ML20132H047

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Rept on Reactor Operations for Period Jan-Dec 1983
ML20132H047
Person / Time
Site: Purdue University
Issue date: 12/31/1983
From: Stansberry E
PURDUE UNIV., WEST LAFAYETTE, IN
To:
Shared Package
ML20132H016 List:
References
NUDOCS 9612270121
Download: ML20132H047 (8)


Text

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SCHOOL OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING Purdue University West Lafayette, Indiana 47907

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REl' ORT ON REACTOR OPERATIONS a

For the Period  ;

Janunty 1, 1983 to December 31, 1983 Pill'I'IIE UNIVERSITY RFACTOR-1 PllRDilE UNIVERSITY Ucst I.nfayette, Indiana 47907 finrch 1984 Prepared by Fidon R. Stansberry 1:enctor Supervisor 2

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This report is submitted to neet the requirements set forth in 10 I l I

-CFR,50;59 and the Technical Specifientions of the Purdue University j 1

' Reactor (PliR-1) for the period January 'I to December 31, 1983. ,

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.- Visitors during the year totaled 748 persons. lliese visitors included 77 tour groups and f>6 visits for caintenance or surveillance 1 tests.

Z. ELMI DESIDH oED OpWATIONAL C!IANES e

11. Enc.flity Dgsign Changss There were no design changes to the facility in 1983.

11 ferfornancs Characisristics Operations of the PUlt-1 facility continued satisf actorily during 1983. 110 change could be identified during the inspection of the fuel plates. This inspection included a visual inspection of the surfaces of two representative fuel plates for defects, and neasuring the plate thickness with a micrometer to verify cladding integrity. Fuci perfor-mance continued satisfactory during the year.

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E2 fh!Dges in OrsInting Procedures Concerning Safety of facility Opsrations i

No changes in the operating procedures of the facility were made during 1983.

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. t 3- t p 1.d. -ER12111 21 EHIZ1111ADie Tests and Inspections i i

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The reactivity worths of the control rods were as follows: I l

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i i center; 1 e n. Shim-safety //1 - A1-15.02% 3p Shin-safety //2 -

.. 2.67% 0k Regulating Rod - .25%  !

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with an. excess of .53% 0[asdeterminedduringtherunfollowingcontrol .

rod inspection the shutdown margin was calculated to bc 7.41% 31- f i

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On llay 24, 1983 a visual inspection of all control rods produced no

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- evidence of deterioration or change. I l

i I During.1983 no experinent was placed in the reactor pool that would  ;

require the determination of its reactivity during the initial criti-cality following its installation.  ;

1.d.l. . Esas19I Safety Systens

  • During the prestartup check that precedes each reactor startup, cach reactor safety system had a channel test performed on it provided the s'hutdown exceeded !! hours or if the system was repaired or de-energized.

c Each reactor safety system had a channel check perforned at time j

, . intervals of less than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> during operation.

-The electronic. calibration of all safety channels was completed on l

. July 1, 1983.

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A power calibration by gold foil irradiation was completed on July ,

8, 1983. No significant change was identified from this calibration. ,

During the prestartup check that precedes each run the radiation i area monitors and the continuous air monitor were checked for normal operation. The radiation arca monitors were calibrated on !! arch 31, and l September 2'during 1983 while the continuous air monitor was calibrated .

on !! arch 31, and September 9,1983 l i

l Following the control rod inspections the rod drop times of the i

, sin-safety rods were measured on !!ay 25, 1983. All rod drop tines. fell I p

between 0.537 and 0.573 milliseconds which is consistent with past mens- ,

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p urements and well within specification limits of I second.

l 2 4.3. L'rimary foolant Syst em The value of the pII of the primary coolant fell between 5.1 and'S.9 dur-l- ing the weekly measurements of 1983, which are within specification lim-its of 5.5 11.0 The coolant conductivity was measured during the prestartup for each reactor run. 11e maximum value never' exceeded 1.35 nicromho cm  !

during 1983. This represents a resistivity of more than 740,000 ohm /cm I

which exceeds the lower limit of 330,000 ohn/cm as given in the specifi- i cations. l l

During 1983 the height of water above the core was 13 feet or i

creater for cach reactor run according the prestartup check list. This l l

l , met or exceeded the requirement of 13 feet of water in the specifica-l tions.

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!!adiological Control. Personnel collected and analyzed nonthly san- -

ples of'the primary coolant for cross alpha and beta activity. No activity of either kind to indicate fuel plate failure, was found in the '

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.. 2.d.d. Containnent )

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l The negative pressure in the reactor room was recorded weekly. -Values

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between 0.055 and 0.13 inches of water exceeded the 0.05 inches stated i

in the specification.

71tc inlet and outlet dampers' are checked along with the air condi-o tioner semi annually. These components were checked on April 29, 1983 and October 28, 1983 and all operated as designed.

Itepresentative fuel plates were visually inspected and acasured for thickness on June 3,1983 No indication of change was identified in-fuel cladding. No change in the surface of fuc1 plate //4-3-73 was iden-1 tified.

2.d.1. .Exp_erinents The flux of the reactor t.nd the quantities of singly encapsulated san-ples were so small that the complete release of all gnscous, particu-Inte, and volatile corponents of the samples would not result in doses in excess of lire of the equivalent annual doses stated in 10 CFil 20.

I No sampics of unknown composition or that required double encapsu-l

! lation were subnitted for irradiation.

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Q.h. [bangsg,195$$ and P.xperinent s Degnizing Connission Anthogigggion i

l No changes, tests or experiments which required authorization fron  !

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the Connission pursuant to 10 CFP. 50.59 (a) were performed during 1983.

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!. -1.f. Changgs jn Facility St_nff  :

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i No changes in the facility staff occurred in 1983. I 2 E91!fB g[ Ell'sTIQB l

The operation of the PilR-1 during 1983 consisted of 39 runs which a generated 297,400 watt minutes of energy and covered an integrated run-  !

ning tine of 115.1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

d. UNS('IfF11HiJ3D F11trrp0}yys A total of 7 unscheduled shutdowns occurred during 1983. Conposite safety nnplifier (CSA). trouble was the indicated cause in 5 of these ,

shutdowns, while a powcr interruption caused 1, and operator error dur-ing a range change caused the other.

The CSA's were designed to trip at 150% power but they are required by the technical specifications to. trip at 120% power. Dy operating closer to the trip points than they were designed to operate, the CSA's are more susceptibic to unscheduled shutdowns due to fluctuations in l

l power supplied to the facility or variations in nating the magnet and the shin-safety rod. Preventive maintenance minimizes unscheduled shut-I downs but a nore permanent solution must await instruncut nodernization. 1 '

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. The loss of building power is beyond the control of the reactor operations personnel.

A student operator turned the range switch on the linear channel the wrong direction wi.ich caused a scran. f! ore attention to details

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by student operntors should reduce the nunber of unscheduled shutdowns due to this cause.

1 U61HIEUANCE No maintenance beyond the usuni routine maintenance was required in 1983

f. [Ubb9ES, TESTS byD EZEERIfD_MS i

No changes, tests or experiments were carried out without prior Conmission approval pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 (b).

2 EADIOA[IlyE FFFL1 TENT RFLEASES No nensurable amounts of radioactive ef fluents were released to the environs beyond our effective control, as measured at or prior to the l point of such release.

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