives, but not to represent 12 the only means of satisfying the objective." So, I am 13 looking to you to say, where could we -- how could we have 14 communicated more clearly what our intent was?
(m) 15 MR. KILLAR: Okay. There's two things. Start off 16 with the very last line, not the one that you had underlined 17 that you read. You say that this criteria is such-and-such 18 and the licensee can use something lesser. What that says 19 to us is that we have to justify why we using something 20 lesser. And what we are saying is that the ISA should 21 demonstrate that we don't need something as high as what you 22 are providing for, and, so, therefore, we can start with the 23 lower level and work up. And, so, you know, licensee 24 already is in sort of a defensive mode as far as defending 25 why he is doing something lesser than what your acceptance
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55 1 criteria is in the SRP.
g] :2 The second issue we have as far as the way SRP is-
%)
3 laid out is that, well, this is in Chapter 2 and you look at 4 Chapter 3 and read the appendix to Chapter 3, you finally i
5 get a sense of what you are trying to, but it is buried in 6 the appendix to Chapter 3 as far as the grading and the 7 approach and things on that line. And this is something we 8 feel should be spelled out at the beginning of each chapter 9 of the ISA -- I mean of each chapter of the SRP, because we 10 look at the way you do work and maybe we have a different 11 perspective or a jaded perspective of it.
12 But we see -- the project manager gets the 13 application and he breaks up the radiation protection 14 section and he gives it to this guy, and he gives the
() 15 chemical safety section to this. guy over here, and he gives 16 the other section other there to the health physics guy, and 17 they go off with just that section of the SRP, and they are 18 reviewing this against the radiation protection program, 19 against that section of the SRP, and we are not sure that 20 they are going to understand the relationship of that 21 radiation protection program to the criticality section, to 22 the fire safety, to the chemical safety sections, unless it 23 is brought to their attention that they have to look at this 24 as it relates to the other programs and it is an integrated 25 program. Because there are times when they say, well, gee, O ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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o 56 1 you could do things a lot better here in this area, and we 2 say, yes, but if we did it better in this area, it is going
(}
3 to cause us a greater risk in this area over here.
4 And, so, you have to look at, even though you look 5 at the individual programs, you have to look at the 6 integration as a whole. You can't break these separate 7 programs out, and that is our concern, is that when the NRC 8 reviews these applications, that is the mode they are going 9 to go into is looking at the individual programs.
10 RDR . PAPERIELLO: Let me ask you this. Let's pick 11 something out, let's talk about training.
12 How would you have me configure the SRP to address 13 training?
14 MR. KILLAR: I would think that what you'd want to
() '15 say in there is the exceptions criteria would be driven by 16 those training requirements identified by the licensee to 17 assure the safe operations of the high-risk items identified 18 where training is essential. It sounds like a little dance, 19 but basically what we're saying is --
20 DR. PAPERIELLO: Let's follow the path. Okay.
'21 And how would the reviewer know what the high-risk areas 22 were?
23 MR. KILLAR: From reviewing the integrated safety 24 assessment.
25 DR. PAPERIELLO: But the point is the integrated ,
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57 1 safety assessment's not going to be submitted.
[ 2 MR..KILLAR: The summary integrated safety b
3 assessment is to be delivered on the docket.
4 DR. PAPERIELLO: So there will be sufficient 5 information in the summary to justify the programs. I mean, 6 I'may be getting ahead of myself, but part of this fits 7~ together. I mean, part of it is fitting what we're trying 8 to do as we move from what I call a deterministic basis, 9 because that's in fact what you're talking about -- in other 10 words, if I turn around and say you've got to have a 11 training program that does whatever number of' things without 12 regard to the ISA, that would be adeterministic more or 13 less, which is the way we've traditionally done things, to 14 one that is ISA risk-based.
() 15 16 There's.still -- see, there's the issue of the public involvement. The fact of the matter is the decisions 17 we make need to be scrutable to the public. It's one thing 18 if I say the acceptance criteria is based on an ANSI 19 standard, QA, we're just going to follow the ANSI standard.
20 The public can say yes, I understand why you licensed them, 21 because they have a QA program that matches what the ANSI 22 standard says. If you're saying that well, we don't really 23 need all that because when we do the risk analysis, in 24' principle the public ought to be able to say we've looked at 25 the risk analysis and we agree.
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r-58 1 I mean, I recognize that many members of the 2 public aren't going to be able to read and understand what 3 we write. I mean, you know, they just don't have the 4 technical background. But in principle everything we do 5 ought to be scrutable to an informed member of the public, 6 and that's part of the problem I can see is that it's -- I 7 mean, my difficulty is fitting them together when in fact, I 8- mean, I think it's -- I mean, if I look at the SRM and 9 things like that in fact is going to be where we leave right 10 now very difficult to make the ISA the basis for a lot of 11 regulatory decisions insofar as we don't have a docketed
- 12. ISA, 13 And I'm not saying docket the whole ISA, I'm just 14 saying if that is the basis for making a regulatory
() 15 decision, and that decision is to be scrutable by the 16 public, sua have to have enough information so an informed 17 member of the public can see the basis for what we have 18 concluded. Either that or we're basically left with a back 19 to a deterministic licensing basis which clearly is 20 scrutable to the public, and then with sort of an overlay of 21 an ISA. I mean, that's kind of the problem I have right 22 now.
23 MR. KILLAR: Right. And when we get into the 24 discussion later, I don't know if we'll get into it today or 25 tomorrow, dealing with the integrated safety assessment and
'[
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f 59 1 how this process works together, I think it'll -- hopefully
() 2 it'll-make more -- gel more as far as how we view this.
3 When we look at the license, we will have program 4 commitments in the license that we will have a criticality 5 safe room, we will have a radiation protection program, and 6 these will be the principal attributes that we will follow 7 for that criticality program for that radiation program.
8 If we determine through the integrated safety
.9 assessment that we need to have a fire protection program, 10 we will have a commitment to have a fire protection program, 11 and what the attributes of that fire protection program will 12- be. Similarly for a chemical safety program.
13 And then through the ISA summary, which we are 14 planning to submit, on the docket but not part of the
() 15 license, the summary will demonstrate how these programs and 16 these attributes are carried out on the items of safety 17 significance to assure the reliability and availability for 18 providing the protection for the workers and the public.
19 That's our vision of how this process will work.
20 DR. PAPERIELLO: We're close. The devil is going 21 to be in the details.
22 MR. KILLAR: Yes. And that's really where the 23 issue is. To us the issue is how much do we get in the ISA 24 summary that is clear, concise, and gives you what you need 25 to feel comfortable that we're running our facilities O ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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60 1 safely, at the same time give you enough information to
() 2 demonstrate to the public that you've done and accomplished 3 your job, but at the same time not overburden you or 4 overburden us with a bunch of detailed-analysis which, you 5 know, maybe a couple old techies can understand but beyond 6 that not a whole lot of people can really comprehend.
7 MR. SHERR: A point of clarification.
8 MR. KILLAR: Yes, sir.
9 MR. SHERR: And this may be a minor point. When 10 we had discussion in the 1985 time frame, one of the 11 concerns that the industry, and a very strong concern, was 12 us calling fire safety or radiation protection, calling them 13 . programs, because the notion was that there should be one 14 combined safety program, and we have tried religiously to O
( ,/ 15 avoid the use of the word " program" in this subset in E146 response to those comments. Have you used the term 17 " program" consistently? Has there been a change in views on 18 that? I mean --
19 MR. KILLAR: Maybe I'll hide this time. I'm not 20 sure. Maybe I ought to -- Charlie or --
21 MR. VAUGHAN: Yes, I wanted to talk about the 22 other thing for a minute, too, but I'll just go ahead --
23 I'll just talk about this one right this second.
24 We may'have been a little misunderstood because we 25 weren't seeming to get across our point on programs. There l' \ ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD. I Court Reporters 1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 1014 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 842-0034
61 1 .in my mind is a particular distinction, and that is in the f
) 2 area of fire protection, in the area of chemical safety, in 3 the area of maintenance of the plant, in terms of assurance 4 at the plant, and a lot of those particular things there is 5 nothing special that a business faces in those areas in a 6 nuclear sense, 7- In other words, every business has to have those 8 kinds of programs in place, and those programs have to 9 operate, and therefore we felt it was unnecessary to have to 10 provide extensive amounts of programmatic information with 11 regard to those because we as an industry follow pretty much 12 the-industry practice.
13 On the other hand, though, we do have to be able 14 to show that we have factored those things into our nuclear O
g ,j 15 operation, and in our proposal to incorporate the use of 16 ISAs to bring all of that together and integrate it and 17 drive the safety in the nuclear facility we felt like we 18 were doing that.
19 But we also recognize that we are a special 20 industry, and there are a couple of special things like the 21 radiological protection and criticality safety that are 22 particularly unique to the nuclear operation, and therefore 23 in those areas in fact there does need to be a programmatic 24 definition that covers that particular subject. And 25 obviously since this license is a contract between
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V 62 1 management, then there needs to be a good, solid, you know,
( 2 communication of the management structure and the management 3 interaction and how that works as well as what the license 4 activities are and so forth. So we may have been guilty of 5 giving'a couple of different opinions, but I think this is 6 kind of where we are in the overall thinking.
7 MS. EYCK: I'd like to go back to the question of 8 the SRP, and still on my mind trying to figure out how we 9 can package it to -- and describe it to be something that 10 would be acceptable to you and that would be understood what 11 our perceptions are.
12 You've mentioned before that you felt that the SRP 13 was too prescriptive, and some of the requirements were too 14 stringent. I guess my one thought is, are you saying that
() 15 you feel'that that would be, if that is the case for 16 high-risk activities that might involve HEU or something --
17 I'm trying to think, because we've got an SRP that, as we 18 all recognize, Part 70 covers a broad spectrum of different 19 licensed activities.
20 And then you mentioned the fact that you were 21 concerned of justifying the lesser -- use of the lesser 22 criteria. Is one proposed approach that you would recognize 23 that in each chapter at the beginning of the chapter we 24 recognize that the criteria contained then could apply to a 25 wide spectrum of risks, and not ask the licensee to justify ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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63 1 their lesser criteria but just to identify their program,
.( 2 and then the licensing reviewer,.who is using this guidance, 3 will.look,' based on the ISA results, and how this particular 4 item relied on for safety, plays in the risk realm, that 5 then they would make the judgement that yes, your proposed 6 program is acceptable using the criteria, and the reviewer 7 would then make the graded determination that your proposed 8 approach is acceptable based on the risk of the item that 9 we're dealing with? Is that something that, you know, that 10 is addressing your concerns?
11 I'm just trying to figure out how do we solve this 12 problem, because recognizing that this is a NRC guidance 13 document for our reviewers, we're sharing it with you to let 14 you know what our expectations would be in certain areas and
() 15 the different types of attributes and characteristics of the 16 measures that you would propose, how they play in our 17 review. But recognizing also that we need an SRP that does 18 cover a range of risks for these items relied on for safety, 19 and recognizing that we're going to be trying to tailor SRPs 20 for different types of activities like if we license a MOX 21 facility we're going to have an SRP that's tailored to the 22
~
MOX activity or analogous activity. {
23 But we felt that the Part 70 SRP in general gave 1
24 us a good foundation to have as acceptance criteria and to 25 be used as a kind of a basis to make that tailoring. And so l
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l 64 l
1 I'm interested in what you see is the way that we can O 2 proceed and what'might be some of the proposed solutions to, V
3 you know, what your concerns are.
4 MR. VAUGHAN: I'll just address part of that. You 5 read a section out'of the introduction a while ago that I 6 think most of the people in industry when they read it felt 7 pretty good about what was being said there, and the problem 8 came when we went to all of the rest of the chapters, and 9 when we read those chapters, they don't add up to us to be J 10 what that statement said.
11 Now the question is, is -- the major problem --
12 there's I guess a couple of major problems. One is these 13 chapters in a number of cases tend to add prescriptive 14 detail that we think -- or imply prescriptive detail even 15 though they're guidance that we don't think is necessarily 16 appropriate. And the other thing is is every one of the 17 chapters seem to be written with a bar at the highest level, 18 and there is no guidance in there to a reviewer in terms of 19 how to deal with things that may not be at that level.
20 So I think what has to happen is the chapters need 21 to be fixed. If you want to set the bar at the upper end, l 22- which I mean you can do that, but if it done that way, then 23 there needs to be guidance in there to the reviewer about 24- how to adjudge a person's performance relative to that bar 25 depending on their individual facility and the situation ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD. i Court Reporters 1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 1014 Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 842-0034
65 l' that's being reviewed..
() 2 3
MR '. KILLAR: Bob?
QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE: I just wanted to 4 mention a couple of things about the standard review plan.
5 Once something is identified as safety related by the ISA, 6 then you start looking at the attributes'and decide what you 7' need to assure that safety related --
8 THE REPORTER: Please speak into the mike.
9 QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE: When you do that, 10 then you default back to the standard review plan.
11 Now,_ as an example, on training, it was never our 12 intention, and if it's decided that training is necessary to 13 assure safety of an ISA attribute, that one would have to go 14 through that entire spectrum of attributes listed in the
) 15 training chapter to maintain that training. That's just 16 given as a guidance to the reviewer that here's a process 17 that.you can go through, and this represents the high bar.
18 In other words, we don't want the reviewer to ask for more 19 than that under any circumstance. But there can be a case 20 made to accept less than that. The same thing would be the 21 case for quality assurance or any of the other areas.
22 So it's interesting, sitting here listening to 23 this, because when we wrote that, we were writing it as a 24 constraint document to give to the staff so that we 25 didn't -- so that, one, there was some predictability and
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p f 66 1 the reviews were done in a systematic process, and they l
() 2 wouldn't go beyond a certain' constraint. And it's 3 interesting that you interpret it to mean that we go through 4' all those processes for everything, because that was never i 5 the intention. But-I guess we probably need to add some 6 words to that effect that -- for the default mechanism. l 7 But as an example -- brought up with the -- Liz I 8 was talking about, it's very difficult to a priori predict y 9 all the particular attributes that one may or may not need.
10 I think you've got to give the reviewer some discretion and 11 the licensee -- and the potential licensee some discretion, 12 because we can't predict all the potentialities we have, 13, can't say if it's sometimes relied on for safety but not 14 really all that important, we do x, but if it's really O
( ,/ 15 relied on for safety, we do y, and if it's really, really 1 16 relied on for safety, we do the full gamut. That's not 17 going to work that way.
18 So I think that we can probably put some words in 19 there to guide the staff to say that this represents the 20 entire set and that subset of that may be appropriate in l 21 some instances. But I guess just philosophically speaking l
l 22 we're trying to tell the staff that we don't want you going l
-23 beyond these requirements we've laid out here for anything i
24' that you may provide.
25 MR. KILLAR: I understand what you're saying, Bob, l
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67 1 and I appreciate-it. I. guess one of the concerns I have is
() 2 3
if you look at a reg guide and the way it reads and what have-you, some of the opening words are to the effect that 4 this is viewed as an acceptable way of meeting the 5 requirements as identified in the rule, and so basically 6 what that says to us as a licensee, that if we do everything 7 that's here, the NRC will accept it.
- 8. But what's happened in practice is that when we 9 say well, we're not going to do everything that's in here 10 because we don't need to do all that, we end up into a long 11 contest going back and forth with the reviewer why we need 12 to do things less. And while I understand what you're 13 saying that's the upper bar to limit the reviewer, what we 14 find is that's sort of the starting point, and then we have
() 15 to argue down from there.
16 QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE: What we would hope is 17 that the integrated safety analysis process would separate 18 that out. But the idea of the license application comes in, 19 we would look at the integrated safety analysis, and define 20 from the integrated safety analysis how we would do --
21 attributes that reflected -- to bolster the integrated 22 safety. So it's not quite as implied earlier where you just 23 take a chapter and give it -- you really need to integrate 24 that.
25 And what we're trying to accomplish here is ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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68 1 flexibility, as Carl-said, because if you don't allow some
() -2 3
latitude in terms of how you can interpret what's needed for safety, you could come up hypothetically with a scenario 4 that you don't want to have a training program. You've made 5 a decision you don't want training programs, if you put some 6 other sort of redundancy in there'and don't have training 7 programs and rely on something else for safety and use that 8 as part of your ISA. Conversely you decide rather than 9 using some other features, you want to have training.
10 We wanted to allow that flexibility. The standard 11 review plan is an attempt to capture that I guess probably 12 because of historical factors. We're going to be looking at 13 it with some trepidation, but I would suggest that really 14 -that represents a box that we want the staff to not go
() 15 beyond that box, and we can always reduce the variable, 16 intending to work down.
17 MR. SILVERMAN: I guess I'm a little concerned 18 that there's a sense that the comments that I think -- what 19 the industry's trying to say in the comments that have been 20 submitted could be addressed with some simple clarifying 21 language or packaging of the document. If I understand what 22 we're trying to say, it's much more substantive than that.
23 The concern is much more substantive. It doesn't go to the 24 ' introductory language of the SRP. The language that you 25 mention, Liz, I think we all think we understand and it ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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w 69 1 makes good sense, that' language. I think we think it's (n,) 2 relatively clear, 3 The problem is that even -- is that when you look 4 in the individual chapters of the SRP, even for a high-risk 5 system, defined by a particular ISA, the SRP says that -- or 6 seems to strongly suggest that for such a system a licensee 7 is going to have to adopt such things -- pardon the 8 expression -- as a systems approach to training or use NQA-1 9 or -- those are my best examples. There are many others 10 that we listed.
11 Those are entirely new concepts. They raise the 12 bar above the existing practice. Think about NOA-1 for a 13 second or a systems approach to training. These are things 14 that would be the subject of an individual rulemaking, a
/N
(/ 15 significant rulemaking, in and of themself if you were 16 applying them for the first time to a facility.
17 Say you wanted to now establish NQA-1 as a 18 requirement for source material licensees or medical 19 licensees. That would be a very significant change in the 20 way they do business. The problem that we have here is to
- 21. me there are a whole host of areas in here that in and of 22 themselves really should be the subject of rulemaking. They 23 go well beyond the existing practices. And a good 24 example -- and they do prejudge the outcome. 4 l
25 A good example is the training area. Let's say a O ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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c 70 licensee goes.out, performs an ISA on a particular system or i
1
/"' 2 D) process, and they discover there is a problem of 3 vulnerability. The risk is too high based upon the existing 4 system, program, procedures that they have in place. They 5 examine this and they discover that one of the problems is 6 there's a training problem, .or the vulnerability issue could 7 be corrected by training an individual in a different way or 8 more thoroughly, okay, because that person is relied upon I l
9 for safety. I 10 That licensee might conclude that to solve that 11 problem all he might possibly have to do is improve -- is 12 retrain individuals, improve the qualification requirements, i
13 perhaps individuals, revise the training modules themselves, I i
14 have more testing and qualification of individuals, those )
-(O,
,, 15 sorts of things, within the bounds of their existing ,
16 program. And that might be sufficient to solve that 17 problem. But when you -- that's within the bounds of their 18 existing program. l 19 It might not be sufficient. Maybe more would be 20 required. But when you read the ISA -- I'm sorry, when you 21 read the SRP in the training area, it seems to say that that 22 kind of a high-risk system you have to have a systems I
23 approach to training. That's a major, major change. And j 24 NOA-1 is another example, and we think many of these areas j l
25 are like that. So it's a substantive issue. It's more than j i
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71 1 just the packaging of the document.
() 2 QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE: It may read that way, 3 and if so, it's -- the intention wac that if you're in a 4 situation -- a systems approach to training would be an 5 acceptable means of accomplishing that. But something less 6 than that, if you substantiate or justify why you're doing 7 it, would also be acceptable. We're not saying that that's 8 the only way. We're saying that that is an acceptable way.
9 MR. VAUGHAN: Bob, I think a lot of your comments 10 we pretty well agree with, but I believe the disconnect 11 comes when we read the words-in all of the chapters and we 12 generally feel like you're suggesting the NRC wanted to 13 proceed or was attempting to proceed, but when we add up 14 what's written, we don't get the answer that you say we (O
,/ 15 should. That's kind of a simple way to put that.
16 I want to pitch out another little personal idea I 17 think on some of this subject that might be considered as we 18 go, and I draw a parallel from the Part 74 regulations. If 19 we look at a number of these evaluations that are called out 20 for the license reviewer in the SRP, there is some objective 21 that has to be satisfied, some determination that needs to 22 be made as the result of that, and I think there may be some 23 opportunity there to look at the sequence of the review and 24 what that objective is and convert that to a much simpler 25- performance objective that has to be met and affirmed or ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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72 1 attested to that the licensee will meet that.
() 2 For example, we are spending a tremendous amount 3 of time talking about training in prescriptive ways to do 4 training and how it gets driven. The fundamental safety 5 dimension of training is to assure that the operator o; the 6 person performing the work does so in accordance with the 7 safety operations and so that the plant is operated safely.
8 So that's kind of the objective, and we spend a lot of time 9 talking about how you get there, and not so much time on the 10 objectives that are important.
11 So I think some of these complex things we might 12 look at a little bit and see if there are affirmations or 13 objective statements that need to be incorporated in the 14 license, and it might simplify some of the work to give us,
() 15 you know, during the licensing process, a little more time 16 to spend on the things that require creative engineering to 17 be able to reach adequate solutions.
18 QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE: I'd like to mention 19 an experience the DOE has had with the criticality safety 20 good practices guide, which is to be issued shortly, and 21 perhaps this will focus some of the problems that are being 22 discussed.
23 This guide is a much weaker document than the SRP.
24 It's a good-practices guide assembling the good practices of 25 the criticality safety community. It was written with an t n ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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T 73 l' introductory section which prohibited the use of the' guide
() 2 3
by auditors or reviewers.
purpose.
It.was not intended for that Very strong words were used.
4 The guide went out in draft form for review, and 5 immediately it began to be used in draft form by certain 6 auditors in a few cases, graphically illustrating the fact 7 that when you have these very excellent words in front, it-8 does no good.
9 I solved the problem, I believe, by putting in the 10 DOE order a prohibition against misuse of the guide and 11 specifically quoting from the guide. So that if you do
- 12. abuse this guide when it comes out, you will be violating 13 the order. Nobody wants to do that, because you get in 14- trouble with the General Counsel.
(' ,/ 15 So in principle I think that will work, but you 16 can't do that with the SRP. And so even if you write good 17 words.in the SRP, I despair of any solution to this problem.
18 I don't know what to do about it. I just bring up the DOE 19 -experience and how I handled it, and let you draw your own 20 conclusions as to what you might be able to do. But I leave 21 it at that.
22 MS. EYCK: I'd like to go back to the comment of 23 NRC requiring NOA-1. It was never our intent to require 24 NQA-1. I think that how we've used it in the acceptance 25 criteria area, we've tried to identify regulatory guidance ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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74 1 that may be applicable to the subject that could be used to
() 2
~3 help focus both the licensee as they provide their application and the reviewer, and the words that I read 4 here, it says -- and also the fact that we wanted to have 5 something that focused on a graded QA, and one of the few 6 things that we know that has focused on graded QA, and 7 related in the nuclear industry, was the NQA-1 effort.
8 And what the SRP actually says is the applicant 9 should refer to the American National Standard Institute, 10 the American Society of Mechanical Engineers standard, 11 ANSI /ASME, NQA-1, da da da, with the title, which provides 12 requirements and guidance for such facilities.
13 It doesn't say that NOA-1 is the standard. All it 14 is was that when I tasked the staff to identify associated
( 15 regulatory guidance so that we could provide it, it was the 16 most what we' thought may be an appropriate standard that 17 applied to QA and it took a graded approach, never requiring 18 the fact that an NOA-1 program be implemented.
19 So maybe you can enlighten me if there's anyplace 20' that specifically requires an NQA-1 program, but that was 21 never our intent when we put the SRP together.
22 MR. KILLAR: Basically, by referencing it we feel 23 that you've set that as what would be acceptable. And 24- granted it's not saying that this is a required program, but 25 the fact that you reference it indicates to us that that's
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75 1 what yout-expectations are.
() 2 Now if you would reference, say, the quality 3 assurance program required for transportation CAS, that may i 4' be acceptable as well, and that certainly would be a lesser 5' program'than NQA-1.
6 MS. EYCK: But don't you think we would be remiss 7 in not referencing NOA-1 as a related type of guidance 8 document that deals with QA and deals with it in a graded 9 approach?
-10 MR. KILLAR: Well, we have a basic problem with 11 NQA-1 because when we see -- look at NOA-1, we think that's 12 something that was designed basically for a reactor which 13 has a high source term and you have a lot higher risk 14 factors and what have you. And so that gives us some real O
( ,/ 15 consternation when you refer to standards that were 16 developed for reactors and for higher source terms than what 17 we have at our facilities.
18 QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE: Another comment.
19 Remember they were trying to design this Standard Review 20 Plan to be somewhat generic. The concept about the source 21 terms there is there are some potentialities that we would 22 be regulating facilities with large source terms not
- 23. represented -- we were trying to make something that would 24 be -- we could capture those sorts of facilities as well, so 25 we could have the reference to extend beyond what we just
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76 1 had, say, limited to the lower hertz fuel facility, so there 2 may be some lesson there.
} I am not sure, but we may need to 3 go back and make a clear distinction between these 4 facilities and some of the others.
5 MR. KILLAR: I appreciate that.
6 DR. PAPERIELLO: The question is what is an 7 alternative? What would happen if we wrote the Standard 8 Review Plan and removed all the acceptance criteria and left {
9 it up to the judgment of the individual reviewer? That's an 10 alternative.
11 MR. KILLAR: I think that is also a loaded 12 question.
13 DR. PAPERIELLO: I know, because -- well, I have 14 logical problems. I mean either -- it comes down to three 15 things.
16 Either because we are not going to have 17 regulations to spell out in detail what a person has to do 18 for everything -- I mean that's the fact of the way we 19 work -- because we don't have as many, it's not like an 20 automobile where there's enough automobiles on the road so 21 that somebody can write specs on how bright the headlights 22 are going to be and how far apart and all that.
23 It seems to me I got three options here 24 I either, one, I turn around and provide the 25 reviewers with no acceptance criteria and leave it to their j
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77 L
l .
1 professional judgment, or two, I turn around and provide ;
2 criteria, but I don't provide it to the public or you -- in
}-
3 .other words, it'becomes internal memos, which in fact is the 4 situation I found when I inherited this job a number of i
5 years ago, or three, I do what we are doing here, and we 6 turn around and we come up with an acceptance criteria that 7 you tell me I can share with the people and we can turn 8 around and work out something that everybody agrees on which
.9 is right.
10 It seems to me somewhere along the line I have got 11 to give some criteria.
12 I am also bound by law which says when I use j 13 criteria to the extent -- I have to justify not using 14 consensus standards, for example, where they are available.
() 15 Right now the nuclear industry appears to have developed a 16- consensus standard that applies to QA, and we are already 17 saying that you consider the ISA, and you consider applying 18 this particular criteria to the areas which the ISA shows, 19 which is relatively high risk.
20' Now put aside the definition of relatively high 21 risk, but if we are dealing with a risk which is on the 22 order of whatever and if it happens to be comparable to a 23 reactor risk, I would agree. One thing I will first mention 24 we all agree on -- that if I have a population group within 25 50 miles of a fuel facility the risk of that facility to the
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78 L 1 people around there is probably not the same as a reactor.
() 2 I say "probably not" because clearly if I had a reactor with 3 a core melt probability in the order of 10 to the minus 10, 4 I may recognize that is ridiculous, that risk would be much 5 lower than -- I'll make something up -- some place that uces 6- nuclear material where it could go out, the stuff go out the 7 stack once a month.
8 I am being a bit -- and so once you have a 9 comparable risk, why wouldn't you use a comparable OA 10 program, and if we write the thing, hey, you don't have to 11 consider this, if you have a low risk -- you see what I am 12 getting at? I mean there's a criteria out there which is an 13 industry consensus standard which I am kind of obliged to 14 use, without defining it -- don't let a lawyer nail me into
( 15 what I mean by obliged, but clearly I've got an Act of 16 Congress that encourages me to do that, and frankly which I 17 want to do because I don't have the resources to write tons 18 of standards myself.
J 19 We are trying to give the reviewers something they 20 can use rather than their own, you know, this is what I i 21 think it ought to be, and you are kind of putting me back in
'22 the position of, you know, tell the reviewer to consider 23 independently whatever the licensee submits, and I don't 24 tell the reviewer some kind of criteria to bounce it j 25 against.
1
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79 1 I mean maybe I am wrong. I am just --
2 MR. VAUGHAN: I think fundamentally we believe 3 that public performance acceptance criteria are necessary 4 because if the criteria for acceptability is not publicly 5 known, then it doesn't do a heck of a lot for safety, so 6 .everyone needs to understand what the acceptance criteria 7 is. That seems to be fundamental in this issue.
8 I think our discussion of this subject centers 9 around the content of that acceptance criteria as opposed to 10 whether we should have one or not have one.
11 NQA-1, which we have talked about, is accepted and 12 a recognized standard for certain applications, but I don't 13 think any of us in the fuel fabrication industry have ever 14 felt that that standard was written to nor applies to the
() 15 kinds of situations we have.
16 Wilbur may want to comment on it, but we had 17 early-on in this thing several people from GE and 18 Westinghouse met over in Columbia for a couple of days and 19 we initially' thought that NOA-1 with some clarification 20 -could result in the quality assurance that we were looking 21 for with safety systems.
22 What we ended up finding out after working with 23 that for a couple of days, that NOA-1 by structure just 24 didn't seem to fit the kinds of systems we were dealing with 25 and every way we cut it we didn't exactly get the result we O ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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7 80 1- believed-you would need for that system, and so we kind of
() 2 3
dropped that effort, but I think that is in the back of our minds.about trying to use the NQA-1 pattern possibly to 4 things that,it just doesn't fit.
5 MR. BIDINGER: George Bidinger, private citizen.
6 I am a little bit disturbed by what I heard the 7 intent of the Standard Review Plan. It was to put an upper 8 level of safety on the Staff.
9 It seems to me the Standard Review Plans should be 1 10 providing the minimum level of safety that is acceptable to 11 the Staff and to us private citizens, but to put limits, 1
12 upper limits, on safety does not seem to make a lot of i 13 sense.
(
14 I think we have to start from a philosophy, and
() 15 that is my philosophy is that you have to specify. I expect 16 a regulatory agency to be defining the. minimum levels of 17 acceptable safety -- margins of safety. i 18 I might add a bit to what Dr. Paperiello has said.
)
19 When standards are applicable, they should be used but in I l
20 the case of the double contingence that no standard on 21 formal probability risk assessment was ever intended, and 22 yet it shows up in the Standard Review Plan.
23 I think there is a standard out there an it is 24 being mated with something that was never intended, and this 25 is a mishmash, which is not correct in the sense of the ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD. u
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81 1 guidance provided in the ANSI standards on criticality 2 safety.
3 QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE: That Standard Review 4 Plan is constructed right now is designed to provide 5 guidance to the Staff for those areas that are important to 6 safety. The Standard Review Plan provides the acceptance 7 criteria -- the minimal acceptance criteria -- but that 8 l means if the safety level is lower than that the Staff can 9 back away from it.
10 What we're trying to do is define acceptance 11 criteria for the Staff to work toward and talking about it 12 in terms of minimum required safety that the Staff is going 13 to have to make that judgment as they are working with that 14 but the Standard Review Plan has to function as a guide to 15 both give the Staff acceptance criteria to work for, to 16 provide that minimum threshold that we would accept.
17 I think you probably misconstrued what I said.
18 MS. EYCK: Also, what I would like to add, is that 19- we are talking about the Standard Review Plan criteria also 20 applying to the high risks areas and this is what we would 21 consider the minimum acceptable for high risk and that is 22 not to say that it would apply to all of the graded levels 23 that we would be addressing based on the results of 24 independent ISAs.
25 QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE: I just wanted to
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82 1 offer a couple comments.
2 -First is in the context of having a "when are you 3 done," "when are you safe enough?" there needs to be limits 4 put on the Staff, and I am counting myself one of'the Staff.
5 If you don't, there won't be predictability. There will be 6 ratcheting, j 7 Each reviewer has a pet. He wants to make his 8 area the best that it can be. The problem is when you 9 compare that with competing risks, it may be detrimental to 10 overall risk. The best may not be needed. You don't need a 11 Rolls Royce if there's low risk.
12 We are trained to do the best we can do in each of 13 our areas. The Commission is trying to control that make 14 everything Rolls Royce in a way that here is an acceptable 15 level of risk. In the reactor arena you have a safety goal.
16 In the SRP there is a like safety goal that says you have 17 arrived -- you don't need to do any more.
18 You should not have risk control programs for 19 events that are in 10 to the minus 10 space. It is a waste 20 of money and it is detracting from your business activities 21 and it is detracting from real risk.
22 You need to put a harness on the Staff and the 23 NRC, otherwise there will be ratcheting.
24 When there are events we run to the football, even 25 though they may be low risk. This setting a level of f ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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7 83 1 acceptable risk and setting an envelope up will control
( 2 that. If we can control it, we will have predictability and 3 we will have stability.
4 I would like to also make a comment on the 5 documents for example we were talking about -- NQA-1. I had 6 quite a bit to do with t hat in the reactor arena and a 7 little bit to do with it in the beginning of Part 70 when we 8 met with the NEI folks.
i 9 NEI was working on a proposal for a QA standard 10 for fuel facilities and as I recall it, the answer that came 11 out was when we looked at NOA-1 and looked at the grading 12 approach in NQA-1 we couldn't come up with something better 13 for the fuel facilities.
14 What needs to be recognized is NQA-1 is like an f
) 15 outline. The folks that fill in the detail are the 16 applicants. You fill in the amount of detail under the 17 outline that is commensurate with the risk that the ISA 18 identifies.
19 If that becomes too prescriptive and too 20 encumbering, the applicant needs to back it off, not fault 21 to the standard and say I did everything, every word, every 22 sentence and standard, and it is an industry standard. We 23 are trying to adopt more and more of industry standards 24 rather than our own creations of either a Reg Guide or a 25 rule itself.
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84 1 We are trying to pick up on those standards and
(} 2 practices, recognize the ISA should be the guide -- here is 3 what's risky, here's what we are relying on -- and there is 4 a scale from killing people to seriously injuring them to, 5 gee, I burped a little bit of something out of the process.
- 6. You write the detail into the outline commensurate 7 with the risk that is involved. When you are inspected, you 8 should be inspected commensurate with the risk. When you 9 are' enforced against, you should be enforced against
,10 commensurate with risk.
11 We are really trying hard to do that. I am not 12 claiming success. There are people out there that are 13 compliance counters. What we need to do is push this risk 14 approach and recognize this is an outline -- you folks fill
/3
(_) 15 in the detail and the detail should be commensurate with 16 what you have identified in the risk analysis and what 17 controls you are putting in place.
18 The industry standards are, quote, " industry 19 standards" and filling in the detail should be unique to 20 each facility, to each activity, to each applicant 21 commensurate with the risk.
22 MR. COX: Tom Cox. Can you hear me? Tom Cox. I 23 am in the Licensing Branch, and I have quite a bit to do 24 with the SRP promulgation, and lest we think we are not 25 -getting too far or achieving some resolution, I would like ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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85 1 to profess a couple of things and declare at least a partial
( 2 victory -- and make a couple of comments.
}
3 I am referring to the specific comments in the 4 November 25th letter to Carl Paperiello, and at my level we 5 have had only a couple of days to work on this and I have 6 significantly focused on just two areas I would like to talk 7 about now.
8 One is 2.6, organization and administration. The 9 NEI made three points there.
10 The first one was about licenses under Part 70 are 11 not for construction and operation but rather for possession 12 and use. I would like to merely point out there -- go to 13 70.23 (A) (3) and (4) and I believe you can only conclude from 14 that that the NRC Staff must make assessments of
/~
(T) 15 construction, design, and the procedures in order to make a 16 reasonable assurance of safety finding, which we are 17 required to make in order to issue a license.
18 I think we must look at the construction and 19 operation, both from the design and procedures and evaluate 20 what we see the applicant saying there. That is point one.
21 Point two made here was about an unnecessary new 22 requirement, referring to the decommissioning of licensed 23 facilities as seen in the draft SRP, Section 2.4.3 where we 24 apparently said Staff review is needed for the experience 25 and availability of personnel at the facilities now for ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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86 1 decommissioning activities that would occur much later.
2 I think we can probably agree on that point. I 3 don't think it is a real major point and some language
)
4 adjustments will take of that.
5 The third point was about SRP calling for NRC l 6 review and approval of internal licensee mechanisms for 7 reporting safety concerns. k 8 I think there it also refers to some language that 9 we can simply adjust and.that will meet, I think, what your 10 basic problems are, and deal with that. I am just 11 suggesting we will probably modify the second sentence there 12 dealing with some under existing facilities and would take 13 care of that one.
14 I think you would have little problem in dealing
() 15 with your comments on Section 2.6.
16 I would like to move on to a little more meaty 17 one, I think, in. terms of configuration management. Your 18 written comments to Carl Paperiello of a few days ago stated ,
19 essentially that Part 70 licenses don't license the 20 design -- again we just talked about that -- and so there 21 should be no requirement to perform design reconstitution.
22 Design reconstitution was the focus of this comment on 23 configuration management.
24 There should be no requirement to perform a 25 reconstitution. But the comment also went on to say another
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4
87 1 paragraph later that operators of facilities should commit
/~') 2 to a configuration management program in their license. I
\~)
3 think the problem here may have been design reconstitution.
4 I was interested in -- Felix, you said earlier 5 today in your comments probably an hour or so ago, that you 6 felt the ISA, production of the ISA necessarily resulted in 7 a design reconstitution or at least in establishing and 8 documenting of the design basis.
9 Perhaps design reconstitution is just a pejorative 10 term. We should call it design basis document validation, 11 something like that, but you moved from the point in the 12 written material here which tells you we shouldn't have it, 13 that it shouldn't be needed to saying that the ISA in fact 14 would provide it. I think we agree on that point.
f%
() 15 In fact, if you will look at Section, the SRP 16 section on configuration management, if you look in what we 17 call there " acceptance criteria," Section 11.1.4.2, we have 18 only six criteria in that whole chapter of some eight pages.
19 The second sentence of the sixth criteria, which 20 is titled, " Design Reconstitution" -- item number 6 under 21 Acceptance Criteria, if you look at the second sentence, it 22 says something like because the information may duplicate 23 the plant design basis described elsewhere to support the 24 ISA, this information may be included by reference to other 25 parts of the application.
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88 1 I think that is a very clear and explicit 2 reference that we recognize what you said a little while
('))
3 ago: this information should be necessary to construct an 4 ISA. If it's there, simply point to it.
5 I think we should give more consideration to the 6 other comments you have made here. I think we can work much 7 of this out, and I have to agree with most of what also has 8 been said here about the fact that we need some direction 9 with reviewers and we need to share that, yourselves and the 10 public.
11 I don't think we are going to get this job done by 12 only having a meeting like this where we sort of talk at a 13 relatively general level about the topic. I would suggest, 14 and I have to point out that this is only my suggestion, I (O) 15 think we need a smaller focus group to handle each of these 16 chapters -- prioritizing them -- some may be more important 17 than others -- bitt it's only until you get a group of about 18 10 people at most who are experts in these fields talking 19 about this I think you are going to work out the language.
20 I think what we are talking about here is 21 language. We are word engineers. We are basically 22 engineers but we do it through document. We must work out 23 the language so that it is acceptable to all concerned so it 24 can be used in years to come.
25 MR. KILLAR: My comment -- the main concern we had i
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1
89 1 on that one area was use of the term " reconstitution" --
2 there should be no need to reconstitute the design because 3 the design is there. The problem we have is the fluid 4 design as through your configuration management, 5 ' configuration control, as you change the facility you update 6 the design to reflect those changes and our concern with 7 .using the word " reconstitute the design" may indicate to us 8 that we may have to go back and say this is what we did in 9 1970 and it doesn't make any sense because our facility 10 doesn't look anything like it did in 1970 because of the 11 changes, so with the " reconstitute the design" that's the 12 kind of concept we were thinking of and that is why the term 13 gave us some concern.
14 MR. COX: And I do hope we all agree that some
() 15 kind of a documented, validated design basis is necessary to 16 know for the plant today in order to make changes from some 17 basis that you.know about or else your maintaining safety 18 and making a change will simply be a matter of luck if you 19 don't have the design basis.
20 MR. KILLAR: We have the design basis today. We 21 operate according to the design basis, but they are ongoing, 22 live design basis.
23 MR. COX: And you will find, I think, the 24 production of the ISA -- even as called for in our ISA 25 chapter -- Chapter 3 --
says you must start with a
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90 1 documented design basis.
() 2 3
MR. VAUGHAN: The only thing I would say, I think we are in part having trouble with words, and when we see 4 " reconstitute the basis" that implies to us going somewhere 5 back in history to develop this thing when in fact we have 6 the current safety basis of the plant documented and the 7 process documented, and what we are proposing is the ISA to 8 go through and apply the ISA process to our current 9 operations and take the result of that and enter that into 10 the configuration management program so it will then 11 maintain itself as a living basis of safety as it lives and 12 breathes and operates and goes on about its way and there's 13 changes and modification, but some words are meaning 14 different things to different people.
() 15 MR. KILLAR: That's basically all we have on the 16 Standard Review Plan.
17 Is there anything else before we move on?
18 I think the questions that you have brought up we 19 have pretty well answered the questions throughout the 20 discussion.
21 The one thing I would like to do is take the 22 opportunity now to talk a little bit about criticality 23 safety, and the Standard Review Plan for criticality safety, 24 which would probably take us up to lunch.
25 MS. ASTWOOD: May I ask one question?
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91 1 MR. KILLAR: Yes, ma'am.
L '~\ 2 MS. ASTWOOD: This is kind of a question to the 3 NRC as well as you~ guys.
4 I hear a lot of,possible solutions being 5 repackaging or changing the words or making it clearer, and 6 then I hear some solutions we know that really need to take 7- a whole new look at the way we have applied these acceptance 8 criteria.
9 Would it be helpful for NEI to try to propose an 10 outline of any chapter of the SRP in a format that would be 11 acceptable,.that would be a little clearer for us to see in 12 which direction you are going, if it really is a whole 13 rethink of the way it's proposed?
14 MR. KILLAR: That is a possibility. I have to
() 15 look.at my members. They all have their heads down.
4 16 [ Laughter.]
17 MS. ASTWOOD: I think we could handle the word 18 changes. I think that we can discuss. We can use the web.
19 We can use phone calls to do those kind of things, but if 20 you are really talking about a complete rethink I think we 21 would like to put that'in an outline --
22 MR. KILLAR: We may be able to take on, say, like 23 'the Chemical Section because we did do quite a bit of 24 changes and suggested changes on that SRP when we sent in 25
~
our letter on the chemical safety, so that may be something j
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91 1 that we may.be able to look and do, capture that.
O 2 Barry?
d 3- MR. MENDELSOHN: Can I ask -- and again this is i 4 something I-have not discussed with anybody, so it is my 5- Jown, but I will through it out to the table.
6 It sounds like one of the concerns that we have 7 here is that we don't have any examples of when the 8- :particular acceptance criteria would be applicable to --
9 what-things would be applicable to, and I was wondering if 10 we were able to in the time that we have available to us 11 -between now and when we have to go back to the Commission, 12 if we were able to add examples in the SRP of those kind of 13 operations, high risk operations to which the highest levels 14- would apply and maybe include some other examples -- say for
() 15 16 this kind of an operation, a lesser criteria would apply whether that would-be helpful.
17 MR. KILLAR: Let me look into it.
18 I think the problem you are going to run into is 19 that there are going to be specific examples and then you
'20 run into the debate as to where that falls on the hierarchy 21 of risk and stuff and you end up spending more time debating 22 that than rather coming out with an example that is 23 workable, so we can sort of look at that but I am not sure 24 if we will be able to successfully accomplish that in the 25 time that we have available.
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m h-93 1 MR. EDGAR: I think one of the things we need to 2- recognize too is that~ historically the use to which these 3 types of guidance documents have been put, and as was 4 pointed out by.this gentleman here, that a draft document 5 comes out.and somebody begins to use it as a. requirement 6 also, and then we ge the guidance' documents'which in 7 principle are_ good things, but the begin to be used as 8' requirements and s'o if I could borrow from Dr. Paperiello's 9 three. alternatives, it seems to me that the preferred 10 ^a lternative would be, yeah, there are criteria that are 11 presented.to the reviewers but in addition to that there has 12 to be professional judgment used as to when those criteria 13 are explicitly applied and when they can be applied at some 14 lower level.
() 15 MR. KILLAR: Since I see no one else moving 16 .towards the mike for our Standard Review Plan, one of the
- 17 things that I would like to do, since the last issue on the 18 Standard Review Plan we had was the criticality safety and 19 = I the question about the use and interpretation of the 20 .American' national standard, Mr. Bidinger is here 21 representing the Ameircan Nuclear Society and I would like 22 to give him a few minutes to talk about the use of the 23 standard and how it has been reflected in the SRP.
24- MR. BIDINGER: I'm George Bidinger. No , I am not 25 here as a private citizen, I am here representing the Q
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94 1 Nuclear Criticality Safety Division of the American Nuclear 2 Society. By way of introduction, we are a profession 3 division. We have about 575 members, and they come from all 4 walks of like, research, commercial, government operations, 5 regulatory development, oversight, educators and 6 consultants.
7 The Criticality Safety Division sponsors 8 Subcommittee 8 on fissionable materials outside reactors, 9 which is an ANS Standards Committee. And most recently, we 10 are pleased that the NRC has endorsed all 15 of the ANS-8 11 standards in Reg. Guide 351.
12 We were made aware of this draft of the Standard 13 Review Plan during the ANS winter meeting last month here in 14 Washington. Senior members of the division reviewed the
() 15 draft and the Standard Review Plan for consistency with the 16 ANS-8 recommended safety practices. Not surprisingly, we 17 generally support the objectives of the proposed rule. We 18 are concerned with the underlying issues with the rule and 19 the Standard Review Plan, and I will go into those.
20 Our first concern deals with nuclear criticality l 21 being defined as a high consequence event. We start off 22 dealing with risk and suddenly we are talking about high 23 consequence. It almost appears that the rule treats the two 24 words synonymously. Most criticality accidents in this 25 country have not exposed people to more than a hundred rem, O ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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95 1 which is another category of high consequence. We have had
[ 2 two deaths in criticality processing plants, one at a 3 licensee's plant, one at a contractor -- a DOE contractor 4 site.
5 Experience, which is very limited, because we have 6 'had few accidents, shows that the lethal consequences occur 7 only when the nuclear worker is within a few meters of the 8 . actual excursion and they are really no off-site 9 consequences to the general public from such an accident.
10 We do agree that continued attention is necessary 11 for criticality safety. However, criticality safety should 12 be treated in no intrinsic way different than normal 13 industrial safety practices. This is a part of our ANS-8-1 14 standard.
() 15 I will take questions as I go along here, if you 16 like, or at the end.
17 Our second concern has to do with the methodology 18 in the Standard Review Plan, Subsection 5.4.5.2, I think 19 that is in Chapter 5, on criticality safety. Subpart (b) is 20 overly prescriptive for establishing safety limits for 21 controlled parameters and their controls. As a matter of 22 fact, while the NCSD is in agreement that it is overly 23 prescriptive, they are not in agreement on what that subpart 24 'actually says. We could not reach consensus, so it is very 25 confusing, but those who could follow it part way through O ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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96 1 used all kinds of adjectives in describing it, but they said
[V T 2 it was overly prescriptive and not within current practice.
3 As an example, we used a simple mass limit, 350 j 4 grams, using Subpart (a). Using the Subpart 03) 5 methodology, we came up with all kinds of numbers from 200 6 grams to 400 grams, and it was just an unrealistic exercise, 7 that it is extremely complicated.
8 The primary concern is that this methodology is 9 just plain inconsistent with concepts of assuring safety and
{
10 risk control, regardless of the basis for the subcritical 11 limit. In Subpart (a), if you use critical mass data, you {
12 are just required to have controls. If you use Subpart 03) 13 and calculate the critical mass, then you have got to go l
14 through an extended, rigorous method, which we are not sure
'Q gj 15 exactly what you mean, to come up with the controls, and we 16 just don't see any basis for differentiating in the controls 17 for protecting a limit regardless of the way that the limit 18 is established.
19 So that is our next bullet there, the selection of 20 the controls should be independent of the method of 21 establishing the parameters, whether those limits come from 22 experimental data or validated calculational methods. So 23 Subpart (b) is just simply inappropriate on the controls.
24 And I say that even though we are not quite sure how one --
25 or what is expected for us -- or expected of the industry to
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97 l' -use those -- that guidelines, or how your people would
-2 interpret them.
3 Our next concern has to do with the Standard 4 Review Plan, the requirement to use PRA to affirm double 5 contingency. PRA is profitable in some applications, but it 6 is a substantial overkill on most applications. It really 7 is not used -- it is rarely used in the industry. It 8 frequently goes far beyond the intent of ANSI-8.1, which is 9 the document that has the double contingency statement in 10 it.
11 As we read the Standard Review Plan, more effort 12 would be expended in calculating the probabilities than in 13- demonstrating that the process is, in fact, subcritical, 14 which is the primary thrust of ANSI-8.1. More important,
() 15 databases for equipment failures in fuel processing plants 16 do not exist -- they do not exist. So you are putting a 17 requirement on the industry that they cannot meet. There is 18 one database at Savannah River plant, but that is for a 19 reprocessing plant, a different chemical environment than 20 you would have in a fuel fabrication plant.
21 The Statement of Considerations notes the 22 industry's objection to PRA but that is ignored then in the 23 Standard Review Plan.
24 Our last concern is with the complex regulatory 25 process for.the ISA. Our division does support the ISA in
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98 1 principle, however, the ISA process and report requirements
() 2 are rather. complex and somewhat unclear. We are afraid that 3 a complex ISA process.with distract from safety engineers, 4 not just criticality engineers, but safety engineers from 5 observing operations and discussing operations with the 6 operators.
- 7. Just as an aside, at the same meeting, we had a 8 session on the Defense Board's impact on criticality safety 9 at DOE plants, and Dr. Kouts, who heads up the Defense 10 Nuclear Safety Board, made the point -- the same point, that 11 he is concerned that the DOE requirements are becoming so 12 complex that engineers are being taken off the floor and 13- away from talking to operators, and this is not -- this is 14 disadvantageous to safety. So we have that concern with the
( ) 15 -- because of what appears to be reporting requirements that 16 are quite burdensome.
17 And, finally, the DOE contractors, by contrast, 18 have a safety basis defined in their SAR. The detailed 19 evaluations are not submitted to DOE. And we would suggest 20 that the NRC look at this model, this DOE model, for their 21 treatment of the ISA materials, because we are concerned 22 that it would detract from safety engineers being on the I 23 process floors where they can do their work.
That's a quick overview of the NCSD program, our
~
24 25 concerns with the current rule, draft rule and draft O
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99 1 Standard Review Program.
I h 2 QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE: George, let me just
\ _./
3 ask'some questions for understanding. One of the things 4 that the Commission is pushing is the risk-informed and 5 . performance-based regulation. Personally, I think it is I 6 great. One of the things that strikes me about nuclear i
7 criticality as an issue is it is a risk item. Sequoia 8 didn't die -- the guy at Sequoia didn't die from a )
{
.9 criticality, he died from essentially a chemical exposure.
10 MR. BIDINGER: That's right, he could not have 11 died from criticality.
12 QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE: So the issue of risk, 13 what we are trying to focus on are things that really hurt 14' people, whether it be chemical, whether it be criticality, (P) 15 whether.it be a dose of some kind, but really focus on risk.
16 Along the lines ofLwhat you were saying about detracting 17 people from real risk, as well as detracting them from 18 making money in business, and I personally like the nuclear 19 industry, so, you know, as long as it is safe. please have 20 it from a business point of view.
21 The point that is a little confusing to me is, if 22- you read the ANSI standard on criticality, it is very
~23 deterministic, double contingency. I am not so sure double 24 contingency.'is necessary in all risk cases. Recently, I 25 have been at DOE sites and, to my astonishment, and also a
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100 1 little bit of a calibration, saw actual, physical barriers, 2 as well as analysis, that if the criticality happened, so 3 what, the worst you could get was two rem, which is within 4 occupational exposure limits. And the argument was, why do 5 we need criticality alarms? Why do we need to have all 6 these controls? They had a convincing case, to be quite 7 honest.
8 I think in our fuel facility processes, looking at 9 the different enrichments, looking at the likelihood, the 10 PRA approach, although I don't think you should ever make 11 decisions based on bottom line numbers, but looking at the 12 risk, I think there are arguments to be made. In the 13 reactor arena, we made arguments about criticality alarms.
14 The ANSI standard tends to ignore than and just 15 simply call for a very deterministic approach that has a lot 16 of prescriptive detail. What we are trying to move toward 17 is the opportunity to make the risk case, and perhaps we did 18 go too far in the SRP and just simply not leave it open to 19 the same risk standard in terms of this is acceptable risk, 20 meaning whether it is criticality or it is anything else, it 21 is acceptable. And then look for the robustness of those 22 controls, and if double contingency, and diversity, and 23 separation are chosen by the applicant, good enough. If 24 there is a case to be made that you don't need all of that
'25 burden, that may be good enough as well.
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l 101 1 I am trying to understand what is it that would be
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the recommendation of the group in the context of not pursuing the risk approach and following more the 4 deterministic approach, which has a lot of baggage on it, or 5 some combination of the two, or retaining the traditional 6 approach as long as you have double contingency, and you l
7 have got a Ph.D. in nuclear engineering, and know the '
8 membership network for criticality membership, or ANS 9 membership, that is good enough. I don't know what approach 10 is that they are suggesting.
11 MR. BIDINGER: Well, I have to strongly disagree 12 with your assertion that the standards are deterministic.
13 If you will go back and read 8.1 -- and let me explain just 14 a bit about ANSI standards. They are three verbs in there,
() 15 shall a requirement, should recommendations, and may, which 16 is permission.
17 In 8.1, there is a requirement that the process 18 shall be shown to be subcritical, and that is a paraphrase, 19 I can't quote the words exactly. The double contingency is 20 that there should be sufficient factors. It is a 21 recommendation. It is not -- it was not important enough to 22 make it a requirement of the standard. So overabundance of 23 attention on the double contingency and its formalism can be 24 a detriment to the actual requirement of the standard that 25 the process be shown to be subcritical. And I afraid that O ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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102 1 the Standard Review Plan does make that mistake.
1 2
(v) QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE: What I would offer, 3 though, is our OGC has put out a position that this is l 4 guidance to the reviewer and it is one acceptable way to 5 satisfy, just like the shoulds, and it is a good practice to 6 do that would be in the ANSI standard itself. The rule 7 states what shall be done. The SRP and any Reg. Guide is 8 what is guidance.
9 MR. BIDINGER: I hear both sides of the table on 10 that issue, and my own experience is that younger people who j 1
11 do need the guidance will tend to take the guidance as 12 gospel, and that is -- well, that is human nature. I mean 13 it is something that has to be dealt with, and that's where 14 I come from, is that they should be provided guidance with a
() 15 minimum degree of safety, not the maximum permitted. That's 16 a concept I just can't accept.
17 But I think we have -- there is another thing that
{
18 comes into your comments and is in the standard and the 19 rule, and it has to do with risk and high consequence, and 20 it looks like they have been used interchangeably. And high 21 consequence -- well, a criticality excursion is not a high 22 consequence to anybody off-site, period. Blank statement.
l 23 In most cases it is not even a high consequence event to 24 workers on-site. I 25 But when you get around to talking about the risk !
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103 1 of criticality safety, with a proper evaluation, and even
(')
v 2 using the double contingency as some additional risk 3 management, then the risk is very low. And I don't think 4 that the proposed documents make the differentiation between 5 risk and consequence. And when it is -- using your 6 definition of high consequence, it is still a very low risk.
7 And then to have to put in all of the additional 8 requirements over and above normal management practices for 9 routine industrial safety is questionable.
10 QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE: What I would offer is 11 that there are certain things that are inherently safe, God 12 protects us all kind of thing. And then there are other 13 consequences we have some controls of some kind that make it 14 acceptable risk. There are natural phenomena that can
() 15 destroy anything you want to build. The thing that makes it 16 acceptable to live in that arena is the likelihood of that 17 happening. And, again, I don't want to make it sound like 18 what the agency is pushing toward is the traditional reactor 19 PRA, because that is not the case, what they are pushing for 20 is let's agree on a risk and not so much focus on a specific 21 consequence or a specific likelihood, and what that buys us 22 is the opportunity to take advantage of things that may be 23 terrible consequence.
24 The fuel cycle process involves people up close 25 and personal to the material. So the issue of being a few
[~')
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104 1 meters away, real people are within meters of the process j
) 2 itself, which can'have a criticality implication. The 3' likelihood of that, on the other hand, makes that 4- consequence acceptable, because it is not very likely, and 5 we have defined likelihoods along with what is acceptable 6- risk, and,1therefore, it makes it acceptable to deal with.
7' What I would offer is, rather than a rigid 8 structure.of prescription that is in any standard, allow the 9 graded approach that says once you demonstrate acceptable 10 ' risk, and the SRP has said here is what-is acceptable, when 11 you reach this, you are done, you don't need to do more, 12 that will' control the staff ratcheting. And then, second, 13 when you identify what the controls are that make that risk 14 acceptable in terms of the frequency and the consequence --
() 15 and/or the consequence, then you are done and all you have 16- to worry about making sure of is that those controls truly 17 are.available and reliable to perform that function when 18 . called on, and will perform it as long as you need it.
19 The contention that I think is driving that is 20 there is a strong belief by the Commission, and even 21 filtering down to the detailed staff reviewer level, that
'22 maybe it doesn't need to be a Rolls-Royce, it can be i 23 something less. Maybe one contingency is enough. And in 24 the case of the recent facilities., I visited at Savannah 25: River and 'at: Oak Ridge, they have got a real good case'for ANN ~RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD-.
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105 1 why worry about criticality alarms. You just literally
() 2 3
can't get more than a two rem dose because of these bunkered cells they use. The bottom line being, get away from the 4 reaction of running to the football with criticality and 5 deal with it in risk base.
6 And I think the Commission is struggling 7 desperately to try to push in that direction to take burden 8 off of industry and, yet, still have the acceptable risk.
9 MR. SHERR: George, if I can interject, I think --
10 the first agenda item after lunch is criticality. I think 11 we are into broad issues that we are dealing with after 12 lunch. My suggestion is we break lunch now and we continue 13 after lunch.
14 MR. KILLAR: Could I just say that the division is
) 15 forwarding a letter to Dr. Paperiello. I should have 16 mentioned that initially. I have a copy of it here, I will 17 give to you, Ted. Unlike a check, the letter is in the 18 mail.
19 MR. SHERR: Could I also get a copy of your 20 viewgraphs?
21 MR. KILLAR: Sure.
22 [Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the meeting was 23 recessed, to reconvene at 1:20 p.m., this same day.]
24 25
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106 1 AFTERNOON SESSION
() 2 3 MR. SHERR:
[1:20 p.m.]
The next agenda item is criticality 4 safety. Before we get into that, our maybe continue it, the 5 attendee list has been typed up. The gentleman who typed 6 this up noted that there are some individuals who have 7 penmanship as bad as mine. I think he said something like 8 that. So I urge you to double-check -- I don't care if we 9 spelled your name right, but make sure we got your e-mail 10 address right, that is where it doesn't work. So, if you 11 could just double-check. If you see any problems with that, 12 give us the changes. Appreciate that.
13 So, we will start with the criticality agenda item 14 number 4. Felix, are you --
) 15 MR. KILLAR: Yes, we are ready. We will move on 16 to the next. topic dealing with criticality safety, and we 17 have got Charlie Vaughan with General Electric that is going 18 to present that topic.
19 MR. VAUGHAN: The presentation is going to 20 generally focus on the rule, but, obviously, there will be 21 some places where we talk about ties into the SRP, and I 22 think that is important as we go forward, because not only 23 do we have to understand'the rule, but we have to understand 24 how that ties into the overall system.
25 And I will mention now that we got.a couple of O ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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107 1 questions on criticality safety yesterday to look at, and,
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in general, I think they are going to be reasonably well answered in the information that I present. On the other
'4 hand, I will try when I get finished, and maybe go back and 5 just touch on those so it is clear.
6 The first place that we started was -- this is not 7 all-inclusive, but what we tried to do was write down the 8 key parts of what we understood from reading the proposed 9 Part 70. There may be differences of opinion about that 10 between different people that read it, but this group tried 11 to write down the key things that we understood. And I will 12 not go through all of them, but I do -- under perform an 13 ISA, item (ii) there, the rule does seem to say that you --
14 or it does say that you assess accident unmitigated
) 15 consequences. It uses that terminology.
16 But in other places in the rule, it also says that 17 it prescribes as high consequence of concern certain items, 18 and it never gets you to the risk component of that and the 19 ' graded part. So, that is kind of a key disconnect, I think, 20 between items in the rule, and I believe the key is that the 21 rule focuses a little bit more on consequence than it does 22 integrating the risk piece into that.
23 MR. SHERR: It is not clear what you mean. Can 24 you elaborate?
25 MR. VAUGHAN: The rule addresses consequence. For
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108 1- example, it prescribes criticality safety to be a high
() 2 3
consequence of concern.
that.
And there's nothing wrong with I think most everybody accepts that as correct, but 4 we are trying to move in the direction of a risk-informed 5 regulation, and to get risk, we also have to look at the 6 likelihood, but the rule stops at consequence and it really 7 doesn't fully integrate the risk element and have the risk-8 be the part that drives the program.
9 MR. LEWIS: Excuse me. I guess I don't understand 10 that so much, because the very next subsection after it says 11 that criticality is a high consequence seems to say that the 12 occurrence of any high consequences should be, or shall be
.13 highly unlikely. So I believe that that is the risk, it is 14 the probability and the consequence that are specified.
() 15 MR. VAUGHAN: And that is the -- but that 16 automatically prescribes -- you see, you still don't get 17 down to the full implementation. That automatically 18 prescribes that criticality is a high consequence, which we 19 all agree on, but the likelihood is not necessarily a 20 likelihood that the ultimate -- we agree that we have to 21 make it highly unlikely, but where we don't agree is the 22 gradation of the controls and the activities that are done 23 to support that. And that is where the risk piece has to 24 come into being. Okay. That is where the difference is, I 25 think, between the way we are looking at it.
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109 1 MR. PERSINKO: So-is your concern then with the q j/ 2 rule? I mean it sounds to me it is not with the rule so 3 much, but we are back to the SRP.
4 MR. VAUGHAN: I said there is a tie there, and I 5 think it is a combination of the rule and the way that ties
'6 in with the SRP. I think there's two pieces of it. And I 7- think the nile needs to be cleaner on the inclusion of risk, 8 not in terms of just' highly unlikely, but needs to be 9 cleaner on that subject, and then the SRP needs to support 10 that.
1 11 MR. COX: Could I make a comment here? Tom Cox, l 12 again. Can you all hear me? As Rob Lewis just pointed out, j 13 and I think, Charlie, from what you said, an accident 14 sequence that ends in a criticality is, by the definition of ,
15 the rule, a high risk accident sequence. It has high 16 consequences, it must be highly unlikely, so both 17 consequences and likelihood have been treated. We have said 18 it is high risk, and the SRP treats a criticality sequence 19 that way also.
20 MR. VAUGHAN: I said that it is high consequence.
21- MR. COX: I'm sorry, what?
22 MR. VAUGHAN: I said -- my words were, and the 23 rule -- the words in the rule that we were concerned with is 24 that it says it is high consequence, and that is a true 25 statement, but it doesn't address the term of risk at the A
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110 1 level of implementation. It just simply prescribes highly rx (sm, ) 2 unlikely, and that is not enough definition to deal with the 3 actual implementation of criticality.
4 MR. COX: Well, I think I could respond to that, 5 and I would agree with that, that the rule does not define 6 highly unlikely. That is what the SRP chapter does in the 7 ISA chapter.
8 MR. VAUGHAN: Okay. And we have said there is a 9 tie between what is in the rule and what is in the chapter.
10 MR. KILLAR: If I could help out here a little 11 bit, Tom. What our concern is, in reading the rule and 12 reading the Standard Review Plan, it does not appear to us 13 that the risk of that criticality is adequately defined, and 14 that when you talk about criticality being an accident -- or
(~ k (s,h) 15 being a high consequence event, we have no disagreement 16 that, that we can't control where an operator could be at l
l 17 the time in the plant, and he could be next to that tank or 18 vat or whatever when it goes critical.
19 But on the other side of the coin, you have to 20 look at the likelihood and, well, it seems to be spelled out 21 somewhat in the SRP that you coupling those. It is not 22 perfectly clear to us that you are taking the coupling and 23 taking account of the barriers and controls that you have to 24 prevent that criticality, which then puts that down into the 25 acceptable risk range.
(p)
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111 l 1 MR. COX: We think the SRP describes in some
{
) 2 detail just exactly how you would go about taking account of 3 those controls when you lay out -- when the owner, operator, l
4 licensee, applicant lays out in that Table A-1, I believe it 5 is, the controls that are involved in a particular sequence 6 leading to a criticality, and you would describe how those 4 7 controls tie in, what the likelihoods of failure of those 8 controls are. The rule simply says that when you get to the 9 end of that accident sequence, it must be highly unlikely.
10 And that's the way.we address it in the SRP.
11 MR. KILLAR: I understand what you're saying. I 12 think we're looking at it from a different direction than 13 you are. And from that case maybe we're not quite -- we may 14 be in agreement, but we're -- because we're coming at it 15 from different directions it's not apparent to us.
16 MR. COX: Oh, it might take more detailed 17 discussion on this point, and I don't know how much you want 18 to do that now.
19 DR. PAPERIELLO: Could I ask -- could we first i 20 listen to the presentation before we start -- I'd like to 21 hear the whole thing first. j 22 MR. VAUGHAN: Okay. This sheet tries to focus on !
23- what industry has identified as concerns, which is a >
l 24 continuation of the discussion that we were just having, and 25 in fact the first item there, it just seems that the rule l
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r 1 112 1 more focuses on just consequence and not risk. Now that's
() 2 3
discussable, but our opinion is that.
We do agree, and it seems like there's uniform 4- agreement, that a nuclear-criticality accident is a high 5 consequence, but may not necessarily be a high-risk item.
6 And we believe that the nuclear-criticality aspect should be 7 treated comparably with other safety considerations for the
~
8 plant site and not treated in necessarily a different 9 fashion.
10 The proposed rule really in our opinion doesn't 11 recognize the appropriateness or the grading of criticality 12 safety controls based on risk. That would be in 70.60(c) I 13 think is where that goes, and in fact nuclear criticality 14 safety controls do vary in their importance. And it has to A
( ,) 15 do with lots of things. Just the enrichments being handled
'16 ' in the facility, the time it takes to get into a dangerous 17 situation when there's been a control failure, the type of 18 controls that you use, whether they're engineered, whether 19 they're administrative, whether they're passive, active, how 20 they're implemented, how they're assured. So there's a lot 21 of things really that go into dealing with the risk and 22 grading the criticality controls and identifying based on 23 their grade what situation should be in place.
24 And again, and we coined a new word up there, but 25 'I did some research on it, and lavels and levels are about !
i
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113 ,
1 the same meaning. But there are different levels of
() 2 assurance that are warranted for different types of control 3 schemes. So we think.70.76 -- and I'll talk about that in a 4 little more detail -- will need some work there.
5 I won't go into this in detail. We picked it up 6 and ANS has picked it up, that the double-contingency 7 -principle is kind of improperly applied by the assignment of 8 quantitative failure frequencies to criticality safety, and 9 generally the professional community has dealt with that in 10 a different way.
11 I'll also say that I understood that we wanted to 12 have a workshop specially on criticality safety, and I 13 suspect with the comments that we've been hearing, that's 14 going to be beneficial, because there does need to be some
'O'
(,,j 15 getting down into basics and see if we can come to agreement 16 on what the professional community is doing, and is that 17 proper, and if it is, then how do we, you know, codify that 18 so it gives it some validity.
19 The rule also talks about criticality controls 20 being continuously available and reliable, and that's where 21' it stops. And that raises a lot of questions in our mind 22 about okay, when we have to take a control off line to do 23' calibrations and maintenance, in fact we do defeat the 24 controls and we do manipulate them to be able to go through 25 those functional tests. If a process is down and not O
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114 1 running, you know, what's the significance of having a
() 2- control that's not operatable. So we think that needs to be 3 qualified to say when required to perform their safety 4 function. And I think that's in 70.60 (d) (3) .
5 And it's also then not clear to us that the 6 licensing process is set up to focus on the high-risk 7' accident sequences. We hear a lot of words when we talk 8 that says that's what the intent is, but when we look at it, 9 we don't see exactly how the guidance would generate an 10 approach that says the high-consequence or high-risk items 11 are the ones that we're going to focus on, and we're going 12 to look at some of the others, but the key is at the high 13 level.
14 Just to look at some of the things that we might
) 15 propose to correct, one is to revise the language so we're 16 both happy that it reflects a risk-based as opposed to a 17 consequence-based regulation. That I think is something 18 that we could work out with a working group on that subject.
19 And we think that we ought to have a risk-informed, 20 . performance-based methodology embedded in all this that 21 enables the licensee to evaluate the risk and the 22 likelihood -- well, the consequence and the likelihood to 1
23 get risk for nuclear criticality accidents as well as all 24 other accidents, and to establish a risk-base which would be 25 graded levels of protection to prevent nuclear-criticality (x ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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115 1 accidents. That's the subject of trying to get in and
() 2 analyze and determine particularly how important various 3 criticality controls are, and what about them is important 4 to control to make sure that they're available when needed.
5 And'then to carry that right on, as I was saying, into the 6 graded level of assurances that we use for their control to 7 ensure their availability and reliability.
8 In the section that talks about graded level of 9 protection, we think that the quantitative approach to the 10 double-contingency rule ought to be removed, and we ought to 11 go back and just incorporate the ANSI standard approach for 12 dealing with that. And we also think that the language of 13 the rule on reliability and availability needs to be 14 clarified to indicate that it's during periods of time when 15 it should be available, and I think -- that's in 16 70.60 (d) (3) .
17 So that's pretty much the prepared information 18 that we had. The question A under criticality, I think that 19 the first part of that with regard to what are the specific 20 concerns that we have with the rule was pretty much the 21 subject of what we presented.
22 What are our concerns with the SRP? We've 23 enumerated some of those, and there are clearly ties between 24 the SRP and the rule, but we have not I think exhausted this 25 whole subject of the SRP and how criticality safety is A
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116 1 treated in there, and like I said, it was our understanding N
2 that we were tentatively proposing to have a workshop with 3 the criticality professionals to do that, and that's 4 probably the forum to resolve some of those issues.
5 With regard to B, I believe where our position 6 really is is that we want ANSI 8.1 to be used as the 7 standard, and apply it across the industry as it has been in 8 the past, and we believe that it's perfectly acceptable to 9 do that. So we don't see a need to regenerate that.
10 Okay?
11 DR. PAPERIELLO: Yes. I've got a couple -- could 12 you put your last slide up?
13 If I go down, the last -- the third bullet I 14 understand, and I probably don't have too much argument 15 there. I noted to my staff at lunch time we have just 16 published a Part 63 as it's been to which we have removed.
17 See, I look on this whole issue as barriers. I 18 mean, the fact of the matter is double contingency is the 19 deterministic way of controlling risk in criticality, much 20 like. defense in depth was used for reactors years ago. That 21 was sort of -- even though we keep it -- we still deal with 22 PRAs, and which in basically subsystem performance for 23 high-level waste, and having quantitative criteria for each j 24 subsystem has now given way to each needs to make a 25; contribution. But we're looking at overall performance of
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117 1 the repository,.and not what each individual barrier 2_ contributes to this thing. So that's why your third bullet 3 doesn't give me much'of a problem.
4 But we keep seeing the talking around here. I 5 agree, risk is consequence times probability of the event.
6 I mean, you know, that's the same. You've made a statement, ;
7 and I think we all agree here, that criticality is a l
8 high-consequence event. So that means to get acceptable 9 risk we ought to be -- I mean, the risk ought to be the )
10 same.
11 I mean, the resulting risk to workers or the 12 public ought to be the same, regardless of the kind of 13 accident you have, because an accident with a low 14 consequence, you can tolerate a higher probability than one (O) 15 with a high consequence, you then have a -- you need to 16 worry about a lower probability, so that overall the 17 product -- I just don't understand when you argue -- thought i
18 that's what we were doing. We were saying we want the i 1
19 probability for a criticality to be low, which is -- I 20 ' don't -- I guess I don't understand. We've defined it as 21 high-consequence, you agree that it's high-consequence. We 22 both want a certain probability there to give an acceptable 23 risk.
24 MR. KIDD: Carl, let me point out just one item.
25 -I think we're both on the same track. I think there's ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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118 1 perhaps a little bit of a wording problem in the rule that
() 2 needs to be corrected, and just as an example, if you look 3 at. 70.60 (c) ,- when we talk about consequences and 4- likelihoods, we tie likelihoods to external events only in 5 that particular rule language, the way it is written 6 currently. And that likelihood should be tied to not only 1 7 external events, but internal events and process. deviations.
8 And I know that was your intent, but all we're saying is 9 that there are a couple of places in the rule language where 10 if we talked specifically to the risk as opposed to the 11 different elements of consequence and likelihood, or that we 12 .get the likelihood tied to the right thing, I think we'll 13 have agreement in many places.
14 DR. DAMON: I think I can -- my name's Dennis 15 Damon. I'm a criticality safety specialist on the NRC 16 staff, and I've been thinking about the same subjects that 17 Charlie's been thinking about. And I agree with~every 18 single one of his points on his slide except one, which I 19 might get to later.
20 But I've recently had an illuminating thought with 21 respect to the two points he's making up there about how you 22 grade safety control. The illumination is this, and that is 23 that among the assurance measures that we apply to 24 criticality -- to any safety thing, there are some which are 25 not proportioned to.the quality of the safety controls or to O ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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119 1 the risks, they're in proportion to the consequences. And
() '2 then there are others which'are proportioned to the 3 reliability level you need to get with the safety controls.
4 So you've got,to get that in -- and let me give an 5 example so you. understand what I mean, is that if -- once 6 you've identified that you've got a high-consequence event, 7 that means you have to have a high-reliability safety 8 control, right? To get the likelihood down and to get this 9 balanced risk that Dr. Paperiello was talking about. So 10 anything that you do to get that likelihood of failure of 11 that safety control down to where it has to be, it has to be 12 of whatever quality level is sufficient to get you there.
13 And so that's the part that's proportional. That's the 14 risk-graded or whatever you want to call it,
) 11 5 . reliability-graded, likelihood-graded part of this thing.
16 Any measure that you take or any item relied on for safety 17 has to get you to that reliability level.
18 So things like how often do you do maintenance, 19 the thicknesses that you make things to prevent wearout 20 failure, preoperational testing, all kinds of things that 21 are specific to a specific piece of equipment, they just 22 have to be done to whatever level is enough to get you to 23 that reliability. And the design engineer can play with 24 these things. He can give you a little more of this, a 25 little less of that, and he can come with all different ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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120 1 combinations that will get you where you want to go. But
() 2 nevertheless the whole scheme is risk-rated.
.3 Now, get to the two things that I come up with 4 that are not graded that way. What they are is 5 configuration management and auditing of the whole system.
6 So if you have like a system that has S&M in it, that system 7 can go critical because it has the S&M in it. So that means 8 since the consequence of the event is a criticality and if 9 you accept that's a high consequence, what the configuration 10 management is protecting you against is that somebody 11 changes that system, and that's why it isn't graded with the 12- quality of the safety control, it has to be applied equally 13 to all systems that have S&M in them. And the reason is 14 that you cannot allow the operations staff to change the 15 configuration of any system that has S&M in it. You can't 16 allow them to do that. Because what they can do is no 17 matter what the safety control is on the system, if you 18 allow the staff to change the system, they can defeat the 19 safety control.
20 So what you need to do is have an adequate degree 21 of configuration management on every system that has a 22 potential for a high-consequence accident. You can't allow 23 any of them to be excluded from configuration management.
24 And then there are some measures that are 25 analogous to configuration management that go along with
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121 1 that. So I thought -- and basically I agree, you know, with j 2 what you're saying, that -- and I think the word, as the
- 3. last gentleman said, I don't think this is a real problem.
4 I don't think this is a real problem. I think we solve it 5 by clarifying the language and giving better guidance to the 6 staff, and we're done with this issue.
7 .MR. VAUGHAN: Let me try a little bit of a 8 question on you. You talked about some of the things that, 9 you know, we do to control, and you were over in one area.
10 But I think that, you know, we have a number of different 11 control methodologies to use like passive and active 12 engineered controls, administrat've,i and each one of those 13 has certain characteristics associated with it. And should 14 that not be factored into looking at what the ultimate risk O
k ,)
s 15 level is and how those controls would be treated?
16 MR. DAMON: See, you don't want to get yourself in 17 a circular argument here. The reason the risk will end up 18 being low is because of the safety control, right? And 19 so -- but they're only good if you do them good. And that's 20 what the graded approach means, is you have to --
21 MR. VAUGHAN: That's true, but if you pick, for 22 example, administrative, which is probably the weakest yet 23 perfectly appropriate in a number of situations, you know, 24 if you pick a very weak control and a very complex system, 25 then the amount of risk reduction you get from that is
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r-122 1 probably minimal compared to if you go with, you know,
() 2 3
strong engineered' controls or something like that that are well maintained.
4 You know, I just -- it seems like those other 5 components play a part in this.
6- MR. DAMON: If what you're saying is that in doing 7 our reviews and stuff we should focus on administrative 8 controls, I actually agree with you.
9 MR. VAUGHAN: That's not what I said.
10 [ Laughter.]
11 We have to focus on all the controls.
12 MR. DAMON: But I -- I mean, that is the more 13 problematic one. I mean, my own view is that the people 14 that you normally go to to have them design a piece of
(_j 15 hardware for you, if you're going to go with a hardware 16 control, hardware engineering has been done a long time, and 17 they generally know how to do them and make them reliable.
18 I rarely see a badly engineered piece of hardware. But I 19 often see a badly engineered piece of procedures.
20 DR. PAPERIELLO: Could I get to words? And we're 21 looking at (c) .. Take a look at the words here. And I say 22 let's go to the 1 and 2. It says the occurrence of any of 23 the high-consequence identifieds in paragraph b(1) of this 24 section is highly unlikely.
25 If I turn around and change it and say the b
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123 1 probability of occurrence of any of the high consequences
() 2 identified in paragraph b(1) of this section is very low, I 3 think I've just defined risk.. In other words, probability 4 or the consequence times the probability of occurring. And.
5 .then you could go to the probability of occurrence of any of 6 'the intermediate consequences identified in' paragraph b(2) 7 of this section is' low.
8 .Does that take care of defining -- I'm going to go 9 back to the other words. I just want it turned around.
10 Does that get this and make it risk? Because the 11 consequence times the probability is risk. We all agree 12 with that.
13 MR. VAUGHAN: Right. And the only problem that 14 we've had with the term " probability" is it's highly O)-
(_ 15 associated with PRA and the things --
16 DR. PAPERIELLO: I know. And we've tried to dance 17 around that thing. I mean, you.know, you're right. We 18 don't -- I just don't think it's technically feasible to do 19 a PRA on a facility like yours. I mean, I'm just -- it's '
20 not technically feasible.
21 I have another argument, because I've got people
- 22. here that are trying to push PRA and everything, and the 23 thing is you can't -- one, the way I define it, you have a 24 loosely coupled system, and PRA is wonderful when you have 25 tightly coupled systems. The system is loosely coupled.
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.1 .You can drop a bundle out in the yard and it won't make a
() 2. damn bit of difference to the pallet presses or a lot of the 3 other things you do, where in a reactor you disconnect 4 the -- your output transformer from the. low-power lines and 5 you immediately cause control rods to go in. That's a very 6 tightly coupled system. And I agree with that. So I 7 understand.
8 But that was one of the things. If I turn it 9 around and say each licensee shall provide a level of 10 protection as commensurate with instead of the severity the 11 risk of the consequences resulting from credible accidents 12 and the likelihood of external events, does that do it?
13 See, I'm looking for words.
14- MR. SILVERMAN: And, Carl, I think you're exactly
() 15 right, in terms of focusing on that section and the words, 16 because what I'm hearing in several meetings now is no one's i
]
17 saying that they don't want this rule to be risk-based, and 18 we are all trying to focus on risk, and I also agree with 19 Tom Cox that when you look at the table in the SRP that kind 20 of describes in fairly gre-at detail how you would have 1 21 someone go through this process of identifying items relied 22 on for safety, there clearly is in my view -- I'm not a 23 technical expert -- a risk analysis going on there. It is
)
24 the language in (c) where we -- and maybe some other areas,
+
25 but (c) is a big issue where we are having problems, and I ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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'l do think if this language were modified to use words like
() 2 3
" risk" and to use words like " consequence times likelihood" perhaps --
4 DR.'PAPERIELLO: That's what I want to get in 5 here,'because I think we all agree.
6 MR. SILVERMAN: I think that would solve a l 7 multitude of sins. That's my own personal opinion.
8 DR. PAPERIELLO: And then go down to the measures ,
i 9 used to instead of saying " assure continuous availability 10 and reliability" "to assure their availability and l
11 reliability when needed." Because I think that's what we l 12 meant. I don't think anybody expected you to maintain a 13 certain, you know, moderator, but you've got to shut it down 14 and wash it out or something.
() 15 I'm being a bit facetious, but, you know, it's --
16 I' guess what I'd like to do with this section here, rather 17 than us argue philosophically, because I really don't 18 think -- standard review plan may be a different issue. I'm 19 trying to break it down into pieces so I can fix problems 20 instead of trying to solve -- I'm not trying to lower the 21 water in a swamp. I'm just trying to keep it out of the 22 boat at this point.
23 I guess what I would do is two things. I'm going 24 to go back to my -- I mean, as I said, I wrote a few words 25 here, but, you know, me saying I'm going to actually, you ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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126 1 taking a look and vriting it down and say whether I like
() 2 3
that or not is something different. What I would really propose to do on this one, at least for the rule, I'm not --
4 putting aside the standard review plan -- I'm just taking 5 the rule -- is I'm going to ask my people to modify the 6 -words. I would ask you to do the same thing. And let's see 7 what we can come up with. Because, I mean, we don't have 8 that many words. I mean, this is what we're talking about i 9 here. We've probably got less than 100 words. What can we 10 do? And we seem to be saying the same thing, I think. But 11 we need to turn around. What words would look right here? ,
l' 12 You know, I'm not going to put you on the spot and 13 say would these words do it, because even though I say that, 14 you've really -- to be fair to you, you need to turn around
(
15 and look at, you know, see it written down. Because I don't 16 feel I have a, you know, a lot of -- just like chemicals, I i 17 don't think we really disagree. It's just whether or not 18 the words -- putting aside the details of the standard 19 review ~ plan.
20 Is that fair? I mean --
21 MR. VAUGHAN: Yes.
22 DR. PAPERIELLO: Yes?
23 MR. VAUGHAN: Yes, that's great.
24 DR. PAPERIELLO: Yes. Because your definition of 25 risk is certainly the same as mine. If we're not getting O'
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127 1 there with the words, then what words will get us there?
[ \ 2 Well, that's what we would do, we'd put them out Al 3 on a web page. Or you do it any way. We could send you a 4 letter, something like that, with the same thing. Do it 5 both ways.
6 MS. EYCK: We're proposing that maybe the web page 7 might be the good vehicle to do this, because we want to use 8 the web page as a vehicle that we can propose language and 9 we can get comments in from everybody and let them know the 10 process that we're going through to resolve the differences 11 that we now have.
12 DR. PAPERIELLO: Anyway, it seems to me we can --
13 I can at least do this in a couple days. I mean -- my own 14 staff will probably argue with me that I'm wrong.
15 MR. KILLAR: We agree with you, Carl.
16 DR. PAPERIELLO: You know, because it's just --
17 you know, we've been arguing in a lot of -- I don't want to 18 say arguing -- I don't want to say it in a negative sense, 19 but we talk about this stuff, it seems like -- it sounds 20 like we agree, but the words don't get us there.
21 QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE: I just want to offer 22 in the context of the language, one of the things in looking 23 at what the consequences are, you may be able to decide just 24 looking at the consequences that they're a no never mind, 25 don't waste a bunch of time doing an analysis. So the ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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128 1 context of doing the risk is once you decide you've got a f
2 consecrience that's' not tolerable in either the context of 3 Part 20 or if it's a nuclear risk or a chemical risk that's 4 affecting nuclear safety, the consequence may not be worth 5 pursuing in terms of it's below some acceptable health 6 threshold, and therefore don't do a big analysis. It's 1
7 self-evident that it's safe because of the level of the 8 consequence inherent in whatever the hazard is.
i 9 So the logic of looking at each is, number 1, it 10 may be such an incredible event, for example, and 11 earthquake, why do an analysis of the consequence if the 12 earthquake is 10 to the minus 8, why pursue it. The same 13 thinking goes with the consequence. If the consequence is .
14 so small, don't do a big analysis to come up with a risk, j 15 because you can live with the consequence.
16 MR. VAUGHAN: Your point's well taken. I think 17 the teams at the sites that are actually implementing this 18 are using that approach. In other words, they're not doing l l
19 an analysis just for analysis s'ake, and when the develop i j
l 20 enough information to give them confidence that it is indeed '
21 a low-risk situation, then, you know, that's about where it 22 stops.
23 Okay?
24 DR. PAPERIELLO: Good. Thank you.
25 .MR. GOODWIN: Is George Bidinger still here? Do ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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129 1 you want to present?
A)
(J 2 MR. BIDINGER: Just as a follow-on to this 3 morning, Ted cut us off for lunch, which I agreed with. But 4 there was somebody I noticed standing at the podium over 5 here had a question. Are there any more-questions on this 6 morning's presentation from the NCSD?
7- DR. DAMON: I was the one standing. This is 8 Dennis Damon again. I was the one standing at the podium.
9 I just wanted to mention that something that might -- there
-10 may be some people in industry who may not be aware of this, 11 but the Commission, in response to the Administration, sent 12 to Congress a strategic plan in which there is a safety 13 performance goal related to criticality.
14 It says, this performance goal is that there
) 15 should be no inadvertent criticalities involving licensed 16 material. And that works its way into the SRP and into this 17 discussion, in that, when you do start thinking about the 18 frequency or likelihood of occurrence of criticalities, what
'19 that says to me is whatever you choose has to be low enough 20 so that you do not expect to see one happen in the industry 21 ; in -- what, 50 years, 100 years? Something like that.
22 That's what it means to me when the Commission says that.
23 You know, in other words, if someone else's l 24 interpretation of double contingency is that it is l 25 acceptable to have a criticality somewhere in the country O ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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130 1_ every ten years, I say the Commission's goal says that they
() 2 3.
don't accept _that, that it has to be better than that. And so we are bound by that, at least I feel bound, that I have 4 to make the quality level that corresponds to double 5 contingency such-that it will meet that goal.
6 And the other thing is it definitely was not the 7 intent of the ISA chapter, and especially as related to 8 criticality, that you would do PRA. In fact, if you look at 9_ -- what it is, is it was structured to permit you to do it, 10 if you chose to do so. Imd the numerical values that were 11 used -- rather used in reverse, they were as a guideline to 12 get you to something qualitative and objective that you 13 could assess, and that is the middle column in Table A-3 of 14 the appendix to the ISA chapter, where it has controls 15 listed in terms of whether they are an administrative 16 control, active control, passive control.
17 And that is the objective here is to get -- is to 18 not have people have to do anything except stand there and 19 use'that as a look-up table. It is a cookbook, but it is a 20 cookbook that the person who is using it applies with the 21 judgment, the experience and the expertise of someone who is 22' familiar with the system and the plant. But it is not -- it 23 is definitely not PRA and, personally, we are not interested 24 in numerical numbers, and we are not interested in adding up 25 things across the plant. We are really interested in each hj
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131 1 system by itself.
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[O 2 MR. BIDINGER: There's a couple of things. I 3 think if we -- speaking for the NCSD again, we think that 4 criticality safety does not need to be put into that 5 emotional area of just an unallowed accident. I think if 6 you look at other parts of the nuclear industry, if you l 7 looked at radiation sources and how they have killed people, 8 it would probably be an industry that would be out of 9 business.
10 In terms of the guidance that you mentioned on 11 PRA, the guidance is that you have to have a control of 10 12 to the minus 2 and a control of 10 to the minus 3. Those 13 are arbitrary numbers. 10 to the minus 5 is impossible to f 14 defend, I think technically, but even so, why couldn't it be (3
(_) 15 5 controls of each 10 to the minus 1. It is much too '
16 prescriptive, as well as improperly considered in the first ,
17 place. So there's a lot of things.
J 18 On the double contingency, it says one of the two l
19 controls. Well, with double contingency, you may have j l
20 umpteen controls. There's nothing in double contingency 1 21 that says -- so there are a lot of technical flaws in the 22 application -- in the guidance to the staff in the Standard 23 Review Plan.
24 DR. D7A0N: Well, I would agree that the language 25 in that area can probably be improved. But it is also true I
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132 1 that -- I think the point that was trying to be in that II V
2- section in the chapter, which, again, I say I didn't write, 3 but the double contingency principle says both -- you have 4 to have at least two unlikely event.s. So what they were --
5 the point that was trying to be made there was that you 6- could not have one event which was extremely unlikely and 7 one other that was going to happen every week, or it is a 8 50/50 shot. Both of them, you have to have two unlikely.
9 So that is all that was trying to be achieved there, and I 10 agree that the words may have to be tuned up to get to that.
11 MR. BIDINGER: If there are no more questions on 12 this morning's, I will switch hats. I now want to speak for ]
- 13. Tom McLaughlin. Tom is the Group Leader of Criticality 14 Safety at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Tom felt inclined
'O
(_,/ 15 to comment because in the -- I think it is in the Statement 16 of Considerations,.there is some reference that these rules
{
17 might apply to DOE facilities in the future, and he is at a 18 DOE facility and felt so inclined.
19- Tom has been at the laboratory for about 30 years.
20 The first ten years he spent performing critical mass 21 experiments and doing reactor design and research. In the 22 last 20 years he has migrated into the field of criticality 23 safety and is the Group Leader.
24 In Tom's way of looking at things, he is 25 presenting first an overview in his letter., I have already i
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l 133 1 given the letter to Ted, and a copy of these viewgraphs.
'( ) 2 But, in essence, he looks first at 10 CFR 70 and he sees 3 that it talks about risk, but it focuses on 4 consequence-based regulation.. And then he talks -- he has 5 many questions about the graded approach, because it focuses (i on the worst case in all cases. But as far as risk is 7 concerned, it is consistent wich the ANS-8 standards, he 8 will call them deterministic, but we think they are really 9' risk-based, performance-based. And he does agree with the 10 performance, risk-informed concepts, however, he says the 11 devil is in the details.
12 With the ISA, he calls it an excellent concept, 13 but he is concerned about the detailed requirements, paper 14 submittals, delays in approvals, very expensive for the 15 industry, if they had to live with all the paper work that
'16 is potentially required by the proposed rule.
17 He looks at the Standard Review Plan and he sees 1 i
18 details, details, details. He questions the basis for 19 specific values and draws implications on costs, manpower 20 and worker safety. That's the same issue that Dr. Kouts 21 mentioned in his recommendation to DOE in 97-2 and be 22 brought up at the ASME meeting this last month.
23 Again, he focuses on, looking now at some of the 1 24 issues in more detail, criticality accidents as defined as a 25 high consequence event. Where is the graded approach? Many l
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l 134 1 criticalities will not have high consequence. The track j 2 record shows that there have been -- most of the criticality i 3 accidents have had little or no exposure.
'4 As far as quantified risk assessment is concerned, 5 the data do not exist to support its use, it simply cannot 6 be done. There are some aspects of PRA that could be done, 7 but in terms of a total database, it does not exist.
8 Unfortunately, my printer doesn't do justice.
9 These were nice Southwest colors on what. he sent me on the 10 computer, but I had to itse my old printer, so it doesn't do 11 justice to Tom's work.
12 As far as the Integrated Safety Assessment is 13 concerned, it is an excellent concept, he agrees with it.
14 It is consistent with the philosophy of ANS-8 and the s ,/. 15 standards that they have written, and it is consistent with 16 the DOE philosophy in criticality safety. Although, I think 17 in reading more in Tom's, he consider the ISA to be more 18 like the SAR that is provided to DOE and becomes, basically, 19
~
their authorization basis. You see that in his comments as 20 we move on.
21 For 70.62, ISA requirements for new processes, 22 submit the results of the ISA. That has severe implications 23 on required actions documentation -- and documentation 24 prepared to current practices. He finds that this would be 25 an unbearable on them. It would slow down their approval
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135 1 process and end up in regulatory. costs that are not
.2- defensible.
3- He questions the baseline design criteria.
4 _ Licensees shall maintain appropriate records of these items
'5 throughout the life of the facility. A literal 6 interpretation of this would be that he would have to 7 maintain records for cans, dissolution pots, filter boats, 8 the like, which there is no reason to maintain such 9 information'for the life of the facility. The requirement 10 is much broader than reason would dictate.
11 In Appendix C, he talked about the reportable 12 events, deviation from safe operating conditions. It has 13 the potential, as identified in the ISA, again, he is 14' concerned that there is no graded approach. A 1 percent
() '15 over-mass limit would be just as reportable as a 10 16 over-mass' limit, as a 100 percent over-mass limit, as a 200 17 percent over-mass limit.
18 DOE has gone through this in a painful manner.
19 Bert mentioned that this morning, but the graded approach on 20 report needs to be worked into the regulation and into the 21 SRP.
22 He also talks about the Standard Review Plan. The 23 act shall conduct and maintain an ISA that identifies 24 specific control parameters. He feels that this should be 25 in a SAR document-and that there should not be a detailed
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136 1 ISA treated as a regulatory document.
2 In summary, the documentation reporting 3 requirements appear to require excessive detail far beyond 4 current NRC or DOE requirements. If this is true, worker j 5 safety will likely suffer as scarce criticality safety 6 professionals will have even less time available to interact 7 on the floor with operations personnel.
8 Some of the SRP requirements that he mentioned, I 9 and I may have these two out of -- okay. It says at least 10 one of the two controlled parameters dealing with double 11 contingency. As I have just mentioned, there should be no 12 limit on the number of controls that are used to satisfy the 13 double contingency. And, in fact, it is a rare situation, 14 indeed, when only two controls are used or available. Even
( 15 when you have engineered controls, there are still 16 administrative controls to make sure you have the engineered 1 17 controls, and they just compound. But that idea that you 18 only need two controls puts the reviewer into counting 19 controls and he forgets that he is really looking for 20 subcriticality.
i 21 The NCS limits, I have already mentioned that. !
22 Those limits, 45 percent and 75 percent, are not in a peer j 23 reviewed document and they certainly are not in any ANS-8 24 standard.
25 Finally, his final comment is that the reviewer 1
i l
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137 1 will determine that the NCS review of the ISA includes a
() 2 3
review of the potential accident sequences that result in inadvertent criticality. Here all accident sequences have 4- to be considered, not just the worst case accidents, and 5 .they have to be maintained for each operation, all 6 sequences. It is contrary to DOE guidance and it is 7 prohibitively expensive to do such a thing.
8 So those are the viewgraphs that Tom supplied.
9 The letter is more detailed. He could not be here to speak 10 for himself. I appreciate your time. I will certainly try 11 to answer any questions, but I can't be in the mind of Tom 12 McLaughlin, but I will try.
13 MR. COX: I would just to like to -- I can't 14 believe Tom McLaughlin would say that a criticality should
() 15 not be a considered a high consequence event. I mean I can
-16 see where, in his environment, where he is working with high
-17 enriched metal or plutonium, that in a DOE establishment, it 18 may be true that they have quite a few criticalities and 19 people don't get killed, because metal criticalities can be 20 quite a low yield event and, in addition, in a DOE op.
21 environment, people may not be near where the S&M is.
22 But if you go into any of the facilities we 23 regulate, typically, there is somebody standing right next 24 to where the S&M is. So, if there is a criticality there, 25 and it is a_ low enriched oxide solution, thermal type ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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r 138 1 system, they are going to be dead. That's all there is to
()
2 it. And that is a high consequence to me.
3 MR. BIDINGER: I am getting into an area where I 4 am going to tread with trepidation, but I think Tom would 5 make the srgument that most of the accidents are indeed not 6 high significance. Most of the accidents are not prompt 7 critical. With criticality alarms, people, if they are few 8 feet away, can evacuate safely and survive. That Tom is --
9 I had a discussion on this, because Tom was going to put in 10 another letter from ANS-8 Standards Committee, but he didn't 11 have enough time to do it.
12 But, as a part of his work, he has been reviewing 13 all accidents in this country and gathering information from 14 the Russians on their accidents, and he describes most of
() 15 them as not consequence events. Primarily because of the 16 physics of criticality, you don't get the prompt bursts, you 17 don't get the large bursts. And the physics'of criticality 18 is very important, both in understanding what criticality 19 and in the shutdown mechanisms for criticality.
20 Tom, I think, would take you on and could argue it 21 much more eloquently and much more strongly than I can.
22 MR. ROTHLEDER: George, I would like to mention 23 that there are two definitions, or two views of consequence.
24 There is another view.of consequence which we don't like to 25 talk about here, but we are faced with, and that is the ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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139 1 political ccusequences. If there is a criticality accident
() 2 and nobody'is injured or nobody is hurt, but there is such 3 an accident, there will be investigations for years by both 4 Houses of Congress, by the Executive, by the agency, or 5 agencies involved, and it will be nightmare. It will 6 detract from safety,-certainly, and be a real problem. That 7 is a consequence ~that we want to avoid. And so, in many 8 people's minds, that is why a criticality accident is not 9 tolerable in any way.
10- This requirement of such a low consequence on that 11 basis, makes the. risk -- and, again, risk here gets 12 redefined to not tolerable either, and that is one of the 13 driving forces behind the large amount -- the large effort 14 in preventing criticality in any way, shape or form.
15 One of the things that Tom is referring to, 16- however, is that if you have a criticality occurrence in a l
17 shielded facility, there is no -- there is no risk to 18 personnel, and that is perhaps tolerable. We do have, in 19 DOE, ' f acilities, nany shielded f acilities, many hot cells.
20 Another point I would like to mention is that, in 21 approach external regulation, we find that DOE and NRC are 22 finding that there are differences that must be resolved in 23 the way the NRC approaches things and the way DOE does, 24 because there are different facilities, different types of j 25 facilities involved, and many of the facilities that DOE now O ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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140 1 has responsibility for were under the old AEC, and maybe X
() 2 3
under ERDA, but many years have passed and the NRC simply hasn't deal with the facilities, essentially, not dealt with 4 them at all, because so much time has passed. And so this 5 is a difference that must be resolved. I think this is part 6 of the concern.
7 MR. BIDINGER: Well, I think that gets into the 8 regulatory issues, but in terms of criticality safety, the 9 ANS-8 standards are applicable equally well to the dol 10 facilities and the NRC licensed facilities. They all were 11 licensed by -- I think they were all licensed by the AEC 12 . originally anyway, so.
13 But criticality safety -- regulatory issues are 14 different, but criticality safety, per se, should not be
() 15 different in the different facilities around the country.
16 MR. SHERR: Thank you, George. I guess that is
-17 your third hat for today.
18 MR. BIDINGER: Yes.
19 MR. SHERR: Okay. One thing George has given is 20 he mentioned he gave me two letters, one from the ANS and 21 one from Los Alamos, and both those letters will be put on 22 the web site.
23 Ituis now 2:15. We will take a short break, and 24 if we can reconvene at 2:30.
25 [ Recess.]-
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141 1 MR. SHERR: If we can reconvene, please. The
() 2 suggestion has been made, before we proceed to the final two 3 items on the agenda, instead of pursing those today, we 4 would save those for tomorrow and talk a little more about 5 some of the proposals that have been talked about so far, 6 and maybe providing a basis for further discussion tomorrow 7 and maybe we can make progress in identifying some 8 appropriate word changes.
9 MR. KILLAR: What we thought we would do -- you '
10 know, we have had some fairly some good discussion this 11 morning on the various topics that we have presented, but 12 there didn't seem to be any direction towards closure on 13 those issues. And so we thought it would be better if we 14 spent a little bit more time talking about some specific j
) 15 wording and what-have-you, just for the purposes of laying 16 down what is the direction we are going in, and then taking 17 those away with us this evening and, basically, sleeping on 18 them, thinking about them more, and what issues are, and 19 then come back in the morning and see if we can then go to 20 some type of closure on it so we can move forward on those.
21 To start that discussion, I think probably 22 chemical safety was the one that we started off with this 23 morning and probably the one I hope that we are closest to 24 closure on. And if Bill is down there, if Bill would mind 25 just -- do you have your slides, Bill, just on the issues O ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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i 142 !
1 that we suggested as far as how to address the chemical 2 safety in the rule?
3 MR. SHARKEY: Yeah.
4 MR. ThYUGHAN: Felix, I think we ought to -- I mean ,
i 5 I agree that if we can work on words and things right now ;
6' that might help get this thing fixed, then that it is smart.
7 But-in cases where we can't do that, I think we also ought 8 to consider what are options are for working this through as 9 we go through, because the schedule is very critical both 10 for the-NRC and for industry. And so if aren't able to 11 necessarily come to pretty good closure here, we ought to {
12 have a plan that would facilitate getting to closure as 13 quickly as possible.
14 ; I just said the only thing -- the only thing that
() 15 was initially said is that we look at the presentations and j 16 see if there are wording changes or things that we can work 17 with'or consider, and I just said, if we can't solve it that 18 way during this session, that we ought to include a 19 ' discussion of what our options are to resolve some of the 20 ~ issues.
21 MR. GOODWIN: I think specifically we need to 22- understand what the process will be, or what we can make it 23 be in order to reach that closure.
24 MR. KILLAR: As I understand it from this 25 morning's discussion, the NRC will take this input, go back ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES,.LTD.
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g 143 1 and look at the rule and put out on their web site the
/ w) 2 revised rule with various options identifying their V
3 preferred option for different approaches to an issue such 4 as a chemical safety, and people will be given the 5 opportunity to provide comments through the web site on that 6 proposal.
7 I guess our concern, and we discussed a little bit 8 earlier today over lunch, is that that is good, but we are 9 not sure whether that is going to really meet the needs of 10 both the NRC and the industry, that it may be worthwhile 11 having a structured meeting, to go through and have a face 12 to face discussion on those, because similar to our 13 discussion earlier on criticality, what you intend by the 14 words you put, versus what we read when we see those same
/~
l 15 words, we may not be getting the same level of agreement on 16 what those words say. So we would like to see some type of 17 iterative process, if possible, and if you can elaborate on 18 your ability to provide that and your schedule to meet the 19 demands of the Commission.
20 DR. PAPERIELLO: I think we can provide an 21 iterative process within the time constraints that we have.
22 What I mean by that is, you know, if we take words and we 23 put them out, and either as such, say this looks like an 24 adequate revision -- you know, we may not even put option.
25 We may say that we have heard the industry comments and we
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144 1 think this is what their position is and we think these
) 2 words will do it. You come back and say, no, we don't.
-[V -
3 Then we would have to go through it again.
4 I would prefer that if we make an iterative change 5 in words, like the issue -- I think you did a good job on 6 chemical safety, because you came back and say this is what 7 -the word. You know, I see that issue right now, the ball is 8 in our court. In other words, we had meeting, we talked 9 about .t, i I asked you to provide words, you provided words.
10 We have talked about them today now. It is up for us to 11 say, hey, can we live with these words, or do we have to 12 say, well, we can live with them, except that, you know, --
13 so we converge on the whole thing. So I think the idea of 14 coming to convergence on issues is one that is good.
7
( 15 Now, let me just talk about chemical safety, 16 because that is a good example. There are a couple of 17 things I need to consider here. One, we got into this whole 18 business a decade ago because of certain events, and certain 19 decisions made by the Commission back in the mid to late 20 '80s.
21 Since then, one of the things you said, which is 22 true, is there-are other players in this, there's OSHA and 23 there's EPA, and there is a process for controlling certain 24 risk out there that may not have been around ten years ago.
25 'So I could go to the Commission and say, okay, these are the
[~h ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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I 145 1 words the industry has offered. We have looked at it, we
() 2 have looked at the MOU, we have looked at things and say, 3 hey, we can live with them if you can live with them.
4 What it will mean, there might be a class of 5 events which_we are not -- is clearly going to be within the 6 purview of EPA or OSHA. The NRC will not send an inspection 7 team and, in fact, if we get called by the newspapers, you 8 know, it is going to be a decision that this is theirs and 9 not ours.
10 You know, I am just saying that is the kind -- if 11 they can do that, then I can live with the words, because 12 what I am trying to do is meet a policy that was defined, 13 you know, ten years ago, and, so, you know, that's -- and I 14 don't, you know, I know what you have said here, and I know
) 15 some of this, but I just don't what tPe detail. It seems to 16 be consistent with the SRM I have where the Commission is 17 telling me to clarify the use, particularly in the context 18 of the MOU and finding out what other agencies do.
19 So, you know, I think you have done a good job 20 there. It is now up to us, and the way I am going to 21 resolve is say, hey, this is what this would all mean, and 22 we will, you know, through the Commissioners' assistance, 23 talk to the Commission, you know, will you -- is this okay?
24 If that's okay, it seems to me that we got 25 ourselves a fixed situation. Now what I would like to do is O ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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i 146 1 I would like to go forward with that.
() 2 One of the things that we have talked about 3: outside is would the industry be willing -- let's take one l 4 section of the Standard Review Plan, Training. It is eight 5 pages long and clearly something, putting aside whether or 6 not we ought to do things like maintenance, training is 7 required by Part 19 but it is also required by Part 70 for 8 areas of emergency preparedness and the like.
9 What should that section of the Standard Review 10 Plan look like? Would you be willing to give us -- I don't 11 care what section you would revise -- but one to give us an 12 example of what you think the SRP ought to look like, and to 13 get an example in training.
14 You see what I mean? Yes, I want to iterate but 15 my biggest problem is the time constraints, and in that 16 process as we iterate, and the Commission and the SSRM has 17 named contacts because we have done this in other rules. We 18 did it for the approval of the privatization for U.S.
19 Enrichment Corporation when we needed a fast decision.
20 We constantly kept the Commission informed of how 21 we were proceeding and getting guidance from them on what 22 they would accept and not accept. Okay? So just as you 23 need to consult with -- among your own, yourselves, I have
'24 to consult with the Commission on this sort of stuff, but 25 no , insofar as vna can do it and still meet -- somewhere O
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L 147 1- along the line where.there's irreconcilable differences I am
() 2 just going to have to tell the Commission about the 3 irreconcilable differences and they are. going to have to 4 make s decision on where we go.
5 Does it sound reasonable? I mean --
6 MR. KILLAR: It certainly sounds reasonable. I 7 . don't have a concern with that. I still have a little bit )
8 of concern with the timing.
9 What type of turn-around can we anticipate from 10 seeing these things showing up on the website, things like 11 that, particularly with the holidays coming up? Are we 12 basically going to lose December or are we going to be able l 13 to see something a week or so after this meeting to where we 14 can really start looking at your reaction to what we have I 15' provided?
16 DR. PAPERIELLO: I don't know --
17 MS. EYCK: We are planning to turn these things 18- around-as fast as we can. ,
19 As was mentioned earlier, we have a dedicated task 20 force working on this and I think what our plans would be is 21 that as we come up with proposed solutions to each of these 22 individual-things, we are going to bounce them out to you on 23 the web and not just wait until we have got an entire 24 package, so I would anticipate that you are going to be 25 seeing'some input that addresses some of the topics we have
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148 1 discussed today before the end of the month. That's for
,- ~
2 sure.
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3 MR. VAUGHAN: In that regard, do you all have a 4 schedule that you are shooting for as to what is going to 5 come when?
6 MS. EYCK: Well, a lot of it was based on the 7 meeting today and to determine what the issues are and how 8 close we were for resolution. At this point we are working, 9 'as Ted mentioned today, to have all of the -- try to 10 finalize all of the rule activities before I think it was 11 mid-February and that would be the closure point on that for 1
12 us to be able to meet all of our commitments with meeting 13 the SRM so I think we are going to be getting these things 14 out to you as soon as possible and it is a question of how A
(, ) 15 easily we can resolve or how quickly we can resolve these 16 issues and we'll depend upon what the timeframe is.
17 It's just kind of hard at this point to come up 18 with certain dates on things when it is a question of how 19 close we are to resolution on the issues, and we really 20 didn't know that until the meeting today. ,
l 21 MR. VAUGHAN: Right, and the reason I asked that l 22 is we are toying with how we are going to respond in terms 23 of what the NRC is asking for, and we kind of need to -- I 24 mean we might adopt an approach that we are responding on 25 things out of sequence and well out of phase with the items
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149 1 that you are -- we would like to get closer, as closely
[ 2 coupled as possible. We may not get it perfectly close.
3 MS. EYCK: I would hope before the meetings 4 terminate today or tomorrow that we have identified which 5 items you all might be taking the lead on and which items we 6 would be taking the lead on. I mean at this point I think 7 that as Carl has just mentioned that maybe if you all take a 8 chapter of the SRP and come up with something that you can 9 give back to us so we will get a flavor of exactly what 10 level you are at, then we won't be working on the SRP.
11 We are going to be working on the rule language 12 and the issues identified in the rule, and we'll be putting 13 them on the Web.
14 I think it's going to be counter-productive if we O
( ,) 15 are both trying to solve the same problem and then come up 16 with two different proposals. I would hope that when we 17 leave here we would know what things we are waiting to have 18 input from you and just like on the ISA thing, we are still 1
19 waiting for your input on what your concerns are with the I i
20 ISA summary that I know Felix has promised us and we are I l
21 going to be getting some time in the future, so I think 22 we'll have a clear understanding of who is taking the lead l t
23 on what topics. )
I t
24 MR. KILLAR: Sounds good. I think we are j 25 certainly moving in the right direction.
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150 1 I guess the concern I still have is somewhat if we
() 2 could sit down and look at a timeline or what have you, you 3 know, you have_given us some dates and cutoff dates and when 4 you look at it mid-February -- well, I know mid-February I 5 looks like a long way off. It's not that far off, 6' particularly with the holidays and stuff here, and we are 7 concerned that we do get through these issues and get 8 through them and have the input that is meaningful to you to 9 help you do your work as well, so I think that's certainly 6
10 something worth going forward on.
11 Maybe to move on, I guess we have provided some 12 suggested words on the chemical safety and so I think that 13 is certainly one that I don't know if we need to spend any 14 more time talking about what those words are. I think you
/"%
(,,) 15 have captured them fairly well, unless there are any 16 specific questions about the wording or suggestions that we 17 have provided. That would be one that you may be able to 18 take off with and similarly on criticality safety I think 19 that also as a result of looking at 70.60(C) and stuff I 20 think we have got some good language, some good words there 21 if you'd go off and look at those.
22 Do we have some other sections that we wanted to >
23 write some wording on, that we provided this morning that we 24 need to incorporate?
25 MR. SILVERMAN: I think you just identified the
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151 1 two areas that it looks like we could move quickly on from O, 2 my sense.
L) 3 There's a lot of discussion about the various 4 sections of the SRP and I guess we have to figure out what 5 the industry can provide.
6 MR. KILLAR: One other one that we did provide --
7 DR. PAPERIELLO: Could I? I have your letter but 8 the letter came in on Monday and so therefore there's not 9 much time to react to the letter, but based on the comments 10 here today, I mean one action -- and we'll take a look at 11 the letter on the Standard Review Plan and respond to 12 that -- but what you can do to help us is, particularly in 13 light of your presentation this morning, is if you took one 14 section -- again, I don't want to say a big one -- a small 15 one, just to kind of "What is the problem?"
16 We think we got to where you wanted us to be. You 17 said no. The question is how would it look different? That 18 is what I am interested in, how it would it look different?
19 I did notice, by the way, you were -- you didn't 20 have any concerns with the Radiation Protection section.
21 MR. KILLAR: We knew that was your expertise and 22 stayed away from that.
23 [ Laughter.]
24 DR. PAPERIELLO: Well, I went through here and I 25- checked which ones you didn't comment so -- but -- so it's I ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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152 1 not a complete loss, but, you know, just to get an idea of
() 2 3
what it would look like from your perspective, that's all, so we would then -- rather than going back, if we don't like 4 it, well, it gives you a chance to make it look like what 5 you think it ought to look like.
- 6. I'm serious. I am not trying to --
7 MR. KILLAR: I think we got that message and we 8- are going to go and do that.
9 There is one other section that we did mention in 10 my presentation. That was the SRP section on 11 Decommissioning, because we do see that there's quite a 12 disconnect here.
13 DR. PAPERIELLO: I read that. I'll take that 14 under consideration. I know what you read. I have to take
) 15 a look at what's in there and then take a look at the -- at, 16 you know -- I recognize there's -- I guess if we don't need 17 it, I don't see why we are asking -- if in fact it does what 18 you represent it, as a complete decommissioning plan at this 19 point, many years before you are going to do it, it doesn't 20 make a whole lot-of sense. You need to do enough to price 21 it out but --
22 MS. ASTWOOD: I don't think that was ever the 23 intent of that part of the SRP.
24 That section was intended to show that there are 25 things that you would have to do at the time of the I
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t
153 1 decommissioning or during license amendments you do have to
() 2' submit a decommissioning plan, which some of you do have to 3 do -- and another thing you have to do for your 4 decommissioning, financial assurance plan. I don't think it 5 is fair to twist language -- I think decommissioning is 6 something_that should be in the SRP and is something that 7 your license amendments are reviewing.
8 MR. KILLAR: I agree with you as far as the 9 funding plan as part of the license commitment, but under 10 70.38 you get into the timeliness rule and decommissioning
.11 if you are trying to release a_ portion of your site, and 12 then that gets into the other aspects of it, and the problem 13 is that when you try to commingle those under license 14 conditions over an operating facility it doesn't make sense.
k 15 That is where we have the disconnect.
16 Liz, you mentioned training. Is there any other ,
17 areas in particular? I know we are holding the ISA in ;
J 18 . abeyance right now. Is there any other areas in particular l l
19 that you would like additional input on or would like us to !
20 focus on? !
.21 I know one thing that we have not spoken to at 22 all,-and that is the reporting requirements and we have R23 looked at that and we do-feel that it is somewhat of a p
24 burden above and beyond what_we have been doing but we have 25 'nct spent the time to go through and identify where the I
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154 1 specific problems are but that is something that we have
[m)
\/
2 been holding in abeyance but it is certainly an issue --
l 3 DR. PAPERIELLO: I recognize that. l 4 MR. VAUGHAN: I have been looking at what we have 5 been talking about and drawing little pictures and I think 6 what LIz said has a lot of merit to it, because we are on a 7 course that kind of says that the rule language now is in 8 NRC space and criticality safety, we have talked about it 9 generally but we think that there's probably the rule space 1
10 again is in the NRC's court but we have identified a need 11 for the practicing criticality engineers, et cetera, to get 12 together and work out some of the details, so that is in a 13 workshop space.
14 Chemical safety that we talked about today is in j
() 15 the NRC space. We just talked about decommissioning and it 16 sounded like decommissioning was in the NRC space, so 17 applying that model works pretty good.
18 We haven't talked about ISAs yet so we don't know 19 what space that will go in, and I can tell you that the 20 management control section has a lot of meat in it and how 21 we get to the bottom of all that and what space it goes it I 22 don't know but it has a lot of content.
23 You know, there's environmental management, fire 24 safety, a few other things on the list that we need to talk 25 about who is going to do what to who, but it sounds like I \
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155 l' this partitioning so we are not working against each other
() .2-3 but we'are working with each other and keep it flowing is going to work.
l 4 DR. PAPERIELLO: And something we can do -- I mean 5 before I tackle the entire Standard Review Plan at least in 6 terms of how'it is written, first, there is a question of 7 whether certain-things are in their appropriately.
8' You have raised the issue about -- and I am not 9 trying to reflect on anybody because I haven't read this 10 thing in detail to know -- I read what you have said about 11 decommissioning, okay? --'so let's take a look at what's in 12 there on decommissioning.
13 Before you do anything with it, I would like to 14 turn around and see what my reaction to the contents of it 15 are.
16 I don't think in terms of style -- I mean you 17 could take on whatever you want to take on, but for my 18 purposes I would pick the section that I said, training, 19 looked fairly short. When I looked at QA I saw that's 20 godawful long, so with help if we find that we get an idea, 21 because we thought, at least the Staff thought that we did 22 have an adequate connection between the ISA and some of 23 these programs and you didn't.
.24 This gives you an opportunity to do that.
25 I am afraid if we take on too much in a Standard O
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l
156 1 Review Plan right now, we are not going to get anything
() 2 done. The rule is just fewer words. I am counting the 3 . number of words in the rule. If I can straighten that out, 4 that sort of takes -- there are things that have to be done.
5 I have to get a lot more concurrence and agreement 6 with the agency on the rule than I do have to on the 7 Standard Review Plan so if I can get the rule language 8 reasonably well locked up by. February, we can still continue 9 to work on the Standard Review Plan, particularly if we have 10 reasonable confidence that we are on the right path on the 11 Standard Review Plan in terms of how it is going to look.
12 MR. SHERR: I have two suggestions.
11 3 One matter is on criticality. The notion is there 14 are some problems with the rule language on criticality.
() 15 Maybe I'm dense, but it is still not clear to me what rule 16 ' language is of concern -- so I.would very much appreciate it
-17 if you provided, at least identified what is the language of 18 concern and at least an approach to how that language could 19 take care.of it.
20 MR. VAUGHAN: I thought that Carl did -- maybe he 21 -didn't have exactly the right words but I think what he was 22 suggesting certainly aims at what is bothering us in the 23 rule.
24 I. thought we had agreement.
25 DR. PAPERIELLO: That's what I thought.
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157 1 MR. VAUGHAN: .That's what I thought.
() 2 MR. SHERR: The specific section I believe is 3 70.60(C).
4 MR. SILVERMAN: Which goes beyond criticality and 5- I'think when you think about -- I think what these folks are 6 saying, the criticality-specific issues, specific to that 7 issue, are more found in the SRP than in the rule itself.
8 There is this general problem in the rule of it 9 not being sufficiently clear that it is a risk-based rule 10 overall, and that is 70.60(C) 'we are talking about. That 11 covers criticality as well as a lot of other things, so I 12 don't think --
13 DR. PAPERIELLO: That was the reading I had. In 14 other words if we fix 70.6(C) we would fix the rule but then 15 you have got to go down -- the devil's in the details -- and
- 16 you have got to go down into the Standard Review Plan and 17 deal with a number of issues.
18 First, in dealing with how you handle double 19 contingencies and then going beyond that, what is the level 20 of detail that you need.
21 MS. EYCK: If I can just reiterate what Charlie 22 has said and maybe we can kind of focus, and correct me if I 23 aml wrong, but what I have identified here is that NRC will 24 take the lead on making any proposed changes to the rule.
25 The Nuclear criticality safety we are going to be ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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158 1 awaiting the workshop before we proceed on trying to address (A) ~ 2 the changes to that, with the exception of the rule changes 3 that we'll be making.
4 On the chem safety SRP I think we can take a stab 5 at moving ahead and trying to address some of the changes 6 there because you had suggested a number of changes to the 7 SRP in-that area and I think we can focus on that.
8 ~ On the decommissioning area in the SRP, NRC will 9 be looking at that.
10- The ISA we are going to wait for your comments.
- 11. Reporting requirements, we are going to wait for 12 your comments and on some proposed chapter of the SRP, i 13 whether it is training or whatever, we are going to wait for 14 you all to provide your draft of what -- where you would (g
s) 15 like to see -- or the level of detail that you would like to i
16 see in the SRP. !
17 Has that encompassed all the things that we are 18 Jgoing to move out on, or does anyone else have any other 19 suggestions or comments?
20 MR. VAUGHAN: I think that is about the way that 21 we see that right this minute, but then there are other 22 things that we need co talk about in terms of how to address 23 them, but as to where we are in the thought process right 24 ~this minute, that'seems to be correct.
25 -[ Discussion off the record.]
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159 1 MR. KILLAR: Just for everybody else, now that I
( J' 2 have walked between the tables, what we have decided we'll 3 do is that each of the' organizations and entities will go 4- off'and caucus as to basically what we have heard today, and
.5 we will reconvene tomorrow morning at 9 o' clock here, and we
'6 will go on with the discussion. i 7 If there is anything in the caucus that we need to 8 clarify based on what we talked about today, we will do that 9 first thing,.and then we'll go on to the discussion of the 10 ISA.
11 MR. SHERR: o There sh'uld be on the table outside, 12- as you leave there should be copies of the briefing charts 13 that-were used today.
14- [Whereupon, at_3:19 p.m., the meeting was
/~N h
15 recessed, to reconvene at 9:00 a.m., Friday, December 4, 16 1998.]
i 17 18
-19 20 21 22 23
~24 25 i
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