Letter Sequence Request |
|---|
EPID:L-2018-LLA-0187, Application to Modify Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Technical Specifications to Extend Surveillance Requirement 3.3.1.5, 3.3.2.2, and 3.3.6.2 Specified Intervals (390-WBN-TS-2018-14) (Approved, Closed) |
|
MONTHYEARCNL-18-090, Application to Modify Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Technical Specifications to Extend Surveillance Requirement 3.3.1.5, 3.3.2.2, and 3.3.6.2 Specified Intervals (390-WBN-TS-2018-14)2018-07-0808 July 2018
Application to Modify Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Technical Specifications to Extend Surveillance Requirement 3.3.1.5, 3.3.2.2, and 3.3.6.2 Specified Intervals (390-WBN-TS-2018-14)
Project stage: Request
ML18189A0032018-07-11011 July 2018
FRN: Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Individual Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for Hearing
Project stage: Other
ML18199A1822018-07-17017 July 2018
NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information Regarding Watts Bar Unit 1 Extension of Surveillance Requirement Intervals
Project stage: RAI
NRC-2018-0144, Comment (1) of Anonymous on Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; License Amendment Request2018-07-17017 July 2018
Comment (1) of Anonymous on Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; License Amendment Request
Project stage: Request
CNL-18-102, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Modify Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Technical Specifications to Extend Surveillance Requirement 3.3.1.5, 3.3.2.2, and 3.3.6.2 Specified ...2018-07-24024 July 2018
Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Modify Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Technical Specifications to Extend Surveillance Requirement 3.3.1.5, 3.3.2.2, and 3.3.6.2 Specified ...
Project stage: Response to RAI
CNL-18-104, Submittal of Revised Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Modify Plant Technical Specifications to Extend Surveillance Requirements 3.3.1.5, 3.3.2.2 and 3.3.6.2 Specified Intervals2018-07-30030 July 2018
Submittal of Revised Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Modify Plant Technical Specifications to Extend Surveillance Requirements 3.3.1.5, 3.3.2.2 and 3.3.6.2 Specified Intervals
Project stage: Response to RAI
ML18220A7672018-08-0707 August 2018
State Consultation: Request for Comments on Amendment to Watts Bar Unit 1 Operating License Related to Revising Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements
Project stage: Other
ML18204A2522018-08-16016 August 2018
Issuance of Amendment No. 121, Modify Technical Specifications to Extend Surveillance Requirements 3.3.1.5, 3.3.2.2, and 3.3.6.2 Specified Intervals
Project stage: Approval
2018-07-30
[Table View] |
|
|---|
Category:General FR Notice Comment Letter type:NRC
MONTHYEARNRC-2018-0263, Comment (1) by Anonymous Individual Opposing Extension for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 22018-12-14014 December 2018
Comment (1) by Anonymous Individual Opposing Extension for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2
NRC-2018-0144, Comment (1) of Anonymous on Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; License Amendment Request2018-07-17017 July 2018
Comment (1) of Anonymous on Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; License Amendment Request
NRC-2015-0006, Comment (1) of David Lochbaum on Behalf of Union of Concerned Scientists on Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations2015-01-21021 January 2015
Comment (1) of David Lochbaum on Behalf of Union of Concerned Scientists on Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses and Combined Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations
NRC-2008-0369, Comment (5) of Brenda E. Brickhouse of Tennessee Valley Authority on the Draft Supplement 2 to Final Environmental Statement Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 22012-01-27027 January 2012
Comment (5) of Brenda E. Brickhouse of Tennessee Valley Authority on the Draft Supplement 2 to Final Environmental Statement Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2
NRC-2011-0013, Comment (12) of R. M. Krich, on Behalf of TVA, on Draft Regulatory Issues Summary, Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages, (Docket Id NRC-2011-0013)2011-03-18018 March 2011
Comment (12) of R. M. Krich, on Behalf of TVA, on Draft Regulatory Issues Summary, Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages, (Docket Id NRC-2011-0013)
2018-07-17
[Table view] |
Text
As of: 7/17/18 10:53 AM Received: July 17, 2018 Status: Pending_Post PUBLIC SUBMISSION Tracking No. lk2-94bn-ex9i Comments Due: August 15, 2018 Submission Type: Web Docket: NRC-2018-0144 SUNS! Review Complete Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; License amendment request Template= ADM-013 E-RIDS=ADM-03 ADD= Natreon Jordan Comment On: NRC-2018-0144-0001 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; License amendment request Document: NRC-2018-0144-DRAFT-0001 Comment on FR Doc# 2018-15100 COMMENT (1)
Submitter Information PUBLICATION DATE: 7/16/201S CITATION# 83 FR 32912 Name: Anonymous Anonymous General Comment This request is confusing and leads me to believe that the applicant is not telling the whole story, as required .
by 10 CFR 50.9.
In one place they claim that testing and troubleshooting will not trip the reactor because the bypass breaker is closed. In another place in the application, they claim that performing troubleshooting and testing is too risky.
What is the risk to performing testing? Is it a risk to the plant or personnel or both?
The applicant states that the.RTB tripped when aligned to the intermediate range trip circuitry. The Watts Bar Technical Specification Bases for Surveillance Requirement 3.3.1.5 states that it tests "all possible logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives." If the RTB tripped when it wasn't supposed to, did the actuation logic pass the test? If the test failed, should they be allowed to continue operating?
I The applicant states that the troubleshooting requires the SSPS train to be powered down. The applicant also states the SSPS train can be powered down for 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> before the reactor is required to be in mode 3.
Finally, the applicant timeline to perform troubleshooting is given as 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
If all of this is true, why don't they perform the troubleshooting and figure out what is wrong with the system?
Maybe they wouldn't need to ask permission to continue operation without knowing whether the reactor will trip when it needs to.
Maybe the real risk is to the public.
