ML18152B664

DPO-2017-008, Case File (Redacted-Public)

ML18152B664
Person / Time
Issue date:	10/24/2017
From:	Cassidy J, Hironori Peterson NRC/RGN-III
To:	Pedersen R NRC/OE
Figueroa G
References
DPO-2017-008
Download: ML18152B664 (36)

Text

DPO Case File for DPO-2017-008 The following pdf represents a collection of documents associated with the submittal and disposition of a differing professional opinion (DPO) from NRC employees involving Dose Limits in Non-Vital Areas during Accidents.

Management Directive (MD) 10.159, NRC Differing Professional Opinions Program, describes the DPO Program. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1513/ML15132A664.pdf The DPO Program is a formal process that allows employees and NRC contractors to have their differing views on established, mission-related issues considered by the highest level managers in their organizations, i.e., Office Directors and Regional Administrators. The process also provides managers with an independent, multi-person review of the issue (one person chosen by the employee). After a decision is issued to an employee, he or she may appeal the decision to the Executive Director for Operations (or the Commission, for those offices that report to the Commission).

Because the disposition of a DPO represents a multi-step process, readers should view the records as a collection. In other words, reading a document in isolation will not provide the correct context for how this issue was reviewed and considered by the NRC.

It is important to note that the DPO submittal includes the personal opinions, views, and concerns by NRC employees. The NRCs evaluation of the concerns and the NRCs final position are included in the DPO Decision.

The records in this collection have been reviewed and approved for public dissemination.

Document 1: DPO Submittal Document 2: Memo Establishing DPO Panel Document 3: DPO Panel Report Document 4: DPO Decision

Document 1: DPO Submittal

Subject of DPO NRR Position on Radiological Impact of the Removal of the Auxiliary Shield Blocks on the Containment Accident Shield Post LBLOCA Summary of prevailing staff view, existing decision, or stated position In summary, the licensee is not required to limit the dose to occupational workers in non-vital areas during design basis accidents. There is no regulation related to radiation exposure that would require restoration of the accident missile blocks (AMBs) or installation of equivalent shielding at D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP). This position is established in a memo from the Deputy Director of DORL to the Region III Deputy Director of DRS. (ML17080A119)

Background

In inspection report 0500315/2014005;05000316/2014005 (ML15042A380), the NRC issued a non-cited violation to the D.C. Cook (CNP) licensee for failing to meet 10 CFR 50 appendix B criterion III for failing to perform a radiological review of a modification to remove AMBs in front of the containment hatch. Since issuance of the finding, the licensee has taken several actions to provide additional administrative controls to ensure workers can egress the area impacted by the AMB removal prior to receiving a dose that could greatly exceed federal exposure limits. While the inspectors believe these actions taken by the licensee can provide worker protection, the inspectors could not locate a staff position regarding substitution of administrative controls for physical controls for post-accident dose reduction. The inspectors contacted the NRR program office to inquire as to the standards or guidance to be used to judge the acceptability of controls used to limit worker dose post-accident. Although the region suggested that a TIA should be used, NRR determined that the question regarding workers protection requirements could be easily answered in a memo.

The resultant memo (ML17080A119) included a review of shielding design from NUREG 0737 and described the ALARA considerations from the Part 20 Statements of Consideration without specifically addressing the subject of substituting administrative controls for physical controls. The memo determined "the licensee is not required to limit doses to occupational workers in non-vital areas during design bases accidents" and there is no requirement for the licensee to demonstrate radiation doses are ALARA during the extremely unlikely event of a reactor accident. Therefore, 10 CFR 20.1101 is not applicable in this case." The memo closed with the conclusion that In summary, the licensee is not required to limit the dose to occupational workers in non-vital areas during design basis accidents. There is no regulation related to radiation exposure that would require restoration of the accident missile blocks (AMBs) or installation of equivalent shielding at D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP).

The inspectors acknowledge that reviews by multiple NRC inspectors of other regulatory requirements, e.g. 50.59, did not identify anything that would preclude the licensee from removing the shield blocks.

Reason for DPO, potential impact on mission, and proposed alternatives:

The inspectors disagree with the prevailing staff position that dose limits do not apply to workers exposed during an accident. The inspectors agree that the area most impacted by the postulated conditions would not need to be accessed to mitigate the design basis accident and the licensee is not required to maintain radiation doses be an absolute minimum, nor use all possible methods to reduce exposure.

1

Subject of DPO NRR Position on Radiological Impact of the Removal of the Auxiliary Shield Blocks on the Containment Accident Shield Post LBLOCA However, the inspectors believe that the current staff position regarding the licensee is not required to limit the dose to occupational workers in non-vital areas during design basis accidents runs counter to 10 CFR 20 and various policy positions. In addition, the inspectors believe the ALARA concept provides a rational bases for determining the adequacy of controls to limit exposure of workers during an accident.

NOTE For the purposes of this discussion, the inspectors are using the term ALARA concept or ALARA principles interchangeably. Additionally, the term is a philosophy that reflects specific objectives radiation dose management such as establishing radiation control activities to ensure the planned exposure to radiation will be effective in achieving a stated objective. The ALARA concept does not embody a specific numerical value.

The current staff position would allow licensee's to significantly degrade existing shielding without regard to the impact on worker dose. As an alternative, the inspectors propose withdrawal of the current memo and establishing well vetted position in a guidance document, such as a regulatory guide.

Strategic Plan The strategic plan specifically includes, as Safety Objective 1 - "Prevent and mitigate accidents and ensure radiation safety." The discussion of this objective states:

Minimizing the likelihood of accidents and reducing the consequences of an accident (should one occur) are the key elements for achieving the NRCs safety goal. Such accidents, particularly for large complex facilities like nuclear power plants, have the potential to release significant amounts of radioactive material to the environment and expose facility workers and the public to high levels of radiation.

The current position fails to satisfy this strategic objective and expresses a regulatory indifference to worker exposure from accidents.

Impact on mission:

The current staff position fails to satisfy the design of NRC regulations, as articulated in the strategic plan, which states:

"The NRCs regulations are designed to protect the public and workers (those individuals potentially exposed to radiation during the course of their professional duties) from radiation hazards resulting from regulated activities."

A position that determines dose limits and the ALARA principle do not apply to workers during accidents is counter to regulations designed to protect workers from radiation hazards.

2

Subject of DPO NRR Position on Radiological Impact of the Removal of the Auxiliary Shield Blocks on the Containment Accident Shield Post LBLOCA 10 CFR 50 and the standard review plan:

Both of these documents include discussion regarding the applicability of radiation protection to workers during accidents. Specifically, 10 CFR 50 Appendix A - General Design Criteria (GDC) for Nuclear Power Plants states:

Criterion 61Fuel storage and handling and radioactivity control. The fuel storage and handling, radioactive waste, and other systems which may contain radioactivity shall be designed to assure adequate safety under normal and postulated accident conditions. These systems shall be designed (1) with a capability to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of components important to safety, (2) with suitable shielding for radiation protection, (3) with appropriate containment, confinement, and filtering systems, (4) with a residual heat removal capability having reliability and testability that reflects the importance to safety of decay heat and other residual heat removal, and (5) to prevent significant reduction in fuel storage coolant inventory under accident conditions.

The coolant systems and nuclear plants include radioactivity; therefore, criterion 61 applies. This is consistent with NUREG-0800 (Standard Review Plan) which states (page 23):

Compliance with GDC 61 requires that systems that may contain radioactivity be designed to ensure adequate safety under normal and postulated accident conditions. This criterion specifies that such facilities shall be designed with appropriate containment, confinement, and filtering systems.

The requirements of this GDC apply to SRP Section 12.3-12.4 because systems and components that contain radioactive material are a potential source of radiation exposure to individual workers in the event of leakage of the systems or components, during normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs),

or in the event of an accident.

Meeting the requirements of GDC 61 provides a level of assurance that releases of radioactive materials during normal operation and AOOs will not result in radiation doses that exceed the limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20. In addition, meeting the requirements will help ensure that systems continue to perform safety functions under postulated accident conditions.

10 CFR 20 application:

10 CFR 20 provides in section 20.1001 and 20.1002 the purpose and scope of 10 CFR 20. In these sections, the regulations state they apply to part 50 licensees with the purpose that "the total dose to an individual does not exceed the standards for protection against radiation prescribed in the regulations in this part." These sections list some exceptions but do not identify accident dose as an exception to the part 20 standards. The inspectors recognize that 10 CFR 20 and other documents do not limit dose received when performing actions necessary to protect health and safety; however, no regulation permits unlimited dose to workers not performing mitigating actions.

3

Subject of DPO NRR Position on Radiological Impact of the Removal of the Auxiliary Shield Blocks on the Containment Accident Shield Post LBLOCA In section 20.1201, 10 CFR 20 states,

" Doses received in excess of the annual limits, including doses received during accidents, emergencies, and planned special exposures, must be subtracted from the limits for planned special exposures that the individual may receive during the current year (see § 20.1206(e)(1)) and during the individual's lifetime."

This requirement clearly articulates that limits apply to accident dose. Further examples are included in sections 20.2202, 2203 and 2205 which establish reporting requirements. These sections require reporting, aside from planned special exposure when an individual's exposure exceeds certain limits. Implicit in the reporting requirement is exceeding the stated values represents a violation of dose limits.

10 CFR 20, defines occupational dose as:

§ 20.1003 Definitions Occupational dose means the dose received by an individual in the course of employment in which the individual's assigned duties involve exposure to radiation or to radioactive material from licensed and unlicensed sources of radiation, whether in the possession of the licensee or other person. Occupational dose does not include doses received from background radiation, from any medical administration the individual has received, from exposure to individuals administered radioactive material and released under § 35.75, from voluntary participation in medical research programs, or as a member of the public.

The definition does not differentiate the individuals employment between routine and accident conditions. Therefore, it should be understood that dose received by a plant employee during an accident at the employer's facility clearly falls within the above definition.

Licensee Procedures Although the focus of this review is to identify where a new decision or staff position is in direct conflict with existing NRC regulations, policies, and principles, it should be noted that licensee procedure RMT-2080-OSC-001, Activation and Operation of the OSC recognizes the need to limit worker dose during accident conditions and requires licensee staff to apply ALARA principles before authorizing extended dose limits to protect valuable equipment and large populations or to mitigate life threatening situations.

Proposed alternative:

The letter establishing the current position should be withdrawn or replaced to emphasize that the limits contained in 10 CFR 20 apply to workers during accident conditions and ALARA principles apply to design of nuclear facilities with respect to worker protection during accident conditions.

The revised position should also recognize that licensee's, for the purpose of post-accident worker protection, may assume the release is not instantaneous.

As a longer term action, the NRC should codify methods acceptable to the NRC to achieve ALARA for workers that may receive exposure during an accident.

These actions would concede that physical controls could be replaced with carefully considered administrative controls while maintaining integrity with long standing regulations, policies, and positions designed to protect the health and safety of occupationally exposed workers.

4

Document 2: Memo Establishing DPO Panel November 8, 2017 MEMORANDUM TO: Christopher M. Regan, Panel Chairperson Office of Research Anton Vegel, Panel Member Region IV Robert Kellner, Panel Member Region II THRU: Anne T. Boland, Director /RA/

Office of Enforcement FROM: Renée M. Pedersen /RA/

Sr. Differing Professional Views Program Manager Office of Enforcement

SUBJECT:

AD HOC REVIEW PANEL - DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION ON DOSE LIMITS IN NON-VITAL AREAS DURING ACCIDENTS (DPO-2017-008)

In accordance with Management Directive (MD) 10.159, The NRC Differing Professional Opinion Program; and in my capacity as the Differing Professional Opinion (DPO) Program Manager; and in coordination with Anne Boland, Director, Office of Enforcement, Brian Holian, Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR); and the DPO submitters; you are being appointed as members of a DPO Ad Hoc Review Panel (DPO Panel) to review a DPO submitted by two NRC employees.

The DPO (Enclosure 1) raises concerns about the NRR position that the licensee is not required to limit the dose to occupational workers in non-vital areas during design basis accidents. The DPO has been forwarded to Mr. Holian for consideration and issuance of a DPO Decision.

CONTACTS: Renée Pedersen, OE (301) 287-9426 Gladys Figueroa-Toledo, OE (301) 287-9497

C. Regan, et al. 2 The DPO Panel has a critical role in the success of the DPO Program. Your responsibilities for conducting the independent review and documenting your conclusions in a report are addressed in the handbook for MD 10.159 in Section II.F and Section II.G, respectively.

The DPO Web site also includes helpful information, including interactive flow charts, frequently asked questions, and closed DPO cases, including previous DPO Panel reports. We will also be sending you additional information that should help you implement the DPO process.

Because this process is not routine, we will be meeting and communicating with all parties during the process to ensure that everyone understands the process, goals, and responsibilities.

Disposition of this DPO should be considered an important and time sensitive activity. The timeliness goal for issuing a DPO Decision is 120 calendar days from the day the DPO is accepted for review. In this case, the DPO was accepted for review on October 26, 2017. The timeliness goal for issuing this DPO Decision is February 23, 2018.

Process Milestones and Timeliness Goals for this DPO are included as Enclosure 2. The timeframes for completing process milestones are identified strictly as goalsa way of working towards reaching the overall DPO timeliness goal of 120 calendar days. The timeliness goal identified for your DPO task is 75 calendar days from the date of this memorandum (January 22, 2018).

Although timeliness is an important DPO Program objective, the DPO Program also sets out to ensure that issues receive a thorough and independent review. The overall timeliness goal should be based on the significance and complexity of the issues and the priority of other agency work. Therefore, if you determine that your activity will result in the need for an extension beyond the overall 120-day timeliness goal, please send an e-mail to Brian Holian with a copy to DPOPM.Resource@nrc.gov and include the reason for the extension request and a proposed completion date for your work and a proposed timeliness goal for issuance of a DPO Decision. Mr. Holian is responsible for subsequently forwarding the request for a new DPO timeliness goal to the EDO for approval.

An important aspect of our organizational culture includes maintaining an environment that encourages, supports, and respects differing views. As such, you should exercise discretion and treat this matter appropriately. Documents should be distributed on an as-needed basis. In an effort to preserve privacy, minimize the effect on the work unit, and keep the focus on the issues, you should simply refer to the employees as the DPO submitters. Avoid conversations that could be perceived as hallway talk on the issue and refrain from behaviors that could be perceived as retaliatory or chilling to the DPO submitters or that could potentially create a chilled environment for others. It is appropriate for employees to discuss the details of the DPO with their co-workers as part of the evaluation; however, as with other predecisional processes, employees should not discuss details of the DPO outside the agency. If you have observed inappropriate behaviors, heard allegations of retaliation or harassment, or received outside inquiries or requests for information, please notify me.

On an administrative note, please ensure that all DPO-related activities are charged to Activity Code ZG0007.

C. Regan, et al. 3 We appreciate your willingness to serve and your dedication to completing a thorough and objective review of this DPO. Successful resolution of the issues is important for the NRC and its stakeholders. If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me or Gladys.

We look forward to receiving your independent review results and recommendations.

Enclosures:

1. DPO-2017-008

2. Process Milestones and Timeliness Goals cc:

B. Holian, NRR M. Evans, NRR B. McDermott, NRR M. Weber, RES B. Thomas, RES S. Morris, RIV B. Bonser, RII A. Boland, OE G. Figueroa-Toledo, OE

C. Regan, et al. 4

SUBJECT:

AD HOC REVIEW PANEL - DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION ON DOSE LIMITS IN NON-VITAL AREAS DURING ACCIDENTS (DPO-2017-008) DATE: 11/8/2017 ADAMS Package: ML17312A476 MEMO: ML17312A531 - ML17310B099 - ML17312A588 OE-011 OFFICE OE: DPO/PM OE: D NAME RPedersen ABoland DATE 11/8/2017 11/8/2017 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Document 3: DPO Panel Report DPO Case File for DPO-2017-008 The following pdf represents a collection of documents associated with the submittal and disposition of a differing professional opinion (DPO) from NRC employees involving Dose Limits in Non-Vital Areas during Accidents.

Management Directive (MD) 10.159, NRC Differing Professional Opinions Program, describes the DPO Program. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1513/ML15132A664.pdf The DPO Program is a formal process that allows employees and NRC contractors to have their differing views on established, mission-related issues considered by the highest level managers in their organizations, i.e., Office Directors and Regional Administrators. The process also provides managers with an independent, multi-person review of the issue (one person chosen by the employee). After a decision is issued to an employee, he or she may appeal the decision to the Executive Director for Operations (or the Commission, for those offices that report to the Commission).

Because the disposition of a DPO represents a multi-step process, readers should view the records as a collection. In other words, reading a document in isolation will not provide the correct context for how this issue was reviewed and considered by the NRC.

It is important to note that the DPO submittal includes the personal opinions, views, and concerns by NRC employees. The NRCs evaluation of the concerns and the NRCs final position are included in the DPO Decision.

The records in this collection have been reviewed and approved for public dissemination.

Document 1: DPO Submittal Document 2: Memo Establishing DPO Panel Document 3: DPO Panel Report Document 4: DPO Decision

Document 1: DPO Submittal

Subject of DPO NRR Position on Radiological Impact of the Removal of the Auxiliary Shield Blocks on the Containment Accident Shield Post LBLOCA Summary of prevailing staff view, existing decision, or stated position In summary, the licensee is not required to limit the dose to occupational workers in non-vital areas during design basis accidents. There is no regulation related to radiation exposure that would require restoration of the accident missile blocks (AMBs) or installation of equivalent shielding at D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP). This position is established in a memo from the Deputy Director of DORL to the Region III Deputy Director of DRS. (ML17080A119)

Background

In inspection report 0500315/2014005;05000316/2014005 (ML15042A380), the NRC issued a non-cited violation to the D.C. Cook (CNP) licensee for failing to meet 10 CFR 50 appendix B criterion III for failing to perform a radiological review of a modification to remove AMBs in front of the containment hatch. Since issuance of the finding, the licensee has taken several actions to provide additional administrative controls to ensure workers can egress the area impacted by the AMB removal prior to receiving a dose that could greatly exceed federal exposure limits. While the inspectors believe these actions taken by the licensee can provide worker protection, the inspectors could not locate a staff position regarding substitution of administrative controls for physical controls for post-accident dose reduction. The inspectors contacted the NRR program office to inquire as to the standards or guidance to be used to judge the acceptability of controls used to limit worker dose post-accident. Although the region suggested that a TIA should be used, NRR determined that the question regarding workers protection requirements could be easily answered in a memo.

The resultant memo (ML17080A119) included a review of shielding design from NUREG 0737 and described the ALARA considerations from the Part 20 Statements of Consideration without specifically addressing the subject of substituting administrative controls for physical controls. The memo determined "the licensee is not required to limit doses to occupational workers in non-vital areas during design bases accidents" and there is no requirement for the licensee to demonstrate radiation doses are ALARA during the extremely unlikely event of a reactor accident. Therefore, 10 CFR 20.1101 is not applicable in this case." The memo closed with the conclusion that In summary, the licensee is not required to limit the dose to occupational workers in non-vital areas during design basis accidents. There is no regulation related to radiation exposure that would require restoration of the accident missile blocks (AMBs) or installation of equivalent shielding at D.C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP).

The inspectors acknowledge that reviews by multiple NRC inspectors of other regulatory requirements, e.g. 50.59, did not identify anything that would preclude the licensee from removing the shield blocks.

Reason for DPO, potential impact on mission, and proposed alternatives:

The inspectors disagree with the prevailing staff position that dose limits do not apply to workers exposed during an accident. The inspectors agree that the area most impacted by the postulated conditions would not need to be accessed to mitigate the design basis accident and the licensee is not required to maintain radiation doses be an absolute minimum, nor use all possible methods to reduce exposure.

1

Subject of DPO NRR Position on Radiological Impact of the Removal of the Auxiliary Shield Blocks on the Containment Accident Shield Post LBLOCA However, the inspectors believe that the current staff position regarding the licensee is not required to limit the dose to occupational workers in non-vital areas during design basis accidents runs counter to 10 CFR 20 and various policy positions. In addition, the inspectors believe the ALARA concept provides a rational bases for determining the adequacy of controls to limit exposure of workers during an accident.

NOTE For the purposes of this discussion, the inspectors are using the term ALARA concept or ALARA principles interchangeably. Additionally, the term is a philosophy that reflects specific objectives radiation dose management such as establishing radiation control activities to ensure the planned exposure to radiation will be effective in achieving a stated objective. The ALARA concept does not embody a specific numerical value.

The current staff position would allow licensee's to significantly degrade existing shielding without regard to the impact on worker dose. As an alternative, the inspectors propose withdrawal of the current memo and establishing well vetted position in a guidance document, such as a regulatory guide.

Strategic Plan The strategic plan specifically includes, as Safety Objective 1 - "Prevent and mitigate accidents and ensure radiation safety." The discussion of this objective states:

Minimizing the likelihood of accidents and reducing the consequences of an accident (should one occur) are the key elements for achieving the NRCs safety goal. Such accidents, particularly for large complex facilities like nuclear power plants, have the potential to release significant amounts of radioactive material to the environment and expose facility workers and the public to high levels of radiation.

The current position fails to satisfy this strategic objective and expresses a regulatory indifference to worker exposure from accidents.

Impact on mission:

The current staff position fails to satisfy the design of NRC regulations, as articulated in the strategic plan, which states:

"The NRCs regulations are designed to protect the public and workers (those individuals potentially exposed to radiation during the course of their professional duties) from radiation hazards resulting from regulated activities."

A position that determines dose limits and the ALARA principle do not apply to workers during accidents is counter to regulations designed to protect workers from radiation hazards.

2

Subject of DPO NRR Position on Radiological Impact of the Removal of the Auxiliary Shield Blocks on the Containment Accident Shield Post LBLOCA 10 CFR 50 and the standard review plan:

Both of these documents include discussion regarding the applicability of radiation protection to workers during accidents. Specifically, 10 CFR 50 Appendix A - General Design Criteria (GDC) for Nuclear Power Plants states:

Criterion 61Fuel storage and handling and radioactivity control. The fuel storage and handling, radioactive waste, and other systems which may contain radioactivity shall be designed to assure adequate safety under normal and postulated accident conditions. These systems shall be designed (1) with a capability to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of components important to safety, (2) with suitable shielding for radiation protection, (3) with appropriate containment, confinement, and filtering systems, (4) with a residual heat removal capability having reliability and testability that reflects the importance to safety of decay heat and other residual heat removal, and (5) to prevent significant reduction in fuel storage coolant inventory under accident conditions.

The coolant systems and nuclear plants include radioactivity; therefore, criterion 61 applies. This is consistent with NUREG-0800 (Standard Review Plan) which states (page 23):

Compliance with GDC 61 requires that systems that may contain radioactivity be designed to ensure adequate safety under normal and postulated accident conditions. This criterion specifies that such facilities shall be designed with appropriate containment, confinement, and filtering systems.

The requirements of this GDC apply to SRP Section 12.3-12.4 because systems and components that contain radioactive material are a potential source of radiation exposure to individual workers in the event of leakage of the systems or components, during normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs),

or in the event of an accident.

Meeting the requirements of GDC 61 provides a level of assurance that releases of radioactive materials during normal operation and AOOs will not result in radiation doses that exceed the limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20. In addition, meeting the requirements will help ensure that systems continue to perform safety functions under postulated accident conditions.

10 CFR 20 application:

10 CFR 20 provides in section 20.1001 and 20.1002 the purpose and scope of 10 CFR 20. In these sections, the regulations state they apply to part 50 licensees with the purpose that "the total dose to an individual does not exceed the standards for protection against radiation prescribed in the regulations in this part." These sections list some exceptions but do not identify accident dose as an exception to the part 20 standards. The inspectors recognize that 10 CFR 20 and other documents do not limit dose received when performing actions necessary to protect health and safety; however, no regulation permits unlimited dose to workers not performing mitigating actions.

3

Subject of DPO NRR Position on Radiological Impact of the Removal of the Auxiliary Shield Blocks on the Containment Accident Shield Post LBLOCA In section 20.1201, 10 CFR 20 states,

" Doses received in excess of the annual limits, including doses received during accidents, emergencies, and planned special exposures, must be subtracted from the limits for planned special exposures that the individual may receive during the current year (see § 20.1206(e)(1)) and during the individual's lifetime."

This requirement clearly articulates that limits apply to accident dose. Further examples are included in sections 20.2202, 2203 and 2205 which establish reporting requirements. These sections require reporting, aside from planned special exposure when an individual's exposure exceeds certain limits. Implicit in the reporting requirement is exceeding the stated values represents a violation of dose limits.

10 CFR 20, defines occupational dose as:

§ 20.1003 Definitions Occupational dose means the dose received by an individual in the course of employment in which the individual's assigned duties involve exposure to radiation or to radioactive material from licensed and unlicensed sources of radiation, whether in the possession of the licensee or other person. Occupational dose does not include doses received from background radiation, from any medical administration the individual has received, from exposure to individuals administered radioactive material and released under § 35.75, from voluntary participation in medical research programs, or as a member of the public.

The definition does not differentiate the individuals employment between routine and accident conditions. Therefore, it should be understood that dose received by a plant employee during an accident at the employer's facility clearly falls within the above definition.

Licensee Procedures Although the focus of this review is to identify where a new decision or staff position is in direct conflict with existing NRC regulations, policies, and principles, it should be noted that licensee procedure RMT-2080-OSC-001, Activation and Operation of the OSC recognizes the need to limit worker dose during accident conditions and requires licensee staff to apply ALARA principles before authorizing extended dose limits to protect valuable equipment and large populations or to mitigate life threatening situations.

Proposed alternative:

The letter establishing the current position should be withdrawn or replaced to emphasize that the limits contained in 10 CFR 20 apply to workers during accident conditions and ALARA principles apply to design of nuclear facilities with respect to worker protection during accident conditions.

The revised position should also recognize that licensee's, for the purpose of post-accident worker protection, may assume the release is not instantaneous.

As a longer term action, the NRC should codify methods acceptable to the NRC to achieve ALARA for workers that may receive exposure during an accident.

These actions would concede that physical controls could be replaced with carefully considered administrative controls while maintaining integrity with long standing regulations, policies, and positions designed to protect the health and safety of occupationally exposed workers.

4

Document 2: Memo Establishing DPO Panel November 8, 2017 MEMORANDUM TO: Christopher M. Regan, Panel Chairperson Office of Research Anton Vegel, Panel Member Region IV Robert Kellner, Panel Member Region II THRU: Anne T. Boland, Director /RA/

Office of Enforcement FROM: Renée M. Pedersen /RA/

Sr. Differing Professional Views Program Manager Office of Enforcement

SUBJECT:

AD HOC REVIEW PANEL - DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION ON DOSE LIMITS IN NON-VITAL AREAS DURING ACCIDENTS (DPO-2017-008)

In accordance with Management Directive (MD) 10.159, The NRC Differing Professional Opinion Program; and in my capacity as the Differing Professional Opinion (DPO) Program Manager; and in coordination with Anne Boland, Director, Office of Enforcement, Brian Holian, Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR); and the DPO submitters; you are being appointed as members of a DPO Ad Hoc Review Panel (DPO Panel) to review a DPO submitted by two NRC employees.

The DPO (Enclosure 1) raises concerns about the NRR position that the licensee is not required to limit the dose to occupational workers in non-vital areas during design basis accidents. The DPO has been forwarded to Mr. Holian for consideration and issuance of a DPO Decision.

CONTACTS: Renée Pedersen, OE (301) 287-9426 Gladys Figueroa-Toledo, OE (301) 287-9497

C. Regan, et al. 2 The DPO Panel has a critical role in the success of the DPO Program. Your responsibilities for conducting the independent review and documenting your conclusions in a report are addressed in the handbook for MD 10.159 in Section II.F and Section II.G, respectively.

The DPO Web site also includes helpful information, including interactive flow charts, frequently asked questions, and closed DPO cases, including previous DPO Panel reports. We will also be sending you additional information that should help you implement the DPO process.

Because this process is not routine, we will be meeting and communicating with all parties during the process to ensure that everyone understands the process, goals, and responsibilities.

Disposition of this DPO should be considered an important and time sensitive activity. The timeliness goal for issuing a DPO Decision is 120 calendar days from the day the DPO is accepted for review. In this case, the DPO was accepted for review on October 26, 2017. The timeliness goal for issuing this DPO Decision is February 23, 2018.

Process Milestones and Timeliness Goals for this DPO are included as Enclosure 2. The timeframes for completing process milestones are identified strictly as goalsa way of working towards reaching the overall DPO timeliness goal of 120 calendar days. The timeliness goal identified for your DPO task is 75 calendar days from the date of this memorandum (January 22, 2018).

Although timeliness is an important DPO Program objective, the DPO Program also sets out to ensure that issues receive a thorough and independent review. The overall timeliness goal should be based on the significance and complexity of the issues and the priority of other agency work. Therefore, if you determine that your activity will result in the need for an extension beyond the overall 120-day timeliness goal, please send an e-mail to Brian Holian with a copy to DPOPM.Resource@nrc.gov and include the reason for the extension request and a proposed completion date for your work and a proposed timeliness goal for issuance of a DPO Decision. Mr. Holian is responsible for subsequently forwarding the request for a new DPO timeliness goal to the EDO for approval.

An important aspect of our organizational culture includes maintaining an environment that encourages, supports, and respects differing views. As such, you should exercise discretion and treat this matter appropriately. Documents should be distributed on an as-needed basis. In an effort to preserve privacy, minimize the effect on the work unit, and keep the focus on the issues, you should simply refer to the employees as the DPO submitters. Avoid conversations that could be perceived as hallway talk on the issue and refrain from behaviors that could be perceived as retaliatory or chilling to the DPO submitters or that could potentially create a chilled environment for others. It is appropriate for employees to discuss the details of the DPO with their co-workers as part of the evaluation; however, as with other predecisional processes, employees should not discuss details of the DPO outside the agency. If you have observed inappropriate behaviors, heard allegations of retaliation or harassment, or received outside inquiries or requests for information, please notify me.

On an administrative note, please ensure that all DPO-related activities are charged to Activity Code ZG0007.

C. Regan, et al. 3 We appreciate your willingness to serve and your dedication to completing a thorough and objective review of this DPO. Successful resolution of the issues is important for the NRC and its stakeholders. If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me or Gladys.

We look forward to receiving your independent review results and recommendations.

Enclosures:

1. DPO-2017-008

2. Process Milestones and Timeliness Goals cc:

B. Holian, NRR M. Evans, NRR B. McDermott, NRR M. Weber, RES B. Thomas, RES S. Morris, RIV B. Bonser, RII A. Boland, OE G. Figueroa-Toledo, OE

C. Regan, et al. 4

SUBJECT:

AD HOC REVIEW PANEL - DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION ON DOSE LIMITS IN NON-VITAL AREAS DURING ACCIDENTS (DPO-2017-008) DATE: 11/8/2017 ADAMS Package: ML17312A476 MEMO: ML17312A531 - ML17310B099 - ML17312A588 OE-011 OFFICE OE: DPO/PM OE: D NAME RPedersen ABoland DATE 11/8/2017 11/8/2017 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Document 3: DPO Panel Report

Document 4: DPO Decision UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 May 8, 2018 MEMORANDUM TO: John G. Cassidy, Senior Health Physicist Health Physics and Incident Response Branch Division of Reactor Safety Region III John A. Ellegood, Senior Resident Inspector D.C. Cook, Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Region III FROM: Brian E. Holian, Acting Director /RA/

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINION INVOLVING RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT OF THE REMOVAL OF THE AUXILIARY SHIELD BLOCKS ON THE CONTAINMENT ACCIDENT SHIELD POST LBLOCA (DPO 2017-008)

On October 24, 2017, in accordance with Management Directive 10.159, The NRC Differing Professional Opinions Program, you submitted a differing professional opinion (DPO) involving radiological impact of the removal of the auxiliary shield blocks on the containment accident shield post LBLOCA (DPO-2017-008). Specifically, your DPO raises concerns that a memo issued by the Deputy Director of the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing (DORL), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), to the Deputy Director of the Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), Region III, states that the licensee is not required to limit the dose to occupational workers in non-vital areas during design basis accidents. There is no regulation related to radiation exposure that would require restoration of the accident missile blocks (AMBs) or installation of equivalent shielding. The purpose of this memorandum is to respond to your DPO.

On November 8, 2017, a DPO Ad Hoc Review Panel (the Panel) was established and tasked to meet with you, review your DPO submittal, and issue a DPO report, including conclusions and recommendations to me regarding the disposition of the issues presented in your DPO. On April 6, 2018, after reviewing the applicable documents, completing internal interviews of relevant individuals and completing their deliberations, the Panel issued their report to me.

CONTACT: Trent L. Wertz, NRR 301-415-1568

J. Cassidy and J. Ellegood On May 7, 2018, I talked to you by telephone to discuss the Panels report and to get your insights and comments. You provided me additional insights into your concerns and your thoughts for resolving the issue.

In order to make a decision with regard to your DPO, I reviewed your DPO submittal, the Panels report, and emailed this letter to the Panel chair.

Statement of Concerns

1) Issuance of the NRR memo: "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP), unit Nos. 1 and 2 - NRR Position on NCV 05000315/2014005-03; 05000316/2014005-03; Radiological Impact of the Removal of the Auxiliary Shield Blocks on the Containment Accident Shield Post LBLOCA" from Kathryn M. Brock to Mohammed A. Shuaibi, dated June 23, 2017, (Ref. 2) was not an appropriate means to document an agency position on licensee worker dose during accident conditions and should be withdrawn or replaced with a more durable regulatory instrument, e.g.,

Standard Review Plan or Regulatory Guide.

2) Contrary to the prevailing staff view, as documented in the memo cited in concern 1) above, which states that a licensee is not required to limit dose to occupational workers in non-vital areas during design basis accidents, the limits contained in 10 CFR Part 20 do apply to workers during accident conditions and As Low As Reasonably Achievable principles do apply to design of nuclear facilities with respect to worker protection during accident conditions. As delineated in various agency policy positions, protecting occupational workers from radiation hazards, even during accident conditions, is a basic tenet of the NRC mission. Furthermore, the current prevailing staff position would allow licensees to significantly degrade existing shielding without regard to the impact on worker dose.

Panel Recommendations The DPO Panel offered the following three recommendations regarding the DPO and one supplemental recommendation (additional detail and bases regarding each recommendation is provided in the enclosed DPO Panel Report):

1) The NRR memo, dated June 23, 2017, should be withdrawn;

2) Process the original technical issue ("clarify the occupational dose requirements for personnel evacuating from non-vital areas during a design basis accident at CNP) per COM-106, "Control of Task Interface Agreements" (TIA); and

3) Establish and institutionalize an applicable agency position regarding licensee worker dose during accident conditions that includes plant workers in non-vital areas, and also which addresses licensee modification of shielding included in the design bases, through development of durable staff guidance, e.g., reactor oversight process inspection and oversight governance documentation and/or standard review plan (SRP) and external guidance, e.g. Regulatory Guide (RG), Regulatory Information Summary (RIS), etc..

Supplemental DPO Panel recommendation related to Recommendation 2 above:

1) Revise COM-106, "Control of Task Interface Agreements," to clarify what constitutes sufficient documentation or record of the results of the precedent search performed per Section 5.2. Additionally, revise COM-106 to clarify expectations for appropriate documentation of

J. Cassidy and J. Ellegood issues that do not individually satisfy TIA acceptance criteria but, when considered in sum, may warrant a TIA or referral to an alternative agency process for dispositioning, e.g., Generic Issues program or Generic Communication.

After considering all the information, I agree in principle with the recommendations provided by the DPO panel. They have thoroughly and conscientiously endeavored to address your well-thought out and articulated concerns. I have the following comments, additions, and clarifications to the recommendations.

I have directed my staff to carry out Panel Recommendation 1 and withdraw the memo. I have also directed the staff to rewrite the guidance and involve the appropriate stakeholders (including the Office of General Counsel) to ensure clarity and accuracy and reissue the guidance through a more formal process. The revised memo should also satisfy Recommendation 3 of the Panel report. Additionally, as discussed with you, I agree in providing additional guidance on whether administrative controls can replace or supplement the physical protection of shield blocks. These tasks have been assigned to DORL, NRR, to be completed by August 31, 2018.

I do not intend to put this issue into the TIA process (Recommendation 2) since DORL is currently evaluating changes to this process to be more timely to questions such as this.

Reissuing the memo following a more comprehensive review should be more efficient. By this memo, I also task DORL to consider the supplemental recommendation as they evaluate the TIA process. Finally, as we discussed, I will have DORL coordinate with both of you as additional guidance is developed on this subject.

Since it is your desire, the DPO, Panel report, and this memo will be made public. Also, a summary of the DPO will be included in the Weekly Information Report (when the case is closed) to advise interested employees of the outcome.

Thank you for raising your DPO and for your active participation in the DPO process. An open and thorough exploration of how we carry out our regulatory processes is essential to keeping these programs effective. Your willingness to raise concerns with your colleagues and managers and ensure that your concerns are heard and understood is admirable and vital to ensuring a healthy safety culture within the Agency.

Enclosure:

DPO Panel report, dated April 6, 2018 cc: R. Lorson, NRR M. Evans, NRR A. Boland, OE G. Figueroa-Toledo, OE S. West, RIII J. Giitter, NRR M. Johnson, EDO

ML18128A020 OFFICE NRR NAME BHolian DATE 5/8/18