ML20085J790

Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants,Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant,Unit 2,Phase II, Draft Technical Evaluation Rept

ML20085J790
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	09/30/1983
From:	Shaber C EG&G, INC.
To:	NRC
Shared Package
ML20084P028	List: ML20084P026 ML20085J790
References
CON-FIN-A-6457, REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8310180524
Download: ML20085J790 (30)

Text

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~ ENCLOSURE 1 -

m CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ENRICO FERMI ATOMIC POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 (PHASE II)

Docket No. [50-341]

Author C. R. Shaber Principal Technical Investigator T. R. Stickley '

Published September 1983 EG&G Idaho, Inc.

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 (

Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Under 00E Contract No. DE-AC07-76I001570 FIN No. A6457 AC 52opFiHosBien SentT PDR~

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ABSTRACT The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has requested that all nuclear plants, either operating or under construction, submit a response of consistency with-NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." EG&G Idaho, Inc.., has contracted with the NRC to evaluate the responses of those plants presently under construction. This report contains EG&G's evaluation and recommendations for Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2 for the requirements of Sections 5.1.4, 5.1.5, and 5.1.6 of NUREG-0612 (Phase II). Section 5.1.1 (Phase I) was covered in a separate report [1].

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e EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2 is not totally consistent with the guidelines of NUREG-0612. In general, inconsistencies exist in the following areas:

o Final resolution of identified design deficiencies and their correction is needed for the RPV Strongback and Dryer / Separator Strongback.

o The Reactor Building Crane Auxiliary hook needs mechanical stops or electrical interlocks to supplement the alarm and bypass when using loads above 1500 pounds, o Resolve conflicts in hoist identification numbering.

o Resolve the additional analysis needs recognized for Reactor Building load numbers 13, 16, 17, 18, and the ventilation equipment hoist loads, o Assure that the additional specification requirements of NUREG-0554 are tsed in hoists ye't to be purchased.

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o Address NUREG-0612 Article 5.1 evaluation criteria I, II, and III as needed to supplement the matrix analyses made on nonsingle failure proof hoists to show consistency with guidelines 5.1.4 and 5.1.6.

-The main report contains recommendations which will aid in making the above items consistent with the appropriate guidelines.

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CONTENTS ABSTRACT ............................................................. 11 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

.................................................... 111

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................... 1 1.1 Purpose of Review ......................................... I 1.2 Generic Background ........................................ 1 1.3 Plant-Specific Background ................................. 3

2. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................. 4 2.1 Overview .................................................. 4 2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.3 Guidelines ................................................ 4

3. CON C LU D I NG S U MMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3.1 Guideline Recommendations ................................. 24 3.2 Additional Recommendations ................................ 25 3.3 Summary ................................................... 25

4. REFERENCES ...................................................... 26 TABLES 2.1 Nonexempt Heavy Load-Handling Systems ........................... 5 2.2 Tabul a ti on o f Heavy Load s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 iv mema -vm--

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CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

, ENRICO FERMI ATOMIC POWER PLANT UNIT 2 (pHASEIll

1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purcose of Review This technical evaluation report documents the EG&G Idaho, Inc.,

review of general load-handling policy and procedures at Enrico Ferm1 Atomic Power Plant Unit 2. This evaluation was performed with the objective of assessing conformance to the general load-handling guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" [2], Sections 5.1.4, 5.1.5, and 5.1.6. This constitutes Phase II of a two phase evaluation. Phase I assesses conformance to Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612 and was documented in a separate report

[1].

1.2 Generic Backorcund Generic Technical Activity Task A-36.was established by the'U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes to these measures. This activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 [3], to all power reactor applicants, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent fuel.

The results of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential problems, do not adequately cover the major causes of. load-handling accidents and should be upgraded.

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In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy locds, the staff

. developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two phase objective using an accepted approach or protection philosophy. The first phase of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load-handling systems at nuclear power plants are designed and operated such that their probability of failure is uniformly small and appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed. The second phase of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Articles 5.1.2 through 5.1.5, is to ensure that, for load-handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (a) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load-handling systems, to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure proof system) or (b) conservative evaluations of load-handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small. Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis -

evaluation criteria as follows:

o " Releases of radioactive material that may result from damage to spent fuel based on calculations involving ,

accidental dropping of a postulated heavy load produce doses that are well within 10 CFR Part 100 limits of 300 rem thyroid, 25 rem whole body (analyses should show that doses are equal to or less than 1/4 of Part 100 limits);

o " Damage to fuel and fuel storage racks based on calculations involving accidental dropping of a postulated heavy load does not result in a configuration of the fuel such that k,ff is larger than 0.95; o " Damage to the reactor vessel or the spent-fuel pool based on calculations of damage following accidental dropping of a postulated heavy load is limited so as not to result in water leakage that could uncover the fuel, (makeup water provided to overcome leakage should be from a borated source 2

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of adequate concentration if the water being lost is borated); and o " Damage to equipment in redundant or dual safe shutdown paths, based on calculations assuming the accidental dropping of a postulated heavy load, will be limited so as not to result in loss of required safe shutdown functions."

The approach used to develop the staff guidelines for minimizing the potential for a load drop was based on defense in depth. This plan includes proper operator training, equipment design, and maintenance coupled with safe load paths and crane interlock devices restricting movement over critical areas.

Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in Section 5 of NUREG-0612.

1.3 Plant-Soecific Background

• On December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter [4] to Detroit Edison, the applicant for Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant Unit 2 (Fermi 2) requesting that the applicant review provisions for handling and 4 control of heavy loads at Fermi 2, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, and provide certain additional information to be used for an inoependent determination of conformance to these guidelines. Detroit Edison prov:ded responses to this request on December 3,1981 [5], April 15,1982 [6], October 15, 1982 [7].

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2. EVALUATION AND REC'OMMENDATIONS 2.1 Overview The following sections summarize Detroit Edison's review of heavy load handling at Fermi 2 accompanied by EG&G's evaluation, conclusions, and recommendations to the applicant for making the facilities more consistent with the intent of NUREG-0612.

2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems Table 2.1 presents the applicant's list of overhead handling systems which are subject to the criteria of NUREG-0612. The applicant has indicated that the weight of a heavy load for the facilities as

>l ton per the NUREG-0612 definition.

2.3 Guidelines The basic guidelines of NUREG-0612 for phase II evaluations are quoted and followed with applicant statements, EG&G's evaluation and recommendations below. The criteria includes guidelines in 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 for pressurized water reactors which are not addressed.

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Fermi 2, a boiling water reactor, needs to show consistency with guidelines 5.1.4, 5.1.5, and 5.1.6.

2.3.1 Reactor Building [NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.41 (1) "The reactor building crane, and associated lifting devices used for handling the above heavy loads, should satisfy the single-failure proof guidelines of Section 5.1.6 of this report.

OR (2) "The effects of heavy load drops in the reactor building should be analyzed to show that the evaluation criteria of Section 5.1 are satisfied. The loads analyzed should include: shield plugs, drywell head, reactor vessel head; steam dryers and separators; refueling canal plugs and gates; shielded spent-fuel shipping casks; vessel inspection 4

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TABLE 2.1. OVEHilI AD llolSTS CAPABL E OF llANDI.ING HEAVY LOADS OVf R SPf MT IUEL OR SHUILOWN SAf ETY SYSTLM -

COMPONENIE Iloist identification Holst iloi at Number Jygg CapacitV 1ocation Rocctor fluilding Crano Main T3100tuo2 (1) 125 Ton Hil-Sth Floor Heactor fluilding Crane T3100E002 (1) 5 Ton Atax i l ia ry llo i s t HB-Sth Floor N&S Torus Hatch lloists 13100E03243 (2) 5 Ton /ea RB-Ist door llPCI floist I3100f030 (2) 12 Ton AB- t st e'loor itClC Holst T3100E031 (2)= 10 Ton HB-Ist Floor RHH Pumps-Division i T3100LO24 (2) 16 Ton itB-Basoment Basement iloibt

.idlR Pumps-Division il T3800F025 (2) 16 Ton Basement iloist Hit-nasement '

HilR Pumps-Division i T3100E026 (2) 16 lon HB-Ist Floor 1st f loor lloist RHH Pumps-Division 11 T3Inut027 (2) 16 Ton itB-Ist Floor 1st Floor lloist N&S Hoc i rcula t ion Pump flo i s ts 13100fol5A&l6A (2) 25 fon/ca Hit-Ist Floor MC So t s. N. C. as S Ilo i s t s 13100F035.6&7 (2) 12 Ton /ca HB-4th Floor MG Set Iluid Drivo N&S Iloist CHD Hepair lloist 1310HIO38&9 (2) 20 Ton /ca lui-4th I loor I3100E019 (2) 3 Ton HB-3rd Floor Coro Spray Division 1 iloist 13I001028 (2) 16 Ion Hil-1st Floor Coro Spray Division Il lloist T3100E029 (2) 16 Ton HB-tst floor

, Diosol Conorator Division 1 N4cS Ilo i s tC (2) 2 Ton /oa fulH-Ground floor

, Diosol Conor.itor Division il N&S IloistC (2) 2 Inn /ca HilH-Ground F loor Diosol Conorator Motor Control --

(2) 4 lon/ca HilR-Upper Floor contral Division i N&S Iloistsc Diosul Generator Motor Control --

(2) 4 fon/ea HilR-Upper Floor Contral Division i Ventilation Equipment --

(2) 8 Ton AB-Sth Floor Hoom 110 i s tc NE Equipment flatch lloistC --

(2) 12 Ion RB-Ist Floor 1 a. ( 1 ) Ove rhead T rave l i ng Cra no, ( 2) Mono ra i l llo i s t ,

b. Itll-Itonctor nul lding, All-Auxi l la ry Hul lding, HHH-IdlH Hul ld ing.

c. those hoists have not yet boon speci riod ror purchaso, although the trolloy support for those hoist

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locations has. boon installed. The specified design of these hoists will include conformance with ANSI 1530.16 critoria for " Overhead floists."

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platform; and any other heavy loads that may be brought over or near safe shutdown equipment as well as fuel in the reactor vessel or the spent-fuel pool. Credit may be taken in this analysis for operation of the Standby Gas Treatment System if facility technical specifications require its operation during periods when the load being analyzed would be handled. The analysis should also conform to the guidelines of Appendix A."

A. Summary of Apolicant's Statements The Reactor Building crane main hoist is rated at 125 tons and is single failure proof. This is verified in the Fermi 2 FSAR, Section 9.1.4.2.1. Original design was based on EOCI 61 and analyses have been made to verify that it meets also CMAA 70 and ANSI B30.2.

The auxiliary hoist supplementing the main crane is rated at 5 tons. It is not of single failure proof design. In order to comply with the guideline the auxiliary hoist is limited to handling a maximum of 1500 pound loads, which is less than the identified heavy load, over spent fuel. The crane is equipped with a load limiting device to assure conformance with the established limitation. In addition, an administrative procedure is included in the technical 4

specifications prohibiting bypass of the limiting device.

The other 17 hoists listed as capable of handling heavy loads over spent fuel or shutdown safety equipment in the Reactor Building are designed to meet ANSI 830.16.

In addition to the hoists involved there are four associated handling systems used, o The RPV Strongback is a 5 ton unit to facilitate handling of the 81 ton RPV head. This strongback design review has been conducted by " General Electric" to determine compliance with ANSI N14.6. They have reported that the lifting lugs meet the criteria of NUREG-0612 Section 5.1.6 (3). They also state that the 6

RPV head strongback lifting device has several components that do not meet the additional design strength criteria of ANSI N14.6, Section 6.2. For some of these General Electric Co. indicates that it is impractical to modify. Detroit Edison is performing additional review of this. The direct, redundant attachment of the strongback to the Reactor Building Crane main hook has strength to meet " single failure proof" when carried unicaded.

o The Dryer / Separator strongback is a specially built sling to handle the 42 ton steam dryer or 73 ton dryer separator. From the General Electric Co. review, they report that the device does not allow adequate strength to meet ANSI N14.6 Section 6.2 criteria for maximum combined static and dynamic forces during handling of the separator in air. No upgrade method was recommended. The design review studies failed to evaluate that the separa+.or is handled under water while it is handled over the reactor. Additional review is under way. Action determined by the review and any possible modifications or additional analyses 4 for the two strongbacks will be taken prior to fuel loading and use after initial criticality.

o The vessel head insulation spreader beam is a 5 ton device that connects directly to the Rector Building crane main hook. It meets single failure proof criteria. It was designed to achieve compliance with ANSI N14.6 strength for static and dynamic loads.

o The Spent Fuel Cask Handling system is " single failure proof" and is addressed in detail in the Fermi 2 FSAR Section 9.1.4.2.1. The load is 100 tons and the handling system consists of a redundant sling system.

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B. EG&G Evaluation The Reactor Building Crane main hoist, the Vessel Head Spreader Beam, and Spent Fuel Cask handling system as reported, are consistent with the guideline requirement for single failure proof. In the April 15, 1982 submittal the Reactor Building Crane design was discussed in detail (20 parameters) to show that it also has been upgraded from the original design of ECCI 61 to comply with CMAA 70.

There is no basis for EG&G to question the report that these devices are consistent with single failure proof design.

The unresolved review problems remaining on the RPV strongback and Dryer / Separator must be brought to their conclusion and acceptable modifications made to show that these two strongbacks are consistent with NUREG requirements.

The Auxiliary hoist (5 tons) associated with the Reactor Building crane and 17 monorail hoists in the Reactor Building are listed as capable of hardling heavy loads over spent fuel or shutdown safety systems. The auxiliary hoist and monorail hoists are not single failure proof, so the 2.3.1 (2) option of the guideline applies. Detroit Edison Co. used the Matrix analysis technique as detailed in the Generic letter 2.1-3 Enclosure 3, Section 2.3-2 a and b to identify locations involving risk from the loads of these hoists. The hazard elimination categories are consistent with those the guideline recommends. However, the submittals show contradiction between hoist identification numbers used in tables and headings for apparently the same hoist used in the matrices. Also, the limitations discussed in A above for the auxiliary 5 ton hoist do not appear to be used in the matrix presentation on this hoist.

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C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations The Reactor Building Crane main hoist, as upgraded from EOCI 61 to CMAA 70; the Spent Fuel Cask handling system; and the Vessel Head Insulation Spreader Beam, all are " Single Failure Proof" in design and are consistent with Article 5.1.4 guideline.

The RPV Strongback and Dryer / Separator Strongback have identified design deficiencies revealed by recent reviews.

These must be resolved and suitable corrections made to show consistency with the guideline.

The risk control plans for the Auxiliary 5 ton hoist appear to be following two separate paths. One, limiting loads to 1500 pounds maximum and restricted travel. One handling loads of.5 and 2-1/2 tons and relying on other hazard elimination categories. These appear inconsistent with each other and for meeting a consistent status with the guideline. Selection of one plan or better explanation of the dual system is recommended.

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The matrix system used with the 17 additional hoists used in the Reactor Building establishes acceptable hazard elimination categories for each risk where a heavy load is handled. Identification numbering upgrade for these hoists to assure uniformity between references is needed. The hoists, according to names used, appear to be consistent with the guideline option permitting analysis showing that an acceptable hazard elimination exists.

2.3.2 Other Areas [NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.5]

(1) "If safe shutdown equipment are beneath or directly adjacent to a potential travel load path of overhead handling systems, (i.e., a path not restricted by limits of crane travel or by r.echanical stops or electrical interlocks) cne 9

of the following should be satisfied in addition to satisfying the general guidelines of Section 5.1.1:

(a) The crane and associated lifting devices should conform .

to the single-failure proof guidelines of Section 5.1.6 of this report; (b) If the load drop could impair the operation of equipment or cabling associated with redundant or dual safe shutdown paths, mech'anical stops or electrical interlocks should be provided to prevent movement of loads in proximity to these redundant or dual safe shutdown equipment. (In this case, credit should not be taken for intervening floors unless justified by analysis.)

(c) The effects of load drops have been analyzed and the results indicate that damage to safe shutdown equipment would not preclude operation of sufficient equipment to achieve safe shutdown. Analyses should conforr to the guidelines of Appendix A, as applicable.

(2) "Where the safe shutdown equipment-has a ceiling separating it fron, an overhead handling system, an alternative to Section 5.1.5(1) above would be to show by analysis that the largest postulated load handled by the handling system would not penetrate the ceiling or cause spalling that could cause failure of the safe shutdown equipment."

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A. Summary of Aoplicant's Statements The other area hoists are not single failure proof; therefore, the alternative option of 2.3.2 (1) (c) was used. Five hoists located in the Auxiliary and RHR buildings as listed in Table 2.1 above, require consideration. The matrix analysis shows that the Ventilation Equipment Room hoist in the Auxiliary building has a second floor risk involving Division 1 anc Division 2 cable trays. Their hazard elimination category is based on

" site specific considerations eliminating the need to consider load / equipment cc=binations." All of the other hoist hazard elimination categories are, " system redundancy and separation preclude loss of capability of the system to perform its safety related function following a load drop."

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8. EG&G Evaluation The scope of the load drop analyses are presented in the matrix format using hazard elimination categories as recommended in the NRC Generic letter enclosure 3. There is no basis for EG&G to question the accuracy of the information presented.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations The coverage and applicability of the analyses used for reviewing load drops in other areas is consistent with guideline specifications. EG&G has no recommendations.

2.3.3 Single-Failure-Proof Handling Systems [NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.61 '

(1) " Lifting Devices:

(a). Soecial lifting devices that are used for heavy loads in the area where the crane is to be upgraded should meet ANSI N14.6-1978, " Standard For.Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds {

(4500 kg) or More For Nuclear Materials," as specified in Section 5.1.1(4) of this report except that the handling device should also comply with Section 6 of ANSI N14.6-1978. If only a single lifting device is provided instead of dual devices, the special lifting device should have twice the design safety factor as required to satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1.1(4).

However, loads that have been evaluated and shown to satisfy the evaluation criteria of Section 5.1 need not have lifting devices that also comply with Section 6 of ANSI N14.6.

(b) Lifting devices that are not specially designed and that are used for handling heavy loads in the area where the crane is to be upgraded should meet ANSI B30.9-1971, " Slings" as 'specified in Section 5.1.1(5) of this report, except that one of the following should also be satisfied unless the effects of a drop of the particular load have been analyzed and shown to satisfy the evaluation criteria of Section 5.1:

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4 (1) Provide dual or redundant slings or lifting devices such that a single component failure or malfunction in the sling will not result in .

uncontrolled lowering of the load; 9R (ii) In selecting the proper sling, the load used should be twice what is called for in meeting Section 5.1.1(5) of this report.

(2) "New crsnes should be designed to meet NUREG-0554,

" Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants." For operating plants or plants under construction, the crane should be upgraded in accordance with the implementation guidelines of Appendix C of this report.

(3) " Interfacing lift points such as lifting lugs or cask trunions should also meet one of the following for heavy loads handled in the area where the crane is to be upgraded j unless the effects of a drop -of the particular load have

i been evaluated and shown to satisfy the evaluation criteria of Section 5.1: -

(a) Provide redundancy or duality such that a single lift point failure will not result in uncontrolled lowering of the load; lift points should have a design safety factor with respect to ultimate strength of five (5) times the maximum combined concurrent static and dynamic load after taking the single lift point failure.

OR (b) A non-redundant or non-dual lift point system should have a design safety factor of ten (10) times the maximum combined concurrent static and dynamic load."

A. Summary of Apolicant's Statements (1)(a) Soecial lifting Devices The special lifting devices have been discussed in detail in 2.3.1 above, in relation to NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.4. This information is not repeated here. The loads handled by the special lifting devices are identified in Table 2.2 by Reactor Building load numbers 1, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 22, and 23.

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(1)(b) Lifting Devices Not Soecially Designed The loads and hoists are presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.1, respectively. Information on the loads, where-handled, safety related equipment at risk, and hazard elimination category are presented in matrix sheets. The presentations cover all hoists listed in Table 2.1. A number of hoists and their loads both below the stated " heavy load" at Fermi 2 have been omitted from consideration herein.

Special lifting devices and slings will be purchased to ensure that the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 and ANSI B30.9-1971 are satisfied. Existin'g slings used for construction will not be retained for. handling of heavy loads around critical equipment after the plant is aperational.

The requirements of the stress design factor will include the maximum static and dynamic loads as defined by NUREG-0612. Any single-failure proof handling systems will also meet the requirements of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6. All slings that fall within the concerns of NUREG-0612 will be clearly marked to identify their qualification for that application. This includes a load rating accounting for static and dynamic loads for hoist speeds up to 30 ft/ min for these slings, as well as any information which might restrict certain specific slings to specific hoist / load applications.

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TABLE-2.2 TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS OVERHEAD HOIST; REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST AREA; REACTOR BUILDING FIFTH FLOOR Load Number Load Load Weight Lifting Device 1 Drywell Head 67 Ton . Head Strongback (T2301A001A) (F1300E009) 2 Reactor Shield 100 Ton /ea 3-Leg Sling,a Plugs (6) 3 Reactor Pressure 6 Ton Service Platform Vessel Service Platform Lifting Device (F1300E010) (CEX-33240A)

-4 Vessel Head Insulation 5 Ton Spreader Beam,"

(81151H001) 5 Reactor Pressure 81 Ton Head Strongback Vessel Head - (F1300E009) 6 Reactor Pressure 5 Ten Connects directly Vessel Head to Main Hoist Strongback (F1300E009) Hook 7 Storage. Pool Slot Plugs (4) 43 Ton /ea 2-Leg Sling,"

8 Fuel Pool .S' lot Plugs (4) 9 Ton /ea 1-Leg Sling,"

4 9 Stud Tensioner 6 Ton Connects directly (F1300E007) to Main Hoist Hook 10 Steam Oryer 42 Ton Dryer / Separator (B11070041) Sling (F1300E008) 11 Steam Separator 73 Ton Dryer / Separator (811120002) '

Sling (F1300E008) 12 Storage Pool Gate 14 Ton 2-Leg Sling,a 13 Fuel Pool Gates (A & B) 4.3 Ton & 2-Leg Sling,a 2.5 Ton

- 14 Crane Load Block 5 Ton None 15 Spent Fuel Cask 100 Ton Redundant Cask (F1600E001) Slings I

A 14

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9 TABLE 2.2 (continued).

Load' Number -Load Load Weight Lifting Device 16 Concrete Floor Hatch 5 Ton 4-Leg Sling,"

(E1/2-10 Column Location) 17 RWCU Demin' Floor Plug 14 Ton 4-Leg Sling,"

18 Equipment Hatch Plugs 17 Ton 4-Let Sling,a 19 Debris Shipping Cask --

b __a 20 Fuel Storage Racks --

b __a 21 Refueling Bridge 14 Ton 4-Leg Sling,"

(T25020001) 22 Dryer / Separator Sling 2.4 Ton Attaches directly to (F1300E008) Main Hook 23 Vessel Head Insulation: 1.2 Ton Attaches directly to Spreader Beam Main Hook OVERHEAD HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING AUXILIARY HOIST (5 TON)

AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FIFTH FLOOR

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Maintenance Tools b ,a 1 5 Ton -

2 Lifting Fixtures 5 Ton - D'"

3 New Fuel Vault Plugs 2 1/2 Ton 4-Leg Sling,"

OVERHEAD HOIST: NORTH, CENTER AND SOUTH MOTOR GENERATOR SET HOISTS (3 12-TON EACH)

AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FOURTH FLOOR North and South Motor b ,a 1 11 Ton -

Generator Set Generator (Without Rotors)

B31035001A,B 15

TABLE 2.2 (continued)

Load Number load Load Weicht Liftino Device 2 North and South Motor b ,a 8 Ton -

Generator Set Generator

' Rotors 3 North and South Motor b ,a 11 Ton -

Generator Set Motors (Without Rotors) 831035001A,8 4 North and South Motor b ,a 8 Ton -

Generator Set Motor Rotors OVERHEAD HOIST: NORTH AND SOUTH MOTOR GENERATOR SET FLUID ORIVE HOISTS (2 20-TON EACH)

AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FOURTH FLOOR North and South Motor b ,a 1 Ton" -

Generator Set Fluid Drives B31035001A,8 OVERHEAD HOIST: CONTROL ROD DRIVE REPAIR HOIST (3-TON) h AREA: REACTOR BUILDING THIRD FLOOR '

l' CR0 Transfer Cask 2 Ton -

b ,a (C1102E001)

OVERHEAD HOIST: NORTH AND SOUTH TORUS MATCH HOISTS (2 S-TON)

AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR North and South b ,a 1 5 Ton -

Torus Hatches 0VERHEAD HOIST: RCIC HOIST (10-TON)

AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLCOR RCIC First Floor Hatch b ,a 1 9 Ton -

b ;a 2 RCIC Basement Floor Hatch 9 Ton -

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TABLE 2.2 (continued)

Load Number Lead Load Weight Lifting Device 3 RCIC Pump (E5101C001) Ton --

b,a 4 b,a RCIC Turbine (E5101C002) Ton --

OVERHEAD HOIST: HPCI HOIST (12-TON)

AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR 1 HPCI Floor Shield Plugs (3) 10 Ton --

b,a 2 HPCI Pump (E4101C001) Ton --

3 b,a HPCI Turbine (E4101C2) Ton --

OVERHEAD HOIST: RECIRCULATION PUMP GEARED HOISTS (2 24-TON)

AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR D '8 1 Recirculation Motor (2) 20 Ton /ea -

(83101C001A,B) 2 Recirculation Drive ~ b ,a 4 Ton /ea -

Mounts (2) 3 Recirculation Pump b ,a 2.5 Ton /ea -

Covers (2) 4 Rotating Pump Assembly b ,a 1.5 Ton /ea -

(2) (B31010001A,B)

OVERHEAD HOIST:

RHR DIVISION 1 AND DIVISION 2 BASEMENT HOISTS (2 16-TON)

AREA: REACTOR BUILDING BASEMENT North and South Floor Hatch b ,a 1 7 Ton -

2 Division 1 and 2 RHR Pumps b ,a 2 Ton -

(4) (E1102C002A-0) 3 Division 1 and 2 RHR b ,a 2 Ton -

Motors (4) (E1102C001A-0) 17 me +e W e*

, . , . , , ., __m __. m -,.

TABLE 2.2 (continued)

Load -

-Number Load Load Weight Lifting Device OVERHEAD HOIST: RHR DIVISION 1 AND DIVISION 2 AREA: FIRST FLOOR HOIST (2 16-TON) b ,a 1 North and South Floor Hatch 8 Ton -

2 Division 1 and 2 RHR Pumps b ,a 2 Ton -

(4) (E1102C002A-0) 3 Division 1 and 2 RHR b ,a 2 Ton -

Motors (4) (E1102C001A-0)

TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS OVERHEAD HOIST: CORE SPRAY DIVISION 1 AND 2 HOISTS (2 16-T08)

AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR Core Spray First Floor b ,a 1 8 1/2 Ton -

Hatch (2)

Core Spray Basement b ,a 2 8 1/2 Ton -

Floor Hatch (2) 3 ' Core Spray Pump b ,a Ton -

Motors (4) E2101C00A-0 OVERHEAD HOIST: NE EQUIPMENT 000R HOIST (12 TON)

AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR NE Equipment Door b 1 11.3 Ton --

T2301A0018 OVERHEAD HOIST: DIESEL GENERATOR MOTOR CONTROL CENTER DIVISION 1 AND 2 HOISTS (4 4-TCN)

AREA: RHR BUILDING GRADE FLOOR

__b __b __b,a 18

TABLE 2.2 (continued)

Lead' Number Load Load Weight Lifting Device OVERHEAD HOIST: DIESEL GENERATOR NORTH AND SOUTH DIVISION 1 AND 2 HOISTS (4 2-TON)

AREA: RHR BUILDING GRADE FLOOR 1 Diesel Generator --

D -

b ,a Components (i.e. cylinders, cylinder liners)

OVERHEAD HOIST: . VENTILATION EQUIPMENT HOIST (8-TON)

AREA: AUXILIARY BUILDING

__b __b __b,a

a. Not yet purchased.

b. _To be determined later.

I 19

(2) New Cranes Table 2.1 base'd on the latest submittal revised to October 10, 1982 shows 6 hoists that have not yet been specified for purchase. The trolly support for these hoist locations has been installed. The specified design of these hoists will include conformance witn ANSI B30.16 criteria for overhead hoists. Future cranes or hoists that fall within the concerns of NUREG-0612 will meet the design guidelines of NUREG-0612.

(3) Interfacine Lift points The submittals do not address this subject.

B. EG&G Evaluation (1)(a) From review of the submittals it is evident that only the lifting devices identified in Table 2.2 by Reactor Building Crane Main Hoist 5th Floor load No.'s 1, 4, 5,'6, 10, 11, 22, and 23 are j intended to meet the criteria for Single Failure Proof. Load No. 14 the crane block, being an integral part of the single failure proof crane also meets this requirement. Minor problems on the Head Strongback (Loads 1, 5, and 6) and the Dryer / Separator Strongback (loads 10, 11, and 23) are pending resolution. These are discussed in 2.3.1 above.

(1)(b) The other loads handled by the Reactor Building Main Hoist at various floor levels and loads handled by other hoists listed in Table 2.1 have been analyzed. The results are presented in 20

matrix form using the format and hazard I elimination category codes recommended in the NRC generic letter Enclosure 3, 2.3.2. No alternative upgrading along the guideline of NUREG-0612 5.1.6 is discussed. Some problems are recognized.

The Main Crane Auxiliary Hoist provides a warning light and depends on technical specifications control for an installed bypass of a load limit switch that is used to keep the hoist from being used for the 2 1/2 and 5 ton loads movement over the spent fuel pool. The intent is to limit the hoist to loads of 1500 pounds over the spent fuel pool.

Supplemental to the matrices analysis Detroit Edison has provided general descriptive coverage for handling of some loads. This information reveals that additional analysis is under way on m specific problems associated with loads No. 13 Fuel Pool Gates,16 & 17 Floor Hatches and plugs, and 18 Equipment Hatch Plugs. Tha Ventilation Equipment Hoist is shown in both Tables 2.1 and {

2.2 as an 8 ton rated hoist. The general description indicates studies showing the floors can withstand drops of 10 tons from Sth floor to 3rd floor. Also it is indicated that,

" Maintenance procedure specifies this load limit for all lifts except those incurred during cold shutdown." Deviations from this specification will require formal approval.

(2) New crane design meeting ANSI B30.16 and plans to meet guidelines of NUREG-0612 are consistent with needs.

Since the 5.1.6 guideline of NUREG-0612, by reference, specifies that new cranes be designed to NUREG-0554, 21

this should assure that Fermi .2 new-cranes will be consistent with NUREG requirements.

'(3) The omission of discussion on interfacing lift points is acceptable on the premise that there is no alternative upgrading of cran n involved, and the analysis and hazard elimination categories are consistent with NUREG-0612 guidelines.

C. EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations (1)(a) Resolve the remaining design details on the two strongbacks and accomplish the necessary corrections so they may be snown consistent with the single failure proof guideline.

(1)(b) Article 5.1.6 as applied to devices not specially-designed allows the alternative to upgrading, of going back to Article 5.1.4. This gives the applicant the options of meeting single failure proof design or evaluation in addition to meeting NUREG-0612 Article 5.1. The evaluation is item IV of Article 5.1.

(

The items 5.1 I, 5.1 II, and 5.1 III have not been addressed. An adequate resolution of this guideline must show consistency with all aspects of the alternative chosen.

The general statement, that devices and slings will be purchased to meet ANSI B30.9, ANSI N14.6 and NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.6 indicates that Detroit Edison is committed to providing lifting devices not specially designed that is consistent with guideline requirements. Proper follow through on this commitment will be necessary.

(2) New Cranes. The new units contemplated are identified as monorail type, therefore the ANSI B30.16 is the appropriate and acceptable design document. If in

. 22

addition they meet, as stated the requirements of NUREG-0612 this will be consistent with the guideline.

(3) Interfacing Lift Points are not discussed. The basis

- for not addressing this subject is that this alternative is not appitcable to single- failure proof devices discussed in (1)(a) above. The analysis matrix rather than the alternative cf upgrading is used for other-loads. The actions indicated for (1)(b) upon proper completion will confirm that discussions of interfacing lift points is not required.

4 23

3. CONCLUDING

SUMMARY

3.1 Guideline Recommendations

.3.1.1 'The Reactor Building Crane Main Hoist is Single Failure Proof. The special lifting devices used with it are approaching full compliance with all requirements for

" Single Failure Proof." A few design details of the RPV Strongback and Dryer / Separator Strongback require final resolution and correction of deficiencies.

The load handling control system for the Reactor Building Crane Auxiliary Hof st needs mechanical stops or electrical interlocks to provide positive controls of intended uses.

The additional hoists used in the Reactor Building have load analysis matrix sheets presented that show hazard elimination categories for all loads and potentially affected safety related equipment. A minor problem of unit identification numbering should be resolved.

3.1.2 The scope and coverage of-load drop analyses used with the 4

matrices on other area hoists NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.5 is consistent with guidelines.

3.1.3 (1)(a) Special lifting devices are approaching full compliance with single failure proof requirements. Minor design detail deficiencies remaining under review must be resolved and corrections made. i (1)(b) A problem exists on showing consistency with the full requirements of NUREG-0612 Article 5.1 evaluation criteria parts I, II and III that are required in conjunction with the exception permitting load drop analysis in lieu of system upgrade. Only 5.1 part IV has been addressed.

24

(2) The commitment made concerning new cranes is consistent with guidelines.

(3) Interfacing ~ lift points nave not been addressed.

If adequate resolution of the analyses for (1)(b) is made this is acceptable.

3.2 Additional Recommendations None.

3.3 Summary Significant progress has been made on the Fermi 2 heavy load case review. Resolution and followup on various details as discussed in this report should materially aid in their being able to show full consistency with the guidelines which NUREG-0612 specifies.

.1 5

25

4. -7

4. REFERENCES

1. EG&G-HS-6191 March 1983, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2 (Phase 1)

C. R. Shaber, T. H. Stickley.

2. .NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, NRC.

3. V. Stello, Jr. (NRC), Letter to all applicants. .

Subject:

Request for Additiontl Information on Control of Heavy ' Loads Near Spent Fuel, NRC, 17 May 197? l

4. USNRC, Letter to Detroit Edison.

Subject:

NRC Request for Additional Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel, NRC, 22 December 1980.

5. Detroit Edison, Letter to USNRC,

Subject:

Control of Heavy Loads Over ar in Proximity of Irradiated Fuel. Mr. Harry Tauber, VP Engineering and Construction, December 3, 1981.

6. Detroit Edison, Same as 5, updatad to April 15, 1982.

7. Detroit Edison, Same as 5, updated to October 15, 1982.

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