ML20207F164
| ML20207F164 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000601 |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1986 |
| From: | WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19292F615 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8607220486 | |
| Download: ML20207F164 (13) | |
Text
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. WESTINGHOUSF CLASS 3 I
AMENDMENT 1 TO RESAR-SP/90 PDA MODULE 9 j l " INSTRUMENTATIONS & CONTROLS AND ELECTRIC POWER" ;
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WAPWR-I&C/EP AMENDMENT 1 4904e:1d JUNE,1986
8 l AMENDMENT 1 TO RESAR-SP/90 PDA MC0VLE 9
" INSTRUMENTATIONS & CONTROLS AND ELECTRIC POWER" INSTRUCTION SHEET
- Remove current page 8.1 -3/8.1 -4 and replace with revised page 8.1-3/8.1-4.
O Remove current page 8.3-21/8.3-22 and replace with revised page 8.3-21/8.3-22.
Insert remainder of package (page 430-1 through page 430-7) behind l
Questions / Answers tab.
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- O WAPWR-I&C/EP i AMENDMENT 1 4904e
- 1d JUNE, 1986
i 8.1. 2 you describe the supply circuits from the 430.1 In section (8.1.2) utility switchyard to the on-site non class-lE power system transformers. Reference in your description of these supply s circuits from the utility switchyard to the on-site power system the requirements of GDC 17 for providing physically independent circuits designed and located so as to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood of their simultaneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions.
Additionally, include a discussion on the control room indication for monitoring the of fsite power supply system.
RESPONSE
Additional interface criteria for the standardized plant is provided in Appendix 8A. The fo' lowing is also applicable:
o The two transformers serving the two offsite power sources O shall be separated by a 3 hr. firewall, o The cables associated with each of the offsite circuits shall be routed in separate and distinct raceways.
o The two offsite circuits shall be fully testable. Since these circuits will be continuously energized and largely passive, these are essentially tested by their use.
o One of the circuits can be shutdown for testing relays, meters and instruments.
o Control and instrumentation power for the offsite power circuits will be provided by the non-Class lE de system.
o The instrumentation associated with the offsite ac power system will provide sufficient information to determine the system availability at any time.
WAPWR-I&C/EP 430-1 AMENDMENT 1 4904e:ld JUNE, 1986
It is planned to provide control room indication of the transmission line voltages and status of circuit breakers.
It should, however, be noted that the offsite power system shall comply with GDC 17. The details of this system will be site specific and provided along with the site safety analysis report.
430.2 Include in your discussion of interface criteria for offsite (8.1.4.1) power system, subsection 8.A.2, item 4, the provisions for minimizing the probability of losing electric power as a result of, or coincident with 1) the loss of most critical transmission line or right-of-way if insufficient clearance exists between lines or transmission towers; 2) loss of largest load; 3) loss of remote switchyard, substation and/or breaker, etc.
RESPONSE
Failure modes and effects analysis showing the system failure modes and the method of such failure detection shall be provided in the FDA or site specific safety analysis report.
However, the design shall r.inimize the probability of losing an electric power because of:
o insufficient clearance o loss of target load o loss of remote switchyard 430.3 Supplement your interface for Regulatory Guides presented in (8.1.4.1) section 8.1.4.3 of your Preliminary Design Approval by the addition of RG 1.128, RG 1.129 and PSB Branch Technical positions Nos. 1, 8, 11, 18 and 21.
O WAPWR-I&C/EP 430-2 AMENDMENT 1 4904e:1d JUNE, 1986
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RESPONSE
Reference to RG 1.128 and RG 1.129 is included in Table 6.1 of Module 2. The confonnance to these RG's and PSB BTP's Nos.1, 8,11,18 and 21 has been included in a revision to page 8.1-4 of Section 8.1.4.3.
430.4 In subsection 8.3.1.1.1 of your PDA, you state that during plant (8.3.1.1.1) startup, planned shutdown and unit trip, the on-site electrical power systems are supplied from the alternate offsite source via the main step-up transformer with the unit generator circuit breaker opened. In order to provide this immediate access to the alternate offsite source (in accordance with GDC 17) describe how the unit generator circuit breaker meets the specific guidelines of Appendix A to SRP Section 8.2.
RESPONSE
O The class 1E system has two load groups and the safety related equipment on both load groups is similar. One load group is adequate to satisfy the minimum engineered safety features demand caused by a LOCA and loss of preferred power supply.
Load group 'A' 4-16 KV bus has imediate access to an alternate offsite power source via the ESF transformer. In addition, there is a delayed access via the main step-up transformer, the unit auxiliary transformer with generator circuit breaker open and the standby transformer.
The loss of immediate access offsite power to load group 'A' due to maloperation of a generator circuit breaker, concurrent with the loss of immediate access offsite power to load group 'B' via the ESF transformer is not credible (single failure criterion).
O WAPWR-I&C/EP 430-3 AMENDMENT 1 4904e:1d JUNE, 1986
However, the generator circuit breaker will comply with all the requirements of the latest ANSI and IEEE standards. The breaker design will be subjected to an adequate testing program to demonstrate its capability to perform its intended function during steady state operation, power system transients and major faults. Provisions will be made, similar to generator circuit breakers at other nuclear plants, to have synchronization circuits to prevent out of phase switching operation.
Therefore, we conclude that the proposed design, including the generator circuit breaker, will satisfy all the requirements of GDC 17.
430.5 As explained in your PDA, a unique design is being proposed for
( 8. 3.1.1. 3 ) providing degraded voltage protection for class lE buses. It i- appears from your description of the degraded voltage protection i
scheme that it does not employ conventional undervoltage relays. The staff has no details on this unique design proposed in your PDA. Describe how your proposed design meets PSB Branch l technical position PSB-1 with regard to testability, 1
reliability, qualification, etc.
RESPONSE
The undervoltage scheme proposed is similar in concept to that used on the SNUPPS plant. The settings of these logic circuits shall be above the minimum motor starting voltage during normal operation. The voltage sensors shall be designed to satisfy the requirement of IEEE-279. Refer to Item 14 in Module 2 Section 6.5 for discussion and criteria for the undervoltage scheme.
The final details will be provided with the FDA.
O WAPWR-I&C/EP 430-4 AMENDMENT 1 4904e:1d JUNE, 1986 I - . - - ,, _ , - _- __ _ - ___ __ _
430.6 Identify all electrical equipment, both safety and non-safety, (8.3.1.2.2) that may become submerged as a result of a LOCA. For all such
- quipment that is not qualified for service in this environment, p your PDA should include provisions for providing an analysis to detennine the following
- a. The safety significance of the failure of this equipment (e.g., spurious actuation or loss of actuation) as a result of submergence.
- b. The effects on class 1E electrical power sources serving this equipment as a result of such submergence.
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- c. Any proposed design changes resulting from this analysis.
RESPONSE
O All electrical equipment would be located above the maximum flood level. The emergency water storage tank (EWST), as described in Section 1.2.3 (and shown in Figure 1.2.2) of RESAR-SP/90 PDA Module 3, " Introduction and Site", and Section 6.3 of Module 1, " Primary Side Safeguards Systems", is located at the lower elevation inside the containment building. The
[ ] spillways for the EWST are extended +a,c
[ ] above the containment floor [ ] pre- +a,c j
cluding flooding of essential electrical equipment. There is no essential electrical equipment located below this elevation.
1 430.7 In section 8.3.1.3 of your PDA, you state that color identifica-(8.3.1.3) tion is provided for each separation group of all field-wired safety related cables. Describe, how this color identification i
scheme meets the requirements of IEEE STD 384-1974 and RG 1.75 item 10.
O WAPWR-I&C/EP 430-5 AMENDMEN1 1 4904e:1d JUNE, 1986 1
RESPONSE
Page 8.3-22 of Section 8.3.1.3 of the text has been revised as follows:
The color identification of all field wired safety related cables shall be provided at a maximum interval of 5 feet along the length of the cable. In addition, cable markers showing cable identification number will be applied at each end of the cable.
I 430.8 The specific requirements for monitoring the de power systems (8.3.2) derive from the generic requirements in section 5.3.2(4),
5.3.3(5), and 5.3.4(5) of IEEE standard 308-1974. In sununary, these general requirements state that the de system composed of batteries, distribution systems and chargers shall be monitored
! to the extent that it can be shown to be ready to perform its 4 intended function. Accordingly, the guidelines used in our review of the de power system designs are that the following indications and alarms of the class lE de power system should be t
provided in the control room:
o Battery current (ansneter-charge / discharge) o Battery charger output current (ammeter) o DC bus voltage (voltmeter)
, o Battery charger output voltage (voltmeter) o Battery discharge o DC bus undervoltage and overvoltage alarm o DC bus ground alarm (for ungrounded systems) l 0 Battery breaker (s) or fuse (s) open alarm o Battery charger output breaker (s) or fuse (s) open alarm o Battery charger trouble alarm (one alarm for a number of abnormal conditions which are usually indicated locally)
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WAPWR-I&C/EP 430-6 AMENDMENT 1 4904e:ld JUNE, 1986
We conclude that the monitoring cited above, augmented by the !
periodic test and surveillance requirements included in the Technical Specifications, provide reasonable assurance that the class lE de power system is ready to perform its intended safety function. Indicate your compliance with these provisions for monitoring the class lE power systems. Alternatively, justify any deviations.
RESPONSE
' Control room instrumentation or annunciation shall be provided to monitor the status of each class 1E de system or follows:
o Battery current (also local) o Battery charger output current (also local)
- l o DC voltage indication (also local at DC bus and charger) o Battery discharge o DC bus undervoltage and overvoltage alarm o DC bus ground alarm (also at DC bus) o Battery breaker trip or open o Battery charger malfunction alarm l
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WAPWR-I&C/EP 430-7 AMENDMENT 1 4904e:ld JUNE, 1986
O SAFETY DESIGN BASIS TWO - The onsite Class 1E electric power system is divided into two independent load groups, each with its own power supply, busses, transformers, loads, and associated 125V DC control power. Each load group is
/ independently capable of maintaining the plant in a cold shutdown (GDC-17).
SAFETY DESIGN BASIS THREE - One independent diesel generator is provided for each Class lE AC load group.
SAFETY DESIGN BASIS FOUR - No provisions are made for automatic transfer of load groups between redundant power sources.
SAFETY DESIGN BASIS FIVE - No portion (AC or DC) of the onsite standby power systems is shared between units (GDC-5). -
SAFETY DESIGN BASIS SIX - The Class lE electric systems are designed to r
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satisfy the single failure criterion (GDC-17).
O SAFETY DESIGN BASIS SEVEN - For each of the four protection channels, one independent 125V DC and one 120V vital AC power source are provided.
Batteries are sized for 2 hrs of operation without the support of battery
- chargers .
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SAFETY DESIGN BASIS EIGHT - Raceways are not shared by Class lE and non-Class l_
lE cables. However, associated cables connected to Class lE busses are treated as Class lE cables with regard to separation and identification and '
A are run in their related Class 1E raceway system.
V SAFETY DESIGN BASIS NINE - Special identification criteria are applied for Class lE equipment, including cabling and raceways.
SAFETY DESIGN BASIS TEN - Separation criteria are applied which establish requirements for preserving the independence of redundant Class lE load groups or power systems. Refer to Subsection 8.3.1.4.1.
O MAPWR-I&C/EP 8.1-3 NOVEMBER, 1984 4904e:ld
SAFETY DESIGN 8 ASIS ELEVEN - Class 1E equipment is designed with the capability of being tested periodically (GDC-18).
SAFETY DESIGN 8 ASIS TWELVE - Two physically and electrically independent ESF transformers are provided to supply the Class 1E AC electric power system.
8.1.4.2.2 Power Generation Design Bases l
POWER GENERATION DESIGN 8 ASIS ONE -A separate non-Class 1E DC system is
) provided for non-Class 1E controls and DC motors.
8.1.4.3 Desian Criteria. Regulatory Guides. and IEEE Standards i The onsite power system is generally designed in accordance with IEEE Standards 279, 308, 317, 323, 334, 344, 379, 382, 383, 384, 387, 450, and 484.
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Compliance with Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.9 1.22, 1.29, 1.30, 1.32, 1.40, 1.41, 1.47, 1.53, 1.62, 1.63, 1.68, 1.73, 1.75, 1.81, 1.89, 1.93, 1.100, 1.106, 1.108, 1.118, 1.128, 1.129, and 1.131, IEEE Standards 323-1974, 1
i 338-1971, 344-1975, 384-1974, 387-1977, 308-1974, 317-1976 and PSB 8 ranch
- Technical Position (BTP) Nos. 1, 8,11,18 and 21 is discussed in RESAR-SP/90 PDA Module 2 " Regulatory Conformance".
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l LdAPWR-I&C/EP 8.1 -4 AMENDMENT 1 ;
4904e:1d AUGUS1, 1986 j i
Trays containing only control or instrumentation cables are generally limited to a 50-percent fill. Where this condition cannot be paintained, a review will be made in each case for adequacy of design for physical fill only and will allow a higher fill percentage so that the total fill does not protrude
(-'s s above the loading depth of the tray.
Conduit fill is in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 9.0 (Table 4) of the NEC 1984. Where these provisions cannot be maintained, a review will be O made in each case and will allow a higher fill percentage based on actual cable sizes, conduit sizes, length of conduit, and number of bends.
- 8. 3.1. 2 Analysis
- 8. 3.1. 2.1 Compliance with General Design Criteria 17 and 18 and Regulatory Guides For discussion of regulatory guides in regard to Class lE AC systems, refer to O RESAR-SP/90 PDA Module 2, " Regulatory Confornance".
Compliance with General Design Criteria 17 and 18 is discussed in Section 3.1 of RESAR-SP/90 PDA Module 7 " Structural / Equipment Design".
8.3.1.2.2 Safety-Related Equipment Exposed to Hostile Environment Information on Class 1E equipment that must operate in a hostile environment during and/or subsequent to an accident is furnished in Section 3.11 of O RESAR-SP/90 PDA Module 7, " Structural / Equipment Design".
8.3.1.3 Physical Identification of Safety Related Equipment I
Each circuit (scheme) and raceway is given a unique alpha-numeric
- identification. This identification provides a means of distinguishing a circuit or raceway association with a particular channel or load group, and is g-~g assigned on the basis of the following criteria
U WAPWR-I&C/EP 8.3-21 NOVEMBER, 1984 4904e:1d
SEPARATION GROUP 1 - A safety related instrumentation control, or power scheme / raceway associated with safety related load group 1 or protection system channel 1.
O SEPARATION GROUP 2 - A safety related instrumentation, control, or power ,
scheme / raceway associated with protection system channel 2.
SEPARATION GROUP 3 -A safety related instrumentation, power, or control scheme / raceway associated with protection system channel 3.
i SEPARATION GROUP 4 - A safety related instrumentation, control, or power scheme / raceway associated with safety related load group 2 or protection system channel 4.
!,. Nonsafety-related cables and raceways associated with all normal plant l~ (non-Class 1E) equipment are uniquely identified and separately routed from safety-related cables and raceways, as described in Subsection 8.1.4.3.
The unique identification afforded all nonsafety-related cables is their black color.
Nameplates with colored backgrounds are provided for all IEFF 308 Class 1E equipment (such as transformers, motors, motor control centers, switchgear, panels, and switchboards). Each separation group has its distinguishing color. The applicable channel or load group designation is marked on each nameplate. For the identification of instrumentation and control equipment, l O refer to Subsection 7.1.2.
Raceways are marked in a distinct, permanent manner at intervals not to exceed 15 feet and at points of entry to, and exit f rom, enclosed areas. ,
The color identification of all field wired safety related cables shall be l provided at a maximum interval of 5 feet along the length of the cable. In I f addition, cable markers showing cable identification number will be applied at
- each end of the cable. -
i WAPWR-I&C/EP 8.3-22 AMENDMENT 1 l 4904e:1d AUGUS1, 1986 l
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