05000390/FIN-2010002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Assure that Test Requirements Were Satsified Following a Design Change |
| Description | The inspectors identified a violation of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XI, Test Control, for the licensees failure to assure that test requirements were satisfied following a design change affecting the unit 2 channel III (2-III) safety-related vital AC board. As a result, the 2-III vital AC board was returned to service with post modification test (PMT) acceptance criteria not being met; leaving a non-conforming transfer switch on the 2-III vital AC board. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as PER 215224.The inspectors reviewed IMC 0612 and determined that the finding was more than minor because the finding would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected, in that, failing to ensure that PMT acceptance criteria are met could allow risk significant equipment to unknowingly be returned to service in a degraded condition. This finding was evaluated using the significance determination phase 1 screening criteria and was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train of equipment for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time. The cause of the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work control component. It was directly related to the licensee appropriately coordinating work activities by incorporating actions to address the impact of changes to the work scope on the plant H.3(b). Specifically, when faced with an unexpected failure of the PMTI as written, the licensee failed to restore the 2-III transfer switch to its design basis condition following maintenance. As a result, a non-conforming switch, revealed during design change testing, was placed into service. |
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000390/2010002 Section 1R19 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | E Guthrie R Baldwin M Pribish J Hamman W Deschaine R Monk |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Watts Bar - IR 05000390/2010002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Watts Bar) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (Watts Bar)
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