ML051520423
| ML051520423 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 02/04/2004 |
| From: | - No Known Affiliation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2004-0277 | |
| Download: ML051520423 (4) | |
Text
I L0- J'-04-e)U4 UrJ-1Z NRC HARRS' PLRNT 9193620640 P.02/05
- For Information Only. Passport Is the ApplicatIon of Record.
Nuclear Condition Reports Initiated Last Day AR Owed To Facility; HNP Criteria: AR Type = MCA; AR Orlignation Date >= CurrentOata
- 1 Day; AR Owed to Facility = HNP; Soned by AR Number Ascending ORIGINATION DISCOVERY AR NBR AR TYPE DATE DATE STATUS ORIGINATOR ORIG. DEPT PRIORITY AR Owed To Facility: HNP AR Originating Facility: HNP 00116959 NCR 20040202 20040202 H/APPR RHODES, ROBERT OPER SUiPORT
Subject:
lR IRE ARE1 OULD CAUSE LOSS OF' Attributes:
1A POT'L OPERIREPORT DescriptIon: F UND TAILSE 2 SUPERVISORREVIEW .
IGUIUL BE DAMAGED BY AFIREIN 2ACRVALID? .
THIS AREA.THIS DOES NOT MEET THE FEQUIREMENT OF .2F FURTHER INVN REOD Y THE CURRENT SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS .THIS IS A HISTORICAL ERFIOR.THIS WAS FOUND DURING THE O 2C RECOMMENDED OWNER..
NGOINGFIRVIEWOFTHECOMMENTSMADr BYSARGENT& 2D OPERIREPORT ISSUE N LUNDY ON TA SK 6 OF THE SAFE SHU1TDOWN ANALYSIS * -AI* ,AP.LIC\,
REEVALUATION. IAINT 2E RULE APPUC 2F SYSTEM 5195 I3 OPERATIONS REVIEW OA IMMED REPT ISSUE N 391 OPER ISSUE , N NLYTHE 3B2 REPORT ISSUE N li N OF EOUIPMENT IS THE CREDIED TEAII pF UIPMENT FOR A'FIRE IN THIS AREA..H E3 REW :
TSNOT OEDITED FOR A FIRE IN THIS AREA.WITHOUT 3BOCg N I MHE EQUIPMENT CREDITED FOR A FIRE IN ThIS NOT.HAVETHE 00UNW E 30 TRACKING NUMBER MOST LIMING COMPONE NT Al 4 REG AFF REVIEW-EVALUATION OF HOWTHE LOSS OF COOUNG WIL AFF THIS ROOM AND HOW LO. I. WI . TO 4A1 OPER ISSUE -
REACHAPOINT WHERE: W WILLNOTI 4A2 REPORT SSUE.
EABLETO PERFORM ITS DESIGN FUNCTION INTHIS CONDITION ( 0 Y) WILL NEED TO BE 4A OPER/REPORT ISSUE PERFORM IV RUCT S ON HOW TO 4B FOLLOWUP ASG REQD RESPNDO I NG 4CT. SPEC VIOLATION PROP OPEN THE DOOR TO 0Cl~lQf l GT PC ILTO THIS WLL P.
VI EE 4D ADD`L REPORT REQD HE HOURLY Fl E WATC H ALREADY PASSES 4E PNSCICIRP REOD TIROUGH ESE AREAS DURING ROUNDS. 5 CLASSIFN/ASSIGNMNT 5 .ACP VALID?
- B FURTHER INVN REOD Last nafreshed: 02J03i2004 02:54:2A AM Action TrackIng General Universe-ItpLAT-.NCOR31nitla1edinl.rep Page 6 of 9
rc:0-Uq-geUs -1.y NNU HHHH1l PLRNi 9193620640 P. 03/05 For Information Only. Passport is the Appricallon of Record.
Nuclear Condition Reports Initiated Last Day -..
AR Owed To Facility; HNP Ceria:AType =NCR; AR OrigInatfon Date > CurrenitDat.- I Day; AR Owed to Facillty HNP; Sorted by AR Number Ascending ORIGINATION DISCOVERY AR NBR AR TYPE DATE DATE STATUS ORIGINATOR ORIG. DEPT PRIORrlY AR Owed To Facilitr. HNP AR OriginatIng Facility, HNP 00116967 NCR 20040202 20040202 HIAPPR RHODES, ROBERT OPER SUPPORT-,
Subject:
IU LOULD CAUSE LOSS 0 Attribules:
lA POrLOPEPJREPORT, Y
DTsHrlptlon: F5 l 1E CONTROL CIRCUIT FO !!!EAW R . .2 SUPERVISOR REVIElW 7 2ACRVAUD?
COULD E AMAGED FY A FIR IN THI S AREA.THIS Li S 2B FURTHER INVN REOD Y NOT MEETTHE REQUIREMENT OF THE CURRENT SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS.THIS IS A HISTORICAL ERROR.THIS 2C RECOMMENDED OWNI ER . '*.
WAS FOUND DURING THE ONGOING REVIEW OFTHE 2D OPER/REPORT ISSUE COMMENTS MADE BY SARGENT& LUNDY. ON TASK 6 OFTH . -
SAFE SHUTDO'NN ANALYSIS RE EVALUATION.
- 2E MAINT RULE APPLIC.
- 2F SYSTEM 3005 3 6PERATIONS FREVIEW LED FROM A IMMED REPT ISSUE IN AU ARE LOCAT I 3B1 OPER ISSUE N N
FiREITiS U 32 REPORT ISSUE VALVE PEN.TOJNTAI3 REW N ..
REQUIRE EITHER CYCING F THE DC: MO UTLET VALVE 3B OCR AMANUAL 0 LOA 3CTRACKING NUMBER REG AFFREVIEW OTHERI CONTlNGENCY.'THIS WIS EH ADD ON 4A1 OPER ISSUE
'OFAI HOUR FIRE WATCHTdl _RTEPORTISSUESU
_ HE HOURLY FIRE WATCH ALREADY PASSES THRUG HTHESE AR1EAS DURING ROUNDS. 4A OPERIREPORT ISSUE 46 FOllOWUP ASG REGD 40 T. SPEC VIOLATION 4D ADD'L REPORT REqD 4E PNSCICIRP REQD S CLASSIFWNASSIGNMNT SA CR VALID?
SS FURTHER INVN REOD
.4
.rep rage o or w Refreshed:
Last Flefre shed: 02A)32004 02:54 02/D0t004 24 AM 02:54:24 AM ActIon Tracking General Aclo iTrbkng eealuerse FptAT_~N uiisiiuhiawoini UnIverse.RPLAL.N CRsinitiatedinl rep rage 8 of
z-SrLH11 Y193620640 P.04/05 Description of Problem: .
As descn-We in the AR text a fire in Fire A ul eutjrteloss of thel wihis credited fo*S.pcfcfyhas its control wr from - -x As intheAR textafreaconlddAhfcou Evaluation:
Description of Area The Control Rooming coRTJPsed of.two r^<re . .- -e_- -OIIM NMF
- w. _ I Occpc. , ; ' .
ntains 480 Volt and lower electrical cabinets, the kitchen area and _
Boundaries The fir- zon separated for the control room b a non rated concrete wall with 3ealed openings and two metal doors. lithin fire zone e kitchen and seprated from the main cabinet room by full heigt walls wih sealed openings and metal doors.
Combustible Loading The in-sitd combustile load is considered negligibi are no cable trays or other significant exposed materials. The only significant materials are located in .the electrical cabinets within the roo>l lassifies the entire fire area "no storage location" and transient combustibles may not be left in the area. . . . ,.;
- . . ~....*. s. ,...S .
Fire Protection Features automatic detection and the kitchen area is prteted by an aThs automatic sprinkler fed from the potable water system The main tearination cabinet room contains automatic detection. The fire zone contains a hose station and C02 fire extinguisher coverage for manual fire suppression. .. . . .
Postulated Fires - v The cabinets containing the chiller circuits are located within the main cabinet room. For the purposes of this fire scenario, fires originating in the kitchen and surge tank areas are not considered to be able to cause damage to the chiller circuits due to the combination of physical separation, lack of intervening combustibles, the automatic detection and the .
suppression in the kitchen area. . . I;; .
- --. . 1. 1 ".. ... S
. i
_ ,',i I 'l l. s nrv rLt-Vrlg 9193620640 P.05/05 The I34 Fire IPEEE was submitted to the NRC staff via letter HNP-95-061. The IPEEB contains a detailed discussion of the postulated effects of a fire originating the electrical cabinets within the control room fire area The following are details from the analysis.
- Based on the ventilation rate the time available to suppress a fire before the smoke is assumed to reach a level of visual impairment is 15-30 minutes.
- Due to the presence of early warning detection in the fire zone the fire is assumed to be detected at incipient stage.
- For a cabinet fire, if a solid intervening wall or barrer exists between cabinets the fire is assumed to be contained entirely within the cabinet.
The cabinets of conc within I V 2-bll-Fji
__ The loss.of either the power panel or-invexter willcause r a oss o lias ,d sical proximity, the worst case is the separation between Ut - Which are separated by approximately 10 ft.. .: .. I:
Effects of a Postulated Fire . ;. -
The panels are 480 Y and below and are solid enclosed metal cabinets. Based on the IPEEE and fire events data, a fire originating in closed metal cabinets of this type will generate sufficient smoke to initiate a detection system control room alarm. Before&the fire can develop into a larger fire it will self extinguish due to oxygen staryationvwithiri the cabinet or be suppressed using manual suppression by the Control Room Aoperators.,
Because of the lack of intervening combustibles and the sptil separation betwyeen the cabinets, any one cabinet fire is not.postulated to damage he adjacent cabinets 6ff.8.,
concern. Due to the lack of transient ciombustibles in the area a transient fire with size to cause damage to a cabinet is not postulated.
Conclusion . .
For the most credible fire impacting these circuits, the fire will be confined to either the This will only impact equipment iwed fr6mithe JShoiuld this occur, since offsite power should not be losi an irn ent, while not cedied, 'would be available to mitigate this fire, this condition does not significantly degrade level of safety of the plant. . ; .
TOTAL P.05