Text

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report - Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1
	ML15049A517
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	12/30/2014
From:	Keithline K, Pierce C; MPR Associates, Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	NL-14-1996 MPR-4122, Rev. 1
	Download: ML15049A517 (57)
	v • d • e

Charles A. Pierce Regulatory Affairs Director December 30, 2014 Docket Nos.: 50-424 50-425 Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

40 Inverness Center Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 Tel 205.992.7872 Fax 205.992.7601 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 NL-14-1996 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant-Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report -

Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1

References:

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012.

2. NEI Letter to NRC, Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic Reevaluations, dated April 9, 2013.

3. NRC Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report XXXXXX, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic" as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations, dated May 7, 2013.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a request for information pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) associated with the recommendations of the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) (Reference 1 ). Enclosure 1 of Reference 1 requested each licensee to reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites using present-day NRC requirements and guidance, and to identify actions taken or planned to address plant-specific vulnerabilities associated with the updated seismic hazards.

The NRC endorsed the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Report, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: EPRI Guidance for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2. 1: Seismic, Draft Report, as an acceptable alternative to the information requested in Reference 1 by letter dated May 7, 2013 (Reference 3). In its endorsement, the NRC staff determined that the EPRI Guidance will provide an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedite plant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of certain core and containment cooling equipment while more comprehensive plant seismic risk evaluations are performed. Reference 3 also provided NRC staff approval of the schedule modifications requested by

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-14-1996 Page2 Reference 2. Based on the modified schedule, Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) licensees are required to submit the reports resulting from the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) by December 2014. Accordingly, the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant ESEP Report for Units 1 and 2 is provided in. A table of outstanding actions required for completion of the ESEP activities, with a schedule for completion of each, is provided in Enclosure 2.

This letter contains NRC commitments described in Enclosure 3. If you have any questions, please contact John Giddens at 205.992.7924.

Mr. C. R. Pierce states he is the Regulatory Affairs Director for Southern Nuclear Operating Company, is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Southern Nuclear Operating Company and, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true.

Respectfully submitted,

c. ~e-C. R. Pierce Regulatory Affairs Director CRP/JMG/TWS

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Sw rn to and sub cribed before me this 30 day of J)ecew. bu-, 2014.

My commission expires: llz./z.o/8 I

Enclosures:

1. Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report

2. Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities

3. Table of Regulatory Commitments cc:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. S. E. Kuczynski, Chairman, President & CEO Mr. D. G. Bost, Executive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer Mr. D. R. Madison, Vice President-Fleet Operations Mr. M. D. Meier, Vice President-Regulatory Affairs Mr. B. K. Taber, Vice President-Vogtle 1 & 2 Mr. B. J. Adams, Vice President-Engineering Mr. G. W. Gunn, Regulatory Affairs Manager-Vogtle 1 & 2 (Acting)

RType: CVC7000 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. V. M. McCree, Regional Administrator Mr. R. E. Martin, NRR Senior Project Manager-Vogtle 1 & 2 Mr. L. M. Cain, Senior Resident Inspector-Vogtle*1 & 2 State of Georgia Mr. J. H. Turner, Director-Environmental Protection Division

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant-Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report -

Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report

r.MPR ASSOCIATES INC ENGINEERS MPR-4122 Revision 1 December 29,2014 Plant Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP)

Report QUALITY ASSURANCE DOCUMENT This document has been prepared, reviewed, and approved in accordance with the Quality Assurance requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix 8 and/or ASME NQA-1, as specified in the MPR Nuclear Quality Assurance Program.

Prepared for Southern Nuclear Operating Company

MPR ASSOCIATES INC.

ENGINEERS Plant Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP)

Report MPR-4122 Revision 1 December 29, 2014 QUALITY ASSURANCE DOCUMENT This document has been prepared, reviewed, and approved in accordance with the Quality Assurance requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix Band/or ASME NQA-1, as specified in the MPR Nuclear Quality Assurance Program.

Prepared by: '(~

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Kimberly A. Keithline Reviewed by: H

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loseph G. Konefal Approved by: ~...d~

Caroline S. Schlaseman Prepared for Southern Nuclear Operating Company 320 KING STREET ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314-3230 703-519-0200 FAX: 703-519-0224 http:\\\\www.mpr.com

Revision 0

1 MPR-4122 Revision 1 Affected Pages All i, ii, iii, A-2 RECORD OF REVISIONS Description Initial issue.

Modified description of item 1-1805-D3-37T in Table A-1 per SNC direction.

iii

Contents Executive Summary...................................................................................................... 1 1

Purpose and Objective......................................................................................... 2 2

Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies..................... 3 2.1 Modes 1 through 4 and Mode 5 with Steam Generators A vailable..............................3 2.2 Mode 6 and Mode 5 without Steam Generators Available...........................................3 3

Equipment Selection Process and ESEL............................................................ 7 3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL...................................................................... 7 3.1.1 ESEL Development............................................................................................. 8 3.1.2 Power Operated Valves....................................................................................... 8 3.1.3 Pull Boxes........................................................................................................... 8 3.1.4 Termination Cabinets.......................................................................................... 9 3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators..................................................................... 9 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections............................................................ 9 3.1.7 Inaccessible Valve Interlocks.............................................................................. 9 3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX lmplementation....................................................................................................................... 9 4

Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS).................................................. 10 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by Licensee........................................................................ I 0 4.2 Comparison to SSE..................................................................................................... II 5

Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM)............................................................... 13 5.1 Description ofRLGM Selected.................................................................................. 13 5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectrum (ISRS).................................... 14 6

Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach............................................................... 15 6.1 Summary ofMethodologies Used.............................................................................. 15 6.2 HCLPF Screening Process.......................................................................................... 15 6.3 MPR*4122 Revision 1 Seismic Walkdown Approach.................................................................................... 16 6.3.1 W alkdown Approach........................................................................................ 16 lV

6.3.2 Application of Previous Walkdown Information.............................................. 17 6.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings........................................................................ 17 6.4 HCLPF Calculation Process....................................................................................... 18 6.5 Functional Evaluation of Relays................................................................................. 18 6.6 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes)............................. 18 7

Inaccessible Items.............................................................................................. 20 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdown......................................... 20 7.1.1 Items in Locked High Radiation Areas............................................................. 20 7.1.2 Insulated Junction Boxes.................................................................................. 20 7.2 Planned Walkdown!Evaluation Schedule/Close Out.................................................. 20 8

ESEP Conclusions and Results........................................................................ 21 8.1 Supporting Information.............................................................................................. 21 8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications..................................................................... 22 8.3 Modification Implementation Schedule..................................................................... 22 8.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments...................................................................... 22 9

References.......................................................................................................... 23 Attachment A:

Plant Vogtle Unit 1 ESEL.............................................................. A-1 :

Plant Vogtle Unit 2 ESEL.............................................................. B-1 MPR-4122 V

Revision 1

Tables Table 4-1. GMRS for Plant Vogtle Units 1 and 2..........................................................................11 Table 4-2. Safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) for Plant Vogtle Units 1 and 2................................ 12 Table 5-1. Plant Vogtle ESEP RLGM........................................................................................... 14 Table A-1. Plant Vogtle Unit 1 ESEL Items and HCLPF Results.............................................. A-1 Table B-1. Plant Vogtle Unit 2 ESEL Items and HCLPF Results............................................... B-1 MPR-4122 Revision 1 vi

Figures Figure 2-1. Flow Diagram for Plant Vogtle FLEX Strategies (Reference 3).................................. 5 Figure 2-2. Electrical Diagram for Plant Vogtle FLEX Strategies (Reference 3)........................... 6 Figure 4-1. PlantVogtle GMRS.................................................................................................... 10 Figure 4-2. GMRS and SSE for Plant Vogtle Units 1 and 2..........................................................12 Figure 5-l. Plant Vogtle ESEP RLGM compared to SSE and GMRS.......................................... 13 MPR-4122 Revision l vii

Executive Summary Plant Vogtle Units 1 and 2 have performed the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 1). The purpose was to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events. The ESEP was performed using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed industry guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 - Seismic (Reference 2). As a result of the ESEP, no modifications have been identified as necessary to meet ESEP acceptance criteria specified in Reference 2.

MPR-4122 Revision 1 1

1 Purpose and Objective Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11,2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review ofNRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena.

Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12,2012 (Reference 1), requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants.

The 50.54( f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard and the current design basis, further risk assessment may be required. Assessment approaches acceptable to the staff include a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA). Based upon the assessment results, the NRC staff will determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.

This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (Plant Vogtle) Units 1 and 2. The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 1) to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed industry guidance in EPRI 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 -Seismic (Reference 2).

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations.

MPR-4122 Revision 1 2

2 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies The Plant Vogtle FLEX strategies for Reactor Core Cooling and Containment Function are summarized below. This summary is derived from the Plant Vogtle Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 (Reference 3). A flow diagram and an electrical diagram depicting the FLEX strategies are shown in Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2 (Reference 3), respectively.

2.1 MODES 1 THROUGH 4 AND MODE 5 WITH STEAM GENERA TORS AVAILABLE During FLEX Phase 1, reactor core cooling is achieved by natural circulation of the RCS coolant through the steam generators (SGs) with makeup provided by the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump with suction from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) and steam release through the Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs). The combined CST inventory is sufficient to feed the steam generators for more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

During FLEX Phases 2 and 3, RCS natural circulation will continue to provide reactor core cooling using the TDAFW pump or the SG FLEX pump. Prior to depletion of the initial CST inventory, a portable Makeup FLEX pump can be used to transfer additional water from the Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank (RMWST) to the CST.

During FLEX Phase 1, RCS inventory control and subcriticality will be maintained by use of low-leakage reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals and injection of borated water from the Safety Injection (SI) accumulators. During FLEX Phases 2 and 3, supplemental boron will be injected to the RCS cold legs by a portable Boron Injection FLEX pump taking suction from the Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) or the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) while venting the RCS by remote operation of the 125 V DC reactor head vent valves.

Because of the minimal mass and energy input into containment, no FLEX coping strategies are required for the containment function beyond monitoring containment pressure.

2.2 MODE 6 AND MODE 5 WITHOUT STEAM GENERATORS AVAILABLE During FLEX Phase 1, core cooling and RCS inventory control can be achieved by providing makeup to the RCS via gravity feed from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) via the SI system flow path to the RCS cold legs. During FLEX Phase 2, core cooling and RCS inventory control can be maintained using a portable, electric-motor driven pump (Mode 5-6 RCS FLEX Pump) for injection to the RCS cold legs via the RHR system with suction from the RWST.

During FLEX Phase 3, portable equipment delivered from off-site can provide a supply of borated water to restore the RWST inventory if it is needed after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

MPR-4122 Revision 1 3

For events that are initiated when the plant is in Mode 6 or Mode 5 without steam generators available, containment integrity is maintained through manual actions to establish a containment vent path. This is accomplished by removing flanges inside containment and at grade level from one of two lines normally used for containment integrated leak rate testing, and then manually opening an isolation valve to establish a vent path and maintain containment temperature and pressure within design limits.

MPR-4122 Revision 1 4

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3 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment for the Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) followed the guidelines ofEPRI 3002000704 (Reference 2) as described in SNCV086-PR-001 (Reference 4) and SNCV-086-PR-002 (Reference 5). The ESELs for Unit 1 and Unit 2 are presented in Attachments A and B, respectively.

3.1 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PROCESS AND ESEL The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of Reference 2. The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE), as outlined in the Plant Vogtle Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 (Reference 3). The OIP provides the Plant Vogtle FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.

The Plant Vogtle ESEL includes permanently installed plant equipment that could be relied upon to accomplish the core cooling and containment safety functions identified in Table 3-2 of Reference 2 in response to a beyond-design-basis earthquake. Per Reference 2, the ESEL does not include portable or pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed) or equipment that is used only for Phase 3 recovery strategies. The scope of equipment on the ESEL includes that required to support a single FLEX success path. Instrumentation monitoring requirements for core cooling and containment integrity functions are limited to those discussed in Reference 2.

In accordance with Reference 2, the following structures, systems, and components were excluded from the ESEL:

Structures (e.g., containment, auxiliary building, control building)

Piping, cabling, conduit, HV AC, and their supports Manual valves and check valves Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies.

Nuclear steam supply system components (e.g., reactor pressure vessel and internals, reactor coolant pumps and seals, steam generators)

MPR-4122 Revision 1 7

3.1.1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the Plant Vogtle FLEX OIP (Reference 3) to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies. Plant drawings (e.g., Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and electrical one-line diagrams) were reviewed to specify the boundaries of the flow paths used in the FLEX strategies and to identify other components needed to support operation of the systems credited in the FLEX strategies. Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier, valve) in branch circuits I branch lines off the defmed strategy electrical or fluid flowpath. P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation needed for FLEX. Once the flow paths were identified, specific components were selected using guidance in Reference 2. Electrical components needed to support FLEX were identified using one-line diagrams and schematics. Based on this review, base list tables of components were developed for each of the methods credited with accomplishing key functions in the FLEX strategies.

The base list tables were then reviewed to determine which equipment should be included on the ESEL. Most of the equipment decisions were clearly outlined in Reference 2; however, some judgments were necessary as discussed below.

3. 1.2 Power Operated Valves Per the Reference 2 EPRI guidance, the ESEL does not need to include power operated valves that are not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigating strategies. However, Reference 2 also states, "In addition to the physical failure modes (load path and anchorage) of specific pieces of installed equipment, functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase 1 equipment should be considered." Because relay chatter could cause a functional failure, the following criteria were used to determine whether specific power-operated valves should be included on the ESEL:

Power operated valves in the primary success path will be included on the ESEL if they need to remain energized during Phase 1 in order to maintain core cooling and containment integrity (e.g., certain DC-powered valves).

Power operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies may be excluded from the ESEL if they would be de-energized by the event that causes an Extended Loss of all AC Power (ELAP) event.

AC power operated valves not required to change state as part of the Phase 1 FLEX mitigation strategies may be excluded from the ESEP if they are re-energized and operated during Phase 2 or 3 activities.

3.1.3 Pull Boxes Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components provide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in the MPR-4122 Revision 1 8

cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of the conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance with Reference 2.

3.1.4 Termination Cabinets Although termination cabinets and junction boxes provide a passive function similar to pull boxes, they were included on the ESEL to ensure industry knowledge on paneVanchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.

3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and are included as separate components; however, seismic evaluation of the instrument indication may be included in the paneVcabinet seismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box).

3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections As noted in Section 3.2 of Reference 2, the scope of the ESEL is limited to installed plant equipment and FLEX equipment connections" and "the selection process for the ESEL should assume the FLEX strategies (modifications, equipment, procedures, etc.) have been implemented." Section 3.2 of Reference 2 goes on to explain that "piping, cabling, conduit, HV AC, and their supports" are excluded from the ESEL scope. Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation. Except as described in Sections 3.I and 3.1.2 above, valves required to change position to establish/maintain FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 flow paths (i.e., active valves) are included in the ESEL.

3.1. 71naccessible Valve Interlocks Some components have interlocks that could potentially inhibit valve operation during Phase 2 or 3 of FLEX. Reference 2 specifically allows exclusion of interlock failures from the ESEL if plant procedures provide instructions for manual operation to ensure performance of the required FLEX function. For valves that cannot be operated locally due to location in containment or high radiation areas, this statement is interpreted as allowing the interlocks in the control circuit to be bypassed to allow remote manual operation. Therefore, these interlocks are excluded in Phase 3.

3.2 JUSTIFICATION FOR USE OF EQUIPMENT THAT IS NOT THE PRIMARY MEANS FOR FLEX IMPLEMENTATION All components on the ESEL for Plant Vogtle Units 1 and 2 are associated with the primary FLEX strategies. Therefore, since no alternate equipment is being used, no justification is needed.

MPR-4122 Revision 1 9

4 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS)

In response to the 50.54(£) letter (Reference 1), SNC reevaluated the Plant Vogtle seismic hazard in accordance with the NRC-endorsed industry guidance (Reference 6).

4.1 PLOT OF GMRS SUBMITTED BY LICENSEE The plot of the Plant Vogtle GMRS submitted by SNC to the NRC in Reference 7 is shown in Figure 4-1. Table 4-1 contains the corresponding numerical values that were also included in Reference 7. The GMRS and SSE control point elevation are defined at plant grade at an elevation of220 feet mean sea level (msl).

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Table 4-1. GMRS for Plant Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Frequency (Hz)

Spectral Frequency (Hz)

Spectral Acceleration Acceleration (g)

(g) 100 0.436 3.5 0.909 90 0.438 3

0.855 80 0.441 2.5 0.731 70 0.447 2

0.587 60 0.458 1.5 0.449 50 0.480 1.25 0.460 40 0.534 1

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1.07 0.25 0.131 7

1.03 0.2 0.105 6

0.964 0.15 0.0787 5

0.921 0.125 0.0656 4

0.939 0.1 0.042 4.2 COMPARISON TO SSE The plot ofthe safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) for Plant Vogtle Units 1 and 2, submitted by SNC to the NRC in Reference 7, is shown in Figure 4-2. Table 4-2 contains the corresponding numerical values that were also included in Reference 7.

MPR-4122 Revision I 11

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Spectral Acceleration (g) 100 0.2 33 0.2 10 0.46 9

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5 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM)

Reference 2 states that the ESEP may be performed using either the GMRS or a linearly scaled version of the SSE. The SSE is to be linearly scaled by the maximum ratio of the GMRS/SSE between the 1 and 10 Hz range (not to exceed 2 x SSE). In-structure RLGM seismic motions are to be derived using existing SSE-based in-structure response spectra (ISRS) scaled with the same factor.

5.1 DESCRIPTION

OF RLGM SELECTED The Plant Vogtle ESEP was performed using an RLGM equal to two times the SSE as shown in Figure 5-1 and Table 5-1. This spectrum exceeds or is similar to the GMRS in the frequency range of 1 to 10Hz.

To facilitate an early start (prior to obtaining the GMRS) and timely completion of the ESEP, 2 x SSE was used as the ESEP RLGM.

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Table 5-1. Plant Vogtle ESEP RLGM Frequency (Hz)

Spectral Acceleration (g) 100 0.4 33 0.4 10 0.92 9

1.044 2.5 1.252 1

0.6 0.25 0.18 5.2 METHOD TO ESTIMATE IN-STRUCTURE RESPONSE SPECTRUM {ISRS)

The seismic demand used in the ESEP is 2 x Plant Vogtle SSE in-structure response spectra (ISRS). As explained in Reference 10, the Vogtle ISRS were conservatively developed (e.g.,

enveloping orthogonal horizontal directions to a single horizontal, absolute summing torsional effects). This approach provides additional seismic margin not explicitly requested in the Reference 2 guidance.

MPR-4122 Revision 1 14

6 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach The objective of the ESEP is to demonstrate that the ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet or exceed the seismic demand associated with the RLGM. Section 5 of Reference 2 provides guidance for characterizing the seismic capacity by determining a high confidence of low probability of failure (HCLPF) using either the Seismic Margin Assessment (SMA) methodology ofEPRI NP-6041-SL (Reference 8) or the fragility analysis methodology ofEPRI TR-103959 (Reference 9). The Plant Vogtle ESEP used the EPRI NP-6041-SL SMA approach, consistent with the earlier Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Program.

The HCLPF capacity is based on the weakest or most seismically limiting attribute of the equipment (structural, anchorage, or functional). The HCLPF evaluation considers the dynamic response of the equipment, but the HCLPF value is expressed in terms of a peak ground acceleration (PGA) to provide a common point of reference relative to the RLGM. Per Reference 2, ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity if the HCLPF capacity is equal to or greater than the RLGM PGA.

6.1

SUMMARY

OF METHODOLOGIES USED Seismic Margin Assessments (SMAs) were performed for Plant Vogtle Units 1 and 2 in the early 1990s as part of the IPEEE Program and are documented in Reference 10. Those SMAs consisted of screening walkdowns and anchorage calculations, and they included several of the items on the ESEL. As part of the ESEP, the Seismic Review Team (SRT) evaluated each accessible item for seismic capacity, anchorage, and relay functionality (when a FLEX methodology relay was identified in the ESEL). (Inaccessible items are discussed in Section 7.1 ). The ESEP walkdowns and evaluations were documented in Screening and Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS), which include checklists that were developed from Appendix F of EPRI NP-6041-SL (Reference 8).

Each member of the SRT was trained as a SQUG Seismic Capability Engineer in accordance with the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) and trained in the use ofEPRI NP-6041-SL.

Selected team members also took the EPRI HCLPF course, which was developed for the ESEP implementation and is based on EPRI NP-6041-SL.

6.2 HCLPF SCREENING PROCESS ESEL items were screened based on an RLGM equal to 2 x SSE as shown in Figure 5-1. When seismic qualification test data were readily available, equipment capacity was compared to the RLGM using simple scaling to determine seismic demand (e.g., 2 times the Vogtle SSE ISRS),

and the evaluation was documented in the SEWS. When such data were not readily available, equipment capacity screening was performed using the criteria specified for the middle column (0.8-1.2g peak spectral acceleration) ofTable 2-4 in EPRI NP-6041-SL (Reference 8).

MPR-4122 Revision 1 15

Most of the anchorage capacity evaluations were performed by scaling existing design calculations and were documented in the SEWS. Loads on anchorage were determined using broadened ISRS. The ISRS were developed using the SSE ground motion. Accelerations were multiplied by two to determine RLGM acceleration levels. For equipment with anchorage that could not meet the HCLPF criteria for the RLGM using scaling, detailed HCLPF calculations were performed as discussed in Section 6.4. ESEL items were excluded from further evaluation if they were shown to have equipment and anchorage capacities greater than or equal to the RLGM, unless they contained relays needing functional evaluations.

6.3 SEISMIC WALKDOWN APPROACH 6.3.1 Walkdown Approach ESEP walkdowns were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 of Reference 2, which refers to EPRI NP-6041-SL (Reference 8) for the Seismic Margin Assessment process. Pages 2-26 through 2-30 ofEPRI NP-6041-SL (Reference 8) describe the seismic walkdown criteria, including the following key points.

MPR-4122 Revision 1 "The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which are reasonably accessible and in non-radioactive or low radioactive environments. Seismic capability assessment of components which are inaccessible, in high-radioactive environments, or possibly within contaminated containment, will have to rely more on alternate means such as photographic inspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more hurried inspections. A 100% "walk by" does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiring an electrician or other technician to de-energize and open cabinets or panels for detailed inspection of all components. This walkdown is not intended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.

Ifthe SRT has a reasonable basis for assuming that the group of components are similar and are similarly anchored, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out of this group. The "similarity-basis" should be developed before the walkdown during the seismic capability preparatory work (Step 3) by reforence to drawings, calculations or specifications. The one component or each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panels for this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation. At least for the one component of each type which is selected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected.

The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner. For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurations with the construction drawings and/or specifications. If a one-to-one correspondence is found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the 16

walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the component class as the SRT becomes confident that the construction pattern is typical. This procedure for inspection should be repeated for each component class; although during the actual walkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel. If serious exceptions to the drawings or questionable construction practices are found then the system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.

The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lack of similarity, anchorage which is difforent from that shown on drawings or prescribed in criteria for that component, potential Sf [Seismic Interaction1] problems, situations that are at odds with the team members 'past experience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern. If any such concerns surface, then the limited sample size of one component of each type for thorough inspection will have to be increased The increase in sample size which should be inspected will depend upon the number of outliers and difforent anchorages, etc., which are observed It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size since they are the ones who are responsible for the seismic adequacy of all elements which they screen from the margin review. Appendix D gives guidance for sampling selection. "

6.3.2 Application of Previous Walk down Information Several ESEL items were previously walked down during the Plant Vogtle IPEEE program and more recently in response to the seismic walkdown request for information in Reference 1 (NRC Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3). Although the ESEP SRT reviewed the IPEEE results, new walkdowns were performed and new SEWS were generated for items on the ESEL.

For two 125V DC motor control centers (l-1806-S3-DCC and 2-1806-S3-DCC), the NTTF 2.3 internal photos (Reference 11 and Reference 12) were used to eliminate the need for electrical bus outages and minimize the risk of tripping the plant by not opening this energized electrical equipment.

6.3.3 Significant Walkdown Findings Consistent with guidance from Reference 8, no significant fmdings were identified during the walkdowns at Plant Vogtle. Some small issues identified during the walkdowns (e.g., missing or loose fasteners on cabinet internals) were entered into the corrective action program to be resolved under the normal processes.

Block walls were not identified as a concern because there are no block walls in the vicinity of the ESEL items.

1 EPRI 3002000704 [2] page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements."

Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI1025287 [15]."

MPR-4122 Revision 1 17

6.4 HCLPF CALCULATION PROCESS The simple methods discussed in Section 6.2 were sufficient for ensuring that the HCLPF capacity of most component failure modes was greater than the RLGM. A few ESEL items, however, had failure modes requiring more detailed HCLPF calculations. Those calculations are listed in the Notes/Comments" columns ofTable A-1 and Table B-1 in Attachments A and B.

For most ESEL item failure modes requiring detailed analyses, HCLPF capacities were developed using the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM) methodology ofEPRI NP-6041-SL (Reference 8).

The Separation ofVariables approach outlined in EPRI TR-103959 (Reference 9) was used to develop the seismic fragilities and HCLPF capacities referenced to the PGA of the 104 UHRS at plant grade for the Vogtle Units 1 and 2 Condensate Storage Tanks and Refueling Water Storage Tanks. These values were used to develop conservative estimates for HCLPF capacities referenced to the PGA of twice the SSE.

6.5 FUNCTIONAL EVALUATION OF RELAYS For each unit, the ESEL contains four relays with active functional requirements associated with the FLEX Phase 1 response. Two relays are in a motor control center (MCC), and two relays are in cabinets. Each relay was evaluated using the SMA relay evaluation criteria in Section 3 of Reference 8.

These eight relays were functionally qualified as part of the seismic test qualification of the MCC and cabinets. Therefore, in-cabinet amplification was included within the testing. The test response spectra used to excite the MCC and cabinets bounded two times the applicable SSE ISRS.

The ESEP relay functional evaluations were documented in the SEWS packages for the items containing the relays.

6.6 TABULATED ESEL HCLPF VALUES (INCLUDING KEY FAILURE MODES)

Tabulated ESEL HCLPF results are provided in Attachments A and B for Plant Vogtle Units 1 and 2, respectively. The following notes apply to the information in the tables.

Items which screened out of an explicit functional capacity analysis using EPRI NP-6041-SL (Reference 8) Table 2-4, or dynamic test qualification documentation, have a HCLPF greater than or equal to the RLGM; therefore, the HCLPF is shown as "~RLGM" in Tables A-1 and B-1. This is consistent with the SMA methodology of not calculating an explicit HCLPF capacity if the criteria for functional capacity (e.g., EPRI NP-6041-SL Table 2-4) are met and instead providing results as meeting or exceeding the seismic input level selected as the RLGM.

It is unknown whether anchorage is the controlling failure mode for items that were screened for their functional capacity because the functional capacity may or may not be MPR-4122 Revision 1 18

higher than the anchorage capacity. The one exception to this is that large, flat-bottom vertical tanks (e.g., the Condensate Storage Tanks (CSTs), Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), and Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST)) were evaluated using a methodology that includes all failure modes (i.e., anchorage failure modes and tank shell failure modes). The HCLPF values for these tanks are reported in Tables A-1 and B-1. In the few cases where an explicit HCLPF value for anchorage was calculated, this value is provided in the

Notes/Comments" column ofTables A-1 and B-1.

Equipment containing FLEX Methodology ("FM") relays was assessed for relay functional capacity as described in Section 6.5 of this report. Because it is not known whether the capacity of the equipment containing the relay, the equipment's anchorage, or the relay's capacity is the controlling HCLPF, the HCLPF is shown as "2:-:RLGM" in Tables A-1 and B-1, and the "Notes/Comments" column identifies the presence ofFM relay(s).

MPR-4122 Revision 1 19

7 Inaccessible Items 7.1 IDENTIFICATION OF ESEL ITEMS INACCESSIBLE FOR WALKDOWN 7.1.1/tems in Locked High Radiation Areas The Vogtle ESELs contain two neutron flux instruments (one in each unit) and two junction boxes (one in each unit) that are located in Locked High Radiation Areas. These ESEL items were evaluated to determine whether a walkdown was necessary.

Appendix D of Reference 8 provides information regarding "Sampling." Specifically, on page D-1, "sampling is technically valid for identical or similar components if there is evidence that the components are manufactured and installed in a consistent manner....In some instances access is severely limited by radioactive environments and limited sampling is the only practical method of conducting a walkdown."

Several local instruments and junction boxes were walked down during the ESEP, and no seismic issues have been identified. Therefore, sufficient sampling has been conducted to justify avoiding the dose associated with walking down these eight components (total for both units).

7.1.2/nsulated Junction Boxes Three junction boxes (two in Unit 1, one in Unit 2) located inside containment were heavily insulated such that the boxes and their anchorage were not visible. Dozens of junction boxes were walked down during the ESEP, and no seismically significant issues were identified due to the passive nature and small weight of these devices; therefore, junction boxes in the drywell do not merit walkdowns.

Each component discussed above is identified in Table A-1 or B-1 in Attachments A and B.

7.2 PLANNED WALKDOWN/EVALUATION SCHEDULE/CLOSE OUT Walkdowns have been completed for installed accessible items on the ESELs. Section 7.1 discusses the disposition for inaccessible items. ESEL items that have not been installed as of the time of the final walkdowns/report preparation will be evaluated after installation per the SMA methodology outlined in Reference 8. See Section 8.4 and Tables A-1 and B-1 for details.

MPR-4122 Revision 1 20

8 ESEP Conclusions and Results 8.1 SUPPORTING INFORMATION Plant Vogtle has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 1 ). It was performed using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704 (Reference 2).

The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is part of the overall Plant Vogtle response to NRC's 50.54(f) letter (Reference 1).

On March 12, 2014, NEI submitted to the NRC results of a study (Reference 13) of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that site-specific seismic hazards show that there has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet ofU.S. plants based on the re-evaluated hazard. As such, the "current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."

The NRC's May 9, 2014 NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter (Reference 14) concluded that the "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in the GI -199 safety /risk assessment." The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in GI -199 safety /risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted."

An assessment of the change in seismic risk for Plant Vogtle was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014 NEI letter (Reference 13); therefore, the conclusions in the NRC's May 9letter (Reference 14) also apply to Plant Vogtle.

In addition, the March 12,2014 NEI letter (Reference 13) provided an attached "Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (1) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of SSCs inherently contain margin beyond their design level, (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs, and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.

The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely. This has been borne out for those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes. The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within structures, systems and components (SSCs ). These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including:

MPR-4122 Revision 1 21

Safety factors applied in design calculations Damping values used in dynamic analysis of SSCs Bounding synthetic time histories for in-structure response spectra calculations Broadening criteria for in-structure response spectra Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis Bounding requirements in codes and standards Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel)

Bounding testing requirements, and Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range, etc.).

These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE.

8.2 IDENTIFICATION OF PLANNED MODIFICATIONS No modifications have been identified as necessary to meet ESEP acceptance criteria.

8.3 MODIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE No modifications have been identified for the items that have been evaluated. SNC intends to comply with the ESEP schedule (Attachment 2 of Reference 19) for any modifications determined to be necessary for items to be walked down as identified in Sections 7.2 and 8.4.

8.4

SUMMARY

OF REGULA TORY COMMITMENTS Please refer to the Table of Regulatory Commitments that will accompany this report.

MPR-4122 Revision 1 22

9

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

References NRC Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 ofthe Code ofFederal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review oflnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 12, 2012 [ADAMS Accession Number ML12053A340].

EPRI Report 3002000704, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1-Seismic," Electric Power Research Institute, May 2013.

SNC Nuclear Letter NL-14-0594, "Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 Third Six-Month Status Report of the Implementation of the Requirements of the Commission Order with Regard to Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design-Basis Events (EA 049)," dated August 26, 2014.

ENERCON Engineering Report SNCV086-PR-001, Rev. 4, "Equipment Selection for the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process for Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.,

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit No. 1."

ENERCON Engineering Report SNCV086-PR-002, Rev. 4, "Equipment Selection for the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process for Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.,

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit No.2."

EPRI Report 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution ofFukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," Electric Power Research Institute, February 2013.

SNC Nuclear Letter NL-14-0344, "Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2 Seismic Hazard and Screening Report for CEUS Sites," dated March 31, 2014.

EPRI NP-6041-SL R1, "A Methodology for Assessment ofNuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Revision 1," Electric Power Research Institute, August 1991.

EPRI TR-103959, "Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities," Electric Power Research Institute, 1999.

SNC, "Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Individual Plant Examination of External Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities," dated November 1, 1995, C.K. McCoy to NRC.

SNC Report No. SNCV061-RPT-01, "Vogtle Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Report, RER SNC432485 for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3:

Seismic," Version 1.0.

MPR-4122 Revision 1 23

12.

SNC Report No. SNCV061-RPT-02, "Vogtle Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report, RER SNC432485 for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3:

Seismic," Version 2.0.

13.

NEI (A. Pietrangelo) letter to NRC (E. Leeds) dated March 12, 2014, "Seismic Risk Evaluations for Plants in the Central and Eastern United States."

14.

NRC (E. Leeds) letter dated May 9, 2014, "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code ofFederal Regulations 50.54(t) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review oflnsights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident."

15.

MPR Calculation 1380-0004-01, "HCLPF Evaluation for Anchorage ofVogtle 1 & 2 7.5 kV A Inverters," Revision 0.

16.

MPR Calculation 1380-0004-03, "Vogtle 1 & 2 Processing Unit Anchorage HCLPF Calculation," Revision 0.

17.

MPR Calculation 1380-0004-05, "Vogtle 1 & 2 Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger HCLPF Calculation," Revision 0.

18.

MPR Calculation 1380-0004-06, "Vogtle 1 & 2 Boric Acid Storage Tank HCLPF Calculation," Revision 0.

19.

NEI (A. Pietrangelo) letter to NRC (D. Skeen) dated April9, 2013, "Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations."

MPR-4122 Revision 1 24

Attachment A:

Plant Vogtle Unit 1 ESEL ID 1-1201-PS-TIA 1-1204-T4-001 1-1205-E6-001 1-1208-T 4-003 1-1302-P4-001 1-1302-P4-001-K01 1-1302-PS-AFP 1-1302-PS-AFT 1-1302-V4-001 1-1302-V4-002 1-1601-QS-MCB 1-1601-U3-T03 1-1601-U3-T04 1-1601-U3-T19 1-1602-PS-NFA 1-1602-05-NIR 1-1604-Q5-PP1 1-1604-Q5-PP2 1-1604-Q5-PP3 1-1604-Q5-PS1 1-1604-Q5-PS2 MPR-4122 Revision 1 Table A-1. Plant Vogtle Unit 1 ESEL Items and HCLPF Results Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Description Normal Desired Results RVLIS TRANSMITTER RACK Operating Operating

~RLGM TRAINA RWST Available Available 0.51 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER A Available Available

~RLGM BORIC ACID STORAGE TANK Available Available 0.44g (BAST)

TDAFW PUMP AND TURBINE SKID Standby Operating

~RLGM AUX FEED PUMP, TURBINE Standby Operating

~RLGM DRIVER AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TURBINE Standby Operating

~RLGM PUMP CONTROL PANEL AUX FDW TURB CONTRL PNL Standby Operating

~RLGM CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK Available Available 0.55g (CST) #1 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK Available Available 0.55g (CST) #2 MAIN CONTROL BOARD Available Available

~RLGM MCB TERMINATION CABINET Available Available

~RLGM MCB TERMINATION CABINET Energized Energized

~RLGM NFMS AMPLIFIER - TRAIN A Operating Operating

~RLGM NIS INSTRUMENT RACK 1 Operating Operating

~RLGM BOP PROTECTION PANEL 1 Operating Operating

~RLGM BOP PROTECTION PANEL 2 Operating Operating

~RLGM BOP PROTECTION PANEL 3 Operating Operating

~RLGM PROCESS I&C PROTECT I Operating Operating

~RLGM PROCESS I&C PROTECT II Operating Operating

~RLGM Notes/

Comments See Sections 6.4

& 6.6 Anchorage HCLPF = 0.4g (Reference 17)

Reference 18 See Sections 6.4

&6.6 See Sections 6.4

& 6.6 A-1

ID 1-1605-C5-ASI 1-1605-P5-SDA 1-1605-P5-SDB 1-1612-P5-TRA 1-1623-05-002 1-1623-D5-005 1-1623-D5-006A 1-1805-D3-04 T 1-1805-D3-37T 1-1805-D3-38T 1-1805-D3-39T 1-1805-F3-009 1-1805-R3-01 P 1-1805-R3-09R 1-1805-S3-B30 1-1805-S3-RHR1A MPR-4122 Revision I Equipment Description ALTERN SHTDWN IND EAGLE 21 CAB SHUTDOWN PANEL-TRAIN A SHUTDOWN PANEL-TRAIN B THERMOCOUPLE REF JUNCTION A

REMOTE PROCESSING UNIT A CAB 2 - TEMP AND LEVEL REMOTE PROCESSING UNIT-HYDRAULIC ISOLATORS DISPLAY PROCESSING UNIT A FLEX Manual Transfer Switch 1 BBA04T for Battery Charger 1BD1CA FLEX Manual Transfer Switch 1ABE37T for Battery Charger 1CD1CA FLEX Manual Transfer Switch 1ABE38T for Battery Charger 1AD1CB FLEX Manual Transfer Switch 1 BBE39T for Battery Charger 1DD1CB Electrical Termination Box FLEX Primary Connection Box FLEX Boron Injection Pump Receptacle 480V FLEX Switchboard TRAIN C RHR ISO VLV STARTER Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/

Comments Normal Desired Results Anchorage Available Available

~RLGM HCLPF = 0.47g (Reference 16)

Available Available

~RLGM Available Available

~RLGM Anchorage Operating Operating

~RLGM HCLPF = 0.47g (Reference 16)

Anchorage Operating Operating

~RLGM HCLPF = 0.47g (Reference 16)

Anchorage Operating Operating

~RLGM HCLPF = 0.47g (Reference 16)

Not yet installed Normal FLEX N/A (See Section 8.4)

Not yet installed Available Available N/A (See Section 8.4)

Not yet installed Standby Operating N/A (See Section 8.4)

Available Available

~RLGM A-2

ID 1-1805-S3-RHR2A 1-1805-Y3-IC5 1-1805-Y3-ID6 1-1806-B3-BYA 1-1806-B3-BYB 1-1806-B3-BYC 1-1806-B3-BYD 1-1806-B3-CAB 1-1806-B3-CBA 1-1806-B3-CCA 1-1806-Q3-DA2 1-1806-Q3-DB2 1-1806-Q3-DC1 1-1806-S3-DCC 1-1806-S3-DSA 1-1806-S3-DSB 1-1806-S3-DSC 1-1806-S3-DSD 1-1807-Q3-VI1 1-1807-Q3-VI2 1-1807 -Q3-VI3 1-1807-Q3-VI5 1-1807-Y3-IA1 1-1807-Y3-IA11 1-1807-Y3-IB2 1-1807-Y3-IC3 1-1816-U3-002 1-1816-U3-007 1-1821-U3-001 MPR-4122 Revision 1 Equipment Description TRAIN D RHR ISO VLV START (DISCONNECT) 25KVA 3 PHASE INVERTER TR D 480V 3 PHASE INVERTER 125 VDC BATTERY 125 VDC BATTERY 125 VDC BATTERY 125 VDC BATTERY BATTERY CHARGER BATTERY CHARGER BATTERY CHARGER 125 VDC DIST PANEL 125 VDC DIST PANEL 125 VDC DISTR PANEL 125VDC MCC 125 VDC SWITCHGEAR 125 VDC SWITCHGEAR 125 VDC SWITCHGEAR 125 VDC SWITCHGEAR 120 VAC VITAL DISTR PANEL 120 VAC VITAL DISTR PANEL 120 VAC VITAL DISTR PANEL 120 VAC VITAL DISTR PANEL VITAL AC INVERTER VITAL AC INVERTER VITAL AC INVERTER VITAL AC INVERTER AUX RELAY PANEL ELECTRICAL AUXILLIARY BOARD SF SEQUENCER BOARD TRAIN A Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/

Comments Normal Desired Results Available Available

~RLGM Energized Energized

?: RLGM Energized Energized

~RLGM Energized Energized

?: RLGM Energized Energized

?: RLGM Anchorage Energized Energized

?: RLGM HCLPF = 0.48g (Reference 15)

Energized Energized

?: RLGM Anchorage Energized Energized

<:RLGM HCLPF = 0.48g (Reference 15)

Anchorage Energized Energized

?: RLGM HCLPF = 0.48g (Reference 15)

Available Available

<:RLGM Available Available

<:RLGM Operating Operating

<:RLGM A-3

ID 11RNFMSJB1 1-2207 -NS-009 13WJB2729 1ARJB0056 1ARJB0285 1ARJB0286 1ARJB0297 1ARJB0298 1ARJB0309 1ARJB0310 1ARJB0321 1ARJB0322 1ARJB3613 1ARJB3614 1ARJB3677 1ARJB4931 1ARJB4960 1ARJB4961 1ARJB4962 1ARJB4963 1ATJB2453 1ATJB2458 1ATJB2464 1ATJB2467 1ATJB2781 1BRJB0287 1BRJB0288 1BRJB0299 1BRJB0300 1BRJB0311 1BRJB0312 1BRJB0323 1BRJB0324 MPR-4122 Revision 1 Equipment Description JUNCTION BOX 1/H CABLE CONNECTOR PLATE JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/

Comments Normal Desired Results Available Available

~RLGM Available Available

~RLGM Inaccessible -

Available Available N/A Insulated (see Section 7.1)

Available Available

~RLGM Available Available

~RLGM Available Available e!:RLGM Available Available

~RLGM Available Available

~RLGM A-4

ID 1BRJB3615 1BRJB3679 1CDJB0001 1CRJB0924 1CRJB0925 1CRJB0929 1CRJB0930 1CRJB0931 1CRJB0931A 1CRJB0942 1CRJB3682 1CRJB3683 1CWJB2680 1CWJB2681 1CWJB2683 1CWJB2684 1CWJB2686 1CWJB2687 1CWJB2689 1CWJB2690 1DDJB0001 1DRJB3684 1DRJB3685 1DRJB4957 1FI-5150A 1FI-5151A 1FI-5152A 1FI-5153A 1FT-5150 1FT-5151 1FT-5152 1FT-5153 MPR-4122 Revision 1 Equipment Description JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX Electrical Termination Box AFW FLOW INDICATOR AFW FLOW INDICATOR AFW FLOW INDICATOR AFW FLOW INDICATOR AFW FLOW TO SG 4 AFW FLOW TO SG 2 AFW FLOW TO SG 1 AFW FLOW TO SG 3 Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/

Comments Normal Desired Results Available Available

~RLGM Available Available

~RLGM Inaccessible -

Available Available N/A High Dose (see Section 7.1)

Available Available

~RLGM Available Available

~RLGM Inaccessible -

Available Available N/A Insulated (see Section 7.1)

Available Available

~RLGM Available Available

~RLGM Operating Operating

~RLGM A-5

ID 1-FV-0610 1-HV-0442A 1-HV-04428 1-HV-0943A 1-HV-5106 1-HV-5113 1-HV-5120 1-HV-5122 1-HV-5125 1-HV-5127 1-HV-8095A 1-HV-80958 1-HV-8096A 1-HV-80968 1-HV-87018 1-HV-8702A 1-HV-8812A 1-HV-8821A 1-HV-8835 1-HV-8875A 1-HV-88758 1-HV-8875C 1-HV-8875D MPR-4122 Revision 1 Equipment Description RHR PUMP 1 MINIFLOW REACTOR HEAD LETDOWN SOV REACTOR HEAD LETDOWN SOV ACCUM NITROGEN HDR VENT VALVE MAIN STEAM TO TDAFWP INLET VALVE TDAFW PUMP SUPPLY FROM CST 2MOV TDAFW DISCH MOV TO S/G 4 TDAFW DISCH MOV TO S/G 1 TDAFW DISCH MOV TO S/G 2 TDAFW DISCH MOV TO S/G 3 RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION RHR PMP A SUCT FROM HL LOOP 1 MOV RHR PMP-8 DNSTRM SUCT FROM HOT LEG LOOP-4 RHR PUMP A SUCTION FROM RWST SIP TRAIN A TO RCS COLD LEG ISO SIS COLD LEG LOOP IN HDR ISO ACCUMULATOR 1 NITROGEN VENT VALVE ACCUMULATOR 2 NITROGEN VENT VALVE ACCUMULATOR 3 NITROGEN VENT VALVE ACCUMULATOR 4 NITROGEN VENT VALVE Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/

Comments Normal Desired Results Open Closed

~RLGM Closed Open/

~RLGM Closed Closed Open/

~RLGM Closed Closed Open

~RLGM Closed Closed/

~RLGM Open Open Throttled

~RLGM Open Throttled

~RLGM Closed Open/

~RLGM Closed Closed Open/

~RLGM Closed Open Closed

~RLGM Open Closed

~RLGM Open/

Open

~RLGM Closed Closed Open/

~RLGM Closed Open/

Open/

~RLGM Closed Closed Closed Open/

~RLGM Closed Closed Open/

~RLGM Closed A-6

ID 1-HY-0442A 1-HY-0442B 1-HY-0943A 1 LI-0102A 1LI-0459A 1LI-0529 1LI-0539 1 Ll-0551 1 Ll-0554 1LI-0990A 1 Ll-51 00 1LI-5115 1-LT-0102 1LT-0459 1LT-0529 1LT-0539 1LT-0551 1LT-0554 1-LT-0990 1LT1310 1LT1311 1LT1312 1LX1310 1LX1311 1LX1312 1NRJB0940 1 PDIC-5180A 1PI-0438 MPR-4122 Revision I Equipment Description 1/P CONVERTER 1/P CONVERTER liP CONVERTER BAST LEVEL INDICATOR PRESSURIZER LEVEL INDIC, PROT SET I SG 2 LEVEL INDICATOR, PROT SET I SG 3 LEVEL INDICATOR, PROT SET I SG 1 LEVEL INDICATOR, PROT SET I SG 4 Level Indicator, PROT SET I RWST LEVEL INDICATOR CST NO.1 LOCAL INDICATION CST NO.2 LOCAL INDICATION BAST LEVEL XMTR PRESSURIZER LEVEL TRANSMITTER SG 2 NARROW RANGE LEVEL, SET I

SG 3 NARROW RANGE LEVEL, SET I

SG 1 NARROW RANGE LEVEL, SET I

SG 4 NARROW RANGE LEVEL, SET I

RWST LEVEL XMTR RV PLENNUM LEVEL UPPER RANGE RV LEVEL NARROW RANGE RV LEVEL WIDE RANGE CONTAINMENT COMPONENT CONTAINMENT COMPONENT CONTAINMENT COMPONENT JUNCTION BOX AUX FW TURB STM IN - PMP OUT RCS LOOP 4 HOT LEG PRESSURE INDIC Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/

Comments Normal Desired Results Operating Operating

~RLGM Operating Operating

~RLGM Available Available

~RLGM Operating Operating

~RLGM A-7

ID 1PI-0514A 1PI-0524A 1PI-0534A 1PI-0544A 1-PI-0937 1-PSV-3001 1-PSV-3002 1-PSV-3011 1-PSV-3012 1-PSV-3021 1-PSV-3022 1-PSV-3031 1-PSV-3032 1PT-0438 1PT-Q514 1PT-Q524 1PT-Q534 1PT-Q544 1PT-0937 1-PV-15129 1-PV-3000 1-PV-3010 1-PV-3020 MPR-4122 Revision 1 Equipment Description SG 1 PRESSURE INDICATOR, PROT SET I SG 2 PRESSURE INDICATOR, PROT SET I SG 3 PRESSURE INDICATOR, PROT SET I SG 4 PRESSURE INDICATOR, PROT SET I CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INDICATOR SG 1 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE SG 1 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE SG 2 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE SG 2 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE SG 3 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE SG 3 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE SG 4 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE SG 4 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE RCS LOOP 4 HOT LEG PRESSURE XMTR SG 1 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER SG 2 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER SG 3 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER SG 4 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER CNMTPRESS TDAFW PUMP, TRIP AND THROTTLE SG 1 ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE SG 2 ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE SG 3 ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/

Comments Normal Desired Results Operating Operating c::RLGM Operating Operating c::RLGM Operating Operating c::RLGM Operating Operating c::RLGM Operating Operating c::RLGM Closed Open/

c::RLGM Closed Closed Open/

<!:RLGM Closed Closed Open/

c::RLGM Closed Closed Open/

<!:RLGM Closed Operating Operating c::RLGM Operating Operating

<!:RLGM Operating Operating

<!:RLGM Open Open

<!:RLGM Closed Open/

c::RLGM Closed Closed Open/

<!:RLGM Closed Closed Open/

c::RLGM Closed A-8

ID 1-PV-3030 1-PX-0937 1RE13135A 1-SC-15109 1SE-15109A 1SE-15109B 1-SV-15133 1TI-0413A 1TI-0413B 1TI-0423A 1TI-0423B 1TI-0433A 1TI-0433B 1TI-0443A 1TI-0443B 1ZIS1310 1ZIS1311 1ZIS1312 MPR-4122 Revision 1 Equipment Description SG 4 ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE XMTR CONTAINMENT COMPONENT NEUTRON FLUX-TRAIN A AUX FW TURB SPEED CONTROLLER/ GOVERNOR AUX FW PUMP 1 TURB SPEED AUX FW PUMP 1 TURB SPEED TDAFW PUMP GOVERNOR VALVE TEMP INDICATOR HOT LEG, LOOP 1, SET I TEMP INDICATOR HOT LEG, LOOP 1, SET II TEMP INDICATOR HOT LEG, LOOP 2, SET I TEMP INDICATOR HOT LEG, LOOP 2, SET II TEMP INDICATOR HOT LEG, LOOP 3,SETI TEMP INDICATOR HOT LEG, LOOP 3, SET II TEMP INDICATOR HOT LEG, LOOP 4,SETI TEMP INDICATOR HOT LEG, LOOP 4,SETII RVLIS HYDRAULIC ISOLA TOR RVLIS HYDRAULIC ISOLATOR RVLIS HYDRAULIC ISOLATOR Operating State HCLPF Screening Notes/

Comments Normal Desired Results Closed Open/

<:RLGM Closed Available Available

<:RLGM Inaccessible -

Operating Operating N/A High Dose (see Section 7.1)

Standby Operating

<:RLGM Standby Operating

<:RLGM Closed Open

<:RLGM Operating Operating

~RLGM Operating Operating

<:RLGM Operating Operating

~RLGM A-9 Plant Vogtle Unit 2 ESEL ID 2-1201-P5-TIA 2-1204-T4-001 2-1205-E6-001 2-1208-T 4-003 2-1302-P4-001 2-1302-P4-001-K01 2-1302-P5-AFP 2-1302-P5-AFT 2-1302-V4-001 2-1302-V4-002 2-1601-05-MCB 2-1601-U3-T03 2-1601-U3-T04 2-1601-U3-T19 2-1602-P5-NFA 2-1602-05-NIR 2-1604-Q5-PP1 2-1604-Q5-PP2 2-1604-Q5-PP3 2-1604-Q5-PS1 2-1604-Q5-PS2 MPR-4122 Revision I Table B-1. Plant Vogtle Unit 2 ESEL Items and HCLPF Results Equipment Operating State HCLPF Screening Results Description Normal Desired RVLIS TRANSMITTER RACK Operating Operating

~RLGM TRAINA RWST Available Available 0.51g RHR HEAT EXCHANGER A Available Available

~RLGM BORIC ACID STORAGE TANK Available Available 0.44g (BAST)

TDAFW PUMP AND TURBINE Standby Operating

~RLGM SKID AUX FEED PUMP, TURBINE Standby Operating

~RLGM DRIVER AUXILIARY FEEDWATER TURBINE PUMP CONTROL Standby Operating

~RLGM PANEL AUX FDW TURB CONTRL PNL Standby Operating

~RLGM CONDENSATE STORAGE Available Available 0.55g TANK (CST) #1 CONDENSATE STORAGE Available Available 0.55g TANK (CST) #2 MAIN CONTROL BOARD Available Available

~RLGM MCB TERMINATION CABINET Available Available

~RLGM MCB TERMINATION CABINET Energized Energized

~RLGM NFMS AMPLIFIER - TRAIN A Operating Operating

~RLGM NIS INSTRUMENT RACK 1 Operating Operating

~RLGM BOP PROTECTION PANEL 1 Operating Operating

~RLGM BOP PROTECTION PANEL 2 Operating Operating

~RLGM BOP PROTECTION PANEL 3 Operating Operating

~RLGM PROCESS I&C PROTECT I Operating Operating

~RLGM PROCESS I&C PROTECT II Operating Operating

~RLGM Notes/

Comments See Sections 6.4

&6.6 Anchorage HCLPF = 0.4g (Reference 17)

Reference 18 See Sections 6.4

&6.6 See Sections 6.4

&6.6 B-1

ID 2-1605-C5-AS I 2-1605-P5-SDA 2-1605-P5-SDB 2-1612-P5-TRA 2-1623-D5-002 2-1623-D5-005 2-1623-D5-006A 2-1805-D3-04 T 2-1805-D3-37T 2-1805-D3-38T 2-1805-D3-39T 2-1805-F3-009 2-1805-R3-0 1 P 2-1805-R3-09R 2-1805-S3-B30 2-1805-S3-RH R 1A 2-1805-S3-RHR2A 2-1805-Y3-IC5 2-1805-Y3-l D6 2-1806-B3-BY A 2-1806-B3-BYB 2-1806-B3-BYC 2-1806-B3-BYD MPR-4122 Revision 1 Equipment Description ALTERN SHUTDOWN IND EAGLE21 CAB SHUTDOWN PANEL-TRAIN A SHUTDOWN PANEL-TRAIN B THERMOCOUPLE REF JUNCTION A REMOTE PROCESSING UNIT-TEMP AND LEVEL REMOTE PROCESSING UNIT-HYDRAULIC ISOLA TORS DISPLAY PROCESSING UNIT A FLEX Manual Transfer Switch for Battery Charger FLEX Manual Transfer Switch for Battery Charger FLEX Manual Transfer Switch for Battery Charger FLEX Manual Transfer Switch for Battery Charger Electrical Termination Box FLEX Primary Connection FLEX Boron Injection Pump Receptacle 480V FLEX Switchboard TRAIN C RHR ISO VLV START TRAIN D RHR ISO VLV START 25KVA 3 PHASE INVERTER TR D 480V 3 PHASE INVERTER 125 VDC BATTERY 125 VDC BATTERY 125 VDC BATTERY 125 VDC BATTERY Operating State HCLPF Notes/

Screening Results Comments Normal Desired Anchorage Available Available

~RLGM HCLPF = 0.47g (Reference 16)

Available Available

~RLGM Available Available

~RLGM Anchorage Operating Operating

~RLGM HCLPF = 0.47g (Reference 16)

Anchorage Operating Operating

~RLGM HCLPF = 0.47g (Reference 16)

Anchorage Operating Operating

~RLGM HCLPF = 0.47g (Reference 16)

Standby Standby N/A Not Yet Installed (See Section 8.4)

Available Available N/A Not Yet Installed (See Section 8.4)

Standby Operating N/A Not Yet Installed (See Section 8.4)

Available Available

~RLGM Available Available

~RLGM Energized Energized

~RLGM B-2

ID 2-1806-B3-CAB 2-1806-B3-CBA 2-1806-B3-CCA 2-1806-Q3-DA2 2-1806-Q3-DB2 2-1806-Q3-DC1 2-1806-S3-DCC 2-1806-S3-DSA 2-1806-S3-DSB 2-1806-S3-DSC 2-1806-S3-DSD 2-1807-Q3-VI1 2-1807-Q3-VI2 2-1807-Q3-VI3 2-1807-Q3-VI5 2-1807-Y3-IA 1 2-1807-Y3-IA11 2-1807-Y3-IB2 2-1807-Y3-IC3 2-1816-U3-002 2-1816-U3-007 2-1821-U3-001 21RNFMSJB1 2-2207 -N6-009 2-2403-P4-001 2-2403-P4-001-M01 2-2403-T 4-001 2-2403-T 4-003 MPR-4122 Revision 1 Equipment Description BATTERY CHARGER BATTERY CHARGER BATTERY CHARGER 125 VDC DIST PANEL 125 VDC DIST PANEL 125 VDC PANEL 125VDC MCC 125 VDC SWITCHGEAR 125 VDC SWITCHGEAR 125 VDC SWITCHGEAR 125 VDC SWITCHGEAR 120 VITAL AC PANEL 120 VAC VITAL DISTR PANEL 120 VAC VITAL PANEL 120 VAC VITAL DISTR PANEL VITAL AC INVERTER VITAL AC INVERTER VITAL AC INVERTER VITAL AC INVERTER AUX RELAY PANEL ELECTRICAL AUXILLIARY BOARD SF SEQUENCER BOARD TRAINA JUNCTION BOX 1/H CABLE CONNECTOR PLATE ITEM 01 D.F.O. STOR TANK PUMP-1 DIESEL FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK PUMP 1 MOTOR DIESEL FUEL OIL STORAGE TANKA DIESEL FUEL OIL DAY TANK Operating State HCLPF Notes/

Screening Results Comments Normal Desired Energized Energized

~RLGM Energized Energized

~RLGM Anchorage Energized Energized

~RLGM HCLPF = 0.48g (Reference 15)

Energized Energized

~RLGM Anchorage Energized Energized

~RLGM HCLPF = 0.48g (Reference 15)

Anchorage Energized Energized

~RLGM HCLPF = 0.48g (Reference 15)

Available Available

~RLGM Available Available

~RLGM Operating Operating

~RLGM Available Available

~RLGM Standby On/Off

~RLGM Available Available

~RLGM B-3

ID 23WJB2729 2ARJB0056 2ARJB0285 2ARJB0286 2ARJB0297 2ARJB0298 2ARJB0309 2ARJB0310 2ARJB0321 2ARJB0322 2ARJB3613 2ARJB3614 2ARJB3677 2ARJB4931 2ARJB4960 2ARJB4961 2ARJB4962 2ARJB4963 2ATJB2453 2ATJB2458 2ATJB2464 2ATJB2467 2ATJB2781 2-AZ-JB-3740 2-AZ-JB-37 41 2BRJB0287 2BRJB0288 2BRJB0299 2BRJB0300 2BRJB0311 2BRJB0312 2BRJB0323 2BRJB0324 2BRJB3615 MPR-4122 Revision 1 Equipment Description JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX Operating State HCLPF Notes/

Screening Results Comments Normal Desired Available Available

~RLGM Inaccessible -

Available Available N/A Insulated (see Section 7.1)

Available Available

~RLGM Available Available

~RLGM B-4

ID 2BRJB3679 2CDJB0001 2CRJB0924 2CRJB0925 2CRJB0929 2CRJB0930 2CRJB0930A 2CRJB0930B 2CRJB0931 2CRJB3682 2CRJB3683 2CWJB2680 2CWJB2681 2CWJB2683 2CWJB2684 2CWJB2686 2CWJB2687 2CWJB2689 2CWJB2690 2DDJB0001 2DRJB3684 2DRJB3685 2DRJB4957 2FI-5150A 2FI-5151A 2FI-5152A 2FI-5153A 2FT-5150 2FT-5151 2FT-5152 2FT-5153 2-FV-0610 2-HV-0442A MPR-4122 Revision 1 Equipment Description JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX JUNCTION BOX Electrical Termination Box AFW FLOW INDICATOR AFW FLOW INDICATOR AFW FLOW INDICATOR AFW FLOW INDICATOR AFW FLOW TO SG 4 AFW FLOW TO SG 2 AFW FLOW TO SG 1 AFW FLOW TO SG 3 RHR PUMP 1 MINIFLOW REACTOR HEAD LETDOWN sov Operating State HCLPF Notes/

Screening Results Comments Normal Desired Available Available

~RLGM Available Available

~RLGM Inaccessible-Available Available N/A High Dose (see Section 7.1)

Available Available

~RLGM Available Available

~RLGM Operating Operating

~RLGM Open Closed

~RLGM Closed Open/

~RLGM Closed B-5

ID 2-HV-04428 2-HV-0943A 2-HV-5106 2-HV-5113 2-HV-5120 2-HV-5122 2-HV-5125 2-HV-5127 2-HV-8095A 2-HV-80958 2-HV-8096A 2-HV-80968 2-HV-87018 2-HV-8702A 2-HV-8812A 2-HV-8821A 2-HV-8835 2-HV-8875A 2-HV-88758 2-HV-8875C 2-HV-8875D 2-HY-0442A 2-HY-04428 2-HY-0943A MPR-4122 Revision 1 Equipment Description REACTOR HEAD LETDOWN sov ACCUM NITROGEN HDR VENT VALVE MAIN STEAM TO TDAFWP INLET VALVE TDAFW PUMP SUPPLY FROM CST2 MOV TDAFW DISCH MOV TO S/G 4 TDAFW DISCH MOV TO S/G 1 TDAFW DISCH MOV TO S/G 2 TDAFW DISCH MOV TO S/G 3 RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION RX HEAD VENT TO LETDOWN ISOLATION RHR PMP A SUCT FROM HL LOOP 1 MOV RHRP-8 IRC SUCT ISO FROM LOOP 4 HL,*,*,8 RHR PUMP A SUCTION FROM RWST SIP TRAIN A TO RCS COLD LEG ISO SIS COLD LEG LOOP IN HDR ISO ACCUMULATOR 1 NITROGEN VENT VALVE ACCUMULATOR 2 NITROGEN VENT VALVE ACCUMULATOR 3 NITROGEN VENT VALVE ACCUMULATOR 4 NITROGEN VENT VALVE liP CONVERTER liP CONVERTER liP CONVERTER Operating State HCLPF Notes/

Screening Results Comments Normal Desired Closed Open/

i::RLGM Closed Closed Open/

i::RLGM Closed Closed Open i::RLGM Closed Closed/

i::RLGM Open Open Throttled i::RLGM Open Throttled i::RLGM Open Throttled i::RLGM Open Throttled i::RLGM Closed Open/

i::RLGM Closed Closed Open/

i::RLGM Closed Open Closed i::RLGM Open Closed i::RLGM Open/

Operating i::RLGM Closed Closed Open/

i::RLGM Closed Open/

Open/

i::RLGM Closed Closed Closed Open/

i::RLGM Closed Closed Open/

i::RLGM Closed Operating Operating i::RLGM Operating Operating i::RLGM Operating Operating i::RLGM B-6

ID 2LI-0102A 2LI-0459A 2LI-0529 2LI-0539 2LI-0551 2LI-0554 2LI-0990A 2LI-5100 2LI-5115 2-LT-0102 2LT-0459 2LT-0529 2LT-0539 2LT-0551 2LT-0554 2-LT-0990 2LT1310 2LT1311 2LT1312 2LX1310 2LX1311

.2LX1312 2NRJB0940 2PDIC-5180A 2PI-0438 MPR-4122 Revision 1 Equipment Description BAST LEVEL INDICATOR PRESSURIZER LEVEL INDIC, PROT SET I SG 2 LEVEL INDICATOR, PROT SET I SG 3 LEVEL INDICATOR, PROT SET I SG 1 LEVEL INDICATOR, PROT SET I SG 4 LEVEL INDICATOR, PROT SET I RWST LEVEL INDICATOR CST NO. 1 LOCAL INDICATION CST NO. 2 LOCAL INDICATION BAST LEVEL XMTR PRESSURIZER LEVEL TRANSMITTER SG 2 NARROW RANGE LEVEL, SET I SG 3 NARROW RANGE LEVEL, SETI SG 1 NARROW RANGE LEVEL, SETI SG 4 NARROW RANGE LEVEL, SET I RWST LEVEL XMTR RV PLENNUM LEVEL UPPER RANGE RV LEVEL NARROW RANGE RV LEVEL WIDE RANGE CONTAINMENT COMPONENT CONTAINMENT COMPONENT CONTAINMENT COMPONENT JUNCTION BOX AUX FW TURB STM IN - PMP OUT RCS LOOP 4 HOT LEG PRESSURE INDIC Operating State HCLPF Notes/

Screening Results Comments Normal Desired Operating Operating

~RLGM Operating Operating

~RLGM Available Available

~RLGM Operating Operating

~RLGM B-7

ID 2PI-0514A 2PI-0524A 2PI-0534A 2PI-0544A 2-PI-0937 2-PSV-3001 2-PSV-3002 2-PSV-3011 2-PSV-3012 2-PSV-3021 2-PSV-3022 2-PSV-3031 2-PSV-3032 2PT-0438 2PT-0514 2PT-0524 2PT-0534 2PT-0544 2PT-0937 2-PV-15129 2-PV-3000 2-PV-3010 MPR-4122 Revision 1 Equipment Description SG 1 PRESSURE INDICATOR, PROT SET I SG 2 PRESSURE INDICATOR, PROT SET I SG 3 PRESSURE INDICATOR, PROT SET I SG 4 PRESSURE INDICATOR, PROT SET I CONTAINMENT PRESSURE INDICATOR SG 1 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE SG 1 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE SG 2 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE SG 2 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE SG 3 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE SG 3 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE SG 4 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE SG 4 MAIN STEAM SAFETY RELIEF VALVE RCS LOOP 4 HOT LEG PRESSURE XMTR SG 1 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER SG 2 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER SG 3 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER SG 4 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER CNMTPRESS TDAFW PUMP, TRIP AND THROTTLE SG 1 ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE SG 2 ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE Operating State HCLPF Notes/

Screening Results Comments Normal Desired Operating Operating

<::RLGM Operating Operating

<::RLGM Closed Open/

<::RLGM Closed Closed Open/

<::RLGM Closed Operating Operating

<::RLGM Operating Operating

<::RLGM Open Open

<::RLGM Closed Open/

<::RLGM Closed Closed Open/

<::RLGM Closed B-8

ID 2-PV-3020 2-PV-3030 2-PX-0937 2RE13135A 2-SC-15109 2SE-15109A 2SE-15109B 2-SV-15133 2TI-0413A 2TI-0413B 2TI-0423A 2TI-0423B 2TI-0433A 2TI-0433B 2TI-0443A 2TI-0443B 2ZIS1310 2ZIS1311 2ZIS1312 MPR-4122 Revision 1 Equipment Description SG 3 ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE SG 4 ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE XMTR CONTAINMENT COMPONENT NEUTRON FLUX - TRAIN A AUX FW TURB SPEED CONTROLLER/ GOVERNOR AUX FW PUMP 1 TURB SPEED AUX FW PUMP 1 TURB SPEED TDAFW PUMP GOVERNOR VALVE TEMP INDICATOR HOT LEG, LOOP 1, SET I TEMP INDICATOR HOT LEG, LOOP 1, SET II TEMP INDICATOR HOT LEG, LOOP2, SET I TEMP INDICATOR HOT LEG, LOOP2, SET II TEMP INDICATOR HOT LEG, LOOP 3, SET I TEMP INDICATOR HOT LEG, LOOP3, SET II TEMP INDICATOR HOT LEG, LOOP4, SET I TEMP INDICATOR HOT LEG, LOOP4, SET II RVLIS HYDRAULIC ISOLATOR RVLIS HYDRAULIC ISOLATOR RVLIS HYDRAULIC ISOLATOR Operating State HCLPF Notes/

Screening Results Comments Normal Desired Closed Open/

<= RLGM Closed Closed Open/

<= RLGM Closed Available Available

<= RLGM Inaccessible-Operating Operating N/A High Dose (see Section 7.1)

Standby Operating

<= RLGM Standby Operating

<= RLGM Closed Open i2:RLGM Operating Operating

<= RLGM Operating Operating

<= RLGM Operating Operating i2:RLGM Operating Operating i2:RLGM B-9

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant-Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report -

Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities to NL-14-1996 Vogtle Electric Generate Plant-Units 1 and 2 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities Vogtle Unit 1 Required Actions and Schedule for ESEL Items Not Installed as of Walkdowns/Report Issuance Equipment Outage Required Scheduled Number Required Action Completion Date 1

1-1805-D3-04T-FLEX Manual Transfer Switch Does NOT require outage to After the item is installed, December 2016 1 BBA04 T for Battery Charger 1 BD 1 CA walk down or install perform Seismic (2 years after ESEP Report

1-1805-D3-37T-FLEX Manual Transfer Switch modification (if modification is Walkdown, generate submittal) 1 ABE37T for Battery Charger 1 CD1 CA necessary)

HCLPF evaluations in accordance with EPRI

1-1805-D3-38T - FLEX Manual Transfer Switch 3002000704 and EPRI 1ABE38T for Battery Charger 1AD1CB NP-6041-SL, and design/

1-1805-D3-39T - FLEX Manual Transfer Switch implement any 1 BBE39T for Battery Charger 1 DD1 CB modifications necessary to meet ESEP requirements.

1-1805-F3-009 - Electrical Termination Box

1-1805-R3-01 P - FLEX Primary Connection Box

1-1805-R3-09R-FLEX Boron Injection Pump Receptacle

1-1805-S3-B30- 480V FLEX Switchboard 2

NA NA Submit letter to NRC March 31, 2017 summarizing results of (90 days following completion Item 1 above and provide confirmation that of ESEP activities) corresponding plant modifications, if required, are complete.

E2-1 to NL-14-1996 Vogtle Electric Generate Plant - Units 1 and 2 Required Actions and Schedule for Completion of ESEP Activities Vogtle Unit 2 Required Actions and Schedule for ESEL Items Not Installed as of Walkdowns/Report Issuance Equipment Outage Required Scheduled Number Required Action Completion Date 1

2-1805-D3-04 T - FLEX Manual Transfer Switch Does NOT require outage to After the item is installed, December 2016 2BBA04T for Battery Charger 2BD1 CA walk down or install perform Seismic 2-1805-D3-37T - FLEX Manual Transfer Switch modification (if modification is Walkdown, generate (2 years after ESEP Report submittal}

2ABE37T for Battery Charger 2CD1 CA necessary)

HCLPF evaluations in accordance with EPRI

2-1805-D3-38T - FLEX Manual Transfer Switch 3002000704 and EPRI 2ABE38T for Battery Charger 2AD1 CB NP-6041-SL, and design/

2-1805-D3-39T - FLEX Manual Transfer Switch implement any 2BBE39T for Battery Charger 2DD1 CB modifications necessary to meet ESEP requirements.

2-1805-F3-009-Electrical Termination Box

2-1805-R3-01 P-FLEX Primary Connection

2-1805-R3-09R-FLEX Boron Injection Pump Receptacle

2-1805-S3-B30- 480V FLEX Switchboard 2

NA NA Submit letter to NRC March 31, 2017 summarizing results of (90 days following completion Item 1 above and provide confirmation that of ESEP activities) corresponding plant modifications, if required, are complete.

E2-2

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant-Units 1 and 2 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report -

Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 Table of Regulatory Commitments to NL-14-1996 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Units 1 and 2 Table of Regulatory Commitments Type Commitment One-Time Continuing Action Compliance Vogtle Unit 1 Complete the remaining NTTF 2.1 X

Unit 1 ESEL walkdowns/evaluations for items that are not currently installed. These items are identified in Attachment A of the Vogtle Units 1 and 2 ESEP Report (Enclosure 1 of this letter) and summarized in Enclosure 2.

Vogtle Unit 2 Complete the remaining NTTF 2.1 X

Unit 2 ESEL walkdowns/evaluations for items that are not currently installed. These items are identified in Attachment B of the Vogtle Units 1 and 2 ESEP Report (Enclosure 1 of this letter) and summarized in Enclosure 2.

E3-1 Scheduled Completion Date (If Required)

Within 90 days following completion of ESEP activities but no later than March 31 I 2017.

v t e Letter Sequence Other
TAC:MF5271, (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Request Acceptance... Administration Questions Answers Results Approval Other: ML15215A137, NL-14-1996, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report - Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1
MONTHYEAR2015-07-31 [Table View]

NL-14-1996, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report - Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1

Text

References:

Enclosures:

5.1 DESCRIPTION

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

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