05000313/FIN-2009003-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Procedure and Perform Postmaintenance Testing Prior to Declaring Equipment Operable |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, associated with licensee personnels failure to follow station procedures. Specifically, following work completed on high pressure safety injection pump P-36C, on April 24, 2009, the specified postmaintenance testing was not performed until April 27, 2009, but the pump was declared operable by the operations department following performance of a quarterly surveillance run. Subsequently, when the postmaintenance testing inspection was performed, maintenance personnel identified a damaged tee fitting which resulted in the pump being declared inoperable. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR ANO-1-2009-0872. The performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could result in more significant concerns. Specifically, during future corrective maintenance work on safety-related equipment, the failure to perform the specified postmaintenance testing, or have operations perform a proper evaluation of the equipment prior to declaring the equipment operable, could result in other more risk significant equipment being inoperable with the licensee unaware of the issue. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, this finding was determined to have a very low safety significance because the finding: (1) is not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability of the pump; (2) did not lead to an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; (3) did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and (4) did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with work practices H.3(b), in that the licensee failed to appropriately coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to address the need to keep personnel apprised of work status and the operational impact of work activitie |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
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| Report | IR 05000313/2009003 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2009 (2009Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Guerra P Elkmann C Graves A Sanchez J Josey J Clark J Mateychick R Kellar J Rotten |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2009003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2009Q2
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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