ML20062N946
| ML20062N946 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1982 |
| From: | Shaber C EG&G, INC. |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20062N941 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8208230428 | |
| Download: ML20062N946 (24) | |
Text
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Enclosure DRAFT REPORT and RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
.3 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ENRICO FERMI ATOMIC POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 Docket No. 50-341 Author C. R. Shaber Principal Technical Investigator T. H. Stickley
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EG&G Idaho, Inc.
l June 1982
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P208230428 820730 d)
PDR ADOCK 05000341 A
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ABSTRACT The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) has requested that all nuclear plants either operating or under construction submit a, response of compliancy with NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power,
Pl ants."
EG&G Idaho, Inc. has contracted with the NRC to evaluate the
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responses of those plants presently under construction.
This report contains EG&G's evaluation and recommendations for Enrico Femi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2.
EXECbTIVE
SUMMARY
Enrico Fenni Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2 is not in total compliance with the guidelines of NUREG-0612.
In general, their. submission concerning canpliance is excellent, but further-action is required in the following areas:
plan methods for temporary identification of heavy load paths o
where painted floor markings are impractical o
completion of all heavy load handling procedures completion of operator training in accord with reported plans o
completion of purchase and prope'r identification of regular o
lifting devices completion of the inspection, testing, and maintenance of cranes o
according to planned guidelines, before handling heavy loads.
The main report contains recomendations which will aid in bringing ithe above items into compliance with the appropriate guidelines.
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CONTENTS Section Title
'Page ABSTRACT............................................................,
ii E X E CU T I VE S UMMA R Y..........'..........................................ii 1.
InTRoouCTION......:.............................................
1 1.1 P u rp o s e o f Re v i ew....... : '.................................
1 1.2 Generic Background........................................
1 1.3 Pl ant-Speci fi~c Back ground.................................
3 2.
EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS..................................
4 2.1 O v e rv i ew..................................................'
4 2.2 Hea vy Load Overhead Handl i ng Sys tems......................
4 2.3 G e n e r al Gu i d el i n e s........................................
-6 2.4 In terim Pro tecti on Mea sures...............................
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1 3.
CO NC LUD I N G S UMMARY..............................................
19 3.1 Appl i cabl e Load Handl ing Systems....'......................
19 3.2 Gui del i ne Recommen da ti ons.................................
19 3.3 I n te ri m P ro te c ti on.........................................
21 4.
R EF E R EN C ES......................................................
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j TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT FOR e
l ENRICO FERMI. ATOMIC POWER PLANT, UNIT:2
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l 1.
INTRODUCTION I
1.1 Purpose of Review This technical evaluation report documents the EG&G Idaho Inc. review of general load handling policy and procedures at Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2 (Fermi 2).
This evaluation was performed with the objective of assessing conformance to the general load handlir.g guidelines of NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants" [1], Section 5.1.1.
1.2 Generic Background Generic Technical Activity Task A-36 was established by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff to systematically examine staff licensing criteria and the adequacy of measures in effect at operating nuclear power plants to assure the safe handling of heavy loads and to recommend necessary changes to these measures.
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activity was initiated by a letter issued by the NRC staff on May 17, 1978 [2] to all power reactor licensees, requesting information concerning the control of heavy loads near spent. fuel.
The resul ts of Task A-36 were reported in NUREG-0612, " Control of.
Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The staff's conclusion from this evaluation was that existing ~ measures to control the handling of heavy loads at operating plants, although providing protection from certain potential prob'lems, do not adequately cover the major causes of load handling accidents an'd should be upgraded.
4 1
In order to upgrade measures for the control of heavy loads, the staff developed a series of guidelines designed to achieve a two-phase The ob'jective using an accepted approach or protection philoso.phy.
j first portion of the objective, achieved through a set of general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1, is to ensure that all load handling syitems at nuclear power, plants are designed a'nd operated such that,their probability of failure is unifomly small and The appropriate for the critical tasks in which they are employed.
second portion of the staff's objective, achieved through guidelines i
identified in NUREG-0612, Articlet 5.1.2 through 5.1.5 is to ensure that, for load handling systems in areas where their failure might result in significant consequences, either (1) features are provided, in addition to those required for all load handling systems., to ensure that the potential for a load drop is extremely small (e.g., a single-failure-proof crane) or.(2) conservative evaluations of load handling accidents indicate that the potential consequences of any load drop are acceptably small. Acceptability of accident consequences is quantified in NUREG-0612 into four accident analysis evaluation criteria.
i The approach used to develop the staff guidelines for minimizing the potential for a load drop was based on de ense in depth and is sumarized as follows:
provide sufficient operator training, handling system o
design, load handling instructions, and equipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the handling system define safe load travel paths through procedures and o
operator training so that, to the extent practical, heavy loads are not carried over or near irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment
o provide mechanical stops or electrical interlocks to prevent movement of heavy loads over irradiated fuel or in proximity to equipment associated with redundant shutdown paths.-
Staff guidelines resulting from the foregoing are tabulated in
~ ~Section '5 of NUREG-0652.
1.3 plant-Specific Background In December 22, 1980, the NRC issued a letter [3] to Detroit Edison, the Licensee for Fermi 2 requesting that 'the Licensee review provisions for handling and control of heavy loads at Fermi 2, evaluate these provisions with respect to the guidelines of NUR5G-0612, and prpvide certain additional information to be used for an independent determination of conformance to these guidelines.
On December 3,1981, Detroit Edison provided the initial response [4a] to this request.
On June 3,1982, additional information and drawings
[4b] were submitted.
These provide a current and more comprehensive report on conformance with the guidelines.
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2.
EVALUATION AND REC 0HMENDATIONS 2.1 Overview 1-i '--
The following sections summarize Detroit Edison's review of heavy load handling' at Fermi 2 accompanied by EG&G's evaluation, conclusions and recommendations to the licensee for bringing the facilitics more completely into compliance with the intent of NUREG-0612.
The licensee did not specify the weight of a single spent fuel element and its handling tool, the NUREG-0612 definition of a heavy load.
However, the licensee specifically identifies, for their use, heavy load 'as " greater than one ton."
2.2 Heavy Load Overhead Handling Systems This section reviews the licensee's list of overhead handling systems which are subject to the criteria of NUREG-0612 and a review of the justification for excluding overhead handling systems from the above mentioned list.
- 2. 2.1 Scope
" Report the results of your review oflant arrangements to p
identify all overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in. damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, technical specifications, operating procedures, or detaile'd structural analysis) and justify the exclusion of any overhead stem from your list by verifying that there is handling sy' physical separation from any load-impact point and any sufficient safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal."
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i A.
Sumary of Licensee Statements The Licensee's review of overhead handling systems ' identified cranes and hoists then provided separate tables to show- " Hoists Capable of Handling Louds Over Spent Fuel or Shutdown Safety System Componen's" and, " Overhead Hoists Exempt From Further t
Analysis Because They Cannot Handle Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel or Shutdown Safety System Components."
Also, they collectively excepted cranes and hoists, located in buildings that do not contain safety equipment needed for safe unit shutdown.
B.
EG&G Evaluation Insufficient information was included in the Licensee's response for EG&G to evaluate adequately whether the lists of cranes and hoists ir.cluded and excluded are complete.
The licensee used the -
information given in the titles of the tables quoted above as the criteria for inclusion or exclusion of a crane or hoist for consideration.
In the drawings provided'there is sufficient information to show good relationship for the crane coverage area of risk they consider as meeting the criteria.
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C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recomendations Based on the information provided EG&G concludes that the Licensee has included all applicable hoists-and cranes in their list of handling systems which must comply with the requirements of the generai guidelines of NUREG-0612.
However, EG&G does recomend that the Licensee be prepared to show an auditor.
. justification for the exclusion of cranes and hoists from consideration.
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2.3 General Guidelines This section addresses the extent ta which the applicable handling systems comply with the general guidelines of NUREG-0612 Article 5.1.1.
EG&G's conclusions and recomendations are provided in summaries for each guideline.
The NRC has established seven general guidelines which must be met in order to provide the defense-in-depth approach for the handling of heavy loads.
These guidelines consist of the following criteria from l
Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:
A.
Guideline 1--Safe Load Paths B.
Guideline 2--Load Handling Procedures C.
Guideline 3--Crane Operator Training D.
Guideline 4--Special Lifting Devices E.
Guideline 5--Lifting Devices (not specially designed)
F.
Guideline 6--Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance)
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G.
Guideline 7--Crane Design.
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l These seven guidelines should be satisfied for all overhead handling systems and programs in order to handle heavy loads in the vicinity of the reactor vessel, near spent fuel in 'the ' spent fuel pool, or in other areas where a load drop may damage safe shutdown systems..The succeeding paragraphs address the guidelines individually.
- 2. 3.1 Safe Load Paths [ Guideline 1, NUREG-0612, Artic1e 5.1.1(1)]
" Safe load paths should be defined for the movement of heavy loads to minimize the potential for heavy leads, if dropped, to impact irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and in the spent fuel pool, or to impact safe shutdown equipment.
The path should follow, to the extent practical, structural floor members, beams, etc., such that if the load is dropped, the structure is more likely to withstand th'e impact.
These load paths should be
' defined in procedures, shown on equipment layout drawings, and clearly marked on the floor in' the area where the load is to be
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l handl ed.
Deviations from defined load ' paths should require written alternative procedures approved by the plant safety review committee."
....g, A.
Sumary of Licensee Statements The licensee has revised their refueling equipment laydown location drawings. The laydown locations and travel paths to them for the reactor crane, main and auxiliary hoists, utilize the criteria of NUREG 0612.
Also the Fermi 2 plant Maintenance Group i.s planning development of eighteen procedures that will address administrative, rigging and load handling concerns of NUREG 0612.
The procedures are to include definitions of " Safe Load Paths" and prior 'to refueling, plans will wherever practical, require floor lines to show the heav'y load paths.
Because of the high strength integrity of the fueling floor (fifth floor) due to its heavily reinforced, 24-inch thick construction, very little added strength is achieved along the building column. lines.
However, travel paths along these column lines have been established where it is practicable, to keep the travel and placement as siinple as possible, so as not to confuse operators and supervisors Detailed' handling procedures developed prior to fuel load, will include definition of these travel paths for each load.
Because of the high strength integrity of the fueling floor at all locitions and the separation of redundant safety systems located below the fueling floor, deviations from the travel paths shown providJd do not notably increase the consequences of any potential accidents as long as these deviations do not traverse over the Reactor, Fuel Storage-Pool and Equipment Ha' ch arear. Therefore, the placement of t
painted travel path lines for each heavy load offers very-7
i little advantage and could cause confusion.
- However, painted barrier lines and signs will be established around the Reactor, Fuel Pool and Equipment Hatch areas, B.
EG&G Evaluation The plans,are fine as developed.
Completion of the procedures and inclusion of a deviation load path approval system will fully satisfy the safe load path guidelines.
l C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations (1 )
The licensee should schedule completion of the planned actions and possible additional procedural needs prior to ' heir need for. fuel handling.
The procedures;should t
be available for audit before plant startup.
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(2)
Where it is not practical to use floor lines for safe load paths compliance can be achieved by alternatives, such as, mechanical stops, electrical interlock _s,..
ceiling streamers etc. when a heavy load is being h'andl ed.
2.3.2 Load Handling Procedures [ Guideline 2, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(2)]
" Procedures should be developed to cover load' hand 1'ing operations for heavy l'oads that are or could be handled over or in proximity to irradiated fdel or safe shutdown equipment. At a minimum procedures should cover handling of those loads listed in Table 3.1-1 of NUREG-0612.
These procedures should include:
identification of required euqipment; inspections and acceptance criteria required before movement of load; the steps and proper sequence to be followed in handling the load; defining the safe path; and other special precautions."
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A.
Summary of Licensee Statements e
The need for eighteen practices was originally identified.
The recent submittal lists 13 different paintenance procedure numbers applying to heavy loads and 7 "to be
- determined later." The procedures are said to referenc'e the Fermi 2 Rigging Manual, developed by the Detroit Edison Civil Design Engineering group, that specifically identifies the rigging equipment and methods used to secure loads.
Preliminary issue of the manual is scheduled for 1982.
Deviations from travel paths established are to be in accordance with the Administrative Control Procedure as defined in the Fermi 2 Technical Specifications.
Also, "all new, revised, and future maintenance procedures for the lifting of heavy loads _will incorporate the guidelines of NUREG-0612. "
B.
EG&G. Eval uation Recognition of the requirements is an effective start At this time nothing has been submitted to evaluate.
Procedures should be completed and available for audit before, " handling heavy loads."
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations (1 )
It is concluded that planned actions must be executed before fuel is handled in-the plant.
(2)
The licensee should get.the procedures written.
Their review should be critical to assure that requirements specified above from Article 5.1.1(2) of NUREG 0612 are included.
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i 2.3.3 Crane Operator Training [ Guideline 3, NUREG-0612,,
Article 5.1.1(3)]
" Crane operators should be trained, qualified and conduct themselves in accordance with Chapter 2-3 of ANSI B30.2-1976,
' Overhead and Gantry Cranes' [5]."
A.
The Licensee Statement Operator training, qualification, and conduct will be in compliance with the requ'irements of ANSI B30.2-1976.
This will be covered under the following crane and hoist written operator training procedures to be completed prior to fuel delivery to the si te.
Procedure 'No.
1.
Training Program for Maintenance 31.000.07 Section Supervisory Personnel 2.
Training Program for Maintenance 31.000.08 Non-Supervisory Personnel B.
EG&G Evaluation The ANSI B30.2 Chapter 2-3 being used as the guide for selection and training, meets the general requirements for guidel.ine 3.
C.
EG&G Cenclusion and Recommendations The selection and training should be started well in advance of the need for qualified operators when reactor fuel becones a part of the risk.
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2.3.4 Special Lifting Devices [ Guideline 4; NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(4)]
"Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI N14.5-1978, ' Standard 'for Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or More for Nuclear Materials' [6). -This standard should apply to all special lifting devices which carry heavy loads in areas as defined above.
For operating plants certain inspections and load tests may be accepted in lieu of certain material requirements in the standard.
In addition, the stress design factor stated in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 should be based on the combined maximum static and dynamic loads that could be imparted on the handling device based on' characteristics of the crane which will be used.
This is in lieu of the guideline in Section 3.2.1.1 of ANSI N14.6 which bases the stress design factor on only the weight- (static load) or the load and of the intervening
, components of the special handling device."
A.
Summary 'of Licensee Statements To date, there are only three lifting devices provided for the handling of heavy loads that would _ fall within the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, as defined in NUREG-0612.
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These are the RPV Head Strongback, the Dryer / Separator lifting device, and the Vessel Head Insula' tion Spreader B.eam.
A design review is tc) be conducted by the designer, General Electric, to verify that RPV Head Strongback and
[ <t Dryer / Separator lifting device are in full compliance with the strength criteria of ANSI N14.6-1978, taking into I
account the combined static and dynamic load forces. This l
study will also identify the feasibility of possible upgrading these devices beyond this criteria.
This review.
and any possible modifications will be completed prior to the use of these devices for the first unit maintenance or
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i refueling outage.
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The Yessel Head Insu1ation Spreader Beam is being designed -
to achieve compliance witih the ANSI N14.6 strength criteria for combined static and dynamic load forces.
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The Spent Fuel Cask handling system is accepted as single-failure-proof and is addressed in detail in the Enrico Fermi FSAR, Section 9.1.4.2.1.
All other special lifting devices and s ings will be T
purchased to ensure that the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 and ANSI B30.9-1971 are satisfied.
B.
EG&G Evaluation The licensee has complied with the requirements of Guideline 4.
C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations None.
Lifting Devices (No'~ Specially Designed) [ Guideline 5,
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t 2.3.5 NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(5))
" Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed and used in accordance with,the guidelines of ANSI B30.9-1971, ' Slings' [7].
However, in selecting the proper sling, the load used should be the sum of the static and maximum dynamic load.
The rating identified on the sling should be in terms of the ' static load' which produces the maximum static and l
dynamic load.
Where this restricts slings to use on only.certain cranes, the slings should be clearly marked as to the cranes with which they may be'used."
A.
Summary of' Licensee Statements Slings used for construction vd11 not be retained for-handling of heavy loads around critical equipment after the plant-is operational.
I The requirements of the stress design factor will include j
the maximum static and dynamic loads as define'd.by NUREG-0612.
Any single-failure-proof handling. systems yi.11 also meet the requirements of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6.
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' Additionalli; the static rating of each sling will be clearly marked on the sling as well as any informatio.n which might restrict the sling to only certain cranes and loads.
B.
EG&G Evaluation l
The planned future actions for lifting devices will, upon completion as stated, meet the requirements of guideline 5.
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C.
EG&G Conclusions and Reconnendations Completion of the pending purchase and labeling required for compliance with guideline 5 should be documented also, to allow for confirmation in case of audit.
l 2.3.6 Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance) [ Guideline 6, t
l NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(6))
"The crane should be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and' Gantry Cranes,' with the exception that tests and inspections should be performed prior to use where Jit is not practical to meet the frequencies of ANSI B30.2 for periodic inspection and test, or where frequency of crane use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency (e.g., the polar crane. inside a PWR containment may only be used every 12 to 18 months during refueling operations, and is generally not accessible during,
power operation.
ANSI B30.2, however, calls for certain inspections to be performed daily or monthly.
For such cranes having limited ~ usage, the inspections, test, and maintenance should be performed prior to their use)."
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A.
Sumary of Licensee Statements The reactor building crane, main and auxiliary h'oists, c'rane inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures will comply with the guidelines in ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2.-
Should any deviat' ions from this standard be required, they will be equivalent to the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976.
The requirements of this standard will be incorporated into the Reactor Building Crane,-General Maintenance Procedures No. 35.000.120..This procedure will be written prior to fuel loading.
For all other overhead hoists, inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures will comply with ANSI B30.16-1973, Chapters 1.2 and 2.2.
B.
EG&G Evaluation Since, procedures are to be written and since ANSI B30.2 Chapter 2-2 or B30.16 will be used for conformance guides, the.specified guideline can be met.
Both of the ANSI documents conformance requirements include inspection, testing and maintenance.
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C.
EG&G Conclusions and Recommendations The procedure writing for plant cranes or hoists should be completed well _in advance of needs for hoisting.
Then, the testing requirements can be met before fuel handling becomes necessary.
l The documentation and test results should be available for audit before fuel handling is required..
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2.3.7 Crane Design [ Guideline 7, NUREG-0612, Article 5.1.1(7)]
e "The crane should be designed to meet the applicab1'e criteria and guidelines of Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, ' Overhead and Gantry Cranes,' and of CMAA-70, ' Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes' [8).
An alternative to a
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specification"in ANSI B30.2 or CMAA-70 may be accepted in lieu of specific compliance if the intent of the specification is satisfied.".
i A.
Summary of Licensee Statements The reactor building main crane is the only single-failure-proof crane at the plant site. The Enrico Fermi 2 Atomic Power Station FSAR, Section 9.1.4.*2.1, describes the single-failure-proof design features incorporated in the 125 ton crane.
The Fermi 2 Reactor Building Crane was designed under the E0C' I #61 " Specifications for Electric Traveling Cranes."
However, additional, upgraded criteria included in 'the later CMAA #70-1976 specification was already'a part of the
, manufacturer's design practices.
As part of the recent Detroit Edison submittal, analyses were included to show that CMAA criterion that differ from EOCI-61 have been satisfied concerning:
o Design stress shall not exceed 20% of the published average
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ultimate strength of the material.
o Welding design and procidure conform to AWS D14.1 and meterial conforms to ASTM A-36.
o Impact allowance minimum is 15% of rated capacity of. hoist for speeds up to 30 FPM.
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e Twisting moments due to overhanging loads and lateral forces o
acting eccentric to the horizontal neutral axis of a girder are calculated based on distance between the load of c of g and the girder section shear center.
Longitudinal. stiffener is to be located 0.4 times the '
o distance from the compression flange inner surface to the neutral axis.
o b/c ratios between 38 and 52, girder allowable compressive stress values are less than EOCI-61 criteria.
o Diaphragm plate thickness is sufficient to keep the. trolley wheel load bearing stress within 26.0 ksi.
o Allowable vertical stresses without impact shall be 14.4 ksi tension or compression.
o Rated capacity load plus the bottom block weight divided by the number of parts of rope must not exceed 20% of the published rope breaking strength.
o The drum shall be designed to withstand combined crushing and bending loads.
o Minimum drum groove depth is 3/8 x rope diameter.
Minimum drum groove pitich is 1.14 + rope diamete'r or rope diameter + 1/8", whichever is less.
I Horsepower rating of gearbox gearing shall be based upon o
AGMA Standards.
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Hoist motion, holding brakes meet minimum specified torque requirements.
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Bridge and trolly bumpers shall be ~ rigidly mounted and capable of stopping the crane within specified ;
de celeration limits.
1 o
Provides criteria that addresses static control.
o Provides for protection to prevent motors from restar. ting upon restoration from a power loss until control handles-are brought to the off position.
For all other overhead hoists listed 'by Fermi 2, CMAA #70 and ANSI B30.2 are not the applicable standards for these hoists.
ANSI B30.16-1973 is the applicable standard.
The recirculating
' pump hoists design does confonn to this standard.
The remaining hoists, which are not yet purchased, have been specified to conform to ANSI B30.16.
B.
EG&G-Eval uation The licensee has provided adequate information to show that Fermi 2 meets guideline 7.
i C.
EG&G Conclusion and Recommendation Fermi 2 is in compliance with guideline 7, EG&G has no recommendations.
2.4 Interim Protection Measures The NRC staff has established (NUREG-0612, Article-5.3) -that six
- measures should be initiated to provide reasonable assurance diat handling of _ heavy loads udll be performed in a safe manner. until final l
implementation of the general guidelines of NUREG-0612, Article 5.1 is complete.
Four of these six interim measures consist of general Guideline 1, Safe Load paths; Guideline 2, Load Handling Procedur,es; 17
Guideline 3, Crane Operator Training; and Guideline 6, Cranes (Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance).
The two remaining interim measures cover the following criteria:
o Heavy load technical specifications
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o Special review for heavy loads handled over the core.
Licensee implementation and evaluation of these interim protection measures is contained in the succeeding paragraphs of this section.
- 2. 4.1 Interim Protection Measure 1 - Technical Specifications
" Licenses for al.1 operating reactors not having a single-failure-proof ~ overhead crane in the fuel storage pool. area should be revised to include a specification comparable to Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7, ' Crane Travel - Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building,' for PWR's and Standard Technical Specification 3.9.6.2, ' Crane Travel,' for BWR's, to prohibit handling of heavy loads over fuel in the storage pool until implementation of measures which satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1."
A.
Summary of Licensee Statements The licensee is not operational ak the Fermi 2 plant and interim protection was not addressed.
l B.
EG&G Evaluation None C.
EG8G Conclusions and Recommendations None 3g
3.
CONCLUDING SLM4IRY i
3.1 Applicable Load Handling Systems
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Based on the information sunpiied, EG&G concludes that the list of cranes and hoists pr'ovided by the iicensee as being subject to the provisions of NUREG-0612 is adequate (see Section 2.2.1).
- However, the justifications for excla 'ing cranes not included should be available in the event an audit.
3.2 Guideline Recommendations
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Compliance with the seven NRC guidelines for heavy load ha6dling (Section 2.3) are partially satisfied at Fermi-2.
This conclusion is represented in tabular form at Table 3.1. ' Specific recommedations to aid in compliance with the intent of these guidelines are provided as follows:
Guideli ne Reconhendation 1.
(Section 2.3.1) Safe Load Paths a.
Proceed with plans for the addition of floor lines for safe load paths where practicable. Where lines are impractical use other
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temporary. means to identify heavy load, paths when load handling must comply with guideline 1.
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Guideli ne Recommendation 2.
(Section 2.3.2) Load Handling Procedures a.
At present, action has resulted in partial compliance only.
The additionally planned procedures should be reviewed, approved, and issued before fuel handling is started.
3.
(Section 2.3.3) Crane Operator Training a.
Training should be started sufficiently in advance to qualify operators before there is a need for fuel handling.
4.
(Section 2.3.4) Special lifting Devices i
a.
None.
5.
(Section 2.3.5) Lifting Devices (Not Special Design) a.
Complete the planned purchase of lifting devices to assure their-availability in time to l
have them properly labeled before needed for fuel 20
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Guideline Recomnendation t
handling, or use during reactor operations.
Maintain documentation to confirm the adequacy of the lifting device rating.
6.
(Section 2.3.6) Crane Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
~a.
Complete procedures for crane inspection, testing, and maintenance b.
Perform and document required testing before fuel handling becomes necessary.
7.
(Section 2.3.7) Crane Design n.
None.
3.3 Interim Protection.
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EG&G's evaluation of information provided by the Licensee indicates that the following actions are necessary to ensure that the six NRC staff measures for interim protection at Fermi 2 are met:.
Recommendation l
Interim Measure l
The Fermi 2 plant is not in operation so interm, requirements do not apply.
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REFERENCES 1.
NUREG-0612 Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants NRC 2.
V. Stello, Jr. (NRC)
Letter to all licensees.
Subject:
Request for Additional' Information on Control of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel NRC,17 May 1978 3.
USNRC Letter to Detroit Edison.
Subject:
NRC Request for Additional Information on Con. trol of Heavy Loads Near Spent Fuel NRC, 22 December 1980 4a.
Detroit Edison Letter to USNRC.
Sv; ject:
Control of Heavy Loads Over or in Proximity to Irraa ated Fuel.
Mr. Harry Tauber, V. P. Engineering &
Construction, D'ecember 3,1981 4b.
Detroit Edison, same as 4a updated' to June ;3,1982.
5.
" Overhead and Gantry _ Cranes" 6.
'" Standard for Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or more for Nuclear Materials"
- 7. - ANSI 830.9-1971 "Sl i ngs "
8.
CMAA-7b
" Specifications for Electric Overhead Traveling Cranes" gg
TARLE 1.1.
ENRICD FEmil AT0 HIC POWER FLANT UNIT 2, NUREG 0612 COMPLIANCE MATRIX
~
Weight Guideline 1 Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Guldeline 5 Guldeline 6 Guidellne 7 or Crane 5pecial Crane-Test Equipment lleavy toads Capacity Safe Load Operator Lifting and
~ Designation (tons)
(tons)
Paths Procedures Training _
Devices Slings Inspection Crane Desi g i
Rea. Rid <g Crane Main Shield Plugs & 24 more 125 C'
R R
C R
R C-Holst
[
E Rea. Ridg. Crane Aux Maint Tools & 3 more 5
C R
R C
R R
'C iloi st
,i 4
NAS Tr.rus flatch NAS Floor Hatches 5
C R
R C
R R
-C i iloist IIPCI Iloist HPCI Floor Shield Plug
- 12 C
R R
.C
.R R
C llCIC lloist Floor Hatches a Turbine 10 C
R R
.C R
R C'
c.
T RHR Pumps-Div. I llatches & Motors
.16y'
' C R
R 6
iC R
R C
8' set Holst I
RID Pumps-Div. 8' set Hatches'A Mgtors 1.16 C'
R R
.C R
R C'
Ilot s t RfD Pianps-Div. I Hatches & MoNrs
.16 C
R R
.C R
R C
~
8 Ist F1. Holst Rin Pianps-Div. II Hatches A Motors 16 C
R R
C R
R C
ist F1. Holst NAS Recir. Pump MG 5et Fluid Dr.
'25 C
R R
C R
R C
lloists s
MG Stes, N, C, A 5 MG Set Fluid Dr.
12 C
R R
C R
R C
lloists NG Set Fluid Dr.
MG Set Fluid Dr.
20 C
R R
C R
R
.* C N45 Holst 4
CRD Repair Holst CRD Transfer Cast 3
C R
R C
R R
C Ccre Spray' Div I.
Ist F1. Hatches 16 C
R R
C R
R C~
Ilot s t Cora Spray Div II.
Basement Hatches 16 C
R ~
R C
R R
C i
iloist e
b l
l
TAnLE 1.1.
(continued) e Weight Guideline 1 Guideline 2 Guideline 3 Guideline 4 Guideline 5 Guideline 6 Guideline 7 or Crane Special Crane-Test Equipaent lleavy Loads Capacity Safe Load Operator Lifting and Destgrntion (tons)
(tons)
Paths Procedures Training Devices Slings inspec tion Crane Design Dies:1 Gen. Div. I I
2 C
R R
C R
R C
N45 Ifolst
'DI:sel Gen. Div. II I
2 C
R R
C R
R C
N&S Iloist Diss~.1 Gen. MCC I
4 C
R R
C' R
R C
l Div. I N&S Iloist Dies 11 Gen. MCC I
4 C
R R
C R
R C
Div. I Yent. Eqpt. Ibe.
I 8
C R
R C
R R
C lloist e
Cran;s ilsted as Exempt from analysis becaure they cannot han412 heavy loads rra nnt incimled here.
C. = Licensee action compiles with NUREG-0612 Culdeline.
NC = Licensee action does not comply with NUREG-06i2 Guideline R = Licensee has proposed revisinns/ modifications designed to comply with NUREG-0612 Guideline.
I = Inufficient information provided by the Licensee.
i e.
e e
e 8
g 8I 9
e I
l t