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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 44653 | 12 November 2008 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21 | All Dimensionally Verified Commercial Grade Items Processed Per Fisher Manufac. Procedure Fmp 2K28 | Commercial grade items processed per FMP 2K28 (Fisher Processing Level D) may not address all the critical characteristics needed to determine if the item can be designated by the utility as a basic component. By accepting 10CFR21 on the order for Level D items, there is the implication that the item can be used as a basic component without further evaluation by the utility. During the latest NUPIC audit, it was pointed out that although FMP 2K28 specifically states that, 'This process does not verify the material or designate the item for use as a basic component,' 10CFR21 is only applicable to basic components. FMP 2K28 is intended to provide dimensional verification only for items where material verification was not readily available through Method 1 discussed in EPRI 5652. Parts provided per Level D are normally elastomer materials (diaphragms, o-rings, etc.) or packing and gasket materials. If a utility decides material verification is a critical characteristic, Fisher assumes that the utility will perform a material evaluation as required prior to designating an item as a basic component. In conclusion, Fisher assumed 10CFR21 responsibility because of defect reporting requirements but did not intend to imply that items processed to FMP 2K28 (Fisher Processing Level D) were capable of becoming a basic component without further evaluation by the purchaser. In the future, Fisher will no longer be able to accept 10CFR21 responsibility for parts processed to FMP 2K28 (Fisher Processing Level D). Fisher will also accommodate those orders requiring dedication traditionally offered as Level D through development and us of additional methods described in EPRI 5652." Potentially affected sites are: Ameren, Arizona Public Service, Arkansas Nuclear, Beaver Valley, Brunswick, Callaway, Calvert Cliffs, Catawba, Comanche Peak, Con Edison, Consumers Energy, Cook, Cooper, CP&L, Crystal River, Davis Besse, Detroit Edison, Dominion Energy, Dominion Power, Duke Energy, Duquesne, Entergy, Exelon, Fermi, Florida Power, G.E. Nuclear, Ginna, Harris, Hatch, Indian Point, Hatch, Kewaunee, Maine Yankee, McGuire, Millstone, Monticello, New York Power Authority, Niagara Mohawk, Nine Mile Point, North Anna, Northeast Nuclear, Oconee, Oyster Creek, Palo Verde, PECA, Perry, Progress Energy, PSE&G, Rochester Gas & Electric, Salem, San Onofre, Shearon Harris, Southern California Edison, South Texas Project, Surry, Texas Utilities, Turkey Point, V.C. Summer, Virginia Power, Vermont Yankee, Waterford, Watts Bar, Westinghouse Electric Corp, Wisconsin Public Service, Wisconsin Electric Power, Wolf Creek, XCEL Energy. | ||
| ENS 44808 | 27 January 2009 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21, Notification of failure to comply or existence of a defect and its evaluation | Part 21 Report - Water Quality Deficiency | The following information was obtained from Fisher Controls International via facsimile: Fisher Controls International issued a Fisher Information Notice: FIN 2009-02, that notified customers of an issue discovered during an internal audit of manufacturing procedures followed by Fisher Controls International LLC. Specifically, on orders processed by Fisher Controls that invoked demineralized water cleaning requirements, Fisher Controls erroneously certified that all orders met demineralized water requirements when all requirements could not be proven to be met. To meet the certification requirements, demineralized water must meet the quality requirements of NQA-1. Fisher Controls uses FMP (Fisher Manufacturing Procedure) 12B3 to verify that demineralized water used to clean parts meets NQA-1. Fisher determined that water quality testing using FMP 12B3 performed from January 1, 2001 to May 1, 2008 did not meet the test protocols. Twenty two orders have been identified, from 500+ orders reviewed, which require either the use of demineralized water and/or NQA-1 high quality water for which Fisher cannot prove full compliance. It is important to note that this review was limited to nuclear assembly orders only. Safety-related parts orders were not included because final cleaning was done either with alcohol or acetone. The affected plants are: Indian Point 2 Seabrook Millstone (two valves) D.C. Cook North Anna (two valves) Catawba (seven valves) Oconee (five valves) McGuire (three valves) | ||
| ENS 44809 | 27 January 2009 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21 | Part 21 Report - Part Not Evaluated for All Critical Characteristics | The following information was obtained from Fisher Controls International via facsimile: The equipment supplied included a 20 inch Fisher valve coupled to a Bettis actuator. The purpose of this Fisher Information Notice (FIN 2009-03) is to alert Alabama Power that as of January 16, 2009, Fisher Controls International LLC became aware of the possibility of a situation which may affect the performance of the applicable equipment. This notice applies only to the subject equipment supplied by Fisher Controls International LLC, identified above, that was provided to Alabama Power - Farley. Fisher Controls has determined that the subject items were provided with parts that were not properly processed per active valve requirements specified by the Alabama Power Order. Specifically, Fisher provided a coupler between the actuator drive lever and valve shaft that was not evaluated for all the critical characteristics deemed necessary for a commercial grade dedicated item per EPRI 5652 and Fisher Manufacturing Procedure FMP 2K27, 'Control of Commercial Grade Items to be Dedicated for Use in Nuclear Safety-Related Systems,' (Fisher Processing Level C). We (Fisher Controls) are reviewing the situation and will pursue a corrective action investigation to prevent problems like this in the future. Arrangements have been made with Alabama Power to retrofit a correctly processed part on the subject serial number. This is a formal notification; Alabama Power was notified of this situation on January 16, 2008. The coupling provided to Alabama Power did not meet the hardness requirements specified in the order. The coupler provided was annealed versus quench-hardened. | ||
| ENS 44836 | 6 February 2009 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21 | Part 21 Report - Defective Asme Sa-193, Grade 6 Cap Screw Material | The following information was obtained from Fisher Controls International via facsimile: Fisher Information Notice (FIN 2009-01, dated February 2, 2009) was issued to notify customers of an issue reported to Fisher by Duke Energy. (Fisher has) informed (their) customers of record of this circumstance in accordance with 21.21 (b) of 10CFR21 because Fisher Controls International LLC, is not aware of each and every application or system design and cannot determine whether an anomaly could cause a defect or "failure to comply," relating to a substantial safety hazard. In particular, this Information Notice deals with customer orders that used improperly heat treated cap screws provided by Texas Bolt Company (Texas Bolt Order 204653, Certified by Texas Bolt Company, April 20, 1987). Receipt of this notice does not necessarily mean that the recipient has been shipped any of the subject equipment. It is expected that the recipients of this notice will review the information for applicability to their facilities, and if required, take the appropriate action as described in the section at the end of this notice. This notice applies only to customer orders processed by Posi-Seal International that used the 100 quantity lot of hex head cap screws identified by Texas Bolt Company Material Certification Report Number 001.87-1758, certified by Texas Bolt Company, April 20, 1987. Fisher was informed by Duke Energy that there have been failures of ASME SA-193 Grade B6 hex head cap screws at the Catawba Nuclear Station. These bolts are used on various size Posi-Seal butterfly valves to maintain a pressure seal on the outboard side of the valve body. Failure of these bolts will impair the pressure retaining capability of the valve body. Based on the experiences at Duke Energy, it is possible that a defective batch of cap screws were used by Posi-Seal around 1987. Fisher Controls International has attempted to determine a complete list of valve serial numbers that may have used bolts from this particular lot. Unfortunately, Fisher Controls International's review of available Posi-Seal records cannot provide validation of its completeness. It is recommended that customers verify if the QA documentation package, provided with the valve, contains a copy of the cap screw material certification attached to this information notice. If so, Fisher Controls International recommends that the subject cap screws be replaced. Fisher Controls requests that the recipient of this notice review it and take appropriate action in accordance with 10CFR21. If there are any technical questions or concerns, contact: Michael Wedemeyer Manager, Quality Fisher Controls International LLC 205 South Center Street Marshalltown, IA 50158 Fax: (641) 754-2854 Phone: (641) 754-2066 Michael.Wedemeyer@.Emerson.com Possible domestic constructions with defective cap screw material (Posi-Seal part number 131550, drawing number 5200-001) include McGuire, Catawba and Indian Point. | ||
| ENS 46655 | 25 February 2011 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21, Notification of failure to comply or existence of a defect and its evaluation | Part 21 - Error in Valve Body Drawing | The purpose of this Fisher Information Notice (FIN) is to alert Duke Energy that as of February 25, 2011, Fisher Controls International LLC became aware of the possibility of a situation which may affect the performance of the applicable equipment provided to McGuire Nuclear Station. Specifically, an error was discovered on valve body drawing V112298, when, during a revision process on Revision B of the drawing, a dimension was omitted that set the depth of the valve shaft bearing bore. This error resulted in a greater possible variation of bearing position in the valve shaft bore. If the error was large, the valve could not be assembled which was not the case for these valves. The valves assembled without incident and passed the operational testing, including a seat leakage test, with no anomalies. In the case that the bearing position error was slight, it is possible that the seal and disc could experience more wear than normal and increased leakage would result. Because these valves are equipped with manual operators, Fisher expects that these valves will not be cycled enough to experience any of the potential problems described above. This equipment included NPS 4, Class 150, Fisher Type A11 Butterfly Valve Assemblies equipped with Fisher Leverlock Manual Actuators. The NPS 4, A11 is a butterfly valve that uses internal bearings (located on either side of the disc) to provide a radial wear surface for shaft rotation and also serve as a centering system for the disc in the waterway. Centering of the disc is accomplished with a wear surface on the end of the bearings adjacent to the side of the disc. Lateral positioning of the disc is accomplished by controlling the length of the bearings and the depth of the bored holes in the body that accept the bearings. Fisher has revised the drawings to ensure that this issue is corrected. | ||
| ENS 47123 | 4 August 2011 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21 | Part 21 - Possible Weld Rod Certification Issues | On March 3, 2011, an audit of one of Fisher Control's suppliers determined that weld rod certified by an ISO process (instead of ASME) might have been used for weld repair of castings intended for nuclear service. Fisher and the supplier are in the process of reviewing all orders affected by this issue and have yet to find any that used the subject non-confirming material Fisher expects to complete this evaluation by August 26, 2011. At this time, if the review determines that a failure to comply condition exits, Fisher will issue notification per the requirements of 10 CFR 21.21(b).
Fisher Controls is providing this final notification per the requirements of 10CFR21.21(a). On August 3, 2011, Fisher provided an interim report concerning an audit of one of Fisher Control's suppliers and the determination that weld rod certified by an ISO process (instead of ASME) might have been used for weld repair of castings intended for nuclear service. Fisher and the supplier have completed the process of reviewing all orders affected by this issue and did not find any orders that used the subject non-conforming material. Therefore, Fisher will not issue a notification per the requirements of 10CFR21.21(b), because the review determined that a failure to comply condition does not exist. Notified the NRC Part 21 Group and all NRC Regional RDOs via e-mail. | ||
| ENS 47706 | 24 February 2012 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21, Notification of failure to comply or existence of a defect and its evaluation | Part 21 Report - Potential Minimum Wall Violation on Seismic Plate Valve Bodies | While reviewing Valve Body drawing 16B2201, it was discovered that an area in the packing bore has the possibility to not meet the minimum wall requirements of ASME B16.34 for a Class 150 valve at the minimum material condition due to a potential stack up of tolerances. Upon discovery of this possible failure to comply, an investigation was performed on all NPS 3-12 Type A11 Class 150 Seismic Plate Valve Bodies and it was determined that this issue was isolated to the NPS 8 Type A11 Class 150 Seismic Plate Valve Body per drawing 16B2201. It is the opinion of Fisher that there is no inherent safety risk associated with this situation. Fisher will be working with the individual plants (Clinton Power Station and Watts Bar) in question to measure the actual dimensions of the bodies to determine if a problem exists and will take appropriate corrective action. Fisher Information Notice: FIN 2012-01 | ||
| ENS 49581 | 7 November 2013 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 Report - Improper Dedication of Actuator Parts | The following information was received via fax: Equipment affected by this information notice: Items subject to this Fisher Information Notice (FIN) were provided to Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC (WEC) via Fisher Order Number 004-X012140579, Items 25, 25A, 25B, and 25C (Westinghouse PO# 4500280610). The valves included Type 657NS2 Size 80 Actuators (Equipment). The equipment is identified by Fisher Serial Numbers 19073487, 19073488, 19073489, and 19073490 (Westinghouse Tag Numbers APP-PXS-PL-V014A, APP-PXS-PL-V014B, APP-PXS-PL-V015A, and APP-PXS-PL-V015B). Purpose: The purpose of this FIN is to alert WEC that as of 07 November 2013, Fisher Controls International LLC (Fisher) became aware of a situation which may affect the performance of the Equipment, including their safety-related function. Fisher is informing WEC of this circumstance in accordance with Section 21.21 (b) of 10 CFR 21. Applicability: This FIN applies only to the subject equipment supplied by Fisher to WEC via the aforementioned order. Discussion: Fisher has determined that the subject valves were provided with actuator parts that had not been properly processed per active valve requirements. Specifically, Fisher provided commercial grade parts instead of commercial grade dedicated items. The parts are identified per Fisher Type III drawing GE40372, find numbers 118, 121, and 122. Action Required: Fisher will support WEC in performing the disassembly and replacement of these parts, at no cost to WEC, on the installed actuators. Arrangements will be made with WEC to retrofit the correctly processed and dedicated parts on the subject serial numbers. In addition, a Corrective Action Request (CAR 1661) has been initiated by Fisher to prevent reoccurrence of this issue. 10 CFR 21 Implications: Fisher requests that the recipient of this notice review it and take appropriate action in accordance with 10 CFR 21. If there are any technical questions or concerns, please contact: George Baitinger Manager, Quality Fisher Controls International LLC 301 South First Avenue Marshalltown, IA 50158 Fax: (641) 754-2854 Phone: (641) 754-2026 George.Baitinger@Emerson.com | ||
| ENS 50291 | 26 June 2014 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 Report - Incorrect Valve Solenoids Provided | The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile: Brunswick Nuclear Plant ordered 10 (ten) 120VAC/60Hz valve solenoids on two purchase orders from Fisher Controls International LLC. In February, 2014, Fisher shipped six 125VDC solenoids to Brunswick. All six of those solenoids were identified as non-conforming prior to installation in the plant. The remaining 4 solenoids at Fisher are on a shipping hold. For technical questions or concerns contact: George Baitinger, Manager, Quality, Fisher Controls International LLC, 301 South 1st Ave, Marshalltown, IA 50158, Fax: (641) 754--2854, Phone: (641) 754-2026. Fisher Information Notice: FIN 2014-02 | ||
| ENS 51643 | 11 November 2015 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Part 21 - Commercial Grade Cap Screws Provided with Safety Related Fisher Type 3570 Positioners | The following information was provided by the reporting organization via fax: Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Fisher Controls International LLC ('Fisher') is providing required written interim notification of a failure to comply concerning Type 3570 positioners when provided as safety-related equipment. On November 11, 2015, Fisher became aware of an issue with the dedication of a Type 3570 positioner. When replacement Type 3570 positioners are ordered, the two cap screws (SAE J429 Grade 5 cap screws/size 3/8-16x1.5) used for mounting the positioner to the actuator cylinder are also included. It was not clearly communicated to the end user that these mounting cap screws are included with the positioner. Further, the dedication plan only addresses the 3570 positioner and does not include dedication of the mounting cap screws. As a result, these cap screws had not been dedicated on any safety-related Type 3570 positioner orders. There is no reason to believe any of the cap screws supplied were defective, only that they were not dedicated and were therefore supplied as commercial grade items. There have been no reported failures of the cap screws in question. An extent-of-condition investigation is underway to identify all potentially affected bolt-on accessories. Any identified affected products will be reported per the requirements of 10 CFR 21.21 (b). This extent-of-condition review is expected to be completed by January 29, 2016. Corrective Action 1791 has been opened to document corrective actions taken to prevent reoccurrence. Should there be any further questions concerning this matter, please contact Benjamin Ahrens, Manager, Quality by email at Benjamin.Ahrens@Emerson.com or via phone at 641-754-2249. Individual informing the NRC: Chad Engle, Director, Nuclear Business Unit, Fisher Controls International LLC, phone (641) 754-3011.
The following information is summarized from a fax received from Emerson Process Management (Fisher Controls): On January 22, 2016, Fisher Controls completed their extent-of-condition investigation and determined that seven of their thirty two product series have the potential to include non-dedicated cap screws and mounting studs. The vendor plans to complete their final report within 45 days. Notified R1DO (Rogge), R2DO (Musser), R3DO (Kozak), R4DO (Pick) and the Part 21 group via email.
The following information is summarized from an email received from Emerson Process Management (Fisher Controls): The supplied instrument assemblies in question were subjected to the processing requirements of Fisher Controls FMP2K27 (Control of Commercial Grade Items to be Dedicated for Use in Nuclear Safety-Related Applications) and were supplied as safety-related components. However, Fisher supplied various mounting parts (in addition to the requested product) that were not processed under FMP2K27; thus, such parts were supplied as commercial items. This issue was first discovered in relation to the cap screws used for mounting a 3570 positioner (please see Interim Report dated 01/08/2016). Fisher conducted an extent-of-condition investigation to include all safety-related actuator-mounted accessories. In total, thirty -two (32) actuator-mounted item types were investigated. It is Fisher's opinion the failures to dedicate these mounting accessories do not pose an inherent safety risk. Additionally, there are no known field issues with respect to the affected equipment and all such non-dedicated equipment passed the required standard testing. Each affected customer needs to: (i) evaluate the application of each referenced item number for all respective orders; (ii) determine whether the incorrectly processed mounting parts are in violation of regulatory requirements; (iii) contact Fisher or otherwise arrange for the procurement of properly processed mounting parts for use in those applications found to be in violation. In addition, a Corrective Action Request (CAR 1791) has been initiated by Fisher to prevent reoccurrence of this issue. Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis), R2DO (Suggs), R3DO (Riemer), R4DO (Proulx), and the Part 21 group via email. | ||
| ENS 52741 | 10 March 2017 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Part 21 Report - Potential Minimum Wall Thickness Issue on Certain Posi-Seal Valves | The following report was received via email: Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21 (a)(2), Fisher Controls International LLC ('Fisher') is providing required written interim notification of a potential failure to comply concerning minimum wall requirements in the packing box region of certain Posi-Seal valves (A11). On March 10, 2017, Fisher discovered a minimum wall issue while processing an order. While the order at issue was corrected prior to shipment, Fisher is currently engaged in an extent of condition investigation to determine whether the noncompliance extends beyond the specific order. Fisher anticipates completing this investigation and disseminating additional information on or before June 9, 2017. Appropriate corrective action will be initiated to prevent reoccurrence. Should there be any further questions concerning this matter, please contact Benjamin Ahrens, Manager, Quality by email at Benjamin.Ahrens@Emerson.com or via phone at 641-754-2249.
The following report was received via email: Fisher Information Notice: FIN 2017-03 9 June 2017 Subject: Potential Minimum Wall Thickness Issue on Certain Posi-Seal A11 Packing Boxes Purpose: The purpose of this Fisher Information Notice (FIN) is to alert affected customers that, as of 10 March 2017, Fisher Controls International LLC (Fisher) became aware of a situation which may affect the minimum wall thickness of certain Posi-Seal designed valve bodies. Fisher is informing affected customers of this circumstance in accordance with Section 21.21 (b) of 10 CFR 21. Discussion: Fisher engineering identified a potential minimum wall thickness issue on a 14 (inch) Posi-Seal Type A11 body drawing in the process of fulfilling an order. The valve body drawing was such that it was possible to machine the packing box region of the valve body neck within drawing-specified tolerances but fail to meet minimum wall thickness as required by ASME B16.34. As a result of this discovery, the affected order was halted and an investigation was initiated. Extent of Condition: POSI-SEAL manufactured and supplied Type A11 valve bodies from their location in N. Stonington, CT to the nuclear industry prior to being acquired by Fisher in 1985. An extent of condition investigation was conducted to identify all potentially affected body drawing numbers and instances of orders shipped by Posi-Seal and subsequently by Fisher that could have had minimum wall issues. The scope of this investigation included all sizes and appropriate pressure classes of potentially affected valves shipped from either Posi-Seal or Fisher. The investigation concluded that only the 14 (inch) size for certain body drawing numbers are affected. Other sizes or types of valves are not affected by this FIN. Equipment Affected by this Fisher Information Notice: Items subject to this FIN are confined to the 14 (inch) Type A11 valve bodies having original Posi-Seal drawing/serial numbers referred to in the attached Appendix A. All affected equipment was shipped from N. Stonington. No affected equipment was shipped from the Fisher Marshalltown, IA location. Action Required: Fisher has revised the affected drawings to ensure the minimum wall requirements of ASME B16.34 are met. Fisher will also work directly with the affected customers to evaluate and resolve the potential minimum wall thickness issues. The in-process order was stopped and will be verified to meet minimum wall thickness requirements prior to shipment. 10 CFR 21 Implications: Fisher requests that the recipient of this FIN review it and take appropriate action in accordance with 10 CFR 21. If there are any technical questions or concerns, please contact: Ben Ahrens Quality Manager Emerson Automation Solutions Fisher Controls International LLC 301 South First Avenue Marshalltown, IA 50158 Phone: (641) 754-2249 Benjamin.ahrens@emerson.com List of Affected Equipment Customer/Site Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., Nine Mile Point, Unit 2, Shipped in 1983 Purchase Order NMP2-P304D/12177 Customer Tag Numbers 2CPS*AOV104, 2CPS*AOV106, 2CPS*AOV108, 2CPS*AOV110 Posi Serial Number 19157-3 Qty 4 Customer/Site Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., Nine Mile Point, Unit 2, Shipped in 1983 Purchase Order NMP2-P304D/12177 Customer Tag Numbers 2GTS*V51, 2GTS*V52, Posi Serial Number 19157-35 Qty 2 Customer/Site Union Electric Company, Callaway Plant Unit 1, Shipped in 1985 Purchase Order 14894-M-236-2 Customer Tag Numbers EF-V343, -V344, -V345, -346, GN-V057, -V058, -V059, -V060 Posi Serial Number 35287-01 Qty 8 Notified R1DO (Welling), R4DO (Rollins), and Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group by email. | ||
| ENS 53077 | 28 September 2017 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 Report - Corrective Action for Fisher Information Notice 2015-01 Insufficient | The following is a synopsis of information received via E-mail: Fisher Information Notice (FIN) 2015-01 was published 3/18/2015 regarding Fisher Type 461 valve plug machining. FIN 2015-01 details an issue in which a valve plug was returned to Fisher after the customer discovered a machining error was present in the plug. This Type 461 valve plug is intended to have a groove machined across the seating surface to provide a controlled leak rate through the valve when the plug is on the seat. It has been determined that the corrective action implemented in association with FIN 2015-01 was insufficient to ensure accurate machining and to prevent reoccurrence of this issue. This Part 21 Notification (issued as FIN 2017-05) applies to Type 461 Plugs sold or reworked since the publication date of FIN 2015-01. Specifically this notification applies to assembly item number 25A0413X162 that Fisher Controls International LLC (Fisher) supplied to Florida Power and Light (FPL) St. Lucie per FPL Order 2363439 (Fisher Order Number 025-X204270) and to item number 29A7841X052 that Fisher supplied to Entergy Waterford 3 per Entergy Order 10297987 (Fisher Order Number 026N-187174). | ||
| ENS 53489 | 7 May 2018 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 Notification - Hex Nuts and Cap Screws on Certain Vee-Ball Valves Not Properly Dedicated | Fisher Controls issued FIN 2018-02 for hex nuts and caps screws for securing the valve body-to-actuator on eight valves (six purchased by D.C. Cook Nuclear and two purchased by Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power) that were not commercial grade dedicated. Fisher became aware of this issue on May 7, 2018. For technical questions, please contact: Jacob Clos Quality Manager Emerson Automation Solutions Fisher Controls International LLC 301 South First Avenue Marshalltown, IA 50158 Phone: (641) 754-2108 Jacob.Clos@Emerson.com | ||
| ENS 54238 | 23 August 2019 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 Notification - Loose Butterfly Valve Taper Pins | Fisher Controls issued FIN 2019-01 for all Fisher type 7600, 7700, 7800, 9100, 9200, and 9500 series butterfly valves that use taper pins to secure the valve shaft to the valve disk. This does not apply to valve constructions that use straight pins or grooved straight pins. Fisher was notified on June 25, 2019 of one instance where a taper pin became loose due to incorrect installation within the valve. Fisher recommends the owners of these valve assemblies perform normal maintenance at regular intervals in order to inspect the valve assembly and replace worn, aged, and damaged parts, as well as verifying that the taper pins are correctly installed and reset them if necessary. For technical questions, please contact: Jacob Clos Quality Manager Emerson Automation Solutions Fisher Controls International LLC 301 South First Avenue Marshalltown, IA 50158 Phone: (641) 754-2108 Jacob.Clos@Emerson.com |