ML20045B004

Revised TS LCO 3.6.4.3, Standby Gas Treatment Sys.

ML20045B004
Person / Time
Site:	05200001
Issue date:	06/11/1993
From:	GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20045B003	List: ML20045B002 ML20045B004 ML20045B005 ML20045B007
References
NUDOCS 9306160058
Download: ML20045B004 (10)

Text

-

I) l

- SGT System  :

3.5.4.3 d 3.5 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.5.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System

,. g9 iv i.s 1 o M LCO 3.6.4.3 dTwohGT:by:W1 tem;shallbeOPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the rv{secondaryT'Eontair. ment, During CORE ALTERATIONS,  ;

During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS _. .. ..

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

); #visiou Jy s .s . w ms A. One SGT std:yttem A.1 Restore SGi ::b:y: tem 7 days inoperable. to OPERABLE status.

Ieh

%.)

r' C

1.CRequired Action and ).1 Se in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A or6 g not met in MODE 1, 2 C.

or 3. h.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> -

D ti. Required Action and ------------NOTE-------------

associated Completion LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Time of Condition A -----------------------------

not met during D movement of irradiated t.1 Place OPERABLE SGT Immediately fuel assemblies in the s et:ystem in y{ secondary} r - operation.

containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or 93 g;,;g during OPDRVs. .

51sd 3 i

- f)i (continued)

S. Two S $ T - 6.] 0 este rA n e .5 G T y boueS .

ino perclatt ;^ (NODES Ys + ,uY*s..

OfEWE .

e,2'or 3.

j;g;sI64 BBWR?ASTS 3.6-53 4e. . G, 09/23/92

~ '

9306160058 930611 '

PDR ADDCK 05200001 L A PDR g

t

.j SGT System

-3.6.4.3 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D D

l. (continued) (.2.1 Suspend movement of Imediately irradiated fuel assemblies in dsecondaryk containment.

D l

$.2.2 Suspend CORE Imediately j ALTERATIONS.  ;

D E 42.3 Initiate action to Immediately

. suspend OPDRVs.

, S' gs

)rWt E

%. Two SGT 2;.bsy;tas

%s E p.1 --------NOTE---------

l i inoperable during LCO 3.0.3'is not movement of irradiated applicable.

fuel assemblies in the ---------------------

nr{secondaryF l containment, during Suspend movement of Immediately i CORE ALTERATIONS, or -

irradiated fuel l during OPDRV1 assemblies in l- , e{secondaryV containment.

E e

Jf.2 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

M E

p.3 Initiate action to Immediately suspend OPDRYs.

FBWR A STS 3.6-54 4. . C, C;/ S/92

4

. SGT System 3.6.4.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS /

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.3.1 Lu OperateeachSGTsesyst+mfore910F

~

31 days continuoushoursjwithheaters operating 7 SR 3.6.4.3.2 Perfom required SGT filter testing in In accordance accordance with the Ventilation Filter with the VFTP TestingProgram(VFTP).

- );visisn SR 3.6.4.3.3 Verify each SGT :2:y: tem actuates on an r{18hnths ]

actual or simulated initiation signal.

l f

b3.6.4.3.4 Verify each SGT filter cooler bypass "

r{18[ months e P T damper can be opened and the fan started.

( - _

d' o

"\ V (,

pd .,

(V 4} 6 f gh Mv Y gM 10 v

Aswn/t STs 3.6-55 Re. O, 09/20/03-

?-

-. _ . - _J

SGT System B 3.6.4.3 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System BASES i

BACKGROUND The SGT System is required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. GDC 41,

" Containment Atmosphere Cleanup" (Ref. 1). The function of l the SGT System is to ensure that radioactive materials that  !

leak from the primary containment into thMsecondar containment following a Design Basis Accident (DBA) j are y F  :

filtered and adsorbed prior to exhausting to t,h,egg environment.

p .

g g, f(,

...& m The SGT System consists of : ~< '"""

.__..,m 1 m i- - ~'. ' Z' Z3";iU'I  ;

py n

f.

_f

_

n , :'- --"""' -

- -- ~.- --

~ " ' " - ' - -

i M

'{o h charcoal filter train consists of (components 1M n'  !

of the direction of the air flow): *

a. ister or moisture separator-O b.

A An elec ic heater; E

.i

c. A prefilter;  :

i

d. A high efficie articulate air (HEPA) filter;

e. A charco adsorber; A cond HEPA filter; and f.

4#

A centrifugal fan.

j_ _ W b,..

f

.The sizing of the SET System equipment nd components is '

based on the results of an infiltrati analysis, as well as i anexfiltrationanalysisofthe*Isoc ryl % ntainment.

The internal pressure of the SET Sys em boundary region is  !

maintained at a negative pressure o gauge when the system is in operation, .25hinches) ich represents the water  ;

i internal pressure required to ensure zero exfiltration of l air from the building when exposed to h) wind j blowing at an angle of 45

• to the bu ding 3 l t.9 m/.s is provided to remove entrained water in the air, while the electric heater reduces the relative humidity l[

N m oLsMr sepo mTor (continued) l%BWR/4 STS B 3.6-109 - . . v,mmu

'k

)

' ()

s.. g Dr.e 100 percent capacity charcoal filter tr consist-

). f (components listed in order of air ow direction):

1. Pre er

2. High e 1ency particula air (HEPA) filter

3. Charcoal a- ber 4 HEFA filter B. Two fully redunda subsys'tet;s each with its own '

ductwork, dame , and contro and consisting of:

3. Dem er

2. ctric heater

3. Centrifugal fan with inlet flow contro ' vanes.

O'- c);gisied s Co^t i 8 tl^ j of A

()) Tu o @ L+er tso.s+aet M e an s qa.rator, r-c.e.c( st+r. e p ro c e n h e.te r, a-

/ r e E Lte r A 4 7)( eff; c.ie t t y a.

ps e r: t.u t. t e. c. i r ( t+bf A) $;Lte r 't twn cknetonL 06ssesze a s e.e . n Q,*L+er a n) sj c~t e ' he eters.

I dit/ s. s a^

.-F a 9 f ra te23 Funs yy o ta pepe nb e r4e-f 4 a c 1 -[-; L+e r +-~ M ad Lo (1) dopas tream ,

eu o ;^p4 J.e nt c o L i n 3 -fl* ~ s for M4 re no v a.L o -F D< c a Y hest fron c L e re.o rt .

i i

5 8 3. 6 - to 9 c ,

O

4 SGT System B 3.6.4.3 (nv)

BASES BACKGROUND of the airstream to less than [70]% (Ref. 2). The prefilter (continued) removes large particulate matter, while the HEPA filter removes fine particulate matter and protects the charcoal from fouling. The charcoal adsorber removes gaseous elemental iodine and organic iodides, and the final HEPA filter collects any carbon fines exhausted from the charcoal adsorber.

The SGT System automatically starts and operates in response dWiAd to actuation signals indicative of conditions or an accident N

that could recuire operation of the system. Following S C' 5 C V Cinitiation, bothM --- " '""- ""- fans start. Upon l verification that both are operating,ythe redundant rd:--m;;; is normally shut down. ou W ten ~mer . W L d i v 'a sio n " d i o ui nt >

APPLICABLE The design basis for the SGT System is to mitigate the o

SAFETY ANALYSES consequences of a loss of coolant accident and fuel handling accidents (Ref. 2). For all events analyzed, the SGT System is shown to be automatically initiated to reduce, via O

v filtration and adsorption, the radioactive material released to the environment.

The SGT System satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.

g PDbr&

LCO Following a DBA, a minimum of one SGT r i y = ; is required to maintain the Tsecondary M ontainment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and to process gaseous releases. Meeting the LC0 requirements for two OPERABLE O-c ; ensures operation of at least one SGT rd~ tr in The event of a single active failure.

h Ni sia %io ~ W j lv tsrw >

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, SGT System OPERABILITY is required during these MODES.

In M30ES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the SGT (OD (continued) pBWR/4 STS B 3.6-110 m. G, 09/EB/92

+, .,- . _- - . . . . .. -

l SGT System

~~

i B 3.6.4.3 .. i BASES ,

l APPLICABILITY (continued)

System in OPERABLE status is not required in MODE 4 or 5 j except for other situations under which significant releases  !

of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during i operations with a potential: for draining the reactor vessel '

(OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of -

irradiated fuel assemblies in thejsecondaryl containment.-

1 clidisles l ACTIONS Ad cpyt.sjon o CM q d % /,r/ '

With one SGT subeyotes in erable, the ino rable :2.,,, ...

% ,y  :

1. must be restored to OPERA E status in 7 ys. In this '

g 0'giM Condition, the remaining PERABLE SGT is adequate to perform the required dioactivity release control i hIf boo s y 4). function. However, thereduced erall system reliability i because a sin,ie faiiu N 's  !

G r t. i^ W, m fn r3 / 4 could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 day Completion Time g%;4 li 1; ,

/W O P E- is based on consideration of such factors as the -

SGT S V s-t e e my availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT and the 1 n e f- 64 Cop a. bt g d low probability of a DCA occurring during this period.

{

r c a. o **N Y Q ,,g g y

,W y;gw re,t er s t. c. o " * *

• L r.ss,&)  ;

.{ u o t,+i o^ . Th* " If the SGT emboyotes cannot be restored to OPERABLE status gd4eo -l

,.r e r Qe within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, ~ 2, or 3, the p sc,3-t e gt w i

,g ceguie*$ N plant.aust apply. be brought to a MODE in which the LCD do(1 pg cal t at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within ' '

$ h.3r3 co #$"~ 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable,  !

W +* based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner

(- and without challenging plant systems.

i O D D D

(.1. (.2.1. (.2.2. and f.2.3  !

i During movement of irradiated fup assemblies, in the . l

-ThecondaryJ' containment, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during i 0PORVs, when Required Action A.1 cannot be completed within 1 the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE SGT rd:,rx Va should lumiediately be placed in operation. This action ensures that the remaining is OPERABLE, that no k,Uny failures that could preven automatic actuation have

&m

/ 'N (continued) thBWR?4 STS 8 3.6-111 Revv-tl, 7,in/iFi u-t

t SGT System i B 3.6.4.3  !

(~

Q) BASES D D D b  :

ACTIONS /,1.E'.2.1.(.2.2.and/.2.3 (continued) )

l occurred, and that any other failure would be readily  !

detected. g AnalternativetoRequiredAction[.1istoimmediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing  ;

radioactive material to th?TsecondaryTr containment, thus  !

placing the plant in a condition that minimizes risk. If  :

applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel l assemblies must insediately be suspended. Suspension of i these activities must not preclude completion of movement of '

a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must issediately be initiated to suspend OPORVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPORVs are suspended.

4 TheRequiredActionsofCondition4havebeenmodifiedbya

)

Note stating that LC0 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving 1 irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LC0 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel O assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is  :

C/ independent. of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

& E E j igt, tion.S I.1.9'.2.andI.3 ,_ g

( bon ,w - - -

When 'Det SGT d,,=;.; are inoperable, if applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in v{ secondary}Tontainmentmustimmediatelybesuspended.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion  ;

of movement of a couponent to a safe position. Also, if '

applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel ,

draindown and subsequent potential for fission product  !

release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. '

Required Action .1 has been modified by a Note statin that ,

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fue l assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify I any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor (continued)

(

BBWR/4 STS B 3.6-112 6. G, 09/2S/02 i

I

SGT System-  !

- B 3.6.4.3 l BASES

& & E .

l ACTIONS f.1. II.2. and 6.3 (continued) _  !

t operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend i movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a - I sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown. j i

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.3.1 /

Qist* .

- S

' V I J iW#

i i

REQUIREMENTS Operating eLch SGT or t 10kontinuoushours i ensures thatiboth d ; r are OPERABLE and that all-  !

associated controls are functioning properly. It also .[

ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive  !

vibration can be detected for corrective action. Operation 1 M with the heaters o (automatic heater cycling to maintain i temperature)J8 Tor a 101'c5ntinuous hours every 31. days t eliminates moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The 31 day Frequency was developed in consideration of the known l reliability of fan motors and controls and the redundancy }

available in the system.  ;

O SR 3.6.4.3.2 ,

This SR verifies that the required SET' filter testing is ,

performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing ~ i Program (VFTP). The SGT System filter tests'are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52 (Ref. 3). The VFTP _l includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber  ;

effir,iency, properties ofminimum system the activated flow rate,(general use andand the charcoal /l following specific operations). . Specific test frequencies sf:

and additional .information are discussed in detail in the V vrTp. 4i;  ;

poisM  ;

SA 3.6.4.3.3 -

f7 This SR verifies that each SGT subsystem starts on receipt of an actual or simulated initiation signal. While this 'l Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power,.

-l operating experience has shown that these nts usually g' pass the Surveillance when performed at 1 1@.3 l Frequency. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST in SR 3.3.6.2.j 1-  !

overlaps this SR to provide complete testing of the safety j i

(Continued)

A BWR74 STS B 3.6-113 -L.  ;, ;;/ /":1 {

i L _

V 1

I

.." ~ -

SGT System .;

B 3.6.4.3 i I

BASES' l

t SURVEILLANCE LR_3. 6. 4. 3. 3 (continued)  !

REQUIREMENTS  !

function. Therefore,~the Frequency was found to be  !

acceptable from a reliability standpoint. l

- - 6 SR 3.6.4.3.4  !

This SR verifies that the filter cooler bypass damper can be opened and the fan started. This ensures that the C ventilation mode of SGT System operation is available.  !

I While this Surveillance can be performed with the reactor at power, operating experience has shown that these components ,

usugpass the Surveillance when performed at the  !

P gv gdhgf},36 ,M 183 -..th Frequency, which is based on the refueling cycle.  ;

Therefore, the Frequency was found to be acceptable from a  ;

id [' -

reliability standpoint.

.}

?

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. GDC 41. '!

AGUA /SAR,SectioD6.2.3[

3. Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revh2[' f i

t i

f I

o 1 l

BBWR/4 STS B 3.6-114 L. . O,e,/G/% i