05000255/FIN-2012004-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Water Leakage into Control Room during Maintenance |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance with an associated NCV of TS 5.4.1 was self-revealed for the failure to implement work management procedures when operators noticed water leakage into the control room from the ceiling during maintenance activities. Water dripped onto the top of a panel near the middle of the control room and inside a nearby walk-in panel. Metal trays that had been previously established to measure and route known leakage from the Safety Injection and Refueling Water Tank (SIRWT) out of the roof area (catacombs) above the control room were moved during maintenance. The plant was shut down at the time to repair the SIRWT and the tank was drained. However, a water-cooled drilling device was being used in the roof at the time to core-bore out old nozzles. Contrary to Quality Procedure EN-WM-105, Planning, no controls were established to keep the trays in place or otherwise prevent water from accumulating in the catacomb area. As a result, the water from the tool seeped through the catacomb floor while it was in use and wetted equipment in the walkin panel. Operators immediately halted the work in the roof area and shielded equipment from further wetting. The licensee inspected the affected equipment and determined there were no adverse effects as a result of the wetted equipment. The issue was also entered into the CAP. The failure to plan work activities in a manner to protect control room equipment from leakage was a performance deficiency warranting further evaluation in the SDP. The issue was determined to be more than minor using IMC 0612, Appendix B, because it impacted the Configuration Control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. Specifically, wetting of electrical components in the control room challenges the ability of those components to perform their function reliability. The inspectors utilized IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Significance Determination Process, to assess the significance of the finding because the plant was shut down at the time. The finding screened as Green, or very-low safety significance, using Checklist 2 of Attachment 1 because with the primary coolant system closed and steam generators available for heat removal, none of the conditions listed as requiring a Phase 2 or 3 analysis applied and all shutdown safety functions were maintained. The finding had an associated cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance area, specifically in the Work Control component. The licensee did not coordinate work activities consistent with nuclear safety (H.3(a)). The core-bore work activity did not properly incorporate the job site conditions, risk insights, or the need for compensatory actions. Since there was a known deficiency in the control room boundary regarding the potential for water ingress, appropriate controls should have been outlined in work instructions or exercised over the catch devices themselves to help control the water that was being used in the tank/catacomb area. |
| Site: | Palisades  |
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| Report | IR 05000255/2012004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Bilik J Lennartz J Ellegood B Cushman M Jones P Laflamme T Taylor A Scarbeary |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Palisades - IR 05000255/2012004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palisades) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Palisades)
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