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 SiteStart dateTitleDescription
3F0997-06, Provides Further Detail & Status on Unit 3 Resolution Plan for Information Notice 92-010 Re Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During CR FireCrystal River18 September 1997Provides Further Detail & Status on Unit 3 Resolution Plan for Information Notice 92-010 Re Potential for Loss of Remote Shutdown Capability During CR Fire
3F0997-26, Notifies NRC of Completion of, Failure Modes & Effects Analysis for Crystal River Unit 3 Class 1E 250/125 Vdc Electrical Distribution SysCrystal River24 September 1997Notifies NRC of Completion of, Failure Modes & Effects Analysis for Crystal River Unit 3 Class 1E 250/125 Vdc Electrical Distribution Sys
3F0997-30, Forwards Suppl Info to TS Change Request Notice 210 Re Proposed Changes to TS & Other Aspects of Licensing & Design Basis,To Address Mods & Procedure Changes Required to Mitigate Consequences of Certain SBLOCACrystal River25 September 1997Forwards Suppl Info to TS Change Request Notice 210 Re Proposed Changes to TS & Other Aspects of Licensing & Design Basis,To Address Mods & Procedure Changes Required to Mitigate Consequences of Certain SBLOCA
3F1007-12, Inservice Testing Program, Ten-Year UpdateCrystal River31 October 2007Inservice Testing Program, Ten-Year Update
3F1009-03, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Severe Accident Mitigation AlternativesCrystal River9 October 2009Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives
3F1085-08, Informs That Licensee in Final Stages of PRA Evaluation of Emergency Feedwater Sys (Efs) Per .Schedule for Submittal of Evaluation Will Be Provided After Review of NRC Generic Ltr Re Efs Reliability for PWRsCrystal River16 October 1985Informs That Licensee in Final Stages of PRA Evaluation of Emergency Feedwater Sys (Efs) Per .Schedule for Submittal of Evaluation Will Be Provided After Review of NRC Generic Ltr Re Efs Reliability for PWRs
3F1085-14, Summarizes Programs & Improvements to Emergency Feedwater Sys for Facility.Sys Installed Which Can Automatically Start & Control Emergency Feedwater Sys & Prevent OvercoolingCrystal River29 October 1985Summarizes Programs & Improvements to Emergency Feedwater Sys for Facility.Sys Installed Which Can Automatically Start & Control Emergency Feedwater Sys & Prevent Overcooling
3F1088-12, Addresses Concerns Re Outstanding Survey Human Engineering Observations Identified in NRC 880829 Ser.Eight safety- Related Indicating Lights W/Single Filaments Found.Mods Unnecessary Since Functions on Control BoardsCrystal River18 October 1988Addresses Concerns Re Outstanding Survey Human Engineering Observations Identified in NRC 880829 Ser.Eight safety- Related Indicating Lights W/Single Filaments Found.Mods Unnecessary Since Functions on Control Boards
3F1093-12, Proposed Tech Specs Reflecting Results of Numerous Meetings Re Improved TSCrystal River15 October 1993Proposed Tech Specs Reflecting Results of Numerous Meetings Re Improved TS
3F1112-04, Revisions to the Radiological Emergency Response Plan Implementing ProceduresCrystal River21 November 2012Revisions to the Radiological Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures
3F1183-17, Clarifies Listed Items Re Proposed Mods to Emergency Feedwater Sys Per NUREG-0737,Items II.E.1.1 & II.E.1.2, Generic Ltr 81-14 & 800509 Crystal River-3 Safety StudyCrystal River18 November 1983Clarifies Listed Items Re Proposed Mods to Emergency Feedwater Sys Per NUREG-0737,Items II.E.1.1 & II.E.1.2, Generic Ltr 81-14 & 800509 Crystal River-3 Safety Study
3F1188-11, Forwards Addl Info on ATWS Mitigation Design,Per 881013 Meeting & Subsequent Telcons.Util Working to Resolve Remaining Issues in Timeframe to Support Installation in Upcoming Refueling Outage.W/One Oversize FigureCrystal River22 November 1988Forwards Addl Info on ATWS Mitigation Design,Per 881013 Meeting & Subsequent Telcons.Util Working to Resolve Remaining Issues in Timeframe to Support Installation in Upcoming Refueling Outage.W/One Oversize Figure
3F1196-03, Submits Response to Request for Addl Info on Exemptions from 10CFR50 App R,Sections Iii.G & Iii.JCrystal River22 November 1996Submits Response to Request for Addl Info on Exemptions from 10CFR50 App R,Sections Iii.G & Iii.J
3F1203-03, License Amendment Request No. 281, Revision 0 Regarding Revised Improved Technical Specification (ITS) 3.7.5, Emergency Feedwater SystemCrystal River9 December 2003License Amendment Request No. 281, Revision 0 Regarding Revised Improved Technical Specification (ITS) 3.7.5, Emergency Feedwater System
3F1284-13, Informs of Util Inability to Fulfill 840229 Commitment for Completion of PRA Evaluation of Emergency Feedwater Sys Per TMI Item II.E.1.1 on 850630.Schedule for Completion Revised to 851127Crystal River18 December 1984Informs of Util Inability to Fulfill 840229 Commitment for Completion of PRA Evaluation of Emergency Feedwater Sys Per TMI Item II.E.1.1 on 850630.Schedule for Completion Revised to 851127
3F1286-05, Forwards SAIC-86/1098, Crystal River Unit 3 Emergency Feedwater Sys Reliability Analysis. Study Incorporates All Recent Improvements to Sys.Sys Believed Highly Reliable & Adequate in Fulfilling Role in Accident MitigationCrystal River2 December 1986Forwards SAIC-86/1098, Crystal River Unit 3 Emergency Feedwater Sys Reliability Analysis. Study Incorporates All Recent Improvements to Sys.Sys Believed Highly Reliable & Adequate in Fulfilling Role in Accident Mitigation
3F1287-30, Forwards Rev 1 to Inservice Insp Pump & Valve Program Crystal River Unit 3, Reflecting Testing Performed Through Refuel VI & Listed Changes,Per Item 5 to Insp Rept 50-302/87-17Crystal River29 December 1987Forwards Rev 1 to Inservice Insp Pump & Valve Program Crystal River Unit 3, Reflecting Testing Performed Through Refuel VI & Listed Changes,Per Item 5 to Insp Rept 50-302/87-17
3F1295-05, Forwards Description of Resolution Strategy for Resolving Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier IssuesCrystal River21 December 1995Forwards Description of Resolution Strategy for Resolving Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Issues
3F1295-16, Requests Use of Code Case N-523 to Install Temporary Mechanical Clamping Device in Section of safety-related, Class 3 Piping as Repair for through-wall LeakCrystal River11 December 1995Requests Use of Code Case N-523 to Install Temporary Mechanical Clamping Device in Section of safety-related, Class 3 Piping as Repair for through-wall Leak
3F1296-09, Forwards 10CFR50.59(b)(2) Rept of Evaluations Which Have Resulted in No Unreviewed Safety Questions for Mods or Procedure ChangesCrystal River9 December 1996Forwards 10CFR50.59(b)(2) Rept of Evaluations Which Have Resulted in No Unreviewed Safety Questions for Mods or Procedure Changes
3F1297-27, Forwards Response to 971126 RAI Re TS Change Request 210, Which Addresses Design & Licensing Basis Changes Primarily Involving Plant Systems Used to Mitigate Consequences of Certain Small Break LOCACrystal River3 December 1997Forwards Response to 971126 RAI Re TS Change Request 210, Which Addresses Design & Licensing Basis Changes Primarily Involving Plant Systems Used to Mitigate Consequences of Certain Small Break LOCA
BSEP-95-0139, Submits Certification for Units 1 & 2 Simulation Facility. Plant Simulator Facility Consists Solely of plant-ref Simulator That Meets Requirements of 10CFR55.45 & Complies w/ANSI/ANS-3.5,1995,as Endorsed by Reg Guide 1.149Brunswick21 March 1995Submits Certification for Units 1 & 2 Simulation Facility. Plant Simulator Facility Consists Solely of plant-ref Simulator That Meets Requirements of 10CFR55.45 & Complies w/ANSI/ANS-3.5,1995,as Endorsed by Reg Guide 1.149
CY-01-012, License Amendment Request 270, Revision 0, Power Uprate to 2568 MwtCrystal River5 June 2002License Amendment Request #270, Revision 0, Power Uprate to 2568 Mwt
ENS 40608Crystal River24 March 2004 08:31:00Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Turbine TripAt approximately 0331 EST the reactor tripped due to reactor protection system actuation. The Emergency Feedwater System actuated. It appears that a main feedwater perturbation (sensed low feedwater flow) occurred which actuated a main turbine trip. The main turbine trip actuated the reactor protection system which tripped the reactor. The reactor shutdown and all control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed using the turbine bypass valves and emergency feedwater. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 41027Crystal River8 September 2004 18:45:00Emergency Feedwater System Actuation

At 1445 on September 8, 2004, while in Mode 3 after an unplanned reactor trip during tropical storm Frances, Crystal River Unit 3 experienced a re-actuation of the B-Train of the Emergency Feedwater System. The Emergency Feedwater System had previously actuated during a Loss of Offsite Power experienced during Hurricane Frances and the B-Train actuation had procedurally been bypassed as part of the plant recovery. While In the process of restoring a Main Feedwater Pump to an operating condition, the signal bypassing the B-Train Emergency Feedwater actuation was momentarily removed due to unusual plant conditions present during recovery from the loss of power This resulted in the re-actuation of the B-Train of Emergency Feedwater. This condition is 8-Hour reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(6). The re-actuation of the B-Train of Emergency Feedwater did not have a significant impact on plant operation and the associated equipment has been returned to a standby condition. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM JOHN ADDISON TO BILL HUFFMAN AT 1402 EDT ON 9/30/04 * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile: At 1823 (hrs. EDT) on 9/8/04, Crystal River Unit 3 made an 8-hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(6) concerning re-actuation of the B-train of the Emergency Feedwater System. The Emergency Feedwater System had previously actuated during a Loss of Offsite Power experienced during Hurricane Frances and the B-Train actuation had procedurally been bypassed as part of the plant recovery. While in the process of restoring a Main Feedwater Pump to an operating condition, the signal bypassing the B-Train Emergency Feedwater actuation was momentarily removed due to unusual plant conditions present during recovery from the loss of power. This allowed for a re-actuation of the B-Train of Emergency Feedwater based on a loss of Main Feedwater Pump signal. However, the two Main Feedwater Pumps had not been operating since the loss of offsite power that occurred on 9/6/04. The A-Train Emergency Feedwater System had been operating continuously since the initial actuation on the loss of offsite power and continued to operate during and after the re-actuation of the B-Train. Re-actuation of the B-Train has been determined to be an invalid actuation in accordance with the guidance of NUREG-1022, and therefore EN 41027 is retracted. The licensee has informed the NRC resident inspector. R2DO (Lesser) notified.

ENS 41081Crystal River8 September 2004 18:45:00Invalid Emergency Feedwater ActuationThe following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile: At 1445 (hrs. EDT) on September 8, 2004 Crystal River Unit 3 experienced an invalid actuation of the B-Train of the Emergency Feedwater System. This occurrence is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(6) using the optional process described in 50.73(a)(1). A complete actuation of the B-Train of Emergency Feedwater occurred and the train started and functioned successfully. The A-Train of Emergency Feedwater was operating at the time, and it continued to operate successfully during and after the B-Train actuation. The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector. See retraction of Event #41027 for related information.
ENS 41428Seabrook22 February 2005 08:08:00Emergency Diesel Generator and Emergency Feedwater Auto Start on Vital Bus Failure to TransferTo support routine preventative maintenance on the 4160V Unit Auxiliary Transformer breaker, 4160V Vital Bus 5 did not successfully transfer to the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer. Bus 5 momentarily de-energized and the Emergency Diesel Generator started and loaded as expected supplying Bus 5. The Emergency Feedwater System actuated as expected on momentary undervoltage to Bus 5. The plant remains stable at 100% power. A station troubleshooting team has been established. The reason that Bus 5 did not transfer to the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer is not known at this time. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 41593Seabrook13 April 2005 08:50:00During Core Reload Reactor Trip Breakers OpenedThe plant is in Mode 6 (Refueling) and core reload is in progress with the reactor trip breakers open; both trains of solid state protection system are in the operate mode. While restoring a line up to place the 'D' steam generator on recirculation, a path was opened that allowed the 'B' steam generator to transfer water to the 'D' steam generator. This alignment lowered the 'B' steam generator to its low-low set point level. This initiated a reactor trip signal (RPS). With the reactor trip breakers open and the reactor core reload in progress, no components actuated as a result of the signal. If the emergency feedwater system had been in service, this would have resulted in equipment actuation. This is an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). The resident inspector has been notified.
ENS 42530Kewaunee27 April 2006 01:49:00Failure of Rps Signal to Initiate Reactor Trip

At 2043 (CDT) on 4-26-06, during a plant shutdown with the reactor at approximately 35% power, the operating crew manually initiated a reactor trip. The operating crew had just stopped one of the two condensate pumps and then the remaining feedwater pump tripped unexpectedly. The operating crew recognized the turbine did not trip, as it is expected to automatically trip when no feedwater pumps are running. The automatic turbine trip would have automatically tripped the reactor. Therefore, the operating crew manually initiated a reactor trip. Because the reactor did not automatically trip (i.e., failure of RPS to initiate and complete a reactor trip), the Shift Manager declared an Alert, at 2049, based on Chart F of Table 2-1 EPIP-AD-02. Therefore, this is a one-hour notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(a)(1)(i) 'The declaration of any of the emergency classes specified in the licensee's approved Emergency Plan.' The manual reactor trip is reportable (4-hour) in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'Any event or condition that results in an actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' All systems functioned as expected following the manual reactor trip. Service Water Train B is inoperable because of a one-gallon per minute leak. All rods inserted fully. Decay heat is being removed with the steam dump and secondary PORVs. The condenser is losing vacuum due to the turbine trip. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started as required. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JERRY RISTE TO JOHN KNOKE AT 01:45 EDT ON 04/27/06 * * *

At 2049 on April 26, 2006, Kewaunee Power Station staff declared an Alert emergency classification (reference EN# 42530). The Kewaunee Power Station staff has assessed this event. There was no affect on the health and safety of the general public and no release of radiation. No plant personnel were injured and the only plant equipment problem was with the failure of a trip of both feedwater pumps to cause the main turbine to trip. The Kewaunee Power Plant staff has conducted a preliminary investigation of the control room indications and sequential events recorder, which indicates that before the manual reactor trip there was no automatic reactor trip signal present and a failure of the reactor trip breakers did not occur. The Alert was terminated at 0024 CDT (on 04/27/06). The unit is currently in the Hot Shutdown Mode with plans to cool the plant to less than 350 degrees Fahrenheit. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying State and local government and issuing a press release. Notified NRR EO (MJ Ross-Lee), IRD Mgr (P. Wilson), R3DO (H. Peterson), DHS (Holz ), FEMA (Steindurf), NRC/EPA (Crews), DOE (Wyatt), USDA (Timmons), HHS (Peagler).

  • * * UPDATE ON 04/27/06 AT 1718 EDT FROM JERRY RISTE TO ARLON COSTA * * *

When performing a review of the event reported on April 26, 2006 (EN# 42530), the Kewaunee Power Station staff determined another reporting criterion was met. An eight-hour report is required to be made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of 10 CFR 50.72 except when the actuation results from and is apart of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(6) is PWR auxiliary or emergency feedwater system. As described in EN# 42530, a manual reactor trip of the Kewaunee Power Station was initiated at 2043 on April 26, 2006. The manual reactor trip was initiated when the plant experienced a loss of both feedwater pumps. With a loss of both feedwater pumps and a manual reactor trip, the narrow range water level in both steam generators decreased to the actuation setpoint value for starting the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, causing all three Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps to start as designed. Because the steam generator water level was below the actuation setpoint, this was a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system. As a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system, this condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv). The untimeliness of the report has been entered into the Kewaunee Power Station's corrective action program. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (H. Peterson).

ENS 43928San Onofre23 January 2008 22:15:00One of Two Main Feedwater Pumps Trip

On January 23, 2008, at about 1415 PST, SONGS Unit 2 was operating at approximately 95 percent power when one of two main feed water pumps (P063/K005), tripped on low oil pressure while an adjustment was being made to the pump's lubricating oil pressure regulator. Control room operators manually actuated the emergency feedwater system in accordance with Abnormal Operating Instructions. Control room operators reduced reactor power level to about 65 percent which can be sustained with one normal feedwater pump in operation. The cause of this event is currently under investigation.

In compliance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), requiring licensees to report any event or condition that results in valid actuation of the emergency feedwater system, SCE is providing this notification to the NRC. At the time of this occurrence, Unit 3 was operating at about 100 percent power. SCE has notified the NRC resident inspectors about this occurrence and will provide them with a copy of this report.

ENS 44024Crystal River1 March 2008 09:27:00Emergency Feedwater Actuation While Shutting DownOn 03/01/2008 a pre-planned unit shutdown was in progress to repair a reactor coolant pump seal. At approximately 20% reactor power, a main feedwater flow perturbation occurred. This flow perturbation resulted in an Emergency Feedwater actuation at 0427 (EST). Both Emergency Feedwater system trains started automatically on low levels in the Once Through Steam Generators as designed. Main feedwater system recovered and continued to supply inventory with levels stabilized at the required low level setpoint. Following plant stabilization, Emergency Feedwater was secured and the pre-planned unit shutdown was resumed. This event is reportable under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). The cause of the feedwater flow perturbation is still under investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 44438Crystal River24 August 2008 19:57:00Manual Reactor Trip Due to Feedwater Flow OscillationsThe 'A' Condensate Pump became uncoupled, lowering Condensate flow. Operators began to manually lower reactor power to maintain deaerator level. Reactor power was lowered to approximately 62 percent. At this power, (feedwater) flow oscillations began and were excessive. With these flow oscillations increasing the decision was made to manually trip the Reactor. The Reactor was manually tripped at 1557 hours. There were no safety system actuations other than RPS (Manual). The plant is stable in a normal post trip configuration. All control rods inserted into the core during the reactor trip. Offsite power is available and powering safety loads. The steam generator safeties lifted during the transient and reseated. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the condenser using normal feedwater to the steam generator. The emergency feedwater system was not initiated during the reactor trip. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 45403Seabrook2 October 2009 02:39:00Unit Experienced a Valid Rps Actuation During Plant Cooldown on Low Steam Generator LevelsOn Thursday, October 1, 2009 @ 2239 hrs EDT Seabrook Station Unit 1 was in Mode 4 in the process of removing feedwater heating and raising steam generator levels during a plant cooldown. A valid actuation of the reactor protection system occurred when both the A and C steam generator (SG) levels were reduced to the SG low level reactor trip setpoint of less than 20%. This occurred twice on both the A and C steam generators approximately 10 minutes apart. Steam generator levels have since been restored to normal operating levels and plant is now in Mode 5. This is reportable under 50.72 (b)(3)(iv) as an event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation. The reactor trip breakers were open and the emergency feedwater system removed from service when the event occurred. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 45549Arkansas Nuclear8 December 2009 14:42:00Manual Reactor Trip Due to Low Steam Generator Level Caused by Loss of Main Feed Water PumpArkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2 experienced a high temperature on the 'A' Main Feedwater Pump thrust bearing which required the pump to be manually tripped . Steam Generator levels lowered as a result of the Main Feedwater Pump trip to the point that operators initiated a manual reactor trip. The Emergency Feedwater System automatically actuated on low Steam Generator level as a result of the Steam Generator level transient. The manual reactor trip requires 4-Hr non-emergency notification IAW 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The automatic actuation of Emergency Feedwater requires 8-Hr non-emergency notification IAW 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). All rods fully inserted. After the trip, decay heat was being removed using steam dumps to the condenser. Steam generator level was being maintained with the emergency feedwater pumps. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 45806Summer2 April 2010 08:45:00Unit Commenced Shutdown After Declaring Motor-Driven Emergency Feedwater System InoperableAt 0445 (EDT), VC Summer Nuclear Station commenced a shutdown required by Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 Action b. FCV 03541-EF, emergency motor driven feedwater flow control valve 'B', was declared inoperable due to the failure of Surveillance Requirement 4.7.1.2.b at 0154 (EDT). In accordance with 3.7.1.2 Action b, hot standby is required to be achieved within 6 hours (0754 EDT). At approximately 87% power, FCV 03541-EF was repaired and the associated Technical Specification was exited at 0608 (EDT). The power descent has been stopped, and all systems are functioning as required. The licensee will inform state/local agencies and has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 46544Oconee18 November 2010 07:45:00Invalid Actuation of Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater SystemThis report is being made per paragraphs 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to address an actuation of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System on Oconee Unit 3 on 11/18/10 while moving the 3A Motor Driven EFW Pump (MD EFWP) control switch from position 'Auto 1' to 'Auto 2.' EFW is a system named in 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). The 3A MD EFWP was inadvertently started during operation of the control switch in the Oconee Unit 3 Control Room. The start signal was a manual start when the operator moved the control switch beyond the intended position. The functioning/behavior of the MD EFWP control switch and human error are being investigated in the site corrective action program. This is considered an INVALID signal with respect to 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The manual start only affected the 3A MD EFWP. On 11/18/10, a Unit 3 startup from a refueling outage was in progress. Unit 3 was in Mode 3. While performing a step in OP/3/A/1102/001 (Controlling Procedure for Unit Startup), the Operator inadvertently started 3A MD EFWP when positioning 3A MD EFWP control switch from position 'Auto 1' to 'Auto 2.' Specific Information Required per NUREG 1022: (a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated: The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated was the 3A MD EFWP and the A train of EFW. The 3B MD EFWP and the Turbine Driven EFW Pump were not affected by this event. (b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial: The manual actuation was considered complete (i.e. all necessary components responded to the start signal to provide EFW to the Steam Generator (SG). The A train control valve (3FDW-315) was open, as expected for the evolutions in progress. This allowed EFW to reach the SG. C) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully: The 3A MD EFWP and train started and operated successfully until secured by Operations personnel. Initial Safety Significance: None, there was no significant transient. Corrective Action(s): EFDW was secured within approximately one minute by placing 3A MD EFWP control switch in the Auto 2 position. This event has been entered into the site corrective action program for resolution. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 47327Seabrook6 October 2011 16:26:00Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Low Steam Generator Water LevelAt 1226 (EDT) today, Seabrook experienced an automatic reactor trip on low steam generator water levels. The low steam generator levels resulted following a trip of one of the two operating main feed pumps. Main feed pump 'A' tripped on low suction pressure while a condensate pump was being returned to service following maintenance on the pump. The emergency feedwater system actuated automatically and recovered steam generator levels. All systems actuated and functioned as designed. The wide range level indication on steam generator 'C' indicated erratically and was declared Inoperable. The plant is stable and being maintained in Mode 3. The station plans to cool the plant to Mode 5 for a previously planned forced outage. This notification provides a four-hour report for an actuation of the reactor protection system while the reactor is critical and an eight-hour report for a valid actuation of the emergency feedwater system. All rods fully inserted. Emergency feedwater has been secured and placed in standby and startup feedwater is supplying the steam generators. Decay heat is being removed to the condenser via the turbine bypass valves. Electrical systems are in a normal shutdown alignment. There is nothing unusual or not understood and all systems functioned as required. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 48221Three Mile Island22 August 2012 12:01:00Automatic Reactor Trip Due to High Reactor Coolant System PressureOn August 22, 2012, during a planned load reduction, Three Mile Island Unit 1 Reactor automatically tripped at 0801 EDT due to high reactor coolant system pressure as a result of a main feedwater transient. The cause of the main feedwater transient is still under investigation. The Emergency Feedwater System (EFW) actuated at 0801 EDT. The electrical grid is stable and Unit 1 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via the Emergency Feedwater System (EFW) flow to both Steam Generators that are exhausting via the normal main condenser cooling loop under manual control. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the reactor trip and EFW actuation except for manual operation of Turbine Bypass Valve control due to failure of the automatic control function. Three Mile Island Unit 1 remains stable in Hot Shutdown mode while conducting the post trip review. No radioactive releases were experienced as a result of this event. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), due to an information release to local officials, both are four (4) hour reports. This event is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B), due to a valid actuation of the Emergency Feedwater System. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." Licensee notified the State, local and other Government agencies.
ENS 49103Callaway11 April 2013 06:28:0060-Day Optional Telephone Notification for an Invalid Specified System ActuationThis 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting the emergency feedwater system. While the plant was in Mode 5 on 4/11/2013, during performance of a maintenance procedure for AMSAC system logic verification, an invalid MDAFAS occurred. (Note: AMSAC is ATWAS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry and MDAFAS is Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal). Both trains of the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (MDAFPs) started. While generation of the actuation signal is an expected result of the procedure, the actuation occurred several steps earlier in the procedure than expected. Additionally, the Control Room Operators were not expecting the MDAFPs to start. The pumps were manually stopped. The actuation was caused by procedural guidance not containing a sufficiently prescribed sequence of activities that should occur when simulating plant conditions leading to the intended actuation of the AMSAC system. The plant was not in a condition where feedwater was required. The Senior NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 49979Seabrook1 April 2014 04:26:00Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Electrical IssueAt 0026 on 04/01/2014, following the turbine shutdown and removal of the main generator from service in preparation for refueling outage 16, Seabrook had a reactor trip and all control rods were fully inserted. The trip was caused by an electrical issue that caused 345 KV bus 6 to deenergize and power was lost to the Unit Auxiliary Transformers (UATs). The in-house busses transferred to the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) supplies and the momentary loss of power to in-house Bus 1 caused 2 reactor coolant pumps to trip, generating a 2 loop loss of flow reactor trip signal. The exact cause of the initiating electrical issue is being investigated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Emergency feedwater actuated at 0035 due to a low low water level in steam generator 'C'. Plant equipment response is being evaluated and the plant is stabilized in Mode 3 with decay heat removal through the steam dump system to the condensers. There was no release and the emergency feedwater system is being restored to standby. The event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
ENS 51268Oconee27 July 2015 13:56:00Valid Actuation of Unit 2 Emergency Feedwater System During StartupAt approximately 0956 EDT on July 27, 2015, Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 2 experienced a valid actuation of the Emergency Feedwater System (EFW). At the time of the event, Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at approximately 17% power and increasing with preparations in progress for placing the main turbine on line during a unit startup. The (EFW) actuation was due to a low level on the 2B steam generator, which resulted from failure of 2B Main Feedwater Block Valve 2FDW-40 to automatically open upon demand. All systems operated as expected with no problems observed. Unit 2 is currently stable at approximately 16% power while troubleshooting valve 2FDW-40 (and the 2B Steam Generator level stable at the normal operating level). Units 1 and 3 were unaffected and remain on line and stable at 100% power. Public health and safety were not impacted by this event. This event is being reported as an 8 hour non-emergency in accordance with 10 CPR 50.72(b)(3)(iv) for a valid actuation of the Emergency Feedwater System. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Corrective Action: Troubleshooting of valve 2FDW-40 is on-going.
ENS 51506Point Beach29 October 2015 08:48:00Actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System Due to Main Transformer LockoutAt 0348 CDT, while Point Beach Unit 2 was performing outage activities, it experienced a Main Power Transformer lockout and associated loss of busses (2A-01, 2A-02, 2B-01 and 2B-02). The loss of the two non-vital 4160 V buses resulted in actuation of the Unit 2 undervoltage logic which resulted in actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The Auxiliary Feedwater System functioned normally upon actuation. This condition was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)(6), PWR auxiliary or emergency feedwater system actuation. This event did not affect the operating Unit 1. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 51695Three Mile Island2 December 2015 02:19:00Invalid Emergency Feedwater ActuationOn December 1, 2015, at 2119 EST, with Unit 1 in power operation mode, during a planned maintenance activity, an invalid Heat Sink Protection System (HSPS) actuation occurred. At the time of the event, electrical maintenance technicians were verifying a HSPS relay contact state using an electrical test meter. The contact was being verified open by recording both voltage and resistance readings across the contact. The technicians first measured voltage. No voltage was found, indicating the relay contact was open, as expected. The technicians then measured for resistance across the open contact. Test meters have lower circuit impedance when measuring resistance as opposed to voltage, which can result in electrically bridging across open contacts. When the meter was installed across the open contact to obtain the resistance reading, the HSPS actuation circuit logic was completed and the inadvertent HSPS actuation occurred. The HSPS actuation resulted in the steam driven Emergency Feedwater (EFW) pump automatically starting and control valves receiving actuation set point signals. There was no emergency feed water injection into the steam generators. At the time of the inadvertent HSPS actuation, steam generator operating levels were above the HSPS actuation setpoint. The specific train and system that actuated was the Heat Sink Protection System, Emergency Feedwater System Actuation on Loss of All Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) Train A. The HSPS Loss of all RCP Train A actuation was complete. The EFW valves and EFW steam driven pump started and functioned successfully. This is reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of HSPS Loss of all RCP Train A and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this notification of the invalid actuation is provided in lieu of a written LER. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 51765Seabrook2 March 2016 18:12:00Valid Actuation of Emergency FeedwaterOn 3/2/2016, (at) 1312 hours EST, while in the process of a plant cooldown, a valid actuation of the emergency feedwater system (EFW) occurred when B steam generator levels were reduced to 20 (percent). The lowering level was a result of the unanticipated tripping of the start up feed pump on low condensate storage level while it was the feed source to the steam generators. The start up feed pump was restarted and feed flow had been restored when the actuation took place. The EFW flow was secured per procedure and the start up feed pump remains the feed source to the steam generators. This is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 52718Seabrook29 April 2017 22:44:00Manual Reactor Trip Due to Steam Generator Hi-Hi Level Signal and Feedwater IsolationAt 1844 (EDT) on 04/29/2017, while the unit was in a low power condition exiting from a refueling outage, the reactor was manually tripped following a P-14 signal (Steam Generator Hi-Hi Level) and a resulting feedwater isolation signal. All control rods were verified to be fully inserted. The cause of the ('B') steam generator high level is currently being investigated. Emergency feedwater actuated at 1845 due to a low-low water level in steam generator 'D'. Plant equipment response is being evaluated and the plant is stabilized in Mode 3 with decay heat removal through the steam dump system to the condensers. There was no release and the emergency feedwater system has been restored to standby. The event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 55028Arkansas Nuclear10 December 2020 22:08:00Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Low Steam Generator Water Level

On December 10, 2020 at 1608 CST, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) experienced an automatic reactor scram from 100 percent power due to Low Steam Generator Water Level in 2E-24A Steam Generator. Emergency Feedwater actuated automatically due to low water level in the A Steam Generator. Due to inadequate control of the B Main Feedwater Control System, water level in the B Steam generator rose to a level requiring manual trip of the B Main Feedwater pump. Emergency Feedwater responded as designed to feed both steam generators automatically. All other systems responded as designed. All electrical power is being supplied from offsite power and maintaining unit electrical loads as designed. Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) maintaining pressure and temperature via Emergency Feedwater and secondary system steaming. There are no indications of a radiological release on either unit as a result of this event. This report satisfies the reporting criteria of both 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(6) for the Reactor Protection System actuation and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the actuation of the Emergency Feedwater System. The Arkansas Nuclear One NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN LINDSEY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1605 EST ON 12/11/2020 * * *

The purpose of this (report) is to provide an update to NRC Event Number 55028. The cause of the inadequate control of the B Main Feedwater Control System to control B Steam Generator Level was verified to be associated with the failure that led to the A Steam Generator low level condition. After taking action to trip the B Main Feedwater Pump, Emergency Feedwater was manually actuated for the B Steam Generator and the Emergency Feedwater System was verified to maintain proper automatic control of both Steam Generator levels. At the time of the initial event notification, plant temperature and pressure control had been transferred from Emergency Feedwater to Auxiliary Feedwater along with secondary system steaming. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Kellar).

ENS 55580Summer15 November 2021 22:28:00Manual Reactor Trip Due to Main Transformer Fault

At 1728 EST on 11/15/2021, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 47 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a main transformer fault. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the emergency feedwater system through the main condenser. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, due to the valid actuation of the emergency feedwater system, this event is being reported as a non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/16/21 AT 1649 EST FROM BRUCE BENNETT TO KERBY SCALES * * *

At approximately 0900 (EST) on 11/16/2021, it was identified that mineral oil from the faulted main transformer had surpassed the capability of the oil containment system and discharged into Lake Monticello. It is estimated that less than 50 gallons of mineral oil entered the Lake. The oil is contained with booms and cleanup is ongoing. The EPA National Response Center and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control have been notified. This is considered a news release or notification to other government agencies; therefore, this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).

ENS 55750Oconee22 February 2022 03:07:00Manual Reactor Trip

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: At 2207 (EST) on 2/21/2022 with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 68 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to lowering water level in the 2A Steam Generator. The trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operators responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Units 1 and 3 were not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non- emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

  • * * UPDATE ON 3/23/22 AT 1643 EDT FROM CHRIS MCDUFFIE TO TOM KENDZIA * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On 2/21/2022, Unit 2 was in Mode 1 increasing reactor power following startup from a forced outage. At 2205 (EST) with Unit 2 at 68 percent power, a feedwater control valve failed to properly control feedwater flow to the 2A Steam Generator and the Integrated Control System initiated an automatic runback. At 2207 (EST), the reactor was manually tripped from 39 percent power due to lowering water level in the 2A Steam Generator. Immediately following the manual reactor trip, an actuation of the Emergency Feedwater System (EFW) occurred. The 2A and 2B Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater (MDEFW) pumps automatically started as designed when the 'low steam generator level' signal was received for the 2A Steam Generator. The trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operators responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat was removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Units 1 and 3 were not affected. Unit 2 was restarted on 2/27/2022 following repairs. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event was reported on 2/22/2022 as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Following further evaluation, it was determined that a valid EFW actuation occurred, therefore this event is now also being reported as a late 8-hour non-emergency notification of a valid actuation of the EFW system in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R2DO (Miller).

ENS 55800Oconee13 February 2022 21:25:00Emergency Feedwater System ActuationThe following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone: At 1625 (EST) on 2/13/2022, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power and plant heat up to normal operating temperature in progress, an actuation of the Emergency Feedwater System (EFW) occurred. The reason for the EFW auto-start was lowering water level in the 2A and 2B Steam Generators due to failure of the 2A Main Feedwater Pump to respond as required to maintain Steam Generator water level as Steam Generator pressure increased during plant heat up. The 2A and 2B Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater (MDEFW) pumps automatically started as designed when the 'low steam generator level' signal was received for the 2A and 2B Steam Generators. Following further evaluation, it was determined that a valid EFW actuation occurred, therefore this event is being reported as a late 8-hour non-emergency notification of a valid actuation of the EFW system in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 56453Summer5 April 2023 10:51:00Manual Reactor TripThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0651 EDT on April 5, 2023, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 85 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to loss of main feedwater pump 'C'. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Main feedwater pump 'B' had previously been removed from service in preparation for a planned shutdown as a part of refueling outage RF27. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the emergency feedwater system. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) resulting from valid actuation of the reactor protection and emergency feedwater systems. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The licensee continues to investigate the loss of main feedwater pump 'C'. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.