ML051810464

From kanterella
Revision as of 00:15, 24 November 2019 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Ucd/Mnrc 2004 Annual Report
ML051810464
Person / Time
Site: University of California-Davis
Issue date: 06/24/2005
From: Steingass W
McClellan Nuclear Research Center
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML051810464 (41)
v • d • e


Text

UCDAVIS 5335 PRICE AVENUE, BUILDING 258 MNRCI McCLELLAN NUCLEAR RADIATION CE ER McCLELLAN, CA 95652 PHONE: (916) 614-6200 FAX: (916) 614-6250 WVEB: http://mnrc.ucdavis.cdu 24 June, 2005 To: See Distribution List

Subject:

UCD/MNRC 2004 Annual Report Attached is the UCD/MNRC Annual Report.

.. Ski ResrManager UCD/MR I Attachment UCD/IMNRC 2004 Annual Report mp r

Page I of I Printed On: 6/24nOO5

MNRCt McCLAN NUCLEAR RADIATON R 2004 ANNUAL REPORT

UCDAVIS MNRC*

M"UAN RtAC --

.;UC/ MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004

1. Introduction The University of California, Davis McClellan Nuclear Radiation Center (MNRC) consists of a research reactor and associated radiography and positioning equipment. This MNRC Annual Report is published each year in support of the license provided by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The aforementioned license is for the operation of a steady-state TRIGA h reactor with pulsing capability.

It is the intent of this document to provide information relevant to the safe operation of the UCD/MNRC. A brief description of the MNRC facility and administration is followed by operational events and health physics information concerning this facility during CY 2004.

2. UCD/MNRC Facility Description The UCD/MNRC is located on the McClellan Industrial Park site; the reactor is housed in Building 258. The McClellan Industrial Park site is approximately 2600 acres, located eight miles northeast of Sacramento, California.

The UCD/MNRC facility is a three level 14,720 sq. ft. rectangular-shaped enclosure that surrounds a 2 MW research reactor. The UCD/MNRC provides four neutron beams and four bays for radiography. All four bays are capable of using radiography film techniques, but Bays 1 and 3 will normally use electronic imaging devices. Space, shielding and environmental controls are provided by the enclosure for neutron radiography operations performed on a variety of samples. Adequate room has been provided to handle the components in a safe manner.

In addition to the radiography bays, the UCD/MNRC reactor also has several in-core facilities ranging from a pneumatic tube system to a central irradiation facility.

For more detailed information on the UCD/MNRC project, the reader is referred to the UCD/MNRC Safety Analysis Report.

3.0 UCD/MNRC Administration UCD/MNRC Organization. The UCD/MNRC is licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory commission (NRC) to operate under the provisions of operating license R-1 30.

The University of California Regents have designated the Chancellor at UC Davis to be the license holder. The UCD Chancellor has in-turn delegated the Vice Chancellor for Research to be the license of record.

The UCD/MNRC is under the direction of the UCD/MNRC Director, and reports to the Vice Chancellor for Research.

A complete organization chart can be found in the UCD/MNRC Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13.

1 UCDOMAACA.- R.,,o, 200d 1

UCDAVIS MNRCC MANRW AUC WM/MNRC e ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004 4.0 Facility Modifications (Section 50.59 of 10CFR Part 50), and experiments.

a. One evaluation was performed and completed during calendar year 2004, the installation of additional stations for the evacuation and fire alert systems. See attached FM procedure figure 3.

5.0 New Approved Experiments

a. A basalt and two standard materials approved to be irradiated in the central facility, for Neutron Activation Analysis, experiment approval number K-4-44.

6.0 Licensing and Regulatory Activities 6.1 NRC Items

a. During the year 2004, the UCD/MNRC terminated 2 Senior Reactor Operator Licenses, and issued 3 Senior Reactor Operator Licenses. All were in full compliance with NRC obligations.
b. Revision to Safety Evaluation of Amendment No.7 to amended facility operation lickense No.R-130- Regents of the University of California (TAC-NO. M85598 issued in March.

6.2 Nuclear Safety Committee (UCD/NSC)

a. The annual NSC audit of the UCD/MNRC was conducted during the month of Aug.
b. The NSC met twice during 2004: May 17, 2004, and December 7, 2004..

6.3 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission performed an inspection November 15-19, 2004.

2 UWDMNC A-wMRip, 2004 2

Evaluation of Experiments or Modifications Under the Provision of 10 CFR 50.59 Experiment/Modification: Date:

Does the proposed change, experiment or Yes No Justification

-.-modificat6n: ._'_._.

a. Result in more than a minimal increase in the 6. Ax-flJr Ht ,

frequency of occurrence of an accident b c  ;

previously evaluated in the FSAR (as XV 4zm Al"Tt updated). _

b. Result in more than a minimal increase in the A z tm likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a MukLL A4t ;

structure, system, or component important to '.C, 2 4 A.

safety previously evaluated in the FSAR (as h eV

c. Result in more than a minimal increase in the c A.

consequences of an accident previously g -,L evaluated in the FSAR (as updated). ____ s ___A

d. Result in more than a minimal increase in the .WK~- dL& AO-AL _

consequences of a malfunction of a structure, . . .IAOU 4 ,ic O.

system, or component important to safety X A, 1 J $ ZA4 previously evaluated in the FSAR (as updated).

Create a possibility for an accident of a . . Af A-- C different type than any previously evaluated in . X the FSAR (as updated). __..

f; Result in a design basis limit for a fission product barrier as described in the FSAR (as updated). _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

g. Result in a departure from a method of _ ,444 AL evaluation as-described-in-the-FSAR (as updated) used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analysis.

Based on the evaluation conducted in the above table, it Is concluded that the proposed action does not meet any of the 10CFR 50.59 criteria; therefore, no license amendment or change to the Technical Specifications is needed to perform the proposed action.

B3 Based on the evaluation conducted on the above table, It Is concluded that the proposed action does meet one or more of the 10CFR 50.59 criteria; therefore, a license amendment or a change.to the Technical Specifications, is required to perform the proposed action.

Performed By:

Signature:

Figure 3 Dates: tO/2?Z/oi' __ _ _

lI UNCONTROLLED COPY I 13 I For Reference Only I FACILITY MODiFICATION PROCEDURE MNRC-0043-DOC-03

MNRC EXPERIMENT REQUEST FORM

1) Experiment Title: INAA of basalt using central 3) Experiment Approval No. K444 irrnfldintinn faciity Fac. Use Auth. No. 002
2) Experimenter (Last, First, MI) Ching, Jeff K K Experimenter Approval No. 007 Safety Analysis (attach additional sheets as needed)
4) Experiment Description See Attached.
5) Anticipated Results See Attached.
6) Effects on Reactor Performance See Attached.
7) Energy Release See Attached.
8) Mechanical Failure of Experiment or Associated Apparatus See Attached.
9) Encapsulation Integrity See Attached.
10) Chemical Reactions or Hazards See Attached.

I1) Handling of Experiment See Attached.

12) Radiation Exposure See Attached.
13) Disposal of Radioactive Material See Attached.
14) Analysis Performed By (Signature): Date 15 March 2004 Review Recommendations Recommend Approval Experiment Coordinator (Signature): l Date ExpVnment Rciiewifoard (ERB)

Remarks ERB Required Recommendations Recommend Approval Chairman ERB (Signature): Date /4< 4X /

O cc of N4clear Licensing and Operations (LI-5)

Remarks Reco ations Experi ent Ap po LI-5 SiatAnre Date o4_

Utilization Document - Rev. 05 22 November. 1998

-n

MNRC EXPERIMENT REQUEST FORM

1. Experiment Title: [NAA of basalt using central irradiation facility
2. Experimenter: Jeff Ching
3. A. Experiment Approval No. K-4-44 B. Fac. Use Auth. No. 002 C. Experimenter Approval No. 007
4. Experimental

Description:

A basalt and two standard materials (coal fly ash and obsidian) are to be sealed in fused-quartz ampoules (3 replicates of each material and 1 blank ampoule) and loaded in an airtight Ti canister. Samples are irradiated in the central facility at 1.8 MW for approximately 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> (not exceeding normal operational hours). Upon completion, Ti capsule will be stored under water for approximately 6 days, then removed and placed in fume hood. Quartz ampoules will be taken out of the canister for radioassay.

5. Anticipated Results: This irradiation should produce approximately 900 mCi of activity (total), which decrease to - 680 piCi (total; average 75 [iCi for each ampoule) within 7days.
6. Effects on Reactor Performance: No effects on reactor performance are anticipated.
7. Eneray Release: No energy release is anticipated, since the experiment contains no fissile, fertile, fissionable or explosive materials.
8. Mechanical Failure: The only mechanical failure anticipated is the possibility that the airtight Ti canister may unfasten from its holder. In this unlikely event, the reactor would be immediately shutdown and the airtight Ti canister would be retrieved manually.
9. Encapsulation IntegriN: The samples are dry powder substances. As such, the sample materials shall be doubly encapsulated. The primary encapsulation consists of sealed quartz ampoule and an airtight Ti canister serves as the secondary encapsulation. The quartz ampoules will be baked at 325TC for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to ensure the integrity and no out-gassing of samples. After loading ampoules, air-tightness of the Ti canister will be tested in water under vacuum.
10. Chemical Reactions or Hazards: No chemical reactions are anticipated or no chemical hazards are associated with the sample materials.
11. Handling of Experiment: The experiment is to be handled in accordance with approved procedures from the following document.
a. EP03-22: INAA of basalt using central irradiation facility
b. MNRC Health Physics Procedures (Doc. No. MNRC-0029-DOC)
12. Radiation Exposure: This irradiation is expected to produce radiation in excess of 10 mR/h at one-foot (open window). Exposure to personnel shall be minimized by procedural compliance to all precautions and steps given in the documents listed in 11 above.
13. Disposal of Radioactive Materials: The sample materials are to be transferred to the researcher for radioassay.

FIGURE S AINRC IRRADIATION

SUMMARY

FORM NOTE: Use one irradiation request for each separate experiment A. EXPERIMENTER I) APPROVED EXPERIMENTER (Print Last Name, First Name, MI) Chdng, Jeff

2) BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIMENT (or E.R. Number with previous description on it)

Irradiate a basalt and tho standard materials in the central facility at 1.8 MW for approximately 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> (not exceeding normal operational hours).

This should provide approximately 900 mCI of total activity. Upon completion store Titanium capsule wuder water for approximately 6 days, then remove and place in funme hood. Remove inner quartz ampule for radjoassay.

B. IRRADIATION DATA

3) EXPERIMENT FACIUITY 4) TOTAL FLUENCE (NVT) 2.2E+18 nI/Oc 2
5) ENCAPSULATION METHOD:

Primary encapsulation: sealed quartz ampouie Secondary encapsulation: sealed Titaniwun capsule

6) INDIVIDUAL TO BE CONTACTED UPON COMPLETION Bob llaslett 7) STORAGE 6 days in-tank C. TIHE AUTHORIZED EXPERIMENTER FOR TIlS IRRADIATION REQUEST DECLARES TIHAT: --I4IAVEREAD, UNDERSTAND ANDAGRE-TOCOMPLY3VJrTH.THEMINRCEXPERIENTER CERTIFICATION FORM__ . _
2. I REQUEST THIS IRRADIATION BE PERFORMED.
3. I ATTEST THAT THE EXPERIMENT BEING PERFORMED HAS BEEN APPROVED AND AUTHORIZED
8) APPROVED EXPERIMENTER (Signature) DATE
9) APPROVAL NUMBER 007 10) RAM PERMIT/LICEN E NUMBER D. THE FOLLOWING SIGNATURES AUTHORIZE THE APPROVED EXPERIMENTER TO RECEIVE THE VARIOUS RADIONUCLIDES LISTED AND/OR PERFORM THE EXPERIMENT:

RZE) I DATE l 12) NSC FACILITY USE AUTH. NUMBER 002 OPERATIONS STAFF APPROVAL

13) REACTOR OPS SUPERVISOR (Signature) DATE 3/1/a 14)HEALTH PHYSICSSUPERVISOR (Signaturie DATE 311 4
15) REMARKS p cf Utilization Document - Rev. 05 24 November 1998

UCDAWnS MNRC!LV WWUMNuIf tAMX I UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004!

7.0 OPERATIONS OPERATING HISTORY:

TOTAL OPERATING HOURS THIS YEAR: 3124.92 TOTAL OPERATING HOURS: 34678.41 TOTAL MEGAWATT HOURS THIS YEAR: 5384.67 TOTAL MEGAWATT HOURS: 48010.30 TOTAL NUMBER OF PULSES PERFORMED THIS YEAR: 36 TOTAL NUMBER OF PULSES PERFORMED: 464 UNSCHEDULED REACTOR SHUTDOWNS:

In 2004, there were fifty (50) unscheduled shutdowns at the MNRC reactor Facility. Watchdog scrams are the largest contributor to the total number of unscheduled shutdowns (68%). The following is a list of the unscheduled shutdowns:

2004 REACTOR SHUTDOWNS Type of Failures Total

- Number CSC 34 Other 16 TOTAL NUMBER OF SHUTDOWNS IN 2004 50 2

CSC Other Jan 6

1

_ Feb 1

Mar 2

2 Apr 7

0 May 4

1 Jun 5

3 Jul 3

1 Au 3

1 Sep 2

2 Oct O

2 Nov 2

1 Dec De 0

Note S 1 2 2

J 3,4 _ __ 5 4,5,6 5 7 8.9 9,10 11,12 Notes:

1: Manual Scram. Reactor CAM Iodine channel loss due to small Xe125 leak from 1125 production system.

2: Loss of Site Power 3: D150-64 timeout 4: TRAINING 5: Bay DoorlShutter interlock trip during door operation.

6: Rx CAM fault, air flow hi/low. No specific cause found for alarm.

7: CSC status monitor failed during operation.

8: Rx CAM iodine channel card failure 9: Recover dropped control rod which fell off during leveling operations 10: SID to blow down and purge beam tubes following loss of helium pressure 11: Fire Alarm due to faulty duct smoke detector.

12: Regulating Rod failure to operate due to computer malfunction.

3 "WAMRCA. dRftwd2004 3

UJCDAVIS MN~ IUCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004 January

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed 6 times during the month due to watchdog circuit time outs. Operations personnel performed the following on each occurrence:
a. Rebooted the CSC computer.
b. Satisfactory performed all weekly checks on the computer.
c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.
2. On January 20 while operating, the reactor scrammed on multiple indications (NM-1000, NPP-1000 power High, NPP-1000 high voltage low). History playback showed reactor power stable at 87-88 %.
3. On January 28 while operating, the reactor operator manually scrammed the reactor due to the loss of the Reactor CAM Iodine channel caused by a Xe-1 25 leak from the 1-125 production system.
4. During the period from January 1 through January 4, personnel were called back to the facility nine (9) times.
a. Three of the callbacks were for loss of facility power problems (most likely momentary outages).
b. Four callbacks were for Iodine CAM alerts caused by the derivative alarm.
c. Two callbacks were for CSC computer lockups.
5. After January 5, personnel were called back into the facility three times for the following:
a. All three callbacks were for the same type of indications listed in item.2.

above. These indications also included NM-1000 stack fault, NM-1000 corn fault, and DISO 64 time out, and UPS fault.

February

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed 0 times during the month due to watchdog circuit time outs.
2. During the period from February 1 through February 27, personnel were called back to the facility six (6) times.
a. One of the callbacks was for a loss of facility power problem (most likely momentary outage).
b. One callback was for an Alarm dispatch company callback as a result of a cellular backup failure and a duress alarm on a weekend. Sacramento County Sheriffs personnel responded and secured the facility. Responding facility personnel arrived and cleared the alarms and performed a facility and perimeter search with the Sheriffs personnel. No problems were found in the facility and the facility was secured.

4 UCDWNfCA-wdRfq ,2004 4

-

UCDAVIS _

' lm UCD/MNRCANNUAL REPORTFOR

c. Three callbacks were for CSC computer lockups.
d. One callback was for a Cooling Tower water level high alarm.
3. On February 25, the facility experienced a complete loss of all site power. The Reactor was shutdown manually and the emergency generator started satisfactorily.

After 28 minutes, site electrical power was restored. Normal reactor operations resumed 30 minutes later with no further power interruptions.

March

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed 3 times during the month. 2 of the scrams were due to watchdog circuit timeouts, 1 was a DIS064 timeout that gave multiple scram indications (UPS fault, Tank levels Hi/Lo, DISO 64 timeout, NM1000 Comm fault, NM-1000 Power Hi, NPP-1000 Power Hi, and NPP-1000 voltage lo). A review of the reactor console history playback data confirmed no actual hi power condition existed at the time of the scram.
2. For the Watch Dog Time outs personnel performed the following for each occurrence:
a. Rebooted the CSC computer.
b. Satisfactorily performed all weekly checks on the computer.
c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.
3. During the period from March 1 through March 31, personnel were called back to the facility one (1) time.
a. This callback was for a CSC computer lockup.
4. The reactor was shutdown on 3/05 for a personnel luncheon.
5. The reactor was shutdown on 3/23 for all hands ALARA training.

April

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed 7 times due to watchdog circuit timeouts,
2. For the Watch Dog Time outs personnel performed the following for each occurrence:
a. Rebooted the CSC computer.
b. Satisfactorily performed all weekly checks on the computer.
c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.
3. During the period from April 1 through April 31, personnel were called back to the facility four (4) times.
a. Three callbacks were for CSC computer lockups.
b. One callback was for a UPS fault.

5 mwA-'dRw 2005 5

MNRCN f1D MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 20041

4. The reactor was shutdown on 4/21 for a UC Davis Admin meeting.
5. While not a shutdown, on April 30 reactor power had to be reduced to below 1.5 MW due to low building water pressure.

May

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed 4 times due to watchdog circuit timeouts,
2. For the Watch Dog Time outs personnel performed the following for each occurrence:
a. Rebooted the CSC computer.
b. Satisfactorily performed all weekly checks on the computer.
c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.
3. During the period from Mayl through May 28, Reactor Operations personnel were called back to the facility one (1) time for a CSC/Watchdog timeout on the CSC console.
4. On May 12 the reactor scrammed on External #1. Description of occurrence in Anomalies Section
5. On May 13, the reactor was shutdown when it was determined that a technical specification surveillance requirement was not satisfied after completion of the transient control rod repair reported in April. See Anomalies Section for further details.

June

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed 5 times due to watchdog circuit timeouts,
2. For the Watch Dog Time outs personnel performed the following for each occurrence:
a. Rebooted the CSC computer.
b. Satisfactorily performed all weekly checks on the computer.
c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.
3. During the period from June 1 through June 30, Reactor Operations personnel were called back to the facility three (3) times. Twice for CSClWatchdog timeouts on the CSC console and the third callback was for a 1-125 CAM problem.
4. On June 15th, the reactor scrammed on External #1. Additional information in the Anomalies Section.
5. On June 16, the reactor was shutdown due to a Reactor CAM fault indication caused by a malfunction of the CAM's photohelic (air flow) hi/low flow alarm circuit. The facilities electronics engineer and the Health Physics Technician 6 CDWC As A 2004 6

UCDAVIS _

MNRC2 IVIU~I~~ k UCD/NRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004 investigated this problem and found no specific reason for the failure. Associated electrical connections were checked for correct assembly and tightness but none were found loose. After these electrical checks were performed, the hi/low alarm functions performed correctly.

6. On June 22, the reactor was shutdown for Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) licensing examinations administered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). This portion of the exam was the performance practical utilizing the reactor itself. All candidates (3) performed satisfactorily on this examination.

July

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed 3 times due to watchdog circuit timeouts.
2. For the Watch Dog Time outs personnel performed the following for each occurrence:
a. Rebooted the CSC computer.
b. Satisfactorily performed all weekly checks on the computer.
c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.
3. During the period from July 1 through July 30, Reactor Operations personnel were not called back to the facility for any reason.
4. On July 21st, the reactor scrammed on External #1. See Anomalies Section for specifics.
5. On July 9th, the reactor scrammed on a CSC watchdog timeout. After the CSC computer was rebooted, the Reactor Operators noted that the Shim #3 control rod did not indicate fully inserted in the core. See Anomalies Section for further details.

Aunust

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed 3 times due to watchdog circuit timeouts.
2. For the Watch Dog Time outs personnel performed the following for each occurrence:
a. Rebooted the CSC computer.
b. Satisfactorily performed all weekly checks on the computer.
c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.
3. During the period from August 1 through August 31, Reactor Operations personnel were called back 2 times for CSC computer problems.

7 VC~DNRC Ab. Rd 2004 7

UCIDAVIS MNRpk WVIIRNP&X KADJCD/M5NRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004

4. On August 11th at 2000 hrs, the CSC status monitor (computer screen/monitor) failed during reactor operation. The reactor was shutdown to replace the monitor.

See the Anomalies Section for further details.

SeDtember

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed 1 time due to watchdog circuit timeouts,
2. For the Watch Dog Time outs personnel performed the following for each occurrence:
a. Rebooted the CSC computer.
b. Satisfactorily performed all weekly checks on the computer.
c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.
3. During the period from September 1 through September 30, Reactor Operations personnel were called back 3 times for CSC computer problems. Additionally, Operations personnel were called back 3 times for CAM problems:
a. Called back twice due to power spike/loss on the reactor room CAM. Health Physics personnel were called in to investigate. Cause of spike/loss of power was due to Reactor Operations personnel failing to reset the automatic start/test of the Emergency Generator for the holiday
b. Reactor Room CAM alarm channel indicated a high count triggering a call back. The CAM was operating satisfactorily upon inspection, and histories showed no alarm conditions were noted. CAM checks were performed prior to reactor operations, with all checks indicating the CAM was functioning properly.
4. On September 9, the reactor was shut down to recover Shim 2 which had fallen off during rod leveling operations.
5. On September 27, the reactor scrammed due to a complete loss of power to the CSC console and DAC console. Investigation showed no problems noted on the UPS regarding power. The computers were re-energized and rebooted. The appropriate scram function checks were performed satisfactorily, and reactor operations were resumed.
6. On September 30, the reactor was shut down due to the iodine channel of the Reactor Room CAM not responding as expected. A failed card was changed out.

CAM operation was verified satisfactory, and reactor operations resumed.

October

1. On October 5, the Reactor Supervisor required the reactor to be shutdown to blow down and purge the beam tubes. Helium pressure was lost overnight, raising the possibility of water incursion into the beam tubes. See Anomalies Section for details.

8 - A%'-' 2004 8

UCDAVIS MNRC D/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004.

2. On October 23, the reactor was shutdown to retest and recover Shim 1 which had fallen off during rod leveling operations.

November

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed 1 time due to watchdog circuit timeouts,
2. For the Watch Dog Time outs personnel performed the following for each occurrence:
a. Rebooted the CSC computer.
b. Satisfactorily performed all weekly checks on the computer.
c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.
3. During the period from November 1 through November 30, Reactor Operations personnel were called back 2 times for CSC computer problems.
4. On 12 November, a fire alarm in zones 6 and 8 prompted a reactor shutdown and evacuation of all unnecessary personnel. Investigation by the fire department and the alarms contractor found A/C 2 duct smoke detector in the alarm state.

Operations personnel cleaned the detector, all alarms were returned to normal, and reactor operations were resumed.

5. On 15 November, the reactor startup procedure was aborted when the Regulating Rod failed to operate. Operations personnel rebooted the CSC and DAC computers, and performed continuity checks from the translator to the control rod. All indications were normal. A rod operability check was performed satisfactorily, and reactor operations were resumed.

December

1. While operating, the reactor automatically scrammed 1 time due to watchdog circuit timeouts,
2. For the Watch Dog Time outs personnel performed the following for each occurrence:
a. Rebooted the CSC computer.
b. Satisfactorily performed all weekly checks on the computer.
c. Resumed normal operation of the reactor.
3. During the period from December 1 through December 31, Reactor Operations personnel were called back O times for CSC computer problems.
4. On 1 December, several startups to determine experiment reactivities for Sandia experiments required aborting the runs due to reactivities being too high. Additional materials were added to the experiment to lower the air void inside the experiment can, lowering the reactivity to acceptable levels.

9 tCDMMNRCAt. a.o',04 9

MNRC!!---

UCDAIWM QWq IUED/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004

5. On 1 December, a startup to determine core excess prior to installation of the Sandia experimental facility indicated that excess was not as expected. The reactor was shut down, and investigations showed that the central facility thimble was not fully seated. The thimble had been dislodged the night before following experiment removal at the end of the shift,. The central facility was repositioned, and core excess was determined to be as expected.

7.2 ANOMALIES

During 2004, there were 12 reported anomalies at the MNRC facility. The specifics are listed below by month.

AD;iI

1. On April 7 during the performance of a normal reactor startup, the reactor operations personnel noted a lower than expected core excess reactivity value. The reactor was shutdown and the core visually inspected, all control rod drive travels measured sat. The reactor was again started up and taken to a power level of 50 watts, here core excess was again determined to be significantly lower than expected. With the reactor in manual mode, the transient control rod was incrementally raised with no corresponding increase in power level indicating that the transient control rod had separated from its control linkage. The reactor was shutdown and the following action was taken:
a. In accordance with maintenance instruction 5140-A6, a visual inspection of the transient control rod was performed.
b. When the transient control rod assembly shroud was lifted off of the guide tube, it was visually confirmed that the transient rod had separated from the control linkage and was resting on the safety plate (fully inserted in the core).
c. Operations personnel recovered the transient control rod by threading the control rod linkage back into the top of the transient rod. The transient rod was then removed from the core and brought to the tank surface for close visual inspection.
d. This visual inspection confirmed that the setscrew that captivates the lower end of the control linkage into the top of the transient rod had backed slightly allowing the transient rod to unthread itself and remain in the core while the operating linkage/drive assembly appeared to operate satisfactorily. See Figure 1.
e. A new replacement setscrew was ordered and the affected setscrew was replaced on April 8.
f. A previous inspection of the transient rod had identified a deficiency with the plastic piston/snubber that sits atop the transient rod. This item appears to have fractured and is close to failure. Operations personnel attempted to install a new captivation setscrew in this component, but the plastic has deteriorated to the point were the plastic is crumbling when any 1 00WWNR 2004 10

WUCAN= A" IUCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004 torque is applied to the setscrew. ALL PULSING AND SQUARE WAVE OPERATIONS OF THE TRANSIENT CONTROL ROD ARE SUSPENDED UNTIL THE PISTON IS REPLACED AND PROPERLY CAPTIVATED.

9. The transient control rod assembly was reassembled and retested in accordance with the maintenance instruction requirements. The scram time test was satisfactory (0.48 sec).
h. The reactor was then started up and taken to 50 watts, the reactor core excess value was determined to be satisfactory and within the expected range.
2. During the troubleshooting and repair of the transient control rod, the secondary pump was found to be ON but not running. The motor was found to be very hot to the touch. Reactor Operations personnel secured the pump and a subsequent investigation determined that this motor suffered a loss of one electrical phase in a manner similar to the one experienced last October. An electrical connector at the motor had failed and burned through the insulation, causing the connection to overheat and fail. The connection was disassembled and the connector replaced as was the electrical insulation around the connector.

Reactor Operations personnel will increase their surveillance of the secondary pump motor to check for heat buildup and will periodically visually inspect the electrical connections. In addition, operations personnel will periodically check the motor phase running currents to attempt to detect changes that could indicate potential failure.

May

1. External #1 scram. This was caused by radiography personnel attempting to open the Bay #1 massive shutter while simultaneously closing the Bay #1 shield door.

This is a known problem, the shield door rocks slightly just as its finally closing causing one of the external scram limit switches to momentarily open then close. If the radiography control console operator is attempting to open the massive shutter at the same instant, the timing of the operation will generate a scram signal. At no time is personnel safety compromised as no personnel are in the radiography bay at the time and the shield door is essentially fully closed/closing at the time of the occurrence. All radiographers and Operations personnel were trained on the occurrence and proper operation of the Bay doors and shutters.

2. Tech Spec violation was discovered during a review of technical specifications and current maintenance and operations. Specifically a control rod calibration of the transient control rod was not performed as required by Tech Spec 4.2.1 following repairs the previous month. The Reactor Operations Supervisor suspended reactor operations until the surveillance required was completed. On May 17, the control rod calibration of the Transient rod was performed satisfactorily confirming no significant change in transient rod reactivity from the previous control rod calibration procedure. Permission was granted to return to normal reactor operations.

June 1 1L OMNRIC A, ARp.t 201 11

UCDAVI MNRC*

mUN RC D jMWNMNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004o'

1. External #1 scram. This was caused by radiography personnel closing the Bay #2 shield door in very small increments, rather than closing the door in one smooth continuous evolution. As a result, the limit switch which controls door motion and position actuated thereby stopping door travel before one of the limit switches for the External #1 scram signal could actuate. The radiography console operator had indication that the Bay #2 shield door was in its proper position and opened the Bay
  1. 2 massive shutter. At that moment the reactor scrammed on the External #1 interlock because not all of the external scram circuits were satisfied. During normal operation, the shield door has a certain amount of momentum that causes it to travel a little farther after the door travel limit switch activates. This additional travel distance ensures the positive activation of both External Scram signal limit switches. At no time is personnel safety compromised as no personnel are in the radiography bay at the time and the shield door is essentially fully closed/closing at the time of the occurrence.. All radiographers and Operations personnel were trained on the occurrence and proper operation of the Bay doors and shutters.
2. On June 9, while performing the simultaneous rod withdrawal prohibit test section of the startup checklist, the magnet power key switch was turned to the reset position and released. The reactor mode status on the Control System Console (CSC) indicated steady state without the magnet status boxes on the Hi-Res monitor turning yellow . The operator depressed the Regulating Rod up button followed by the Transient rod up button. At that point the following control rod drive mechanisms began driving out Shim 1, Shim 2, and Shim 3. The control room operator stopped driving out the Regulating rod and Transient rod and their rod motion stopped. However the drive mechanisms for Shim 1, Shim 2, and Shim 3 continued to drive out finally stopping at the upper travel limit. Operators in the Reactor Room confirmed that only the 3-control rod drive mechanisms were actually moving and none of the control rods themselves were attached or moving (the magnets were not energized).

The operators in the Reactor Room Scrammed the Reactor locally and verified that the drive mechanisms drove in and that no control rod was actually attached. After visually verifying all control rods were fully inserted into the core and that all control rod drive mechanisms were also fully down, the CSC computer was rebooted and all control rod functions on the Reactor startup checklist retested Sat. The Reactor Supervisor was then notified of the problem. During the performance of the retests, the control room operators made several attempts to duplicate the conditions that may have caused the abnormal control rod drive mechanisms operation, these attempts were unsuccessful. No abnormal Control rod indications were observed.

The Reactor Supervisor then directed that another entire Startup Checklist be performed normally, and this was done with no abnormalities.

The Reactor Supervisor reviewed this occurrence with the Operators and the Facility Director. The operators were counseled to ensure that they observe correct and expected changes in indications before proceeding with the next step in any procedure. (Before any control rod motion was attempted initially, the operator should have verified proper magnet indication.)

July 1 2 oCDAfNRCA.d w. 200 12

UCDAVSS MNRCEANuANLI

- -

MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004

1. External #1 scram. This was caused by radiography personnel operating the Bay #2 shield door a very small amount to check a faulty indication. After initially closing the shield door, operators noticed the door-closed indication was not illuminated as expected. A radiographer was sent out to open the door slightly and then reclose it to check both the open and closed position indications on the radiography console.

The open indicator illuminated as expected but the closed indicator did not and was deemed to have burnt out. The radiographers then assumed the door was closed based on visual verification of the actual door position and by visually checking the door limit switches. All 3 shield door limit switches appeared to be actuated by the door follower plate. The operation of the shield doors in small increments has been identified previously as a problem, most recently on June 15,2004 (as noted in the June 04 monthly report). Much like the External #1 scram that occurred in June, when the shield door is operated in small increments, not all of the limit switches may fully actuate.

The observed result is that the limit switch which controls door motion and position actuated first, thereby stopping door travel before one of the limit switches for the External #1 scram signal could actuate. The radiography console operator assumed that the Bay #2 shield door was in its proper position and opened the Bay #2 massive shutter. At that moment the reactor scrammed on the External #1 interlock because not all of the external scram circuits were satisfied. During normal operation, the shield door has a certain amount of momentum that causes it to travel a little farther after the door travel limit switch activates. This additional travel distance ensures the positive activation of both External Scram signal limit switches. At no time is personnel safety compromised as no personnel are in the radiography bay at the time and the shield door is essentially fully closed/closing at the time of the occurrence.

As a result of this Anomaly and the one that occurred in June (and one that occurred in May caused by similar circumstances on Bay #1) the Reactor Supervisor directed that the Bay #2 limit switches for the External Scram Circuits 1 and 2 be adjusted so as to actuate just slightly before the door position/indication limit switch actuates stopping door travel. The Bay #2 door shut/closed position indicator lamp was replaced. Operations personnel then performed Maintenance item 5420 M2 (Verify the Shield Interlock System) as a retest after the limit switch adjustment.

This was performed satisfactorily. The Shield door was also cycled repeatedly by radiography personnel with every way they were likely to think of without a problem. All indications and limit switches operated as expected/desired.

2. On July 9th, the reactor scrammed on a CSC watchdog timeout. After the CSC computer was rebooted, the Reactor Operators noted that the Shim #3 control rod did not indicate fully inserted in the core. The numerical position indication showed the rod was down, but the Hi-Res monitor display color for that control rod was still Wgreen' indicating the rod was not fully down. A visual inspection of the Shim #3 Control Rod drive mechanism and the control rod linkages verified that the assembly that actuates the 'foot switch' that changes the display color of the control rod had loosened, thereby preventing the switch from actuating. Operations personnel adjusted/tightened the foot switch assembly and then satisfactorily performed the control rod operability checks for Shim #3 August 1 3 LDUONRCAdAo.4 2004 13

UCDAVI MNRCc DY"/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004

1. On August 11th at 2000 hrs, the CSC status monitor (computer screen/monitor) failed during reactor operation. Part of the displayed image became unreadable to the Reactor Operator. The on-shift Senior Reactor Operator and the Shift Reactor Operator attempted restore the proper display utilizing the Console keyboard and controls on the monitor itself, these attempts failed. A hardcopy printout of the status monitor display was made and this was normal. The Operations personnel shut down the reactor to continue troubleshooting the display problem. The Facilities Electronics Engineer replaced the status monitor the next morning with a spare monitor.

October

1. On October 5, operators noted that the helium supply to the beam tubes pressure at the bottle regulator read 0 psi. The bottle was replaced with a full one. During investigations, it was found that the helium line vent valve had been opened the previous evening during the shutdown checklist walkthrough. This valve was operated in lieu of shutting the Bay 4 isolation valve, which allowed the helium bottle to depressurize. A valve lineup check was performed, and the system valves were returned to their normal configuration prior to placing the new supply bottle on service. All inserts were blown down to remove any water. A Caution Tag was hung on the Bay 4 insert isolation valve to indicate the valve shall remain closed except during Bay 4 radiography operations.
2. On October 8, operations personnel noted the positioning collar at the top of the neutron test source was out of its normal position by nearly an inch. This is similar to a problem noted and reported on last year. Operations personnel discussed the issue with the Health Physics Supervisor, notifying him they intended to reposition the collar and tighten the setscrews. Two operators and a health physics technician participated in the operation. The test source was brought to the surface of the tank, and radiation levels of 55 Rem/Hr were noted. The source remained at the surface for about two minutes while the operators evaluated the problem. The test source was returned to the normal in core position. The Operations personnel noted that their pocket dosimeters were off scale at greater than 200 mr. The Reactor Supervisor and Health Physicist were informed of the radiation levels, and the off scale Dosimetry.

The two operators' Dosimetry was pulled immediately and sent out to be analyzed, and they were prohibited from participating in operations which required Dosimetry until the results were returned from the contractor. Additional Operations personnel moved the test source to the underwater table, removed the old collar, and installed a new one. The removal and subsequent reinstallation of the source collar was performed per a Special Operating Procedure, and no significant exposure was noted during the second attempt.

The contractor reported dose levels for the two initial operators. No limits were reached or exceeded.

A review of the occurrence revealed some areas of concern and problems. Actions were implemented to avoid a repeat of the situation.

7.3 MAINTENANCE OTHER THAN PREVENTIVE:

14 UCODNRCA..dAwd2004 19

UCDAVI aNUCaryR C/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004 January

1. Repaired broken wire on Shim 3 10 turn potentiometer. Re-soldered the connection.
2. Adjusted Shim 1 bottom limit switch.

February

1. Performed 5240-Q1 8.5% weight fuel inspection per SOP 99-24 March
1. Shifted on service demineralizer resin bottles.
2. Replaced failed ECCS-GA-1 gage due to needle damage.
3. On 3/29/04 the failed 1-125 irradiation chamber was removed from the reactor core (grid location E-6) and replaced with fuel element 5296. The failed irradiation chamber is currently stored in a specially designed quiver in the south end of the reactor tank awaiting decay and removal at some future date. This action was performed in accordance with SOP 04-04.

Avril

1. Re-attached transient control rod to its operating linkage
2. Adjusted transient rod, rod bottom foot switch
3. Repaired damaged connections inside secondary pump terminal box.

May

1. Replaced the burned out main line contactors in AC-2.
2. Replaced a burned out relay in the HV-3 controller unit.

June

1. Contractor troubleshot and repaired equipment room overhead crane brake assembly (replaced missing set screws).
2. Contractor replaced wire rope and safety latch on the Bay #2 staging area crane
3. Installed a new pressure damper (snubber) on the building water supply pressure gage to minimize hydraulic shock from pressure surges (water hammer).
4. Changed out Helium gas supply bottle.
5. Changed out defective 5 %/"floppy drive in the Control System Console computer.

1 5 -CD-MNRC-7d1 2004 15

UCIDAVIS MNRC&t AOUAN~FJAlArjEl 0LEVUAN Waf XADLCND/MNRC t JUD ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004

1. Contractor troubleshot and repaired Air Conditioning unit #2 (Equipment Room).

Replaced a failed compressor and two burnt out contactor assemblies.

2 Operations personnel replaced two burnt wires on the main contactor assembly in Air Conditioning unit #1 (Reactor Room). Wires damaged due to heat and vibration due to close proximity to contactor.

3. Reattached, adjusted and tightened the connecting rod to the Shim #3 control rod foot switch. All setscrews checked tight on this rod.
4. Adjusted door limit switches identified in Anomaly Section.
5. The Bay #4 key control box has a failed key switch. This switch has been taken off service awaiting replacement ordered by the facilities electronics engineer.

August

1. During the Annual Shutdown, replaced the DAC computer monitor in the Reactor Room.
2. Replaced the Control System Console Status Monitor.
3. Removed and repaired CSC strip chart recorder to correct irregular operation.
4. Replaced damaged/worn cooling tower flow proof switch sensing line.
5. Inspected electrical wining/power connections in the Secondary System pump.

Reinsulated connectors and replaced cable markers

6. Replaced depleted helium supply gas cylinder.
7. Replaced failed cooling fan in the DAC cabinet.
8. Replaced depleted resin bottles on the south set of bottles in the Demineralizer System.
9. Troubleshoot and adjust the regulating rod limit switches.

In addition to scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, the annual shutdown was held in August, beginning on August 16, and completed on August 23. A quarterly inspection of 8',2 w/o fuel elements was also performed as a final inspection prior to closing out the Special Operating Procedure 99-23, Fuel Movement to Locate Fuel Element Leak.

Rod drop times were measured after control rod maintenance was performed.:

16 CDNC A P.,, 2004 16

UCDAVIS M NRIC2 IUCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004; Y Control Rod Reactivity worths were measured following the control rod maintenance Control Rod Previous Worth New Worth Difference Transient Rod $2.02 $2.09 + $0.07 Shim 1 $2.55 $2.48 -$0.07 Shim 2 $2.30 $2.35 + $0.05 Shim 3 $2.59 $2.45 -$0.14 Shim 4 $2.70 $2.56 -$0.14 Regulating Rod $2.89 $2.61 -$0.28 September

1. Calibrated spare NPP-1 000 unit.
2. Installed spare NPP-1000 in DAC, performed Calorimetric as retest along with pre-start checks.
3. Replaced bulb in reactor tank south lighting fixture.
4. Replaced security light bulb, SW corner of trailer.
5. Placed the Demineralizer System south resin bottles on service after filling and purging. No resin beads noted. Isolated north set of bottles.

October

1. Replace depleted north set of Demineralizer System resin bottles. Replacement bottles left empty and dry.
2. Replaced fan belt on HV-3.
3. Replaced failed high level alarm float switch in the Secondary System cooling tower.
4. Removed and replaced neutron test source collar per SOP 04-11 with a new collar.
5. Replaced failed Helium System bottle pressure regulator with new.

November

1. Replaced the two drive belts on EF-1.
2. Replaced failed UART interface board for local display on the NM-1000 nuclear instrument system.
3. Replace expended Helium System supply bottle.
4. Locate and correct leak at Diffuser Pump. Leak found to be coming from PV-39 packing gland. Leak stopped.

December 17 tAWRCA.-MRp.12001 17

UCDAVIS MAJC-/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004.

1. Lamps replaced in several units throughout the facility.
2. Replaced depleted helium supply bottle in the Helium Supply system.
3. Replaced 10 batteries in the UPS battery cabinet.
4. Removed, changed resin, reinstalled inlet demineralizer bottles to the makeup water tank.
5. Hardware installation of new CSC computer.
6. Hardware installation of new DAC computer 7.4 Training January
1. Reactor theory training was given on 2 occasions.

February

1. The Reactor Operator trainees and SRO candidates continue to complete the required items in their training plan.

March

1. The Reactor Operator trainees and SRO candidates continue to complete the required items in their training plan.
2. All hands completed annual ALARA training.

APri

1. The Reactor Operator trainees and SRO candidates continue to complete the required items in their training plan.

May

1. The Reactor Operator trainees and SRO candidates continue to complete the required items in their training plan.

June

1. The Reactor Operator trainees and SRO candidates satisfactorily completed the written and practical portions of the NRC administered SRO licensing examination.
2. All Operators attended Facility Design and Operating Characteristics training.

July 18t DfNAC AFd ftor 2004 18

UCDAVI IS MCLA IUCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FO 2

1. The Reactor Operator trainees and SRO candidates satisfactorily completed the written and practical portions of the NRC administered SRO licensing examination in June and received their license numbers on July 13 th*
2. All Operations Personnel satisfactorily completed the Facilities Design and Operating Characteristics written examination.
3. Operations personnel attended training on Regulations and Administrative controls.
4. 4 SRO's satisfactorily completed their facility administered biennial requalification written examination.

August None September

1. During the month of September, Reactor Operations personnel attended the following training:
a. EH and S Refresher Training
b. Machine Shop Usage
c. Injury and Illness Prevention Program, Initial Safety Training October
1. During the month of October, Reactor Operations personnel attended the following training:

a: Initial Safety Training b: Telephone System Training c: ALARA Refresher Training November

1. During the month of November, Reactor Operations personnel attended the following training:

a: Safety Topics Briefing b: Radiation Survey Techniques c: Pre-Drill Security Briefing December

1. During the month of December, Reactor Operations personnel attended the following training:

a: Safety Topics Briefing b: Radiation Survey Techniques. All qualified Operations Personnel are now certified to perform radiation surveys.

1 9 UCDWNRCA-,I R.,1 2004 19

UCCAM MNRC; mtEUAN e4fwLAR anon 1 UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004 Set Screw (Upper)

Connecting Rod Snubber 114 inch Guide Tube Snubber Bevel (Missing)

TRANSIENT ROD FIGURE 1 CCHEIDEL 2 o UCDMIMRCAnal Rwnor 2004 20 Col

UCDAVIS MNR C RWM MU"RAUAM EDCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004i UCD/MNRC Operating History I OperatingHours 4500 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 0

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 UC&MNPCAm A e"2004 s

1

UCDAM1 MNRCt UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004 Reactor Hours (2004) 0 Total Op-Hrs B Total MW-hrs

- Linear (2003 Op-Hrs) -- - Linear (2003 MW-Hrs) 7000 6000 -

5000 -

w 4000 -

0 3000 -

2000 -

1000 0 -i

0. U M %CL @1 El z Zr 0

.

ILk < IA 0 z a UCDIMRC A Report 2004 2

Co-Z-

UCOD A9 MNRC MtC&OLN I)EU ftADltN R UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004

,II Unscheduled Shutdowns--

70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

.0 L. L C CD 0.

a . > U Eu EU 0. El

.9% U. z z I, U) 0 z0 V a

UCOAMNRCAm Rw.pA 2004 3

c03t

UCDAM MNRCJ MC~fUMNUARLE A"ATON UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004

'ItD,i "Al 11 Reactor Tank IrradiationFacilities Total Number of IrradiationsCompleted (2004)

E Silicon Fixture - Central Facility - Argon

  • Neutron Irradiator

+-*-2004 Total - Iodine Facility ---- Linear (2003 Total) 90 85 80 75 70

' 65

° 60 60 X 55 ff 50

'- 45 1 40 40 o 35 E 30 Z 25 20 15 10 5

0 C.0 L. L. . C CL U 0.

z0 El U-' U. Z z M- (A 0 a UCDIMNRCArwk-I Repolt 2004 4

ucAvi MNRCt ,p W~t1BLW h1LAM RAMAM~4 UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004 Bay Irradiations Completed (2004)

- Bay 1 - a Bay F 2 es Bay 3 Bay 4 - 2004 Total - - - Linear (2003 Total) 350 300 250 -

IA C

0 Eu X 200-4-

0 Mu150-so E

z 10 -

50 0

Eu 6 Eu 0. Eu2 F, 41 U IU. x OC z X 4 (A 0 0 a Repa 2004 UCDIMPNRC As 5

UCDAVIS MNR 'N WUME MCW AALE DOIN --CD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004 8.0 Radioactive Effluents A summary of the nature and amount of radioactive effluents released or discharged to the environment beyond the effective control of the MNRC, as measured at or prior to the point of such release or discharge, include the following:

8.1 Liquid Effluents Liquid effluents released during 2004 are summarized on a monthly basis in Table 1 below.

TABLE 1 2004

SUMMARY

OF LIQUID EFFLUENTS MONTH TOTAL ACT. DETECTABLE SPECIFIC TOTAL ACT. OF AVG. CONC. FRACTION TOTAL VOL.

RELEASED RADIO- ACT. OF EACH DETECT- OF RAD. OF 10CFR20 OF NUCLIDE(S) EACH ABLE RADIO- MATL. AT LIMIT EFFLUENT DETECT- NUCLIDE POINT OF WATER ABLE RELEASE' (INCLUDING RADIO- DILUENT)

NUCLIDE RELEASED (Cl) (uCI/ml) (Ci) (uCi/ml) (gal)

JAN 0 NONE FEB 0 NONE MAR 0 NONE APR 0 NONE MAY 0 NONE JUN 0 NONE JUL 0 NONE AUG 0 NONE SEP 0 NONE OCT 0 NONE NOV 0 NONE DEC 0 NONE

UCDAM MNRCt gabs NoN U M/NRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004 8.2 Airborne Effluents Airborne radioactivity discharged during 2004 is tabulated In Table 2 below.

TABLE 2 2004

SUMMARY

OF AIRBORNE EFFLUENTS MONTH TOTAL TOTAL EST.MAX AVG. FRACTION OF EST. DOSE () FRACTION OF TOT. EST. AVERAGE EST. EST. CONC. OF APPLICABLE FROM Ar-41 APPLICABLE QUANTITY CONC. OF ACT. QUAN. Ar-41 IN 10CFR20 Ar-41 FOR 10CFR20 OF ACT. PART.ACT.

UNRESTRICTED IN RELEASED Ar-41 UNRESTRICTED CONC. LIMIT FOR AREA (1) DOSE LIMIT PART. RELEASED (Ar-41, 1- RELEASED AREA() UNRESTRICTED FOR FORM WITH 125,and AREA (1) UNRESTRICTED WITH HALF-LIFE Xe-125) AREA ") HALF-LIFE > 8 DAYS

>8 DAYS (Cf) (Cl) (uCl/ml) (%b) (mrem) (%i) (Cl) (Ucl/mI)

JAN 16.49(3) 14.63 7.84E-10 7.8 3.98E-01 0.40 NONE NONE FEB 13.92 13.92 8.26E-10 8.3 4.19E-01 0.42 NONE NONE MAR 16.77 16.77 8.98E-10 9.0 4.56E-01 0.46 NONE NONE APR 18.71 18.71 1.04E-09 10.4 5.25E-01 0.53 NONE NONE MAY 14.95 14.95 8.01E-10 8.0 4.06E-01 0.41 NONE NONE JUN 10.38 10.38 6.26E-10 6.3 3.17E-01 0.32 NONE NONE JUL 9.74 9.74 5.68E-10 5.7 2.88E-01 0.29 NONE NONE AUG 9.67 9.67 5.64E-10 5.6 2.86E-01 0.29 NONE NONE SEP 9.40 9.40 5.66E-10 5.7 2.87E-01 0.29 NONE NONE OCT 10.27 10.27 5.99E-10 6.0 3.04E-01 0.30 NONE NONE NOV 9.65 9.65 5.81E-10 5.8 2.95E-01 0.29 NONE NONE DEC 3.62 3.62 2.11E-10 2.1 1.07E-01 0.11 NONE NONE TOT 143.56 141.70 4.09 4.09 NONE NONE AVG 6.72E-10 6.7 (1) This location Is 240 meters downwind which is the point of maximum expected concentration based on the worst case atmospheric conditions (see MNRC SAR Chapter 11).

(2) Based on continuous occupancy and the calculation techniques used In Appendix A of the MNRC SAR (Ar-41 at 2.3E-10 uCi/mI continuous for one year equals 1.4 mrem).

(3) 1.86 Ci of Xe-125 was released during I-125 dispensing.

UCDAYIS MNRCUF MCU atCIAMAT" R !UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004 8.3 Solid Waste Solid waste packaged and transferred for disposal during 2004 is summarized In Table 3 below.

TABLE 3 2004

SUMMARY

OF SOLID WASTE TOTAL VOL. TOTAL DATE OF DISPOSITION ACTIVITY SHIPMENT (cu. ft.) (CI) 0 0 NA NA

MNR MKJAN I R LqCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004 9.0 Radiation ExDosure Radiation exposure received by facility operations personnel, facility users, and visitors during 2004 Is summarized in Table 4 below.

TABLE 4 2004

SUMMARY

OF PERSONNEL RADIATION EXPOSURES NUMBER OF AVERAGE GREATEST AVERAGE GREATEST INDIVIDUALS TEDE INDIVIDUAL EXTREMITY EXTREMITY PER TEDE INDIVIDUAL (mrem) (mrem) *(mrem) (mrem)

FACILITY 31 155 793 413 3736 PERSONNEL FACILITY 7 11 58 *

  • USERS VISITORS 1152 1 24 * *
  • Extremity monitoring was not required.

UCDAVIS MNRC*

mcCfUm IEAN lA4 t tM ?UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004, 10.0 Radiation Levels and Levels of Contamination Radiation levels and levels of contamination observed during routine surveys performed at the MNRC during 2004 are summarized in Table 5 below.

TABLE 5 2004

SUMMARY

OF RADIATION LEVELS AND CONTAMINATION LEVELS DURING ROUTINE SURVEYS AVERAGE HIGHEST AVERAGE HIGHEST (mrem/hr) (mrem/hr) (dpm/lOOcm 2 ) (dpm/lOOcm 2 )

OFFICE SPACES <0.1 <0.1 <800(l) <800(1)

REACTOR CONTROL RM <0.1 <0.1 <800(t) <800(1)

RADIOGRAPHY CONTROL RM <0.1 <0.1 <800(l) <800(1)

COUNTING LAB <0.1 0.4 <800(l) <800(1)

STAGING AREA <0.1 0.6 <800(1) <800(1)

COMPOUND <0.1 0.5 <800(1) <800(1)

EQUIPMENT RM 0.4 183 <800(1) <800(1)

DEMINERALIZER AREA 40 1440 <800(l) <800(1)

REACTOR RM 10 2200 <800(l) <800(')

SILICON STORAGE SHED <0.1 1.4 <800(1) <800(l)

RADIOGRAPHY BAYS 2.0 188 <800(l) <800(l)

(1) <800 dpm/100 cm 2 = Less than the lower limit of detection for a swipe survey.

UCDAVIS MNRC tl N LeIUDX> IUCDI/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004 11.0 Environmental Surveys Environmental surveys performed outside of the MNRC during 2004 are summarized in Tables 6-9 below. The environmental survey program is described in the MNRC Facility Safety Analysis Report.

TABLE 6 2004

SUMMARY

OF ENVIRONMENTAL TLD RESULTS (WITH NATURAL BACKGROUND"1 ) SUBTRACTED)

AVERAGE HIGHEST (mrem) (mrem)

ON BASE (OFF SITE 1-20 & 64) 5 14 ON SITE (SITES 50 - 66 & 65-69) 23 67 (1) Natural background assumed to be the off base (Sites 27-42) average of 27 mrem.

UCDAVIS N RI. IUCD/MNRCANNUAL REPORTFOR 2004a TABLE 7 2004

SUMMARY

OF RADIOACTIVITY IN SOIL SAMPLES BETA Cs-137

- (pci/gm) (pci/gm)

AVERAGE 18.40 0.01 HIGHEST 22.10 0.11 MDA is the minimum detectable activity at the 95% confidence level.

The MDA range for the analyzed radionuclides (pCi/gm).

MIN MAX Beta 4.42 5.64 Cs-137 0.04 0.09

UCDAVIS M NRC&_

MCCUAN NfmLAR

_ __ _

UCD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004,

_

TABLE 8 2004

SUMMARY

OF RADIOACTIVITY IN VEGETATION SAMPLES BETA Cs-137 K-40 Be-7 (pCi/gm) (pCi/gm) (pCI/gm) (pCi/gm)

AVERAGE 18.62 <MDA 15.39 2.21 HIGHEST 43.60 <MDA 38.00 2.21 MDA is the minimum detectable activity at the 95% confidence level.

The MDA range for the analyzed radionuclides (pCi/gm).

MIN MAX Beta 4.41 4.82 Cs-137 0.05 0.19 K-40 0.55 5.10 Be-7 0.59 1.98

UCDAVIS MNRCL MCOUUAEM WC"Mmv CD/MNRC ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2004 TABLE 9 2004

SUMMARY

OF RADIOACTIVITY IN WELL WATER ALPHA BETA TRITIUM Cs-137 (pCi/I) (pci/I) (pCi/,) (pC!/,)

AVERAGE <MDA 3.63 <MDA 27.7 HIGHEST <MDA 3.63 <MDA 27.7 MDA is the minimum detectable activity at the 95% confidence level.

The MDA range for the analyzed radionuclides (pCi/L).

MIN MAX Alpha 2.25 4.26 Beta 2.87 8.39 Tritium 261 283 Cs-137 5.85 8.90

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML051810464&oldid=2198350"