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 Discovered dateReporting criterionTitleDescriptionLER
ENS 4698826 June 2011 05:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System ActuationBoth Emergency Diesel Generators Supplying Plant Emergency Buses Per Plant ProcedureAt approximately 0125 (hrs. CDT), the AquaDam providing enhanced flood protection for FCS (Ft. Calhoun Station) Unit 1 failed. At 0221, as a precautionary measure, DG-2 (Diesel Generator) was automatically started per plant procedure to divorce bus 1A4 from offsite power. At 0250, DG-1 was automatically started to divorce bus 1A3. Both Emergency Diesel Generators loaded on buses as designed. 345KV and 161KV offsite power remain available. This is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'System Actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generators'. All safety related flood protection barriers remain in place. Current river level is 1006.5' MSL and stable. FCS remains in a NOUE (Notification of Unusual Event) due to high river level. NRC personnel stationed onsite for flood monitoring have been informed.
ENS 4698926 June 2011 15:45:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News ReleaseOffsite Notification Due to Petroleum Release to the Missouri RiverAt approximately 0125 CDT, the AquaDam providing enhanced flood protection for Fort Calhoun Station Unit 1 failed. This resulted in approximately 100 gallons of petroleum being released into the river after a protective barrier was breached and many fuel containers were washed out to the river. The fuel/oil containers were staged around the facility to supply fuel for pumps which remove water within the flood containment barriers. The spill was reported to the State of Nebraska at 10:45 AM CDT on 6/26/2011. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency. Applicable governmental agencies have been notified per plant procedures. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4700130 June 2011 19:23:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News ReleaseOffsite Notification Due to Person Being Evacuated

At 1423 CDT, the Control Room was notified of a fire inside the protected area isolated to a portable water evacuation pump. At 1425 CDT, the Control Room was notified the fire was extinguished and the presence of an injured person; the Control Room immediately notified Washington County 911 to request emergency medical assistance. At 1511 CDT, injured person was transferred off-site by medical helicopter.

This four-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), event or situation related to health and safety of on-site personnel for which notification to other government agencies has been made. NRC Resident informed. Due to this event, 1/2 gallon of gasoline was discharged to the Missouri River. The spill was reported to the State of Nebraska on 6/30/2011. This condition is also being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency. Applicable state agencies have been notified per plant procedures. The injured person is a plant employee and was injured while refueling a portable generator. The injured person suffered burns to the forearms and neck. The licensee intends to issue a press release. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

ENS 470337 July 2011 18:40:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessLoss of Power to 10 Emergency SirensPower has been removed from 10 (out of 101) sirens due to flooding conditions. (Three) out of 5 sirens in Pottawattamie county, 4 of 18 in Harrison county and 3 of 78 in Washington county. There are compensatory measures in place to ensure notification to any members of the public that may still be in these areas. The station is also suspending testing and reporting (performance indicator) data for these sirens in accordance with NEI 99-02. All of these sirens serve areas for which there are no residents requiring evacuation. This is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)) for 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or communications capability'. The licensee notified the States of Nebraska and Iowa, the Counties of Harrison, Washington and Pottawattamie and the NRC Resident Inspector of this report.
ENS 4703510 May 2011 09:30:0010 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER60 Day Report - Emergency Diesel Generator Started Due to Invalid SignalThis 10CFR50.73(a)(1) report is a 60-day telephone notification in lieu of a written licensee event report being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On May 10, 2011 at 0430 CDT, during installation of the new loss of offsite power relay, Emergency Diesel Generator 2, started (a complete start) due to an invalid signal but remained operable while running as a backup power supply to its bus. The unit was in a refueling outage at the time. Offsite power was not lost and the diesel bus remained energized from offsite power and was operable. The diesel was subsequently secured. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4705115 July 2011 00:13:0010 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class DeclarationUnusual Event Declared Due to Suspected Introduction of Contraband Into the Protected AreaThe licensee declared an Unusual Event due to indications that potentially dangerous contraband had been introduced into the protected area. After further investigation, the licensee determined that the indication of contraband was due to incorrect interpretation of screening equipment imaging. The licensee exited its Unusual Event declaration at 1942 CDT. The licensee continues to investigate the circumstances leading to this event declaration. The licensee notified State and local authorities and will notify the NRC Resident Inspector
ENS 4706718 July 2011 17:15:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News ReleaseOffsite Notification of a Raw Sewage DischargeAt approximately 1215 CDT FCS began discharging raw sewage to the Missouri River via the Raw Water Header. Portable toilets staged inside the plant for plant flooding are being pumped for disposal. Per discussions with the State of Nebraska, this is an additional bypass of the sewage system and requires state notification. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency. Applicable governmental agencies have been notified per plant procedures. NRC Resident informed.
ENS 4708822 July 2011 13:30:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionFire Supression Pumps Inoperable

Both Fire Suppression Pumps are not operable because the required monthly surveillance tests will not be completed for June and July. The surveillance tests will be completed when flood waters recede to below 1004 feet MSL. The current river level is 1006.3 feet. Both fire pumps, FP-1A and FP-1B, are available and lined up for use. Other options are also available to provide a means of backup fire water supply that include: - Water Plant Pumps DW-8A and DW-8B aligned to the Fire Protection (FP) system. - Temporary connection to the fire protection water distribution system by the Fort Calhoun Fire Truck that is staged on site or any other fire pumper truck via fire hydrant FP-3G. - Admin Building/Training Center fire hydrant via fire hoses or water truck. This supply is from Blair water system and FP storage tank west of Highway 75. - Drafting from the Missouri River via temporary pumps. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ERICK MATZKE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1714 EDT ON 8/30/11 * * *

Further review of the plant design and licensing basis determined that the plant is adequately analyzed for the reported situation and that it does not constitute an unanalyzed condition significantly degrading plant safety as originally reported. Therefore, this event is being retracted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Proulx).

ENS 4720226 August 2011 17:36:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessTechnical Support Center Unavailable for Emergency ResponseDuring performance of IC-PM-VA-0200, Preventive Maintenance Air Flow Measurement of TSC Air Filter Unit VA-119, it was discovered that the required flow-rate of 2700 cfm and minimum overpressure of 0.1 inches of water in the TSC could not be achieved. Troubleshooting on VA-107, TSC Air Handling Unit, is in progress. This condition renders the Technical Support Center unavailable for Emergency Planning Responses. Approved compensatory actions are to relocate personnel to alternate facilities if required. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4726013 September 2011 13:22:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessLoss of Technical Support Center Ventilation

VA-106, TSC HVAC Unit VA-107 Rooftop Condensing Unit, tripped off and attempts to restart were unsuccessful. The cause of VA-106 tripping is unknown at this time. Troubleshooting is in progress. This condition renders the Technical Support Center unavailable for Emergency Planning Responses. Approved compensatory actions are to relocate personnel to alternate facilities if required. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM ERICK MATZKE TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1245 EDT ON 9/16/2011 * * *

TSC ventilation troubleshooting has been completed and the system was determined to be functional today, September 16, 2011 at 1115 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Pick).

ENS 4735920 October 2011 15:50:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident
Flood Barrier Penetrations Not Water TightDuring follow-up inspections of flood barrier penetrations into two rooms in the plant it was determined that some of the water tight conduit fittings were not filled with the material required to make them water tight. Inspection caps were removed from the fittings to perform the inspections. Three fittings into room 19 (auxiliary feedwater and plant air compressors) and fittings into room 56E (electrical switchgear) were found to contain no filling material. One additional fitting into room 56E that was thought to be capped was found to be open with a sheet metal box covering the inside access thereby obscuring inspections. All of the affected penetrations have modifications in progress to assure that they are modified and qualified for design basis flood levels. Of the 16 penetrations 6 have been verified to be made water tight by other means, specifically fire foam barrier installed in the conduit from the room 56E side. The remaining 10 penetrations will leak with a 1014 flood, although the plate will restrict flow to some degree. The stations auxiliary feedwater and safety related electrical switch gear could be affected. This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4747322 November 2011 23:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual HeatTemporary Loss of Shutdown Cooling

During walkdown of scheduled work it was discovered that HCV-335 (Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Inlet Header Isolation Valve) would not be able to be manually positioned open due to a missing idler gear key. Upon a loss of instrument air, HCV-335 would have failed closed, interrupting shutdown cooling flow with no ability to open HCV-335 manually. Alternate shutdown cooling pump and paths were available at the time of discovery. No loss of instrument air or interruption in shutdown cooling flow occurred while preparing to align alternate shutdown cooling. An 8 hour LCO under Technical Specification 2.8.1(3)2 was entered at 1700 CST. Alternate shutdown cooling was established on a containment spray pump as allowed by procedure. The 8 hour LCO was exited at 2306 CST. A replacement idler key has been fabricated for HCV-335. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM ERICK MATZKE TO PETE SNYDER AT 1654 EST ON 12/16/11 * * * 

Additional analysis has determined that the shutdown cooling system was capable of performing its design safety functions during the time that the idler key was missing. Therefore this event is being retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Walker).

ENS 4765810 February 2012 06:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionUnanalyzed Condition - Guidance Not Adequate to Mitigate a Design Basis FloodDuring a review of the station's procedures for responding to external flooding conditions, it was determined that the guidance is not adequate to mitigate a design basis flood event (1014 feet mean sea level (msl)). Compensatory actions have been identified and are being implemented. Additional corrective actions are being evaluated. The plant is currently in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, with a river level of 986 feet 2 inches msl with no predictions for river level to pose a threat to safety related components. NRC inspectors identified procedural inadequacies relating to the mitigation of flooding. The licensee is addressing the procedural inadequacies. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.05000285/LER-2012-001
ENS 4769423 February 2012 15:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News ReleaseOffsite Notification Due to an Intake Structure Oil SpillOn February 23, 2012, at 0900 CST, an oil leak was identified from a gear box in the intake structure that had leaked into the circulating water cell. Prompt action was taken to stop the leak. Less than or equal to 1 pint of oil was spilled into the circulating water cell and, subsequently, to the Missouri River. The spill has been stopped and clean up of the oil sheen in the intake cell is proceeding. A visible oil sheen was noted on the Missouri River downstream of the station's intake structure near the station's outfall. The gear box has been drained to prevent any further leakage. Notifications will be made per Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. Samples will be taken for off site analysis to determine the quantity of oil discharged. The State of Nebraska, Department of Environmental Quality and National Response Center will be notified. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), 4 hour non-emergency notification due to a notification being made to a Government Agency (State of Nebraska, Department of Environmental Quality and National Response Center). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4769624 February 2012 04:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessLoss of 21 Out of 101 Emergency Sirens

Communications has been lost to 21 sirens out of 101. The loss of communications does not allow the activation of the sirens. Almost all of Harrison County and Pottawattamie County in Iowa are without communications to the sirens. There are compensatory measures in place to ensure notification by local law enforcement in case of an actual emergency to inform the public in these areas. This is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or communications capability'. An attempt is being made to reboot the siren's communication system in order to restore the sirens. During the reboot, sirens in Washington County, Nebraska, will also lose communications and therefore will not be functional. Local Law Enforcement has been notified in Washington County to perform compensatory measures in case of an emergency. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

  • * * UPDATE FROM DAVID SPARGO TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0621 EST ON 2/24/2012 * * *

As of 0518 CST, communications has been reestablished and all sirens were returned to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident inspector. Notified R4DO (Deese).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ERICK MATZKE TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1602 EDT ON 04/05/12 * * *

Following an investigation of the siren failure, it was determined that all sirens were lost for a period of time from approximately 1809 CST February 23, 2012 until 0518 CST February 24, 2012. The control room was notified at 0215 CST February 24, 2012 and compensatory measures were established for all affected counties in Iowa and Nebraska. No new compensatory measures or actions are or were required. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Haire).

ENS 477216 March 2012 22:13:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessLoss of Emergency Sirens Due to Router Power Supply FailureAt 1613 (CST), FCS (Fort Calhoun Station) Control Room was notified by corporate communications that 2 non-adjacent sirens out of 101 total sirens lost communication. These were Siren #1 at 1602 (CST) and Siren #50 at 1609 (CST) due to potential router issues. Required compensatory actions were established at 1630 (CST) for loss of the 2 sirens. Initial troubleshooting revealed radio communication failed at 1543 (CST) and manual testing of the remaining sirens was instituted. At 1643 (CST), corporate communications notified the Control Room initial testing on Siren #2 was not responding and indicative that all sirens were lost. Based on that report, all sirens for the Alert Notification System within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) were declared nonfunctional and notifications were completed. Local Law Enforcement has been notified in the required surrounding counties to perform required actions in case of an emergency with the sirens unavailable. Compensatory measures are in place to ensure notification of the public by local law enforcement in case of an actual emergency. Troubleshooting of the siren's communication system revealed that a peripheral router dual power supply had failed at 1539 (CST) and has been replaced. All repairs completed and retested satisfactorily with proper communications confirmed with each siren. As of 1750 (CST), all sirens (were) restored to functional status. The power supply failure resulted in 2.2 hours with the sirens being unavailable. Notifications have been completed with compensatory actions by local law enforcement secured. This is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for, 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or communications capability'. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4777427 March 2012 14:50:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News ReleaseOffsite Notification Due to Inadvertent Siren ActuationAt 1145 CDT on 3/27/12, OPPD (Omaha Public Power District) was notified by Harrison County Emergency Management that the sirens in Harrison County Iowa were inadvertently activated at 0950 CDT on 3/27/12. This activation occurred during an exercise at Fort Calhoun Station which included FEMA evaluation of local State and County participation. The sirens were activated by Iowa Emergency personnel for less than 5 seconds. An OPPD and State of Iowa joint media press release will be conducted following the termination of the Emergency Planning exercise. The licensee notified the State of Iowa EMA and the Harrison County Sherriff's Dispatch. The licensee also notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 478486 October 2011 18:44:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionWaste Disposal System Class One Seismic Support Inoperable

The Waste Disposal System (WDS) Class 1 piping requires operable seismic supports downstream of the isolation valve class break. Currently, eight (8) INC (International Nuclear Safety, Corp.) snubbers have been degraded to (Non Nuclear System) NNS Class 4 ridged struts. The snubbers original design function was to allow thermal motion but restrain seismic motion. The snubbers have been identified as potential to create an unanalyzed condition that over stresses the safety class 1 drain pipe upstream of the isolation valve if the snubbers on the drain pipe downstream of the isolation valve were in a locked condition (acting as a strut). Per NRC bulletin 81-01, these snubbers are assumed to be frozen and do not allow movement of the pipe; thus, they have been degraded to rigid struts as they are not in the snubber program and are not tested. They still provide a seismic safety function for (class) II/I issues and act as a strut to provide horizontal restraint to the WDS piping.

The snubbers were removed from the piping system and tested to determine their performance and if they would have moved to allow thermal growth. Six snubbers failed the test and were either in a locked condition or their movement was dimensionally small relative to the required movement. The (Reactor Coolant System) RCS is within acceptable stress values with the snubbers removed. The 8-hour regulatory reporting time has been exceeded. An initial Reportability Evaluation was completed on March 26, 2012 and had determined the supports were operable. A second Reportability Evaluation later determined the supports have been inoperable since October 6, 2011. The WDS is used to drain the RCS. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 9/26/12 AT 1949 EDT FROM ROBERT KROS TO DONG PARK * * *

Additional review and testing demonstrated that (there was) no degradation of the RCS from thermal fatigue. The analysis demonstrates adequate past performance of the snubbers with regard to thermal fatigue. The impact of the snubber has been analyzed and determined to have not resulted in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. Therefore, this event is being retracted. The failure to retract this notification in a timely fashion has been entered into the corrective action system. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Werner).

ENS 4786225 April 2012 14:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionUnanalyzed Conditions Resulting from a Non-Conservative Error in CalculationsA non-conservative error was identified in the Proto-Flo input calculation FC06644 for LPSI (Low Pressure Safety Injection) flow post-RAS (recirculation actuation signal). The calculation used an incorrect (non-conservative) input for LPSI pump performance. Also, the associated procedure (EOP/AOP Attachment 11) as written does not provide adequate direction during the Alternate Hot Leg Injection mode of operation. EOP/AOP Attachment 11 (Alternate Hot Leg Injection) used 140 psia as the entry point. The LPSI pumps may not be able to meet minimum flow requirements at this pressure, affecting core cooling and possibly resulting in pump damage. Also the EOP/AOP attachment directs the operator to verify that flow is approximately 400 gpm as indicated on FIC-326. If 400 gpm cannot be achieved the contingency is to open any LPSI loop injection isolation valve. This step would not depressurize the RCS low enough to allow the 400 gpm flow rate to be achieved which would cause insufficient flow. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the referenced procedural guidance may not be able to complete the safety function of providing adequate core cooling during the Alternate Hot Leg Injection mode of operation under a worst case scenario. Therefore, this condition is an unanalyzed condition and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4787027 April 2012 18:45:0010 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirementsFitness for Duty - Non-Licensed Supervisor Tested Positive for Illegal DrugsA non-licensed supervisory employee was determined to be under the influence of illegal drugs during a random test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 478842 March 2012 13:41:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionPotential Degradation of Reactor Containment Electrical Penetration Seals

During a review of environmental qualification records for reactor containment building electrical penetrations, six penetrations were identified that may not provide an adequate seal during worst case (Design Basis Accident (DBA)) conditions as required. These penetrations are through wall from the containment into the auxiliary building. The conditions that could cause degradation of the electrical penetration seals are not applicable to this operating mode. The station is currently in a refueling mode. This event was identified on March 2, 2012. The reportability was confirmed on May 1, 2012 at 1502 CDT. The current penetration configuration has existed since the plant was built. The area of concern is that the Teflon connections may degrade under conditions of high radiation and high temperature during a DBA event. The licensee is investigating the extent of the condition and repair techniques. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT KROS TO PETE SNYDER AT 1523 ON 6/26/12 * * * 

On review of CR 2012-01947 by a new Project Manager, who was brought in as a subject matter expert on HELB/EEQ, and issue was identified with the 530 primary containment electrical penetration feed-throughs used for non-CQE devices. The CR (Condition Report) correctly notes that under the original accident testing, the Teflon seals failed, and water was noted leaking from these penetrations. On further review, the following was noted: Due to the design of the penetration feed-throughs, when the inboard Teflon seal fails (as it is expected to, due to high level of radioactivity in the primary containment, following a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)), the atmosphere of the primary containment will be introduced to the penetration assembly, first through the failed seal or seals, and then through the weep hole between the inboard and outboard seals of the feed-through. This will put the same high level of radioactivity in direct contact with the outboard seals, resulting in the failure of its Teflon Seal. This would result in approximately 530 breaches of the Primary Containment during post LOCA conditions. The existing vendor analysis does not assume any contribution to the outboard seal exposure from the mixing of containment atmosphere with the penetration air after the failure of the inboard seal. This is probable, as each feed-through has a weep hole. Once the inboard seal fails, the penetration will be filled with containment atmosphere to equalize the pressure, which will bring the associated noble gas and Iodine fraction in proportion, into the penetration. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Clark)

  • * * UPDATE AT 1748 EDT ON 7/17/12 FROM MOECK TO HUFFMAN * * *

During the extent of condition review for CR 2012-01655 and 2012-01947 additional penetration feed-through assemblies were identified that are subject to the same failure mechanism. These penetrations are associated with the containment sump recirculation isolation valves, and also associated with the personnel air lock. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Walker).

05000285/LER-2012-002
ENS 478922 May 2012 16:55:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionPotential Unanalyzed Condition with Containment Pressure Instruments

While investigating operating experience from another station it was determined that Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) is subject to similar conditions. The operating experience involved setpoint drift of safety related pressure switches beyond what had been accounted for in the station's safety analyses. Following investigation and evaluation, it was determined that pressure switches that provide safety related signals for high containment pressure to the reactor protection system (RPS) and engineered safeguards actuation circuitry may be similarly affected at FCS. The impact of the potential drift was evaluated, and it was determined that neither RPS nor the engineered safeguard circuitry may actuate at the required containment pressure of 5 psig. An evaluation determined that the actuation may not occur until slightly higher than the required pressure. Other systems are currently being evaluated to see if this same condition applies. The station is in MODE 5, refueling shutdown condition, and there is no immediate safety concern. The pressure instruments are located in the penetration area which is subject to elevated temperatures. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1616 EDT ON 10/19/2012 FROM LUKE JENSEN TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The condition was initially determined to be reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), plant in unanalyzed condition, based on a conservative assumption that the error introduced violated not only the Technical Specification limit (5.0 psig) but also the safety analysis limit of 5.4 psig, USAR Table 14.1-1. Subsequent evaluation of actual data concluded that the safety analysis limit was not exceeded and therefore not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). LER 2012-004-1 reported this condition under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(A,B,C,D). Revision 2 of the LER will correct the reporting criteria. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee. Notified the R4DO (Pick).

05000285/LER-2012-004
ENS 479004 May 2012 15:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionContainment Equipment Not Analyzed for Environmental Conditions of RecordWhile evaluating the station environmental equipment qualification for equipment inside the containment it was determined that a number of different pieces of equipment were not analyzed for the environmental conditions associated with the current analysis of record. The equipment is subject to adverse conditions for a time frame longer than currently accounted for (220 verses 60 seconds). In addition, the equipment is subject to potentially different temperature effect than that to which it is currently analyzed. This affects a variety of equipment in containment. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4795323 May 2012 21:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously DegradedCrack Identified in Pressurizer HeaterDuring inspections to determine the physical integrity of a failed pressurizer heater it was determined that the heater (number 26) was cracked. Due to the location of the pressurizer heater crack, this is considered a degradation of the RCS Barrier. The initial visual inspection of heater 26 in November of 2011, did not identify the cracking. During efforts to remove the heater, a crack was observed on May 21, 2012. The crack is above and below the heater support plate. The crack is an axial crack showing some branching. The crack is about an inch above and inch below the heater support plate. These inspections were being performed as a result of the operating experience at the Sizewell B reactor in the United Kingdom. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 479924 June 2012 20:14:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionReactor Coolant System in a Degraded Condition Due to an Instrument Rack Seismic Design Issue

During a review of plant installed instrumentation racks inside containment, two instrument racks were identified that were over the analyzed weight for the seismic analysis. The instruments on these racks are used for reactor coolant pressure transmitters that are part of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary, as they are connected via instrument lines to the RCS with no remote closure capabilities. A failure of these racks during a seismic event due to the excessive weight could result in an unisolable leak from the RCS within containment based on engineering judgment. This results in the RCS principal safety boundary being in a degraded nonconforming condition as the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) specified Class 1 requirement is not being met for the current seismic design. Further engineering analysis is in progress to address the weight issue for these racks and mounting requirements. The plant is shutdown and in Mode 5 with the reactor vessel head removed, so RCS is not intact and not required to be for current plant conditions. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for a degraded condition. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE ON 8/3/12 AT 1708 EDT FROM JULIE BISSEN TO DONG PARK * * *

On June 4, 2012, at 2059, Fort Calhoun Station made an 8-hour non-emergency notification for a degraded condition. Subsequent internal review has determined that the initial reporting criterion for degraded condition, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), was incorrect. The instrument racks were identified as being over the analyzed weight for the seismic analysis. This is an unanalyzed condition, not a degraded condition. The report made on June 4, 2012 should have been made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), unanalyzed condition. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Werner).

ENS 4808912 February 2012 19:54:0010 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or DefectPart 21 - Failed Auxiliary Contactor Affecting Diesel GeneratorOn February 10, 2012, during the monthly testing of Diesel Generator 1 (DG-1), speed was raised from 500 RPM to 900 RPM. At approximately 750 RPM, the generator field did not 'flash', a term used to describe the normal voltage buildup in the field of a generator. Initial troubleshooting identified that the auxiliary contacts on the 2CR contactor did not close. This caused the field flash failure. The failure of the auxiliary contacts on the 2CR contactor prevented the diesel generator from performing its designed safety function. The specific part which fails to comply or contains a defect is General Electric CR105X300 auxiliary contactor. The auxiliary contactor was manufactured by General Electric Company and supplied by Nuclear Logistic, Incorporated, as an auxiliary part of a General Electric CR305 contactor. Further evaluation of the failure determined it to be reportable under 10CFR21 on June 8, 2012. The Corporate Officer was informed on June 13, 2012. The Regional Administrator was notified as required, but, due to an oversight, this report was not made to the Operations Center. The required 30 day report has been submitted (ML 121910230). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4809411 July 2012 21:03:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionAnalysis of Internal Containment Support Beam Exceeds Load Combination LimitFort Calhoun Station is making an 8-hour verbal report per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition. An internal containment support beam (B-22) has been identified by the station as not passing the required load combination as stated in the USAR for at power conditions. Beam B-22 is the designation for the two beams that directly support Safety Injection Tanks 6B and 6D. This beam was also identified as having potential loading conditions outside the allowable limits for the load combination for shutdown conditions. Specifically, it was determined that in order to bring the beam loading to within acceptable levels, the allowable floor live load would need to be reduced from the current designated load distribution of 200 pounds per square foot (psf) to 140 psf. A walkdown of the area by Design Engineering estimates the current floor live load is approximately 100 psf. Compensatory actions are being established to remove any equipment that is contributing to current live loading of the support beam and to isolate and post the affected area to ensure no equipment is stored without engineering analysis. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4811117 July 2012 15:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously DegradedDegraded Charging Line Socket Welds Based on Thermal Fatigue AnalysisResults of a thermal fatigue analysis on the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) charging line concluded that the socket weld fittings above the RCS piping cannot be qualified. As an interim action, shut down cooling purification has been secured and charging has been isolated to the RCS. The plant is shutdown and in Mode 5 with the reactor vessel head removed, so RCS is not intact and not required to be for current plant conditions. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for a degraded condition. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 481481 August 2012 15:10:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessLoss of Ens, Hpn, Pmc, and Rsc Phone LinesAt 0327 CDT, a call was received from the NRC Operations Center for Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone status check on the commercial phone line. The ENS phone system had no incoming rings, nor a dial-tone. The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) was to submit a trouble ticket. At 0949 CDT, Emergency Planning personnel were working with Verizon Communications to determine the cause of the loss of the ENS phone. Verizon had isolated the problem to the American Broadband network and was working to resolve the problem. At 1010 CDT, Emergency Planning personnel identified that the Health Physics Network (HPN) line, the Protective Measures Counterpart (PMC) and Reactor Safety Counterpart (RSC) lines with the NRC had also been lost. The Conference Operations Network (COP) and all other commercial phone lines were functional and remained available. All areas were reachable by commercial phone lines. At 1022 CDT, the FCS Control Room was informed by Emergency Planning personnel of the communication means that were lost. The Emergency Plan per EPIP-OSC-1 was reviewed and verified no initiating conditions applied. At 1034 CDT, Emergency Planning personnel verified the communications problem with ENS, HPN, the Protective Measures Counterpart and Reactor Safety Counterpart lines was limited to the Fort Calhoun site. The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was not affected. At 1054 CDT, the ENS phone was restored to the FCS Control Room. This was verified by FCS placing a call to the NRC Operations Center. The NRC Operations Center then returned the call. All communications were satisfactorily restored. At 1132 CDT, the Protective Measures Counterpart line was restored. At 1142 CDT, the HPN and Reactor Safety Counterpart lines were restored. This is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or communications capability.' The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4831317 September 2012 13:58:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessLoss of Emergency SirensAt 0858 hrs. (CDT), Corporate Communications notified the control room that there was a communication issue with the emergency siren router. Based on the report, all sirens for the Alert Notification System within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) were declared nonfunctional and notifications were completed. Local law enforcement has been notified in the required surrounding counties and compensatory measures are in place to ensure notification of the public in case of an actual emergency. Troubleshooting of the siren's communication system revealed that a peripheral router power supply had failed. The power supply was replaced at 0935 and router restarted. At 0955 sirens were restored to the counties of Harrison and Pottawattamie in Iowa. Communications were restored to all but one siren, in Washington County Nebraska by 1031, with that one siren (Siren 35) restored at 1103. All repairs completed and retested satisfactorily with proper communications confirmed with each siren. The power supply failure resulted in 2.1 hours with the sirens being unavailable. Notifications have been completed with compensatory actions by local law enforcement secured. This is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or communications capability.' The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 484857 November 2012 15:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessPlanned Outage of Emergency Sirens

A planned outage of all FCS (Fort Calhoun Station) sirens is to occur at 0900 CST today to replace required router power supplies. Based on the planned maintenance, all sirens for the Alert Notification System within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) will be nonfunctional. Prior notifications and coordination with Local Law Enforcement have been completed with compensatory measures established to support notification of the public in case of an actual emergency during the scheduled maintenance. The planned maintenance is expected to take three hours with a projected completion time of 1200 CST. Also, contingencies have been established with the maintenance to back out if required in support of Law Enforcement activities. This is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for: 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or communications capability'. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and local counties.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN FICKLE TO CHARLES TEAL ON 11/7/12 AT 1246 EST * * *

At 1129 CST, maintenance was completed with all sirens restored to functional status. Local Law Enforcement has been notified and relaxed required compensatory actions. NRC Resident informed. Notified R4DO (Farnholtz).

ENS 485512 December 2012 21:30:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual HeatInadequate Raw Water Pump Anchor EmbedmentThe raw water pumps (AC-10A/B/C/D) base plate support anchors were discovered by Fort Calhoun Station personnel to have inadequate embedment to support existing analysis. Plant drawing specify a j-bolt type of anchor with a required 16 inch embedment. Actual plant configuration was found to be a j-bolt type anchor with a 9 inch embedment. Plant design analysis requirements are not being met for the existing configuration. Existing analysis requires a minimum embedment of 60 inch for a j-bolt type anchor. There are a total of 4 anchors for each raw water pump, totaling 16 anchors. The as found condition renders all four raw water pumps inoperable. In the current plant Mode 5 (De-fueled), Shutdown Condition, the raw water pumps are considered available per the station's Shutdown Operations Protection Plan. Raw water pumps AC-10B and AC - 10D are in service providing cooling to the Component Cooling Water System. The core is offloaded and the Component Cooling Water System is maintaining Spent Fuel Pool temperature. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4862827 December 2012 20:45:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessScheduled Operations Support Center (Osc) Outage for Equipment Upgrade

Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) will be implementing a scheduled modification to renovate and upgrade the interior configuration of the site's Operational Support Center (OSC). The OSC is located within the Technical Support Center (TSC). The TSC will remain fully operable. Due to the construction, beginning on December 27, 2012 with a planned completion date of February 27, 2013, the OSC will be inoperable. An alternate OSC has been established on-site and is fully operable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0900 EST ON 03/08/13 FROM MICHAEL PEAK TO S. SANDIN * * *

This is an update to Event Notification 48628, dated December 27, 2012. On March 8th, 2013, Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) will be entering a new phase of scheduled modifications to renovate and alter the interior configuration of its Technical Support Center (TSC). The TSC ventilation system will not be functional during this phase of modification. Combined with renovations, the primary TSC and OSC will be inoperable. An alternate OSC and TSC have been established. If the Emergency Response Organization is activated the alternate emergency facilities will be available for emergency responders per existing Emergency Plan procedures. The project is scheduled to be completed April 12, 2013. An update to this report will be provided when the TSC renovation is complete. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Werner).

  • * * UPDATE AT 1020 EDT ON 04/12/13 FROM DAVID ORTIZ TO P. SNYDER * * *

This is an update to Event Notification 48628, dated December 27, 2012. As of April 12th, 2013 Fort Calhoun Station has completed modifications to the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC). The TSC ventilation system has been proved functional through required testing. The primary TSC/OSC is now fully operational. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Deese).

ENS 4866811 January 2013 15:20:0010 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirementsFitness for Duty - Access TerminatedDuring a random screening, a non-licensed contract supervisor tested positive for a controlled substance. The individual's unescorted access has been terminated. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4870529 January 2013 15:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessAlert Notification System Sirens Will Be Disabled for Planned Maintenance

A planned outage of all Fort Calhoun Station sirens is to occur at 0900 CST today to replace router power supplies. Based on the planned maintenance, all sirens for the Alert Notification System within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) will be nonfunctional. Prior notifications and coordination with Local Law Enforcement have been completed with compensatory measures established to support notification of the public in case of an actual emergency during the scheduled maintenance. The planned maintenance is expected to take three hours with a projected completion time of 1200 CST. Contingencies have been established with the maintenance to back out if required in support of Law Enforcement activities. This is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or communications capability.' The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and local authorities.

  • * * UPDATE FROM LUKE JENSEN TO CHARLES TEAL ON 1/29/13 AT 1314 EST * * *

At 1159 CST, maintenance was completed with all sirens restored to functional status. Local Law Enforcement has been notified and relaxed required compensatory actions. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Walker).

ENS 487307 February 2013 20:30:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionUnanalyzed Condition Due to Possible Run-Out of High Pressure Safety Injection PumpCurrent design basis calculations indicate the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps could potentially operate in a run-out condition under certain worst case design basis conditions. The calculated flow is beyond the pump curves. The HPSI pumps could operate in a run-out condition for an extended period following a design basis accident. The pump vendor indicates that long term operation in this condition could not be supported due to accelerated wear of pump internal components. This represents a reportable unanalyzed condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.05000285/LER-2013-003
ENS 4878124 February 2013 23:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionInverters Potentially Inoperable During Emergency Diesel Generator OperationDuring a review of the plant inverters, it has been determined that the inverters may not have been operable. The inverters were replaced during the 2008 refueling outage. It appears that either the modification did not recognize that the diesel frequency range is wider than the new inverters, or did not recognize its consequence. Consequently, when the diesel is supplying power to the buses and loads are being sequenced onto the bus, the bus frequency exceeds the inverter frequency range. This causes inverter voltage transients. Operation of the inverters has been modified to improve plant reliability. This issue was discovered during scheduled plant testing of the electrical system. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4878727 February 2013 02:12:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionRelay Backing Plate Fasteners Discovered to Be at Less than Specified TorqueDuring a follow-up review of off-site testing of a sample of General Electric model HFA relays, it was discovered that some of these relays did not pass testing for full qualification in their as-found condition. Additional torquing of the relay backing plate mounting screws was required to fully meet the required qualification. Further investigation into the as-found condition of these relays installed in the plant continues at this time. The relays in question are installed in Engineered Safeguards Features, Auxiliary Feed Water, and 4160 volt systems and are used in protective and actuation functions. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4879227 February 2013 21:00:0010 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirementsTest Lab Failed to Identify Positive Samples

Per 10 CFR 26.719 section (c)(2) the Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) is making this notification of an apparent false positive error that has occurred on a blind performance test sample submitted to the Health and Human Services (HHS)-certified laboratory used for drug testing. On February 27, 2013, OPPD was notified that two positive drug samples that were part of a blind performance test package provided by Professional Toxicology and submitted to Clinical Reference Laboratory tested negative. Currently Professional Toxicology indicates that the two positive samples were provided with the NRC required positive levels for the drug. OPPD will investigate the issue and report to the NRC as required by part 26.719(c)(1). Professional Toxicology and Clinical Reference Laboratory are contracted by OPPD as required by NRC regulations to provide fitness for duty services. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION AT 1640 EST ON 3/8/2013 FROM MICHAEL PEAK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Additional investigation has determined that the samples submitted by Professional Toxicology did not contain the required levels of the drug being tested. The analysis performed by Clinical Reference Laboratory was correct. There was not a reportable condition per 10 CFR 26.719. Therefore, this report is being retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Powers).

ENS 488064 March 2013 20:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionUnanalyzed Condition Due to Mechanical Seal Material DesignIt has been determined that the mechanical seals used in two Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps and three Containment Spray Pumps are made of a material that may not maintain the designed integrity of the systems under certain accident conditions. These seals have been installed since original plant construction. This issue was discovered by plant personnel while researching requirements for the replacement parts during scheduled outage activities. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 489943 May 2013 10:20:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessOutage of Ft. Calhoun Station Sirens for Planned Maintenance

A planned outage of all FCS (Ft. Calhoun Station) sirens will occur today at 0530 CDT to transfer in-service zone controllers. During the planned maintenance, all sirens for the Alert Notification System within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) are nonfunctional. Prior notifications and coordination with Local Law Enforcement have been completed with compensatory measures established to support notification of the public in case of an actual emergency during the scheduled maintenance. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Washington, Harrison, and Pottawattamie counties.

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MOECK TO CHARLES TEAL ON 5/3/13 AT 0641 EDT * * *

The maintenance has been completed and the EPZ sirens have been returned to service. Local Law Enforcement has been notified that the scheduled maintenance is complete and the primary method of alerting the public with sirens is restored. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Haire).

ENS 4902713 May 2013 15:10:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessPlanned Outage of Sirens Due to Scheduled Upgrades

Planned intermittent outages of all FCS sirens will occur the week of 5/13/13-5/17/13 due to scheduled upgrades to the radio system. Based on the planned maintenance, all sirens for the Alert Notification System within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) will be nonfunctional for various amounts of time. Prior notifications and coordination with Local Law Enforcement will be completed with compensatory measures established prior to work each day to support notification of the public in case of an actual emergency during the scheduled maintenance. Updates will be made to the NRC on 5/13/13 when the work starts, and upon completion of the work not to exceed 5/17/13. Work is currently scheduled to be complete 5/17/13. Also, contingencies have been established to back out if required in support of the plant or Law Enforcement activities. Work is scheduled to commence today, 5/13/13, at 10:10 AM. This is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for 'Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, off site response capability, or communications capability.' The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 0915 EDT ON 5/17/2013 FROM LUKE JENSEN TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The work was completed on 5/16/2013 at 1700 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Walker).

ENS 4905017 May 2013 05:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionEmbedment Depth for Seismic Anchors Inadequate

It has been determined that some instrument racks in the Containment and Auxiliary buildings do not meet their design basis capacity due to inadequate embedment depth of the seismic anchors. Assumptions made about embedment depth for a previous event were determined to be incorrect; therefore, the design basis capacity cannot be assured. This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 'Unanalyzed condition'. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 6/10/2013 AT 1630 EDT FROM DAVID ORTIZ TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Additional evaluation has determined that the instrument racks are adequately anchored. Therefore, this event is not reportable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Gepford).

ENS 4905621 May 2013 17:00:0010 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirementsFitness-For-Duty Report Involving a Non-Licensed Contract SupervisorA non-licensed, contract supervisory employee failed a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been revoked. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4911213 June 2013 13:05:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionUnanalyzed ConditionThe station is reporting an unanalyzed condition involving the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump. A postulated high energy line break in the room containing the pump could result in steam communicating with equipment in the safety related switchgear and battery rooms which are immediately above the room. The plant is currently in cold shutdown with the fuel removed from the core. The licensee stated that in the event of a postulated high energy line break, steam could possibly enter the switchgear and battery rooms via a stairwell and ventilation ductwork. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4911914 June 2013 16:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionInvalid Conditions Discovered Due to Exclusion of Small Bore Piping from AnalysisWhile revising calculations for the station analyses for potential high-energy line breaks outside of containment, the station determined that the conditions required to validate the exclusion from analyzing for a break in some small-bore (1- to 4-inch diameter) piping could not be validated. The piping is contained within the station's auxiliary building. In the unlikely event of a break of one of these lines during power operations, the plant may not have been able to respond as expected. The plant is currently in cold shutdown, with the fuel removed from the core. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 492416 August 2013 12:22:0010 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class DeclarationUnusual Event Declared Due to High Winds

Fort Calhoun Station entered a notification of unusual event due to high wind speeds at the site of 90.2 mph during a severe thunderstorm. IC (Initiating Condition) HU1 EAL2. Wind speeds have reduced to 25 mph sustained. The licensee has offsite power available and is in progress of conducting plant walkdowns. The thunderstorm has passed and sustained winds are 25 mph. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State, and local governments.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MATT AMIELAK TO VINCE KLCO ON 8/6/13 AT 0928 EDT * * *

At 0828 CDT Fort Calhoun Station terminated from the notification of unusual event. There was no damage to plant equipment or structures from the storm. Sustained winds are 15 mph. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State, and local governments. Notified R4DO (Vasquez), NRR EO (Chernoff), IRD MOC (Kozal), DHS SWO, FEMA and DHS NICC.

ENS 493245 September 2013 13:31:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionPotential Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump Run Out Condition

Current design basis calculations indicate the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pumps could potentially operate in a run-out condition under certain worst case design basis conditions. The LPSI pumps could operate in a run-out condition beyond the analyzed time by 20 minutes. Current design basis calculation assumes LPSI Pump would be shutdown by (the) RAS (Recirculation Actuation Signal) in less than one hour, however due to past changes to Containment Spray Pump Start Logic, the time was lengthened to 80 minutes which is beyond the one hour analyzed. This represents a reportable unanalyzed condition. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM LUKE JENSEN TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1722 EDT ON 10/31/13 * * *

Fort Calhoun completed additional analysis which verified that the LPSI pumps will not go into run-out as previously reported. Therefore Fort Calhoun is withdrawing the event notification. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Drake).

ENS 4937823 September 2013 18:40:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed ConditionUnanalyzed Condition - Epoxy Floor Coatings Do Not Meet Design Basis Requirements in Two RoomsAt 1340 CDT, on 09/23/2013, as part of a vendor analysis for the high energy line break reconstitution project, it was determined that Room 81 and 82 epoxy floor coatings do not meet the design basis requirements for a high energy line break barrier. This is an unanalyzed condition based on 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) as loss of the floor coating could affect multiple redundant trains of safety-related equipment during a design basis event. The plant is currently in a cold shutdown condition. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4945218 October 2013 18:28:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously DegradedPotential for High Energy Line Break on Letdown System Outside ContainmentA postulated High Energy Line Break (HELB) between the Letdown Heat Exchanger and its containment penetration has been identified in the Fort Calhoun Station calculation FC07885, Rev. 0, Stress Analysis of Small Bore Piping on Isometric CH-4106 High Energy Line Break Assessment. Based on this, there is a potential for a HELB on the inlet of the Letdown Heat Exchanger that may adversely impact the upstream piping and the outboard containment isolation valve. Assuming a single failure of the inboard isolation, this condition has the potential to degrade a principal safety barrier by bypassing the containment building. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.