NRC-2018-0144, Comment (1) of Anonymous on Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; License Amendment Request

Comment (1) of Anonymous on Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; License Amendment Request

ML18199A091
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	07/17/2018
From:	- No Known Affiliation
To:	Rules, Announcements, and Directives Branch
References
83FR32912 00001, NRC-2018-0144
Download: ML18199A091 (1)

Text

As of: 7/17/18 10:53 AM Received: July 17, 2018 Status: Pending_Post PUBLIC SUBMISSION Tracking No. lk2-94bn-ex9i Comments Due: August 15, 2018 Submission Type: Web Docket: NRC-2018-0144 SUNS! Review Complete Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; License amendment request Template= ADM-013 E-RIDS=ADM-03 ADD= Natreon Jordan Comment On: NRC-2018-0144-0001 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; License amendment request Document: NRC-2018-0144-DRAFT-0001 Comment on FR Doc# 2018-15100 COMMENT (1)

Submitter Information PUBLICATION DATE: 7/16/201S CITATION# 83 FR 32912 Name: Anonymous Anonymous General Comment This request is confusing and leads me to believe that the applicant is not telling the whole story, as required .

by 10 CFR 50.9.

In one place they claim that testing and troubleshooting will not trip the reactor because the bypass breaker is closed. In another place in the application, they claim that performing troubleshooting and testing is too risky.

What is the risk to performing testing? Is it a risk to the plant or personnel or both?

The applicant states that the.RTB tripped when aligned to the intermediate range trip circuitry. The Watts Bar Technical Specification Bases for Surveillance Requirement 3.3.1.5 states that it tests "all possible logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives." If the RTB tripped when it wasn't supposed to, did the actuation logic pass the test? If the test failed, should they be allowed to continue operating?

I The applicant states that the troubleshooting requires the SSPS train to be powered down. The applicant also states the SSPS train can be powered down for 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> before the reactor is required to be in mode 3.

Finally, the applicant timeline to perform troubleshooting is given as 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

If all of this is true, why don't they perform the troubleshooting and figure out what is wrong with the system?

Maybe they wouldn't need to ask permission to continue operation without knowing whether the reactor will trip when it needs to.

Maybe the real risk is to the public.