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MONTHYEARNRC 2017-0037, High Frequency Seismic Evaluation Confirmation Report2017-08-0202 August 2017 High Frequency Seismic Evaluation Confirmation Report Project stage: Request ML17230A0882017-08-10010 August 2017 Submittal of High Frequency Supplement for Information Per 10CFR50.54(f) Re Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident Project stage: Supplement ML17234A4782017-08-22022 August 2017 Mitigating Strategies Assessment (MSA) Report for the Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Information - NEI 12-06, Appendix H, Revision 2, H.4.4 Path 4: GMRS ≪ 2xSSE Project stage: Request JAFP-17-0083, Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012, Commission Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events2017-08-29029 August 2017 James a Fitzpatrick, Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012, Commission Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events Project stage: Other ML17244A2692017-08-29029 August 2017 Catawba Nuclear Station High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Re Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima D Project stage: Supplement ML17256A7752017-09-11011 September 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Seabrook Flooding MSA Project stage: Request MNS-17-040, (Mns), Units 1 and 2 - Supplement to the High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force ..2017-09-27027 September 2017 (Mns), Units 1 and 2 - Supplement to the High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force .. Project stage: Supplement ML17291A7082017-10-23023 October 2017 Staff Review of Mitigating Strategies Assessment Report of the Impact of the Re-evaluated Seismic Hazard Developed in Response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) Letter Project stage: Approval ML17277B1092017-10-23023 October 2017 Staff Review of Mitigating Strategies Assessment Report of the Impact of the Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Developed in Response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(F) Letter Project stage: Approval ML17310B5312017-11-16016 November 2017 Staff Review of Mitigating Strategies Assessment Report of the Impact of the Re-Evaluated Seismic Hazard Developed in Response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) Letter Project stage: Approval ML17306A4842017-11-29029 November 2017 Flood Hazard Mitigation Strategies Assessment Project stage: Other NL-17-1889, NEI 12-06, Appendix H, Revision 4, H.4.5 Path 5: GMRS Greater than 2 X SSE, Mitigating Strategies Assessment (MSA) Report for the New Seismic Hazard Information2017-12-0505 December 2017 NEI 12-06, Appendix H, Revision 4, H.4.5 Path 5: GMRS Greater than 2 X SSE, Mitigating Strategies Assessment (MSA) Report for the New Seismic Hazard Information Project stage: Request ML17349A9912017-12-21021 December 2017 Units 1 and 2 - Staff Review of Mitigating Strategies Assessment Report of the Impact of the Re-Evaluated Seismic Hazard Developed in Response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) Letter (CAC Nos. MF7843 and MF7844, ... Project stage: Approval CNS-17-058, Supplement to the High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukus2017-12-28028 December 2017 Supplement to the High Frequency Supplement to Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushi Project stage: Supplement ML17313A8812018-01-22022 January 2018 Staff Review of Mitigating Strategies Assessment Report of the Impact of the Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Developed in Response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) Letter (CAC Nos. MF7809 and MF7810; EPID L-2016-JLD-0006) Project stage: Approval ML18017A1212018-01-30030 January 2018 Staff Review of Mitigating Strategies Assessment Report of the Impact of the Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Developed in Response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) Letter Project stage: Approval ML18033A2092018-02-0707 February 2018 Staff Review of Mitigating Strategies Assessment Report of the Impact of the Re-Evaluated Seismic Hazard Developed in Response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(F) Letter Project stage: Approval ML18040A4542018-02-20020 February 2018 Staff Review of Mitigating Strategies Assessment Report of the Impact of the Re-Evaluated Seismic Hazard Developed in Response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(F) Letter Project stage: Approval ML18068A6542018-03-22022 March 2018 Staff Review of Mitigating Strategies Assessment Report of the Impact of the Re-Evaluated Seismic Hazard Developed in Response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(F) Letter Project stage: Approval CNL-18-007, Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Supplemental Information2018-04-10010 April 2018 Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Supplemental Information Project stage: Request ML18115A5082018-04-30030 April 2018 Staff Review of Mitigating Strategies Assessment Report of the Impact of the Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Developed in Response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(F) Letter Project stage: Approval ML18130A7502018-05-0909 May 2018 Report of Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements of Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events Project stage: Request ML18159A2892018-06-13013 June 2018 Staff Review of Mitigation Strategies Assessment Report of the Impact of the Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Develop in Response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) Letter Project stage: Approval NL-18-0684, Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Supplemental Information Regarding NEI 12-06. Appendix H. Revision 4. H.4.5 Path 5 Mitigating Strategies Assessment (MSA) Report2018-06-25025 June 2018 Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Supplemental Information Regarding NEI 12-06. Appendix H. Revision 4. H.4.5 Path 5 Mitigating Strategies Assessment (MSA) Report Project stage: Supplement ML18180A3142018-07-10010 July 2018 Seismic Hazard Mitigation Strategies Assessment (CAC Nos. MF7888 and MF7889; EPID L-2016-JLD-0006) Project stage: Other ML18156A1512018-07-12012 July 2018 Seismic Hazard Mitigation Strategies Assessment (CAC Nos. MF7891 and MF7892; EPID L-21016-JLD-0006) Project stage: Other ML18184A2732018-07-18018 July 2018 Staff Review of Mitigation Strategies Assessment Report of the Impact of the Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Developed in Response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) Letter (CAC No. MF7819; EPID L-2016-JLD-0006) Project stage: Approval ML18173A1652018-07-19019 July 2018 Staff Review of Mitigation Strategies Assessment Report of the Impact of the Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Developed in Response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) Letter (CAC No. MF7828; EPID L-2016-JLD-0006) Project stage: Approval ML18207A8542018-08-14014 August 2018 Staff Review of Mitigating Strategies Assessment Report of the Impact of the Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Developed in Response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(F) Letter Project stage: Approval ML18236A1912018-08-29029 August 2018 Staff Review of Mitigation Strategies Assessment Report of the Impact of the Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Developed in Response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) Letter (CAC No. MF7875; EPID L-2016-JLD-0006 Project stage: Approval ML18249A1692018-09-0707 September 2018 Seismic Hazard Mitigation Strategies Assessment (CAC Nos. MF7800 and MF7801; EPID L-2016-JLD-0006) Project stage: Other ML18262A4152018-09-27027 September 2018 Staff Review of Mitigating Strategies Assessment Report of the Impact of the Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Developed in Response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) Letter (CAC No. MF7893; EPID No. L-2016-JLD-0006) Project stage: Approval 2018-02-20
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARML24243A0072024-09-10010 September 2024 – Correction of Amendment Nos. 223 and 206 Regarding Revision to Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-339-A, Relocate Technical Specification Parameters to the COLR Consistent with WCAP-14483 ML24102A2642024-09-0909 September 2024 – Exemption Request Regarding Final Safety Analysis Report Update Schedule (EPID L-2024-LLE-0013) - Letter NL-24-0337, Interim 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2) Report Regarding Operation Technology, Inc., ETAP Software Error in Transient Stability Program2024-09-0909 September 2024 Interim 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2) Report Regarding Operation Technology, Inc., ETAP Software Error in Transient Stability Program ML24249A2942024-09-0606 September 2024 Correction of Amendment Nos. 218 and 201 Regarding Revision to Technical Specifications to Use Online Monitoring Methodology 05200025/LER-2024-002, (Vegp), Unit 3, Manual Reactor Protection System and Automatic Safeguards Actuation Due to an Unexpected Change in Position of a Main Feedwater Pump Minimum Flow Control Valve2024-09-0505 September 2024 (Vegp), Unit 3, Manual Reactor Protection System and Automatic Safeguards Actuation Due to an Unexpected Change in Position of a Main Feedwater Pump Minimum Flow Control Valve IR 05000424/20240052024-08-26026 August 2024 Updated Inspection Plan for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 - Report 05000424/2024005 and 05000425/2024005 ML24235A1952024-08-22022 August 2024 Updated Inspection Plan for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4 - Report 05200025/2024005 and 05200026/2024005 IR 05000424/20244012024-08-15015 August 2024 4 - Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000424-2024401, 05000425-2024401, 05200025-2024402, and 05200026-2024403 - Cover Letter NL-24-0299, Exemption Request: Final Safety Analysis Report Update Schedule, Response to Request for Additional Information2024-08-14014 August 2024 Exemption Request: Final Safety Analysis Report Update Schedule, Response to Request for Additional Information 05000425/LER-2024-001, (Vegp), Unit 2, Manual Actuation of the Reactor Protection System Due to a Rod Control Fuse Opening Causing a Misaligned Shutdown Rod2024-08-0909 August 2024 (Vegp), Unit 2, Manual Actuation of the Reactor Protection System Due to a Rod Control Fuse Opening Causing a Misaligned Shutdown Rod ML24218A1842024-08-0707 August 2024 Examination Report and Cover Letter 05200026/LER-2024-001, (Vegp), Unit 4, Manual Reactor Protection System Actuation Due to Procedure Not Optimally Sequenced to Reset the Rapid Power Reduction Signal2024-08-0606 August 2024 (Vegp), Unit 4, Manual Reactor Protection System Actuation Due to Procedure Not Optimally Sequenced to Reset the Rapid Power Reduction Signal ML24212A1442024-08-0101 August 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05200025/2024002 and 05200026/2024002 IR 05000424/20240022024-07-29029 July 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000424/2024002 and 05000425/2024002 IR 05000424/20244042024-07-26026 July 2024 Material Control and Accounting Program Inspection Report 05000424/2024404 and 05000425/2024404 (Cover Letter) NL-24-0126, – Units 3 and 4, License Amendment Request: Changes to Technical Specification 3.7.6, Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System (Ves) Action a and SR 3.7.6.62024-07-25025 July 2024 – Units 3 and 4, License Amendment Request: Changes to Technical Specification 3.7.6, Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System (Ves) Action a and SR 3.7.6.6 NL-24-0282, License Amendment Request and Exemption Request: Remove Tier 1 and Tier 2* Requirements2024-07-25025 July 2024 License Amendment Request and Exemption Request: Remove Tier 1 and Tier 2* Requirements ML24204A0722024-07-23023 July 2024 Issuance of Amendment No. 225, Regarding LAR to Revise TS 3.7.9 for a one-time Change to Support Nuclear Service Cooling Water Transfer Pump Repairs - Emergency Circumstances NL-24-0286, Emergency Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.9 for a One-Time Change to Support a Unit 1 Nuclear Service Cooling Water Transfer Pump Repair2024-07-20020 July 2024 Emergency Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.9 for a One-Time Change to Support a Unit 1 Nuclear Service Cooling Water Transfer Pump Repair NL-24-0261, 10 CFR 50.46 ECCS Evaluation Model Annual Report for 20232024-07-19019 July 2024 10 CFR 50.46 ECCS Evaluation Model Annual Report for 2023 ML24191A4562024-07-19019 July 2024 Request for Relief and Alternative Requirements for Squib (Explosively Actuated) Valves First Test Interval ML24194A0342024-07-12012 July 2024 Review of the Refueling Outage 1R24 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML24191A3792024-07-10010 July 2024 – Initial Test Program and Operational Programs Inspection Report 05200026/2024011 NL-24-0227, Proposed Inservice Inspection Alternative GEN-ISI-AL T-2024-03 for Pressurizer Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)2024-07-0303 July 2024 Proposed Inservice Inspection Alternative GEN-ISI-AL T-2024-03 for Pressurizer Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) NL-24-0234, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-589, Eliminate Automatic Diesel Generator Start During Shutdown2024-06-28028 June 2024 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-589, Eliminate Automatic Diesel Generator Start During Shutdown NL-24-0143, Proposed Alternative to Use ASME Code Case N-752, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment for Repair/ Replacement Activities in2024-06-27027 June 2024 Proposed Alternative to Use ASME Code Case N-752, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment for Repair/ Replacement Activities in NL-24-0087, License Amendment Request: Changes to Technical Specification 3.7.6, Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System (Ves) Air Storage Tanks2024-06-21021 June 2024 License Amendment Request: Changes to Technical Specification 3.7.6, Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System (Ves) Air Storage Tanks NL-24-0201, Proposed Inservice Inspection Alternative GEN-ISI-ALT-2024-002 for Steam Generator Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)2024-06-18018 June 2024 Proposed Inservice Inspection Alternative GEN-ISI-ALT-2024-002 for Steam Generator Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) NL-24-0243, Registration of Spent Fuel Cask Use2024-06-18018 June 2024 Registration of Spent Fuel Cask Use ML24163A0632024-06-12012 June 2024 2024 Licensed Operator Re-qualification Inspection Notification Letter Vogtle, Units 3 & 4 ML24155A1772024-06-0505 June 2024 Regulatory Audit in Support of Review of the LAR to Revise Emergency Diesel Generator Frequency and Voltage Ranges for Technical Specification 3.8.1, Surveillance Requirements NL-24-0202, SNC Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2024-01: Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2024-05-24024 May 2024 SNC Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2024-01: Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML24141A0482024-05-17017 May 2024 EN 56958_1 Ametek Solidstate Controls, Inc ML24094A1402024-05-16016 May 2024 Staff Response to Request for Revision to NRC Staff Assessment of Updated Seismic Hazard Information and Latest Understanding of Seismic Hazards at the Vogtle Plant Site Following the NRC Process for the Ongoing Assessment of Natural Hazard ML24130A2412024-05-13013 May 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05200025/2024001 and 05200026/2024001 ML24120A1812024-05-13013 May 2024 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure Responses to NRC Request for Additional Information for Refueling Outage IR24 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report – Enclosure 2 ML24101A2112024-05-11011 May 2024 Expedited Issuance of Amendment No. 198 Change to Technical Specification 5.5.13, Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP) NL-24-0191, Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports for 20232024-05-10010 May 2024 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports for 2023 ML24127A2372024-05-0909 May 2024 Initial Test Program and Operational Programs Inspection Report 05200026/2024010 NL-24-0194, Revised Request for Relief and Alternative Requirements for Squib Valves First Test Interval (V34-IST-ALT-03-R1)2024-05-0707 May 2024 Revised Request for Relief and Alternative Requirements for Squib Valves First Test Interval (V34-IST-ALT-03-R1) IR 05000424/20244032024-05-0101 May 2024 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000424/2024403 and 05000425/2024403 Public ML24120A2832024-04-30030 April 2024 Project Manager Reassignment NL-24-0170, Responses to Second Round NRC Request for Additional Information for Refueling Outage 1 R24 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2024-04-25025 April 2024 Responses to Second Round NRC Request for Additional Information for Refueling Outage 1 R24 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report NL-24-0165, Annual Non-Radiological Environmental Operating Reports and Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports for 20232024-04-25025 April 2024 Annual Non-Radiological Environmental Operating Reports and Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports for 2023 IR 05000424/20240012024-04-23023 April 2024 –Integrated Inspection Report 05000424/2024001 and 05000425/2024001 NL-24-0154, Preservice Inspection Progam Owners Activity Report2024-04-16016 April 2024 Preservice Inspection Progam Owners Activity Report ML24030A9092024-04-10010 April 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 224 and 207, Regarding Revision to Technical Specification 3.4.14 (Reactor Coolant System) Pressure Isolation Valve Leakage Surveillance Requirement 3.4.14.1 ML24079A0062024-04-10010 April 2024 – Proposed Alternative to the Requirements of ASME Code of Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants for Pressure Isolation Valve Testing Frequency ML24096A1322024-04-0505 April 2024 Individual Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Opportunity for Hearing and Order (EPID L-2024-LLA-0043) - Letter NL-24-0115, Response to Request for Additional Information Exemption Requests for Physical.2024-04-0404 April 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information Exemption Requests for Physical. 2024-09-09
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 July 10, 2018 Ms. Cheryl A. Gayheart Regulatory Affairs Director Southern Nuclear Operating Co .* Inc. 3535 Colonnade Parkway Birmingham, AL 35243
SUBJECT:
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -SEISMIC HAZARD MITIGATION STRATEGIES ASSESSMENT (CAC NOS. MF7888 AND MF7889; EPID L-2016-JLD-0006)
Dear Ms. Gayheart:
By letter dated March 12, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status, pursuant to Title 1 O of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 50.54(f), "Conditions of Licenses" (hereafter referred to as the "50.54(f) letter").
The request was issued in connection with implementing lessons learned from the 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, as documented in the NRC's Near-Term Task Force report (ADAMS Accession No. ML111861807).
Enclosure 1 to the 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees reevaluate seismic hazards for their site(s) using present-day methods and regulatory guidance used by the NRC staff when reviewing applications for early site permits and combined licenses.
Concurrent with the reevaluation of seismic hazards, licensees were required to develop and implement mitigating strategies in accordance with NRC Order EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A735).
In order to proceed with implementation of Order EA-12-049, licensees used the current licensing basis seismic hazard or the most recent seismic hazard information, which may not have been based on present-day methodologies and guidance, in the development of their mitigating strategies.
By letter dated December 5, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17339A367), Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC, the licensee), submitted its seismic mitigation strategies assessment (MSA) for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Vogtle).
The MSA is intended to confirm that licensees have adequately addressed the reevaluated seismic hazards within their mitigating strategies for beyond-design-basis external events. The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC's assessment of the Vogtle MSA. The NRC staff has concluded that the Vogtle MSA was performed consistent with the guidance described in Appendix H of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance document NEI 12-06, Revision 4. The guidance in NEI 12-06, Revision 4, and Appendix H in particular, supports the proposed Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events rulemaking.
In a letter to the NEI dated C. Gayheart February 8, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17034A286), the NRC staff stated that Japan Lessons-Learned Division (JLD) Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) JLD-ISG-2012-01, Revision 2 (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML17005A182) had been issued and had been made publicly available.
This ISG revision endorsed NEI 12-06, Revision 4, with exceptions, clarifications and additions.
In addition, the licensee has demonstrated that the alternate mitigation strategies, if appropriately implemented, are reasonably protected from reevaluated seismic hazard conditions for beyond-design-basis external events. This closes out the NRC's efforts associated with CAC Nos. MF7888 and MF7889. If you have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-1132 or via e-mail at Joseph.Sebrosky@nrc.gov.
Docket Nos. 50-424 and 50-425
Enclosure:
Staff Assessment Related to the Mitigating Strategies for Vogtle cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv Sincerey 1 / ,v~ f " \. //""\ eph Sebrosky, ienior Proje~t-Manager yond-Design-Basis Management Branch -Division of Licensing Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation STAFF ASSESSMENT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERA TING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 AS A RESULT OF THE REEVALUATED SEISMIC HAZARD NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1 -SEISMIC (CAC NOS. MF7888 AND MF7889)
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated March 12, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12053A340), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status, pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.54(f}, "Conditions of Licenses" (hereafter referred to as the "50.54(f) letter).
The request was issued in connection with implementing lessons learned from the 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant as documented in the NRC's Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) report (ADAMS Accession No. ML111861807).
Enclosure 1 to the 50.54(f) letter requested that licensees reevaluate seismic hazards for their respective site(s) using present-day methods and regulatory guidance used by the NRC staff when reviewing applications for early site permits and combined licenses.
Concurrent with the reevaluation of seismic hazards, licensees were required to develop and implement mitigating strategies in accordance with NRC Order EA-12-049, "Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A735).
That order requires holders of operating reactor licenses and construction permits issued under 10 CFR Part 50 to modify the plants to provide additional capabilities and defense-in-depth for responding to beyond-design-basis external events, and to submit to the NRC for review a final integrated plan that describes how compliance with the requirements of Attachment 2 of the order was achieved.
In order to proceed with implementation of Order EA-12-049, licensees used the current licensing basis seismic hazard or the most recent seismic hazard information, which may not have been based on present-day methodologies and guidance, in the development of their mitigating strategies.
The NRC staff and industry recognized the difficulty in developing and implementing mitigating strategies before completing the reevaluation of external hazards. To address this issue, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI} guidance document NEI 12-06, Revision 4, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide" (ADAMS Accession No. ML163546421) was written as an appropriate methodology for licensees to perform assessments of the mitigating strategies against the reevaluated seismic hazards developed in response to the March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) letter. The guidance in NEI 12-06, Revision 4, and Appendix Hin particular, supports the proposed Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events rulemaking.
In a letter to the NEI dated February 8, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17034A286), the NRC staff stated that JLD-ISG-2012-01, Revision 2 (ADAMS Package Accession No. ML17005A182) had been issued and had been made publicly available.
This interim staff guidance (ISG) revision endorsed NEI 12-06, Revision 4, with exceptions, clarifications and additions.
2.0 BACKGROUND
By letter dated March 31, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14092A019), Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC, the licensee) submitted the reevaluated seismic hazard Enclosure information for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Vogtle ). The NRC performed a staff assessment of the submittal and issued a response letter on April 20, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15054A296).
The NRC's assessment concluded that the licensee conducted the hazard reevaluation using present-day methodologies and regulatory guidance, appropriately characterized the site, and met the intent of the guidance for determining the reevaluated seismic hazard. By letter dated October 27, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15194A015), the NRC documented a determination of which licensees were to perform: ( 1) a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA); (2) limited scope evaluations; or (3) no further actions based on a comparison of the reevaluated seismic hazard and the site's design-basis earthquake.
As documented in that letter, Vogtle was expected to complete an SPRA, which would also assess high frequency ground motion effects, and a limited-scope evaluation for the spent fuel pool (SFP). These seismic evaluations were expected to be submitted to the NRC by March 30, 2017, and December 31, 2017, respectively.
By letter dated March 27, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17088A130), SNC provided its SPRA report for Vogtle. The NRC staff assessed the licensee's submittal and concluded that the technical adequacy of the licensee's SPRA submittal was sufficient to support regulatory decisionmaking associated with Phase 2 of the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter and that the risk and safety insights provided by Vogtle's SPRA report support the NRC's determination that no further response or regulatory action is required in response to the reevaluated seismic hazard. The NRC's staff assessment documenting this decision was issued on March 7, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17293A427).
By letter dated December 5, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17339A367), the licensee submitted its seismic mitigation strategies assessment (MSA) for Vogtle. 3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION Section H.4.5.3 of NEI 12-06, Revision 4, describes a method that the staff finds acceptable to demonstrate that the alternate mitigation strategies (AMS) at Vogtle are reasonably protected against the reevaluated seismic hazard. As specified in NEI 12-06, Vogtle's SPRA was peer reviewed in accordance with the expectations described in the Electric Power Research lnstitute's (EPRl's) Seismic Evaluation Guidance Report 1025287, "Screening, Prioritization, and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic" (ADAMS Accession No. ML12333A170). The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's SPRA information submitted by letter dated March 27, 2017, and determined that its technical adequacy was sufficient to support regulatory decisionmaking associated with the reevaluated seismic hazard. The seismic core damage frequency (SCDF) and seismic large early release frequency (SLERF) values reported for Vogtle in the March 27, 2017, letter are less than the 5x10-5/yr (SCDF) and 5x10-6/yr (SLERF) screening values described in Section H.4.5.3 of NEI 12-06, Revision 4. These base SPRA results demonstrate a high likelihood that the AMS are reasonably protected against the reevaluated seismic hazard, and no further evaluation of the maintenance of core cooling or containment integrity is necessary.
Regarding maintenance of spent fuel pool (SFP) cooling, Section H.4.5.6 of NEI 12-06, Revision 4, states that licensees following Path 5 need to ensure the SFP cooling mitigating strategies are maintained.
Specifically, licensees will ensure that SFP makeup capability needed to accomplish the SFP cooling strategies is evaluated for seismic adequacy against the reevaluated seismic hazard. The licensee's letter dated December 5, 2017, states that Vogtle's SFP cooling strategy relies on a flexible hose from the discharge of the portable SFP pump directly to the pool. The letter states that hoses will be deployed inside the fuel handling building prior to the SFP reaching 200 degrees Fahrenheit in order to minimize the need for personnel access to the SFP area, which may have degraded environmental conditions during an extended loss of alternating-current power. The December 5, 2017, letter further states that, under the most limiting non-outage conditions, the SFP is estimated to boil approximately 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> after the loss of SFP cooling due to the initiating event. The licensee supplemented the December 5, 2017, MSA with another letter dated June 25, 2018 (ADAMS Accession No. ML18176A148), that presented more information on the strategy for SFP cooling. The June 25, 2018, supplement stated that the relied upon strategy to provide makeup water to the SFPs is via a gravity feed from the refueling water storage tank (RWST). The licensee's supplement cited Table A-1 from the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Program (ESEP) report (ADAMS Accession No. ML15049A517), which shows that the high confidence of low probability of failure (HCLPF) capacity value of the RWST corresponds to a peak ground acceleration (PGA) of 0.51g. This HCLPF capacity value is greater than the 0.436g PGA demand of the 10-4 uniform hazard response spectra that was used in the fragility evaluation.
Therefore, the RWST is expected to be available following a seismic event at least the magnitude of the reevaluated seismic hazard. Additionally, the licensee's supplement states that no significant differential ground settlements were computed; thus, the piping to facilitate gravity feed from the RWST to the SFPs is also expected to be intact. The June 25, 2018, supplement also provided information about the protection, deployment, and suction sources of a defense-in-depth SFP cooling strategy and capability using onsite portable equipment that the licensee expects to be available following a beyond-design-basis seismic event. In general, the licensee's site-specific SFP cooling evaluation concludes that portable equipment used to provide makeup water to the SFP will not be needed for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> based on the capacity of the RWST. Portable equipment from offsite is expected to be available from the National Strategic Alliance for FLEX Emergency Response (SAFER) Response Center to continue the SFP cooling strategy within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, but the onsite equipment, for which the licensee has provided a justification for the expectation that it will be available, represents a defense-in-depth strategy and capability that the staff recognizes.
Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee has demonstrated that the strategy to maintain SFP cooling is reasonably protected against the reevaluated seismic hazard in accordance with NEI 12-06, Revision 4 and ISG-2012-01, Revision 2. 4.0 AUDIT REPORT The NRC staff previously issued a generic audit plan dated December 5, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16259A189), that described the NRC staffs intention to conduct audits related to MSAs and issue an audit report that summarizes and documents the NRC's regulatory audit of the licensee's MSA. The NRC staff activities have been limited to performing the reviews described above. Because this staff assessment appropriately summarizes the results of those reviews, the NRC staff concludes that a separate audit summary report is not necessary, and that this document serves as the final audit report described in the December 5, 2016, letter.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The NRC staff has reviewed the information presented by the licensee in the MSA for Vogtle and finds that the licensee's seismic hazard MSA was performed consistent with the guidance in Appendix H of NEI 12-06, Revision 4. Based on the NRC's assessment of the technical adequacy of the licensee's SPRA and the results compared to the screening criteria of Section H.4.5.3 of NEI 12-06, Revision 4, and the evaluation of the SFP cooling strategy, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee has demonstrated that the alternate mitigation strategies at Vogtle exhibit reasonable protection against the reevaluated seismic hazard.
C. Gayheart
SUBJECT:
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -SEISMIC HAZARD MITIGATION STRATEGIES ASSESSMENT DATED July 10, 2018 DISTRIBUTION:
PUBLIC RidsNrrlaSLent Resource RidsRgn2MailCenter Resource RidsNrrDlpPbmb Resource RidsNrrDorllpl2-1 Resource RidsNrrDorl Resource RidsNrrPMVogtle Resource PBMB R/F RidsOgcMailCenter Resource RidsOpaMail Resource RidsACRS_MailCTR Resource ADAMS Accession No. ML18180A314 OFFICE NRR/DLP/PBMB/PM NRR/DLP/PBMB/LA NRR/DLP/PBMB/BC (A) NAME JSebrosky Slent BTitus DATE 7/10/18 7/2/18 7/3/18 OFFICE NRR/DLP/PBMB/PM NAME JSebrosky DATE 7/10/18 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY *via email OGC (NLO} BHarris 7/9/18