Semantic search
| Discovered date | Reporting criterion | Title | Description | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 47105 | 28 July 2011 06:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Control Room Temperature Recorder Inoperable | On July 28, 2011, at 0115 hours, a main control room recorder failed. The recorder functions to remotely monitor plant area temperatures, including eight areas used in accident classification (specifically, Emergency Action Level classifications when predetermined temperature levels are exceeded). Troubleshooting efforts have been initiated to determine the cause of the recorder failure; the eight affected areas are being monitored locally twice per shift during operator rounds. Given this recorder is used for accident classification, this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 47634 | 3 February 2012 16:35:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"On February 3, 2012, at 1035 hours (CST), the Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (CREV AC) system was declared inoperable when the electrical feed breaker to the Refrigeration Compressor Unit (RCU) was found in a tripped condition. As a result, Technical Specification 3.7.5, Condition A, was entered. Troubleshooting is in progress at this time. "The CREV AC system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions. "This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system, and loss of the CREV AC could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident." The LCO places the plant in a 30-day action statement. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | 05000254/LER-2012-001 | |
| ENS 47799 | 2 April 2012 19:52:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown | Initiation of Reactor Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications (Ts) 3.8.1.F | On April 2, 2012, at 1452 hours, Unit 1 received Panel 901-8 A7 U1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Trouble alarm. Equipment Operators were dispatched and the Unit 1 EDG was found running unloaded, without a generator field flash, and no auto start signal received. Troubleshooting identified that a 125 VDC ground had caused the Unit 1 EDG to start. As a result, the Unit 1 EDG was declared inoperable. At this time Unit 2 is in a refueling outage and the Unit 2 EDG is currently inoperable for repairs. Due to the inoperability of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 EDGs, at 2000 hours a Reactor Shutdown was initiated on Unit 1 in accordance with TS 3.8.1.F. In addition, since the EDGs supply emergency power to both Unit's Standby Gas Treatment Systems (SBGTS), emergency power was unavailable to SBGTS; however, normal power supplies remained available. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). At 2151 hours, the Unit 1 EDG was declared operable following repairs and successful operability testing. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. | |
| ENS 47806 | 4 April 2012 22:16:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | Degraded Condition Due to Identified Reactor Pressure Vessel Test Leakage | On April 4, 2012, at 1716 (CDT), with Unit 2 shutdown for refueling, leakage was identified from a 2-inch vessel nozzle during a Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) pressure test. The leakage amount was approximately one drop per second. The penetration (N-11B) is a reference leg used for reactor vessel instrumentation. The leakage originates from the area where the nozzle penetrates the vessel wall. The nozzle is welded on the inside of the vessel, so the actual attachment weld could not be examined at the time of this report. The RPV pressure test has been stopped and the reactor vessel depressurized. The cause and resolution are under evaluation. The condition is being reported under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) given the defect was associated with the primary coolant system pressure boundary. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | 05000265/LER-2012-002 |
| ENS 47847 | 18 April 2012 20:11:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Unit Two Automatic Reactor Scram on High Reactor Pressure | On April 18, 2012, at 1511 hours (CDT), an automatic scram occurred on high reactor pressure. The pressure increase occurred during post-modification testing on the main generator automatic voltage regulator, which had been upgraded during the recent refueling outage. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately zero inches, which resulted in automatic Group II and III isolations (Reactor Water Clean Up and Secondary Containment Isolation) as expected. All systems responded properly to the event. The cause of the event is still under investigation. Unit 1 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100% power. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). All Control Rods fully inserted, decay heat is being removed through the bypass steam valves to the main condenser, and the plant remains in a normal shutdown electrical alignment. The high reactor pressure appears to have been caused by a load rejection associated with the main generator voltage regulator testing. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 47875 | 25 March 2012 00:36:00 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER | Invalid Protection System Actuation During Station Electrical Transient | The purpose of this report is to provide a telephone notification for an invalid actuation. On March 24, 2012, following the completion of switch yard work, the Control Room received switching orders to open Bus Tie 9-10 Bus 9 disconnect and close Bus Tie 9-10 Bus 10 disconnect. Operations was unaware that a grounding device, installed for personnel protection during the work activities, had not been removed. Consequently, when the Bus Tie 9-10 Bus 10 disconnect was closed the switchyard was grounded resulting in an electrical transient. Protective relaying operated as designed to clear the fault, and there were no injuries. During the electrical transient, the voltage depression tripped the Unit 1 "A" Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus which caused a 1/2 scram and certain protective logic systems to de-energize by design. The following invalid actuations occurred as a result of the loss of power to the RPS bus: partial Group 11 Isolation (Primary Containment); Group III Isolation (Reactor Water Cleanup); Reactor Building Ventilation Isolation; Control Room Ventilation Isolation; and Standby Gas Treatment Initiation. The electrical transient also tripped the Unit 1 ECCS keep�fill pump, resulting in the Core Spray (CS) discharge pressure decreasing to the alarm setpoint. Both CS subsystems were conservatively declared inoperable and entry into Technical Specifications (TS) 3.0.3 occurred at 1936 hours. Subsequent fill and vent activities confirmed no air existed in the discharge headers of the CS subsystems (no loss of safety function) and both subsystems were declared operable with TS 3.0.3 being exited at 2017 hours. Following the electrical transient, the Unit 1 generator was temporarily limited to approximately 90% load due to elevated vibration on Turbine Bearing No. 10. In-plant walk-downs identified no other equipment concerns. Unit 1 returned to full power on April 2, 2012, following confirmation the bearing vibration is acceptable for long-term operation. Unit 2 was in a scheduled refueling outage during the event and was unaffected by the electrical transient. A Root Cause Investigation is ongoing. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 48108 | 15 July 2012 15:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (Hpci) Inoperable Due to Valve Leak | On July 15, 2012, at 1030 hours, a defect (pinhole through-wall leak) was identified on the 1-2301-29 valve (HPCI Steam Line to Main Condenser Isolation Valve). The defect was identified during a routine system walkdown. The 1-2301-29 valve (1" valve downstream of the HPCI drain pot) is normally open during HPCI standby operation and closes upon system initiation. Due to the location of the defect, the 1-2301-29 valve would not have completely isolated the steam line as designed. As a result, HPCI was declared inoperable. Given that HPCI is a single train system, this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). HPCI will remain inoperable until system repairs are complete. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS Report made on July 15, 2012, at 1030 hours (ENS Report # 48108). Further evaluation performed by Quad Cities Station confirms the Unit 1 HPCI system would have performed its safety function. Based on this subsequent evaluation, ENS Report # 48108 is being retracted. Note: On July 21, the 1-2301-29 valve (HPCI Steam Line to Main Condenser Isolation Valve) was successfully repaired and HPCI was returned to Operable status. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Giessner). | |
| ENS 48114 | 17 July 2012 16:20:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Control Room Emergency Ventilation Ac System Inoperable | On July 17, 2012, at 1120 hours the Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (CREV AC) system was declared inoperable due to a cooling water leak from the condenser on the Refrigeration Compressor Unit (RCU). The leakage originates from an apparent gasket leak at a bolted connection on the condenser. As a result, Technical Specification 3.7.5, Condition A, was entered. A repair plan and schedule is being developed. The CREV AC system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system, and loss of the CREV AC could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS Report made on July 17, 2012, at 1120 hours (ENS Report # 48114). Further evaluation performed by Quad Cities Station confirms the CREV AC system would have performed its safety function. Based on this subsequent evaluation, ENS Report # 48114 is being retracted. Note: On July 18, 2012, the CREV AC system was successfully repaired and CREV AC system was returned to Operable status. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Giessner). | |
| ENS 48172 | 9 August 2012 13:55:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Confirmed Positive Fitness for Duty Test | A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a follow-up fitness for duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been denied. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 48282 | 6 September 2012 18:14:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Loss of Secondary Containment Ventilation for Eight Seconds | On September 6, 2012, at 1314 hours, the reactor building ventilation system was being restored to service following planned maintenance and surveillance activities. During the reactor building pressure transition when restoring reactor building ventilation (from the Standby Gas Treatment System), an employee entered a secondary containment interlock and identified a door leading to the environment had opened. The employee immediately secured the door and notified Operations personnel. A review of the door alarm history determined the door was open for approximately eight seconds. Given the temporary breech in secondary containment, this event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 48332 | 21 September 2012 19:49:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Drywell Radiation Monitor Inoperable | At 1449 CDT on September 21, 2012, the 2B Drywell Radiation Monitor was found downscale during control room panel monitoring. This monitor provides the input into one division of the primary containment isolation logic for a Group II isolation. As a result, the channel was placed in a tripped condition at 1515 hours in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.6.1, Condition B. Initial troubleshooting indicates that one of the two divisions of the isolation logic was inoperable. Given both divisions are required to complete the Group II isolation logic, this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The station is currently taking action to restore the 2B Drywell Radiation Monitor to an operable condition. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 48406 | 15 October 2012 13:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Technical Support Center (Tsc) Maintenance | Planned maintenance activities will commence today (October 15, 2012) on the Quad Cities Station TSC. The maintenance involves replacing a portion of the TSC roof. The roof repair work affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation (the roof is part of the habitability boundary). The maintenance is scheduled to be completed in approximately 48 hours. During off-hours the roof will be temporarily sealed. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since the scheduled maintenance affects an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 48527 | 20 November 2012 19:21:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Drywell Radiation Monitor Inoperable | At 1321 (CST) hours on November 20, 2012, the 1B Drywell Radiation Monitor exhibited degraded performance at the conclusion of surveillance testing. This monitor provides the input into one division of the primary containment isolation logic for a Group II isolation. As a result, the channel was placed in a tripped condition in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.6.1, Condition B. Given both divisions are required to complete the Group II isolation logic, this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The station is currently taking action to troubleshoot and restore the 1B Drywell Radiation Monitor to an operable condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS Retraction - Drywell Radiation Monitor Inoperable The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS Report made on November 20, 2012, at 1827 EST hours (ENS Report # 48527). Further evaluation performed by Quad Cities Station confirms the 1B Drywell Radiation Monitor would have performed its safety function when required. Based on this subsequent evaluation, ENS Report # 48527 is being retracted. Note: On November 21, 2012, the 1B Drywell Radiation Monitor was successfully repaired and returned to Operable status. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Bloomer). | |
| ENS 48853 | 27 March 2013 07:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | Reactor Pressure Boundary Leakage | On March 26, 2013, at 1635 (CDT), with Unit 1 shutdown for refueling, leakage was identified from the 2-inch reactor head vent line during a Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) pressure test. The leakage was approximately 20 drops per minute. The RPV pressure test was stopped and the reactor vessel depressurized to facilitate examination of the piping and associated flange connections. At 0245 hours on March 27, 2013, the leak was confirmed to be through-wall originating from a socket weld (i.e., pipe elbow). The cause and resolution are under evaluation. The condition is being reported under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) given the defect was associated with the primary coolant system pressure boundary. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector | 05000254/LER-2013-003 |
| ENS 48916 | 11 April 2013 18:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Degraded Electrical Connections | On April 11, 2013, at 1300 hours, during the performance of On-Line Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Blowdown Logic Testing, two poor wiring connections were identified (the electrical leads were not properly compressed at their termination point). The electrical leads are associated with the B and C ADS valves. Quad Cities has five ADS valves which can be used to depressurize the Reactor Pressure Vessel under accident conditions. While the solenoids of these valves were actuated successfully during the recent Unit 1 refueling outage (which ended on April 8, 2013), the less than optimum configuration could have prevented the valves from actuating under design basis conditions. The degraded wiring for both valves was restored at 1741 hours (CDT). Given the potential impact on the ADS depressurization function, this event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS Report made on April 11, 2013, at 2110 EDT (ENS Report # 48916). Further evaluation performed by Quad Cities Station confirms the Unit 1, 3B and 3C Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) valves would have performed their safety functions when required. Based on this subsequent evaluation, ENS Report # 48916 is being retracted. Note: On April 11, 2013, at 1741 CDT the degraded wiring for the Unit 1, 3B and 3C ADS valves was repaired and both valves were returned to operable status. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Orth). | |
| ENS 49135 | 19 June 2013 15:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Planned Maintenance | Planned breaker maintenance activities will be performed today (Wednesday, June 19, 2013) which will temporarily remove power to the Quad Cities Station TSC. The maintenance will be completed in approximately 2 hours and is scheduled to be worked continuously to minimize out-of-service time. If TSC activation is required during this period, compensatory measures have been established to direct ERO (Emergency Response Organization) members to an alternate location. No other emergency response facilities are impacted by the breaker maintenance. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since the scheduled maintenance affects an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 49321 | 4 September 2013 21:15:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Confirmed Positive Fitness-For-Duty Test | A licensed employee had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 49407 | 4 October 2013 01:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (Hpci) Inoperable Due to Drain Line Leak | On October 3, 2013, at 2045 (CDT) hours, a defect (pinhole through-wall leak) was identified on the drain line for the LS 2-2365, HPCI TURBINE INLET DRAIN POT LEVEL SWITCH. The defect was identified during investigation of leakage near LS 2-2365. The LS 2-2365, HPCI TURBINE INLET DRAIN POT LEVEL SWITCH, is provided to detect a failure of the HPCI steam trap during standby line-up. The location of the defect, is in Class 2 Safety related piping. HPCI is a single train safety system and this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The instrument isolations for LS 2-2365 have been close and the leak has been isolated. There is no increase to plant risk and RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) is available. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.
The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS report made on October 4, 2013, at 0212 EDT (ENS Report # 49407). Upon further investigation the pinhole through-wall leak discovered in the Unit 2 HPCI room was in a weld at a 'Tee' downstream of the Unit 2 HPCI turbine inlet drain pot level switch (LS 2-2365) on drain line 2-2386B-1-B. The defect was characterized as a 1/16-inch rounded hole due to gas porosity (with no evidence of cracking). A subsequent evaluation performed by Quad Cities Station considering the defect size, location, and characterization confirmed the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system would have performed its safety function when required. Based on this subsequent evaluation, ENS Report # 49407 is being retracted. Note: On October 3, 2013, at 1155 CDT the Unit 2 HPCI drain line leak was isolated and HPCI was declared operable. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lipa). | |
| ENS 49589 | 27 November 2013 20:46:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Non-Occupational Death On-Site | At approximately 1446 hours (CST) on November 27, 2013 a badged employee was discovered non-responsive inside a vehicle within the Owner Controlled Area. (The vehicle was located outside the protected area and in the parking lot). On-site and off-site emergency personnel responded to the medical issue. The individual was pronounced dead at 1604 hours. No radioactive material or contamination was involved. The death was not work-related nor the result of an occupational event. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident lnspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 49727 | 15 January 2014 13:23:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Drywell Radiation Monitor Inoperable | At 0723 (CST) hours on January 15, 2014, the 2A Drywell Radiation Monitor was declared inoperable after exhibiting erratic performance. This monitor provides the input into one division of the primary containment isolation logic for a Group II isolation. As a result, the channel was placed in a tripped condition in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.6.1, Condition B. Given both divisions are required to complete the Group II isolation logic, this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The 2A Drywell Radiation Monitor has been repaired and restored to an operable condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS notification made on January 15, 2014 (ENS 49727). Upon further investigation it was verified that the Drywell Radiation Monitors do not mitigate the consequences of an accident as discussed in Chapters 6 and 15 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and the Technical Specifications Bases for 3.3.6.1. Therefore, the threshold for reporting the issue as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function was not met (NUREG 1022 Revision 3 - Event Report Guidelines Section 3.2.7). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R3DO (Orlikowski). | |
| ENS 49870 | 5 March 2014 01:17:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Momentary Loss of Secondary Containment | At 1917 hours (CST) on March 4, 2014, the Unit 1B fuel pool radiation monitor spiked high due to an invalid actuation which caused the U1 and U2 reactor building ventilation system to isolate (the control room ventilation system also isolated as designed). The Standby Gas Treatment system was already in operation for a scheduled surveillance as of 1900 hours on March 4, 2014. During the ensuing pressure transient, the Reactor Building differential pressure momentarily went positive. As a result, Secondary Containment was declared inoperable. Given the temporary loss in secondary containment, this event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. After the transient, the reactor building ventilation system was shutdown for scheduled maintenance and the control room ventilation system was returned to its normal configuration. The Standby Gas Treatment system was operating to support planned reactor building ventilation system maintenance. Troubleshooting of the radiation monitor spike is underway. | 05000254/LER-2014-001 |
| ENS 49962 | 26 March 2014 15:15:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness for Duty Report Involving a Supervisory Licensed Employee | A supervisory licensed employee had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 49977 | 31 March 2014 18:02:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | Unit 2 Reactor Pressure Boundary Leakage and Unit Shutdown | On March 31, 2014, at 1302 (CDT), with Unit 2 operating in Mode 1 (coastdown), leakage was identified from the body of a one inch isolation valve associated with a Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Control Unit (CRD HCU 18-27 insert valve 101). The leakage is several drops per minute; attempts to isolate the leak have been unsuccessful. The associated piping communicates with the reactor coolant system (through the CRD mechanism). Technical Specification 3.4.4 (RCS Operational Leakage), Condition C, was entered at 1302 hours. Condition C requires the unit to be placed in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) in 12 hours. At 1616 hours, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated on Unit 2. The cause and resolution of the leakage are being pursued. This condition is being reported under 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) given the defect is associated with the primary coolant system pressure boundary. This notification is also being made in accordance with 10 CPR 50.72(b)(2)(i) given the initiation of a plant shutdown required by the plant Technical Specifications. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | 05000265/LER-2014-001 |
| ENS 49984 | 1 April 2014 18:57:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Unit 2 Secondary Containment Interlocked Doors Opened Simultaneously | On April 1, 2014, at 1357 hours, the Control Room was notified that two Secondary Containment interlock doors (between the Unit 2 Reactor Building and Unit 2 Turbine Building) were open simultaneously. The doors were immediately closed and Secondary Containment pressure remained negative. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2 given two doors in a single access opening were open simultaneously. As a result entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to Secondary Containment being inoperable. This event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. | 05000254/LER-2014-002 |
| ENS 49988 | 2 April 2014 18:40:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Alert Declared Due to Fire in Unit 2 Turbine Building | Quad Cities Unit 2 Alert Classification (HA3) Due to Fire. On April 2, 2014, at 1340 CDT, an ALERT was declared due to a fire in the Unit 2 turbine building. Prior to declaring the ALERT, Unit 2 was manually scrammed at 1302 CDT. All control rods inserted and all automatic isolations actuated as designed. The Main Steam Isolation Valves were manually closed. The fire has been extinguished. Unit 2 is currently in Hot Shutdown. The cause of the event is under investigation. Unit 1 remains at 100% power. The Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of the event. Unit 2 is still being supplied from off-site power and is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup with the exception of Bus 29-1 (480 VAC safety bus) that was deenergized. One Unit 2 emergency diesel generator is inoperable due to the loss of power to its cooling water pump. The licensee has notified the State and local agencies. Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA OPS Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, and Nuclear SSA via email.
At 2132 CDT on April 2, 2014, the licensee terminated the Unit 2 Alert declaration. Unit 2 is stable in Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown). Unit 2 is proceeding to Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) on shutdown cooling. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State emergency agencies. Notified the IRD (Gott), R3DO (Passehl), and NRR EO (McGinty). Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, NICC Watch Officer, USDA OPS Center, EPA EOC, FDA EOC, and Nuclear SSA via email. | 05000265/LER-2014-002 |
| ENS 50132 | 23 May 2014 02:50:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Both Hpci Secondary Containment Airlock Doors Open Simultaneously | On May 22, 2014, at 2150 hours, the Shift Manager was notified that both HPCI Secondary Containment interlock doors were open simultaneously. The doors were immediately closed and Secondary Containment pressure remained negative. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2 given two doors in a single access opening were open. As a result, entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to Secondary Containment being inoperable. This event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | 05000254/LER-2014-003 |
| ENS 50427 | 5 September 2014 00:05:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Control Room Emergency Ventilation (Crev) System Inoperable | On September 04, 2014, at 1905 hours (CDT), the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to the Air Handling Unit (AHU) tripping upon restoration of Control Room Ventilation following testing of Reactor Building Ventilation instrumentation. Troubleshooting is in progress at this time. Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition A, was entered which requires the CREV system to be restored to an operable status in seven (7) days. Additionally, Technical Specification 3.7.5, Condition A, was entered which requires CREV AC to be restored to an operable status in 30 days. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), '(any) event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function,' because the CREV system is a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS notification made on September 4, 2014 (ENS 50427). Upon further investigation it was verified that the function of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System was not affected as discussed in Chapters 6 and 15 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Therefore, the threshold for reporting the issue as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function was not met (NUREG 1022 Revision 3 - Event Report Guidelines Section 3.2.7). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and applicable State authorities. Notified R3DO (Pelke) | |
| ENS 50593 | 4 November 2014 17:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (Hpci) Inoperable | On November 4, 2014, at 1100 (CST), LS 2-2365 (HPCI Turbine Inlet Drain Pot Level Switch) was determined to be inoperable during planned testing. HPCI was inoperable (for the planned testing) at the time of discovery. The function of LS 2-2365 is to detect a failure of the HPCI steam trap (i.e., outlet of the HPCI inlet drain pot) by providing a control room alarm and opening an alternate drain path. HPCl is a single train safety system and this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | 05000265/LER-2014-004 |
| ENS 50597 | 6 November 2014 01:38:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | Six Unit 2 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Control Units Inoperable | Six (6) U2 CRD (Control Rod Drive) HCU (Hydraulic Control Unit) accumulators were identified with riser brackets that were installed incorrectly. This issue impacts U2 CRD HCU accumulators only. The incorrect riser bracket installation could challenge the ability of the CRD hydraulic control unit to perform its design function during a seismic event. Identified U2 control rods associated with HCU accumulators that had riser brackets installed incorrectly were declared inoperable. This condition has been corrected since initial identification, restoring all control rods to operable status. Reference IR 2407342. This notification is made pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) regarding the reportability of multiple failures that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS notification made on November 6, 2014 (ENS 50597). An Engineering Evaluation has determined that the function of the affected U2 CRD HCU Accumulators was not affected as discussed in Chapters 6 and 15 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Therefore, the threshold for reporting the issue as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function was not met (NUREG 1022, Revision 3, Event Report Guidelines Section 3.2.7). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Dickson). | |
| ENS 50622 | 18 November 2014 15:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Secondary Containment Interlock Doors Open Simultaneously | On November 18, 2014, at 0900 (CST), the Shift Manager was notified that two Secondary Containment interlock doors were open simultaneously. The doors were immediately closed and Secondary Containment pressure remained negative throughout the event. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2 given two doors in a single access opening were open. As a result entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to Secondary Containment being inoperable. This event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The State of Illinois has been notified. | 05000254/LER-2014-004 |
| ENS 50678 | 15 December 2014 13:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Inoperable | On December 15, 2014, at 0730 hours (CST) the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to a partially stuck open main control room door. The door was unable to be closed to establish the boundary of the control room envelope. As a result, Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition C, was entered. A repair plan and schedule is being developed. The CREV system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions as well as protection of the operators from a high dose environment assumed during a design basis accident. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system, and loss of the CREV system could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident as stated in Chapter 6 of the UFSAR. This event is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since this condition also impacts the control room as an Emergency Response Facility. At 0910 (CST) exited Tech Spec 3.7.4, Condition C, for CREV System Inoperable due to inoperable Control Room Envelope (CRE). The Control Room door is now closed. Completed post maintenance smoke test, satisfactory. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | 05000254/LER-2014-005 |
| ENS 50708 | 30 December 2014 14:16:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Technical Support Center Maintenance Affecting the Air Handling System | Planned maintenance activities will commence today (December 30, 2014) on the Quad Cities Station TSC. The activity involves maintenance on the TSC Air Handling Unit (AHU). Work on the AHU affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation since the AHU supports habitability. The duration of maintenance is currently unknown, and is dependent on the conditions discovered during maintenance. Restoration from maintenance is expected to take longer than the required activation time of the TSC. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since the maintenance activity affects an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will be notifying the onsite Illinois Emergency Management Agency representative. * * * UPDATE FROM CHAD BRITTON TO DANIEL MILLS AT 1527 EST ON 12/30/2014 * * * At 1230 CST on December 30, 2014, the maintenance activity was completed and the TSC ventilation was restored. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Notified R3DO (Cameron). | |
| ENS 50730 | 12 January 2015 11:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Maintenance on Radiological Monitor | At 0500 (CST) today (January 12, 2015), planned maintenance activities commenced on the Reactor Building Separate Particulate Iodine and Noble Gas (SPING) monitor. Work on the SPING affects classification and assessment of the Emergency Plan for a radiological release through the Reactor Building Vents. In the case of a radiological event, the Reactor Building Ventilation will be isolated via Area Radiation Monitors (ARM) in the ducting and the Main Chimney SPING will be used for classification and assessment. This would be the normal response for a radiological event. This maintenance activity is expected to be longer than 72 hours. The Reactor Building SPING is scheduled to be restored on Friday, January 16. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since the maintenance activity affects classification and assessment. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 50803 | 10 February 2015 16:55:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Secondary Containment Interlock Doors Open Simultaneously | On February 10, 2015, at 1055 CST, the Shift Manager was notified that both (High Pressure Coolant Injection) HPCI Secondary Containment interlock doors were open simultaneously. The doors were immediately closed and secondary containment pressure remained negative. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2 given two doors in a single access opening were open simultaneously. As a result entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to secondary containment being inoperable. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee reported that personnel were posted in the area as a compensatory measure. The State of Illinois Emergency Management will be notified. | 05000254/LER-2015-002 |
| ENS 50882 | 13 March 2015 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Fuel Assembly Mis-Oriented Resulting in a Unanalyzed Condition | On March 13, 2015 at 0100 (CDT), it was identified that fuel assembly QAD224 was mis-oriented 180 degrees at core location 51-40. The intended orientation was (southeast). However the assembly was identified as being (northwest). This issue was identified during the core verification process. In the current core configuration, there is not a bounding analysis that assures adequate Shutdown Margin. This event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS notification made on March 13, 2015 (ENS 50882). An evaluation has determined that Shutdown Margin was met with the mis-oriented fuel bundle. Therefore, the threshold for reporting the issue as a degraded or unanalyzed condition was not met (NUREG 1022 Revision 3 - Event Report Guidelines Section 3.2.7). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R3DO (Skowkowski). | |
| ENS 50928 | 26 March 2015 18:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Seismograph Not Available for Emergency Plan Assessment | Quad Cities Station has completed a review of the station strong motion seismograph's performance. The seismograph is currently functional; however, this review identified 3 times in the past 3 years that the seismograph was non-functional such that emergency classification at the ALERT level could not be obtained with site instrumentation: 1) 02/03/2014 2) 10/07/2014 3) 10/19/2014 These unplanned non-functional conditions of the seismograph were entered into the Quad Cities Corrective Action Program when they occurred. While Exelon procedural direction allowed the use of offsite sources to obtain seismic data when the seismograph was nonfunctional, this was not explicitly referenced in the approved Emergency Action Levels. The loss of assessment capability is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This report is required per 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(ii) as an event that occurred within 3 years of the date of discovery. Corrective actions are in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |
| ENS 50949 | 3 April 2015 02:33:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Manual Reactor Scram Due to Steam Leak | On April 2, 2015 at 2133 CDT, a manual scram was inserted on Unit 1 following discovery of a steam leak in the Turbine Building at the D-ring, near the Turbine Bypass valves. Following the reactor scram, reactor water level decreased to approximately -2 inches, which resulted in an automatic Group II and Group III isolation (expected response). The steam leak was isolated by manual closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves. All systems responded properly to the event. Unit 1 remains in Mode 3, with cooldown in progress. Reactor water level is in the normal level band. The cause and details of the event are under investigation. Unit 2 was unaffected by the event and remains at 100 percent power. Operators reduced reactor power to 20 percent before initiating a SCRAM. All rods fully inserted and the reactor is shutdown and stable. The electrical supply is in a normal shutdown lineup. The reactor is being supplied by normal feedwater, and decay heat is being controlled by use of the ADS valves. The licensee is currently cooling down and depressurizing the reactor in preparation for repair of the steam leak. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Illinois Resident Inspector. | 05000254/LER-2015-005 |
| ENS 51021 | 28 April 2015 14:35:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Two Secondary Containment Interlock Doors Open Simultaneously | On April 28, 2015, at 0935 CDT, the Shift Manager was notified that two Secondary Containment interlock doors (1/2 EDG room door and the Unit 1 reactor building door) were open simultaneously. The doors were immediately closed and secondary containment pressure remained negative. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.2 given two doors in a single access opening were open simultaneously. As a result entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to secondary containment being inoperable. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Personnel were posted in the area as a compensatory measure. The State of Illinois Emergency Management has been notified. | 05000254/LER-2015-006 |
| ENS 51093 | 27 May 2015 14:52:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Inoperable | On May 27, 2015, at 0952 CDT, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to opening a ventilation duct hatch to facilitate fire damper inspection without administrative controls. The hatch was opened and upon discovery was immediately shut, re-establishing the boundary of the Control Room Envelope. As a result, Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition C, was entered and subsequently exited. The CREV system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions as well as protection of the operators from a high dose environment assumed during a design basis accident. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system, and loss of the CREV system could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident as stated in Chapter 6 of the UFSAR. This event is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since this condition also impacts the control room as an Emergency Response Facility. At 0955, Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition C, for CREV System Inoperable due to inoperable Control Room Envelope was exited. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | 05000254/LER-2015-007 |
| ENS 51165 | 19 June 2015 06:53:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Secondary Containment Interlock Doors Open Simultaneously | On June 19, 2015, at 0153 CDT, two Secondary Containment interlock doors (1/2 EDG (Emergency Diesel Generator) room door and the Unit 1 reactor building door) were open simultaneously. The doors were immediately closed and secondary containment pressure remained negative. This condition represents a failure to meet surveillance requirement 3.6.4.1.2 given two doors in a single access opening were open simultaneously. As a result entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to secondary containment being inoperable. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The door has been posted to notify to restrict access. The State of Illinois Emergency Management has been notified. | 05000254/LER-2015-008 |
| ENS 51272 | 27 July 2015 22:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Inoperable | On July 27, 2015, at 1730 hours (CDT), the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to the 'B' Air Filtration Unit (AFU) Booster Fan discharge damper stuck open in mid-position. In this condition, the CREV system cannot be guaranteed to achieve required design flow rate. As a result, Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition A, was entered. The CREV system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions as well as protection of the operators from a high dose environment assumed during a design basis accident. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system, and loss of the CREV system could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident as stated in Chapter 6 of the UFSAR (Updated Final Safety Analysis Report). This event is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since this condition also impacts the control room as an Emergency Response Facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Both units are in a seven day technical specification for troubleshooting and repairs. If the control room became uninhabitable, procedure "Complete Loss of Control Room HVAC" would be entered. | 05000254/LER-2015-009 |
| ENS 51364 | 3 September 2015 02:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Technical Support Center (Tsc) Maintenance | Planned maintenance activities will commence today (September 2, 2015) on the Quad Cities Station TSC. The activity involves inspection and replacement of the TSC charcoal absorber trays and canisters on the filtration portion of the Air Handling Unit (AHU). Work on the charcoal absorbers affects habitability of the TSC during a declared emergency when radiological conditions require activation of the filtration portion of the AHU. The duration of maintenance is currently planned to begin on September 2, 2015 at 2100 hours (CDT) and is estimated to be completed by September 3, 2015 at 1100 hours (CDT), depending on any conditions discovered during the inspections. Since restoration from this maintenance activity is expected to take longer than the required activation time of the TSC, this notification is being made. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since the maintenance activity affects an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified (and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency).
At 1430 CDT on September 3, 2015, the maintenance activity was completed and the TSC ventilation was restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Illinois Emergency Management Agency. Notified R3DO (Skokowski). | |
| ENS 51502 | 27 October 2015 15:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Tsc Air Filtration System Degraded | A planned surveillance was started on the Quad Cities Station Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation air filtration system. The surveillance measures the flow rate through the air filtration unit and verifies the TSC is pressurized to ensure habitability requirements. The flow rate obtained was high, outside of acceptance criteria, and the surveillance was stopped pending resolution. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing procedures. If TSC evacuation is warranted due to radiological conditions, the facility will be relocated in accordance with existing procedures. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) since the air filtration unit affects an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The TSC Air Filtration system was successfully tested on 10/27/15 at 2100 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Stoedter). | |
| ENS 51589 | 7 December 2015 14:25:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Inoperable | On December 07, 2015, at 0825 hours (CST), the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to the Air Handling Unit (AHU) tripping upon attempting to swap from the non-safety related CR HVAC. Swapping was being performed to allow maintenance on the non-safety related system. Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition A, was entered which requires the CREV system to be restored to an operable status in seven (7) days. Additionally, Technical Specification 3.7.5, Condition A, was entered which requires CREV AC to be restored to an operable status in 30 days. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function,' because the CREV system is a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The Licensee notified the Illinois Emergency Management Association. | 05000254/LER-2015-010 |
| ENS 51650 | 12 January 2016 19:40:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Momentary Loss of Secondary Containment | On January 12, 2016, at 1340 CST, an alarm was received indicating secondary containment differential pressure rose unexpectedly above the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement, SR 3.6.4.1.1, limit of 0.10 inch of vacuum water gauge. A reactor building supply fan was immediately secured to restore differential pressure below the Technical Specification limit. The secondary containment differential pressure returned to below the Technical Specification limit within one minute. The Standby Gas Treatment System remained in standby, and fully operable. At 1341 CST, the secured reactor building supply fan was restarted to restore the normal ventilation lineup. The secondary containment differential pressure remained below the Technical Specification limit. Troubleshooting is in progress. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1. As a result, entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to secondary containment being inoperable. Given the temporary loss of secondary containment, this event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. | 05000254/LER-2016-001 |
| ENS 51659 | 16 January 2016 02:38:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | Momentary Loss of Secondary Containment | On January 15, 2016 at 2038 CST, an alarm was received indicating Secondary Containment Differential Pressure rose unexpectedly above the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement, SR 3.6.4.1.1, limit of 0.10 inch of vacuum water gauge. This loss of differential pressure occurred when Operations had entered the 2A Reactor Water Cleanup Pump room. The pump room door was closed and Secondary Containment Differential Pressure returned to Technical Specification limits in approximately 4 minutes. The Standby Gas Treatment System remained in standby and fully operable. This condition represents a failure to meet Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.1. As a result, entry into Technical Specification 3.6.4.1, Condition A, was made momentarily due to secondary containment being inoperable. Given the temporary loss of secondary containment, this event is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified." The licensee also notified the State of Illinois Emergency Management Agency. | 05000254/LER-2016-002 |
| ENS 51880 | 25 April 2016 11:07:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable | On April 25, 2016, at 0607 hours (CDT), HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) was isolated via the HPCI MO 2-2301-4 (HPCI Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve) to stop a packing leak on the HPCI MO 2-2301-5 (HPCI Outboard Main Steam Isolation Valve). The packing leak was causing a steam plume potentially impacting the motor operator on the 2-2301-5 valve. HPCI was declared inoperable and T.S. 3.5.1 Condition G was entered. Since HPCI is a single train safety system, this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D), as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | 05000265/LER-2016-002 |
| ENS 52099 | 18 July 2016 19:50:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Offsite Communications Capability | Testing of the Everbridge ERO (Emergency Response Organization) notification system identified that the system cannot notify all ERO individuals. This constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability. The issue has subsequently been reported resolved by the vendor and both site testing and common ERF (Emergency Response Facility) (EOF (Emergency Operations Facility) at Cantera) has verified resolution. The Everbridge system capability loss for Quad Cities was identified at approximately 1450 (CDT) hours on July 18, 2016, due to an undetermined loss of system communications, which is currently being investigated. Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) capability was not lost. The Everbridge system capability loss for the common ERF (EOF at Cantera) was identified at approximately 1500 (CDT) on July 18, 2016. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of EP offsite communications capability. The NRC Resident inspector has been notified. The site was developing compensatory measures when the event was terminated. | |
| ENS 52127 | 26 July 2016 17:52:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Inoperable | On July 26, 2016 at 1252 hours (CDT), the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system was declared inoperable due to a toxic gas analyzer spurious alarm which resulted in the 'B' Air Filtration Unit (AFU) being inadvertently isolated. In this condition, Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) system cannot be guaranteed to achieve required design flow rate. Tech Spec 3.7.4, Condition A was entered which requires the CREV system to be restored to an operable status in seven (7) days. The CREV system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions as well as protection of the operators from a high dose environment assumed during a design basis accident. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function,' because the CREV system is a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 52334 | 31 October 2016 07:39:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | High Pressure Coolant Injection (Hpci) Inoperable | On October 31, 2016, at 0239 hours (CDT), a defect (minor audible through-wall leak) was identified on the steam line drain valve 1-2301-55, HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve. The defect was identified by Operations personnel traversing through the HPCI room as part of normal rounds. HPCI was declared inoperable under Tech Specs 3.5.1, Condition G. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was verified operable. HPCI remains available (but not operable). The leak has been isolated. The 1-2301-55 is a manual valve downstream of the HPCI steam line drain trap. In a standby line-up, this line drains condensation from the HPCI steam supply line to the main condenser. During operation in an accident scenario, this line drains condensation from the HPCI steam supply line to the Torus via a drain pot. The location of the defect is in class 2 safety related piping. HPCI is a single train safety system and this notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Technical Specification 3.5.1, condition G requires that HPCI be Operable within 14 days.
The purpose of this notification is to retract the ENS Report made on October 31, 2016, at 0239 hours CDT (ENS Report #52334). Upon further investigation, a pinhole through-wall leak was discovered in the body of the 1-2301-55 valve (HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve). The defect was characterized as a 1/32-inch rounded hole due to a manufacturing defect in the casting located on the downstream side of the valve near the piping connection. A subsequent evaluation performed by Quad Cities Station considering the defect size, location, and characterization, confirmed the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system would have performed its safety function when required. Based on this subsequent evaluation, ENS Report 52334 is being retracted. Note: On November 1, 2016, at 1624 hours CDT, the 1-2301-55 valve (HPCI Steam Line Drain Line Steam Trap Outlet Valve) was successfully repaired and HPCI was returned to Operable status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Stone). |