ML20071G500
| ML20071G500 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/2020 |
| From: | Jay Collins Citizens' Resistance at Fermi Two |
| To: | NRC/SECY |
| SECY RAS | |
| References | |
| 50-341-LA, License Amendment, RAS 55601 | |
| Download: ML20071G500 (21) | |
Text
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SECRETARY In the Matter of DTE Electric Company DTE Energy Docket No. 50-341 Enrico Fermi Unit 2 Monroe County, Michigan (Fermi 2 nuclear reactor)
PETITION OF CITIZENS RESISTANCE AT FERMI 2 (CRAFT) FOR LEAVE TO INTERVENE AND FOR A HEARING ON DTES LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO INVALIDATE A LICENSE EXTENTION CONDITION BY A LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST Jessie Pauline Collins Pro Se Counsel for Petitioners Citizens Resistance at Fermi 2 (CRAFT) 17397 Five Points Street Redford MI 48240 Tel. 313.286.3827 Jessiepauline2003@yahoo.com Dated: March 9, 2020 1
INTRODUCTION The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering whether to grant a license amendment request submitted by DTE Electric (DTE) for the Enrico Fermi Unit 2, Docket No.
50-341, Monroe County, Michigan. The request was submitted September 5, 2019 and a publicly available version is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML19248C679. The requested amendment would eliminate the license renewal license condition based upon a proposed alternative to install neutron absorbing inserts (i.e., NETCO SNAP-IN rack inserts) in the spent fuel pool (SFP) storage racks containing Boraflex. The amendment also requests revision of technical specification (TS) requirements associated with the SFP storage racks based on a new criticality safety analysis. In addition, approval of the new criticality safety analysis, including methodology, is being requested.
The Renewed Facility Operating License NPF-43 issued on December 15, 2016 contains a License Condition regarding the Boraflex material in the spent fuel pool (SFP) storage racks. The License Condition is to discontinue reliance on the Boraflex material to perform a neutron absorption function by replacing the SFP storage racks containing Boraflex with racks containing Boral. As an alternative to rack replacement, DTE proposed to utilize neutron absorbing inserts (i.e., NETCO SNAP-IN rack inserts) in the racks containing Boraflex. DTEs submittal also requests revision of TS requirements associated with the spent fuel pool (SFP) storage racks based on the new criticality safety analysis. Additionally, approval of the new criticality safety analysis, including methodology, is requested.
The Fermi 2 SFP contains two types of high-density storage racks. The first type was supplied by Joseph Oat Corporation (Oat) and utilizes Boraflex as the neutron absorbing material.
These racks have a nominal 6.22-inch center-to-center distance between assemblies (pitch). There are thirteen racks of this type, with a total storage capacity of 2,197 cells. The second type was supplied by Holtec International (Holtec) and utilizes Boral as the neutron absorbing material.
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These racks have a nominal 6.23-inch pitch. There are nine racks of this type, with a total storage capacity of 1,393 cells. Thus, the Fermi 2 SFP has a capacity of 3,590 storage cells.
The Joseph Oat high-density racks are of welded stainless-steel construction with the Boraflex neutron absorber sandwiched between the stainless-steel sheets. The Holtec high-density racks are square cross-section boxes with Boral neutron absorber panels on its sides to form a composite box.
Fermi 2 was issued a Renewed Facility Operating License on December 15, 2016 which contained three License Renewal Conditions, one of which addressed the SFP storage racks containing Boraflex, the Oat racks. The License Condition requires DTE to discontinue reliance on Boraflex to perform a neutron absorption function prior to the period of extended operations which begins on March 20, 2025. The License Condition requires that this discontinued reliance be achieved by replacing the racks containing Boraflex with racks containing Boral. The License Condition was consistent with a commitment DTE made to the NRC by letter dated September 24, 2015 and discussed in Section 3.0.3.2.2. of the Safety Evaluation Report for the License Renewal.
DTEs License Condition is plainly stated by the NRC for Fermi to obtain a 20-year extension:
DTE Electric Company shall fully implement the Boraflex rack replacement approved in Amendment No. 141 before the Period of Extended Operation (PEO) March 20, 2025, so that the Boraflex material in the spent fuel pool will not be required to perform a neutron absorption function. DTE Electric Company shall submit a letter to the NRC, within 60 days following completion of the removal of the Boraflex material and installation of the Boral material, as described in Amendment No. 141, confirming the removal of the Boraflex material and discontinued reliance on its neutron absorption function.
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In License Amendment No. 141, DTE committed to replace the Boraflex racks with Boral racks. This was to be done in three campaigns. The first two campaigns were completed in 2001 and 2007, but the third has not been completed yet, 13 years after the last campaign. The License Condition requires DTE to complete the third campaign so that credit for Boraflex is no longer required, DTE stated in this change of plan request.
It is CRAFTs position that if DTE is not held accountable to this License Amendment Condition and made to abide by their original agreement, then they have invalidated the license condition contract and therefore Fermis 20-year extension should be revoked until such time as DTE upholds their legal commitment and replaces the Boraflex materials with the Boral. DTE has signed and committed to a legal agreement and cannot at this point make a substitution just because it is quicker and cheaper.
CRAFT also takes issue with DTEs cavalier attitude that, Installation is currently scheduled to begin in the summer of 2020 states DTEs LAR, 3.1.5. DTE has requested that this LAR be approved by October 1, 2020, which would not be prior to the currently scheduled start of installation in the summer of 2020.
And doesnt DTE need a License Amendment to start using a different type of fuel?
Although GNF3 is not currently present in the Fermi 2 SFP, introduction of GNF3 is expected to begin in Cycle 21 (approximately 2020) and this fuel type was therefore considered in the analysis. (LAR 3.2., #2)
LAR 3.4.1. Fuel Assemble Clearances seems to be full of contradictions. It begins by admitting that the insert reduces the inside cell dimensions available for fuel assemble insertion.
DTE identified a mishap from the LaSalle plant regarding an insert that was inadvertently removed while moving a fuel assembly. What would DTE do if a similar issue happened in their proposed 4
SNAP-Ins, Inadvertent removal of a rack insert would be entered into the Fermi 2 Corrective Action Program for resolution of the condition.
STANDING Now comes Citizens Resistance at Fermi 2 (hereafter, CRAFT) to make their request for a public hearing and Petition for Leave to Intervene in the above captioned matter, pursuant to the Federal Register of 7 January 2020 (pages 731-732) and in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.174 and 2.309.
In support of the Request for Hearing and Petition to Intervene, said Petitioner as Intervener further states as follows:
CRAFT is a grassroots organization based in Redford, Michigan that publishes a monthly newsletter to keep the general public informed about the Fermi 2 nuclear reactor. The attached affidavits are individual CRAFT members who reside, work, and recreate withing the fifty (50) mile radius of Fermi 2. CRAFT is providing the declarations of its members, for which CRAFT seeks to intervene to protect their interests. The central office of CRAFT is located at 17397 Five Points Street, Redford, Michigan 48240, telephone is 313-286-3827. This office is approximately 30 air miles from Fermi. CRAFT Co-Chair Jessie Pauline Collins seeks to represent CRAFT pro se, and other interveners in this proceeding.
The Declarants are: Martin R. Kaufman; Hedwig Kaufman; Andrea Pierce; Pam Barker; Cass G. Olszta; Rita Mitchell; Alisha Barker; and Janet Cannon. All these declarant affidavits submitted live within a 50-mile radius of the Fermi 2 nuclear reactor (some within 5-miles) and have presumptive standing by virtue of their proximity to the Enrico Fermi Unit 2 reactor. Diablo Canyon, supra, 56NRC at 426-427, citing Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-01-6, 53NRC 138, 146, affd, CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3 (2001).
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In Diablo Canyon, the licensing board noted that petitioners who live within 50 miles of a proposed nuclear power plant are presumed to have standing in reactor construction permit and operating license cases, because there is an obvious potential for offsite consequences within that distance.
Id DTE now seeks to renege on a license condition that allowed them to gain a license extension.
The Petitioners hereby request to be a party to the proceedings because continued operation of the Fermi 2 nuclear reactor with degraded Boraflex neutron absorbers continues to present a tangible and harm to the health and well-being of members living within 50 miles of the site.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.309, a request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene must address (1) the nature of the petitioners right under the Atomic Energy Act to be made a party to the proceedings, (2) the nature and extent to the petitioners property, financial, or other interest in the proceedings, and (3) the possible effect of any order that may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioners interest. In determining whether a petitioner has sufficient interest to intervene in a proceeding, the Commission has traditionally applied judicial concepts of standing. See Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear station, Unit 1), CLI-83-25, 18 NRC 327, 332 (1983) (citing Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2),
A petitioner for intervention is entitled to party status if she establishes standing and pleads at least one valid contention. Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-119A, 16 NRC 2069, 2070 (1982). Petitioners believe that if Fermi can set aside their License Condition Agreement and add additional materials into an over-crowded SPF in order to save time and money, then they are endangering all life within a 50-mile radius.
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The Petitioners have standing because CRAFT is a grassroots organization with their office inside the Fermi 2 radiation zone and approximately 1,500 members within said zone. Those members interests will not be adequately represented without this course of action and intervention, and without the opportunity to participate as full parties in this proceeding.
Representational standing of the Petitioners is provided through the attached Declarant Affidavits.
For these reasons and others discussed in detail below, CRAFT seeks leave to intervene in the pending license amendment request for the Fermi 2 reactor and requests that a hearing be held on the questions whether the proposed substitute is legal as required under the Atomic Energy Act and relevant NRC regulations.
CONTENTIONS PREFACE to ALL Contentions:
The issues raised in each of the following Contentions are integrally relevant and Material to these proceedings. 10CFR 2.309 (f)(iv) requires that the Petitioner Demonstrate that the issue raised in the contention is material to the findings the NRC must make to support the action that is involved in the proceeding. In discussing the materiality requirement, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) considering the license renewal for Millstone Nuclear Power Station stated, In order to be admissible, the regulation require that [w]here a contention alleges a deficiency or error in the application, the deficiency or error must have some independent health and safety significance. Millstone, supra at 7, and see Private Fuel Storage, supra at 179-180.
The deficiencies highlighted in these Contentions have enormous independent health and safety significance. The Applicants LRA and associated analyses have material deficiencies to an extent that could significantly jeopardize public health and safety.
An Adjudicatory Hearing is the only way to properly address the Petitioners concerns.
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BACKGROUND:
Boraflex degradation in spent fuel pools is a known nuclear power industry issue that has warranted monitoring and evaluation to ensure the margin to criticality is maintained in the spent fuel pool (SFP). The Boraflex Monitoring Program is described in Fermi 2 Final Safety Analysis Report Appendix S, License Renewal Commitments, as a program that assures degradation of the Boraflex panels in the spent fuel racks does not compromise the criticality analysis in support of the design of the spent fuel storage racks.
Our Contentions below challenge that domain assumption.
The Boraflex Monitoring Program relies on (1) neutron attenuation testing, (2) determination of boron loss through correlation of silica levels in Spent Fuel Pool water samples and periodic areal density measurements, and (3) analysis of criticality to assure that the required 5% subcriticality margin is maintained.
The Fermi 2 License Amendment Request would eliminate the license renewal license condition of removing the Boraflex and replacing it. Instead Fermi 2 proposes an alternative that would install NETCO SNAP-IN rack neutron absorbing inserts in the spent fuel pool storage racks containing Boraflex. The amendment also requests revision of technical specification (TS) requirements associated with the spent fuel pool storage racks based on a new criticality safety analysis. In addition, approval of the new criticality safety analysis, including methodology, is being requested. It is Citizens Resistance at Fermi Two (CRAFT) that the proposed alternative does not meet licensing conditions as set out in License Renewal here:
NRC License Condition No. 3 (As spelled out by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission)
DTE shall fully implement the Boraflex rack replacement approved in Amendment No. 141 before the period of extended operation (i.e., March 20, 2025), so that the Boraflex material in 8
the spent fuel pool will not be required to perform a neutron absorption function. DTE shall submit a letter to the NRC, within 60 days following completion of the removal of the Boraflex material and installation of the Boral material, as described in Amendment No. 141, confirming the removal of the Boraflex material and discontinued reliance on its neutron absorption function. https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML16179A224 Safety Evaluation Report Related to the License Renewal of Fermi, Unit 2 (TAC No.
Mf4222) 07/12/2016 In 1999, Fermi 2 spent fuel pool contractor Holtec Inc., reported calculations for time-to-boil of spent nuclear fuel pool at Fermi 2 to begin at 4.20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> into the loss of water circulation at year 2015. According to the Holtec Report as of 2015, the spent nuclear fuel pool at Fermi 2 will have been filled to double the capacity of its design to 4608 fuel assemblies. The spent fuel pool was designed for 2300 fuel assemblies. The utilization of the spent fuel pool at twice designed capacity remains the case today in March of 2020. [ https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML993440246 ] POOL RACK INSTALLATION Holtec Report M1-992154, Revision 6 Non-Proprietary Version, November 4, 1999 - See pp. 114/279 and 127/279 of pdf page count.] (the) ...Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration...
- 1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? (DTE / NRC) Response: No.
CRAFT Contends (Contention 1) that there is potential for a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. License Condition No. 3 for 9
License Renewal calls for the removal of Boraflex and replacement. By not physically removing the CRAFT Contends (Contention 2) that corrosion leads to degradation and can result in unanticipated consequences and unaccounted for debris in the spent fuel pool. Exacerbating corrosion through prolonged exposure and reliance on faulty Boraflex must be examined and considered as potentially problematic when loading into the Dry Cask Storage. That evaluation has not been provided.
There have been problems at other U.S. nuclear power plants revolving around Boraflex. On June 21, 2010 the NRC fined Turkey Point $70,000 for improper insertion of neutron absorbers in the spent fuel pool. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1017/ML101730313.pdf The Turkey Point "Apparent Violations" included: (1) failure to provide notification to the NRC in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR § 50.73 when testing of Boraflex panels in the Unit 3 SFP revealed degradation beyond minimum design values specified in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR); (2) failure to comply with 10 CFR § 50.59, which requires licensees to maintain records, including written evaluations, which provide the bases for a determination that a change, test, or experiment does not require a license amendment; and (3) failure to update the FSAR in accordance with 10 CFR § 50.71(e) so that the report accurately reflects significant changes made to the facility.
More recently, the Pilgrim nuclear power plant also lost proper control over neutron absorbers in the spent fuel pool.
https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?AccessionNumber=ML16333A006 degraded Boraflex from the spent fuel itself Fermi 2 will be out of compliance with License Condition No. 3. Cumulative longitudinal degradation to the spent fuel has not been evaluated for corrosion and degradation which could lead to failure in the spent fuel pool and potential for failure 10
when transferred to Dry Cask Storage has not been evaluated. The Boraflex racks can become damaged and adhere to the fuel assemblies and this has not been evaluated.
During the June 27, 2018 Pre-submittal Meeting on Neutron Absorbing Inserts DTE argued that corrosion criteria of less than 0.05 milometers per year is not excessive corrosion or mass loss. The rate of corrosion is the speed at which any given metal deteriorates in a specific environment. The rate, or speed, is dependent upon environmental conditions as well as the type and condition of the metal. What has not been considered is the older Boraflex racks and the extent of corrosion adhering to those fuel assemblies.
CRAFT Contends (Contention 3) that the credit for Boraflex as a neutron absorbing material as required by the License Renewal License Condition, the effective neutron multiplication factor, k-effective, is less than or equal to 0.95, if the spent fuel pool (SFP) is fully flooded with unborated water does not leave conservative margin to stay subcritical. There is no conservative buffer, DTE proposes to play on the margin to stay subcritical with less than or equal to 0.95 being subcritical and measurement of 1.00 being supercritical. CRAFT Contends that this is not Conservative.
CRAFT Contends (Contention 4) that the more prudent course of action to ensure subcriticality in the spent fuel pool is to remove spent fuel from the pool and reduce the density. That highly irradiated spent fuel should be placed into Dry Cask Storage, placed on ISFSI pad and bunkered with Hardened On-Site Storage (HOSS).
The spent fuel pool at Fermi 2 was not designed to hold 4608 fuel assemblies, and currently places undue risk on Public Health and Safety. Public risk from highly irradiated "spent fuel" can be immediately mitigated by reducing the inventory of high-level nuclear waste stored in the spent fuel pool at Fermi 2.
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DTE's reliance on SNAP-IN Boraflex for protecting against spent fuel pool criticality for the duration of Fermi 2 License Renewal is not prudent. Wise owners and responsible regulators would manage the risk by moving spent fuel assemblies into Dry Cask Storage. Better protection against criticality; Better protection against spent fuel pool heat up events; Better protection against spent fuel pool accidents.
CRAFT Contends that consideration to reduce spent fuel pool density has not been adequately evaluated and considered, nor has it been pursued as an Alternative to the use of SNAP-IN Boraflex prophylactic bandage. CRAFT Contends that reducing the inventory of spent fuel in the pool also reduces the consequences of an accident, should one occur. Instead of the radioactive material in six cores being available for release, the material in about two cores at most could be released.
For 20 years the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) were unavailable at Fermi 2, please see 'Futility at the Utility' by Dave Lochbaum. http :// www. beyondnuclear .org/storage/kk-links/2%25202007%252020070200-f2- ucs -futility-at-the-utility. pdf - Cached -
Had those EDGs been needed for Emergency Recirculation of the spent fuel pool they would not have been available. The poor-Quality Assurance at Fermi I, Fermi II, and Fermi III spans decades. Reducing the inventory of spent nuclear fuel is requested.
DTE License Amendment Request contends that: The changes are necessary to ensure that, without credit for Boraflex as a neutron absorbing material as required by the License Renewal License Condition, the effective neutron multiplication factor, k-effective, is less than or equal to 0.95, if the spent fuel pool (SFP) is fully flooded with unborated water. Since the proposed changes pertain only to the SFP, only those accidents that are related to movement and storage of fuel assemblies in the SFP could potentially be affected by the proposed changes.
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The installation of NETCO SNAP-IN rack inserts and their credit in the criticality safety analysis does not result in a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously analyzed because there are no changes in the manner in which spent fuel is handled, moved, or stored in the rack cells. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
- 2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? DTE Response: No.
CRAFT Contends (Again Contention 1) that by not physically removing the degraded Boraflex from the spent fuel itself Fermi 2 will be out of compliance with License Condition No.
- 3. Cumulative longitudinal degradation to the spent fuel has not been evaluated for corrosion and degradation which could lead to failure in the spent fuel pool and potential for failure when transferred to Dry Cask Storage has not been evaluated. The Boraflex racks can become damaged and adhere to the fuel assemblies resulting in loading complications for the lifting of 125 tons, and this has not been evaluated. Therefore, the proposed change does create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.
- 3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?
DTE / NRC Response: No.
DTE presents: The NETCO SNAP-IN rack inserts are being installed to maintain the margin of safety in the SFP criticality safety analysis. The NETCO SNAP-IN rack inserts, once approved and installed, will replace the existing Boraflex as the credited neutron absorber for controlling spent fuel pool reactivity, even though the Boraflex material will remain in place.
Fermi 2 TS 4.3, Fuel Storage, Specification 4.3.1.b requires the SFP storage racks to maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor, k-effective, less than or equal to 0.95 when 13
fully flooded with unborated water, which includes an allowance for uncertainties. Therefore, for SFP criticality safety considerations, the required safety margin is 5 percent. The proposed changes ensure, as verified by the new criticality safety analysis, that k-effective continues to be less than or equal to 0.95, thus preserving the required safety margin of 5 percent.
CRAFT Contends (Again Contention 3) that the credit for Boraflex as a neutron absorbing material as required by the License Renewal License Condition, the effective neutron multiplication factor, k-effective, is less than or equal to 0.95, if the spent fuel pool (SFP) is fully flooded with unborated water does not leave conservative margin to stay subcritical. There is no conservative buffer, DTE proposes to play on the margin to stay subcritical with less than or equal to 0.95 being subcritical and measurement of 1.00 being supercritical. CRAFT Contends that this is not Conservative. Therefore, the proposed change does involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety and should not be allowed.
While DTE argues... ... "the radiological consequences of a dropped fuel assembly, considering the installed NETCO SNAP-IN rack inserts, remain unchanged as the anticipated fuel damage due to a fuel handling accident is unaffected by the addition of the inserts in the SFP storage cells. The proposed changes also do not increase the capacity of the SFP."
Again, CRAFT Contends (Again Contention 4, and Contention 5) that by not physically removing the degraded Boraflex from the spent fuel itself Fermi 2 will be out of compliance with License Condition No. 3. Cumulative longitudinal degradation to the spent fuel has not been evaluated for corrosion and degradation which could lead to failure in the spent fuel pool and potential for failure when transferred to Dry Cask Storage has not been evaluated. The Boraflex racks can become damaged and adhere to the fuel assemblies resulting in loading 14
complications for the lifting of 125 tons, and this has not been evaluated. CRAFT Contends that there are historically concerns about the rating of the spent fuel Crane.
DTE was to have loaded dry casks in the fall (2010). But when inspections were done on the Crane, it was learned that blueprints from 1970 called for welds on vertical beams that would not meet seismic specifications. It was determined that the ceilings and floors could not support the Crane as the vertical beam welds were missing. Those welds were never made. Remedial work at Fermi 2 was required. The Crane at Fermi 2 was rated at 125 tons and single fault. Later evaluations and documentation indicate that the Crane is only certified for 117 tons.
The Fermi 2 Crane must be demonstrated pedigree and be certified for the 125 tons that it will need to lift. In addition, all the years the Crane operated lacking those vertical beam welds. The Inspection Reports - IRs speak to the fact that Fermi 2 has been missing welds on vertical beams / superstructure shown on 1970 blueprints. The reason Detroit Edison could not unload fuel from the pool and bring it down from the fifth floor to ground in 2010 is that the Crane could not bear the weight, because the floors and ceilings, could not handle the load because vertical beams / superstructure was missing (may still be) seismic qualification. The Crane is rated at 125 tons, the weight of fuel bundle and basket 125 tons. Not much on a margin of error.
The U.S. Congress commissioned a report in 1980 to be conducted by Sandia National Laboratories known as: The Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences (CRAC-2). The report published by U.S. Congress in 1982, the calculated consequences of a worst case reactor accident scenario at Fermi 2 are as follows: 8,000 Peak Early Fatalities; 340,000 Peak Early Injuries; 13,000 Peak Cancer Deaths; that $136 Billion Property Damage in 1982 now equates to
$363 Billion Property Damage indexed to 2020. The authors of the Reactor Safety Study concluded that changing some of the criteria for data gathering would increase the number of early 15
fatalities by a factor of 3 to 4 depending upon circumstances. [NUREG-0340] [The Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences (CRAC-2) report was published by Congress November 1, 1982.
https://www.nirs.org/wp-content/uploads/reactorwatch/accidents/crac2.pdf ]
Specifically, germane to Spent Fuel Pools is the following report by Professor Frank von Hippel from Princeton University and Dr. Edwin Lyman with the Union of Concerned Scientists. The report has found the public to be at high risk from fires in spent-nuclear-fuel cooling pools at reactor sites. A fire could release enough radioactive material to contaminate an area twice the size of New Jersey. On average, radioactivity from such an accident could force approximately 8 million people to relocate and result in $2 trillion in damages.
CRAFT Contends (Contention 6) that there is need for Fermi 2 specific analysis on the spent fuel pool at Fermi 2 as currently loaded, and that analysis needs to be completed prior to consideration of License Amendment put forth.
The Fukushima accident could have been a hundred times worse had there been a loss of the water covering the spent fuel in pools associated with each reactor, Dr. Frank von Hippel said.
That almost happened at Fukushima in Unit 4. [Regulators Greatly Underestimate Potential for Nuclear Disaster By: B. Rose Kelly, March U.S. Nuclear 25, 2017 Source: Woodrow Wilson School http://wws.princeton.edu/news-and-events/news/item/us-nuclear-regulators-greatly-underestimate-potential-nuclear-disaster ]
In addition CRAFT Contends (Contention 7) that the proposed use of Global Nuclear Fuel - 3, an experimental, higher enriched and longer burn-up fuel has not undergone adequate evaluation as it pertains to being placed into spent fuel pool and subsequent impact on criticality coefficient of the effective neutron multiplication factor, k-effective, is less than or equal to 0.95, if the spent fuel pool (SFP) is fully flooded with unborated water does not leave conservative 16
margin to stay subcritical. In conclusion a spent fuel fire can happen here. Different triggers but same result. Please begin accelerated removal of highly irradiated spent fuel from the spent fuel pool at Fermi 2.
CRAFT does not agree with DTE and does not agree with the NRC staff analysis that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the CRAFT does not accept NRC staff determination no significant hazards consideration. CRAFT requests that an Adjudicatory Hearing be held in Monroe, Michigan to address our Contentions and Concerns.
CONTENTION 8. REJECTING REGULATORY RELIEF FOR IRRESPONSIBLE OPERATION Detroit Edisons request for regulatory relief to nullify their re-licensing agreements concerning their spent fuel pool safety should be rejected as part of an ongoing pattern of irresponsible and dangerous decisions to lower costs at the risk of catastrophic impacts to the public and the environment.
Industrial disasters are typically caused when what seem to be minor flaws and ad hoc design changes compound and interact in unforeseen ways to trigger a cascade effect that initiates beyond design basis accidents.
The spent fuel pool at Fermi 2 has already been reconfigured well beyond designed parameters. The fuel re-racking alone has dramatically changed the thermal dynamics of the pool, shortening the initiation period of any potential boil-off event. The Mark 1 design has been repeatedly flagged for critical design errors, with spent fuel pool vulnerabilities as a potential source of a worst-case scenario accident.
Exemplary of DTEs nuclear over-reach from inception is the ill-fated beginnings of DTEs nuclear gambles at the Fermi Complex: Fermi 1, which failed spectacularly before performing to 17
designed capacity and birthed the phrase: We almost lost Detroit. A catastrophic accident initiated by the failure of an ad hoc safety design change that triggered a cascade failure that led to a reactor melt-down and permanent closure of the doomed experiment. The heat shields added to the design at the last minute were meant to protect the coolant channels from the heat damage that the liquid sodium moderator may have caused. During initial testing, one of these safety shields worked loose, blocked the liquid sodium from flowing to sections of the core, and melting fuel was reconfiguring to criticality when the reactor was manually scrammed. In the ultimate testament to DTEs irresponsibility, news of this major accident was kept from the public for nearly 10 years. Not until the release of John Fullers book, We Almost Lost Detroit was the public made aware. The meltdown in progress was so thoroughly secretive that the Vice President was allowed in harms way as he dedicated a library in Monroe as the accident was unfolding.
Fermi 2 has been plagued with cost-overruns, construction delays, and severe accidents since its inception. The Christmas Day accident at Fermi 2 in 1993 was a direct result of these engineering oversights. The turbine failure was long and apparent in its tragic unfolding. The turbine had heavy vibration upon initial operation. The turbine sat on a railcar while plant construction dragged on, causing it to warp. Initial fitting of the turbine was complicated by bearings out of design tolerances (apparently due to the standard to metric conversions between DTE and the manufacturer in England). DTE saw fit to operate the violently shaking turbine regardless, leading to the accident and subsequent down time, radioactive releases, and expensive repairs. DTE continued running the plant with a now even more damaged turbine while a replacement was manufactured, further proving the extent DTE is willing to endanger the public for short-term profit.
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The attempt to cheapen the replacement of degraded Boraflex neutron absorbers with plastic snap in surrogates should not be viewed out of context, as a simple, single modification to an otherwise problem free plant: but as one of many steps to ensure profitability regardless of the cost to the public. DTE maintains the assertion that Fermi 2 is a vital asset yet seeks to slash their related tax obligations. DTE maintains that Fermi 2 is economical to operate and safe for their workers yet claim current valve inspection regimens are too expensive and an unnecessary, additional exposure to their inspectors. DTE claimed in its testimony to the ASLB, in response to CRAFTs renewable energy as a viable replacement contention, during the relicensing intervention, that there is no storage capacity in Michigan for electricity on the scale of Fermi 2, despite being part owners of the Ludington Power Pumping Station, the worlds 4th largest water battery built to store energy from both Fermi 2 and Palisades.
DTE spends millions on deceptive advertising and community influencers to spread disinformation. DTE commercials are drowning the airways with false claims of championing renewable energy and fighting to reduce CO2 emissions, while their lobbyists fight against renewable energy progress and reducing fossil fuel use in the legislature. DTE claims to follow regulatory imperative, yet it is their lawyers who write much of the energy legislation in Michigan.
DTE claims to be responsive to, and working for the benefit of the public, yet pays obsequious influencers to masquerade as concerned community leaders at public hearings to repeat DTEs disinformation, such as what if the sun stops shining?. While Cities, States, and other Countries are making great strides in advancing renewable energy and decarbonizing their economies, DTEs antiquated, self-serving agenda is a form of gas lighting the public, seemingly 19
admonishing us to believe their lies over our own eyes. DTEs refrain of Know your own power while fighting the adoption of making your own power is emblematic of depths their disinformation campaign is willing to go to dissuade meaningful progress.
DTE is not to be trusted. DTEs flagrant disregard for public safety, sustainability, and its own fallibility has long been causing enough to lose oversight of the operation of the most dangerous experiment in its monopolistic arsenal of polluting power plants: Fermi 2. In this latest attempt to back out of its solemn agreements, DTE has proven yet again that without meaningful oversight and necessary intervention, that the company will stop at nothing to further its monopolization of Michigans energy future. A future which, if guided by DTEs defunct IRP would be a dystopian hellscape of smoggy skies, undrinkable water, and high energy bills. A wholly unnecessary future for Michigan, where we are a net importer of dirty energy, yet have all the resources to power ourselves with an abundance of in-state renewable energy resources to tap safely and cleanly.
Considering DTEs untrustworthy track record, and the fact that Fermi 2 is wholly dependent on taxpayer subsides, DTEs request for regulatory relief should not only be denied, but operation of the plant should be turned over to a publicly responsive body to assess the environmental and economic viability of the future operation of the plant as compared to the adoption of clean, renewable energy generation and storage. Assessments need to consider potential for accidents, releases of toxins and radiation, spent fuel pool safety, the safety of interim storage, risks of transporting spent fuel, and a safe, long term solution to waste storage.
CONCLUSION OF CONTENTIONS The contention rule is not a fortress to deny intervention. Matter of Duke Energy Corp.
Oconee Nuclear Power Plant, 49 NRC at 335 (quoting Philadelphia Elec. Co. (Peach Bottom 20
Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), 8 AEC 13, 20-21 (1974), revd in part, CLI-74-32, 8 AEC 217 (1974) revd in part, York Committee for a Safe Environment v. NRC, 517 F.2d 812 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). There is no requirement that the substantive case be made at the contention stage.
Matter of Entergy Nuclear Generation Co., el al. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), 50-293-LR (ASLB Oct. 16, 2006 WL 4801142 at (NRC) 85 (quoting Oconee, 49 NRC at 342).
The Commission has explained that the requirement at 2.309(f)(1)(v) does not call upon the Intervenor to make its case at the contention stage of the proceeding, but rather to indicate what facts or expert opinions, be it one fact or opinion or many, of which it is aware at that point in time which provide the basis for its contention. A petitioner does not have to provide a complete or final list of its experts or evidence or prove the merits of its contention at the admissibility state.
And as with a summary disposition motion, the support for a contention may be viewed in a light that is favorable to the petitioner, so long as the admissibility requirements are found to have been met. The requirement generally is fulfilled when the sponsor of an otherwise acceptable contention provides a brief recitation of the factors underlying the contention or references to documents and texts that prove such reasons. (Emphasis supplied)
Wherefore, Petitioners pray the Commission admit their contentions for hearing.
/Signed by Jessie Pauline Collins and submitted by Digital Certificate Pro Se on behalf of Petitioners/
Jessie Pauline Collins Citizens Resistance at Fermi 2 (CRAFT) 17397 Five Points Street Redford MI 48240 Telephone 313-286-3827 Email jessiepauline2003@yahoo.com 21