05000324/FIN-2012004-01
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Finding | |
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| Description | The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of TS 3.6.4.1, Secondary Containment because the licensee did not maintain secondary containment operable as required during a maintenance activity considered an operation with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRV). Once questioned by the inspectors, the licensee restored secondary containment, developed an Operation standing instruction (12-052) to treat the activity as an OPDRV and placed this issue into its corrective action program (CAP) as AR 562188. The failure to maintain secondary containment operable while Unit 1 was in Mode 4 with an OPDRV in progress was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events because the Unit 1 secondary containment boundary was not preserved or maintained. The inspectors evaluated the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, which required an analysis using IMC 0609 Appendix G since the reactor was in Mode 4 (cold shutdown). The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) according to IMC 0609 Appendix G, Attachment 1, Checklist 6, since a quantitative assessment (Phase 2 or Phase 3 evaluation) was not required. Specifically, the inspectors determined that the licensee maintained adequate mitigation capability for reactor vessel water level inventory and an event did not occur that could be characterized as a loss of control. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of Accurate Procedures in the Resources component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not consider the recirculation pump seal replacement activity to be OPDRV based on procedural guidance that contains exclusions to what are considered OPDRV activities. |
| Site: | Brunswick  |
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| Report | IR 05000324/2012004 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Lake R Musser J Dodson P Niebaum M Catts M Schwieg M Endress |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Brunswick - IR 05000324/2012004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Brunswick) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Brunswick)
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