Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 41039 | 14 September 2004 16:44:00 | The following information was received from the licensee via facsimile: Notified New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection of a planned shutdown of OCNGS (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station) scheduled to commence at 2000 hrs. (EDT) on 9-14-04. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41040 | 14 September 2004 17:32:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile: Waterford 3 entered Unusual Event Emergency Classification due to the National Weather Service declaring a hurricane warning for St. Charles Parish at 1600 CDT. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Waterford 3 is no longer in an unusual event (as of 0502 CDT) . Hurricane watch/warnings for St. Charles Parish has been lifted at 0400. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified NRC Region 4 IRC, FEMA (Kevin Biscoe), NRR (Catherine Haney), IRD (Peter Wilson), DHS (Frank Griggs). |
| ENS 41043 | 16 September 2004 12:17:00 | This 24 hour Notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per Operating License No. NPF-39, Section 2.F to report a potential violation of the requirements contained in Section 2. C of Limerick Unit 1 license. On September 15, 2004 at 1600 Hrs. it was determined during an investigation of megawatt output differences between the two LGS Units, that LGS Unit 1 secondary plant parameters were identified as being outside of their expected range. This change occurred over several months at the rate of 0.1 %/month for a total potential error of 0.4%. This data indicates that LGS1 could possibly be above the operating license limit of 3458 MWth. Unit 1 power was reduced to 99% power to 3423 MWth as of 1618 to provide margin to licensed thermal power limit. A written report is required within 30 days in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| ENS 41044 | 16 September 2004 13:57:00 | The Department of Veterans Affairs, National Health Physics Program reported a package that exceeded the limits for removable radioactive surface contamination. The package was received on September 16, 2004, by a permittee authorized under the master materials license issued to the Department of Veterans Affairs, NRC License 03-23853-01VA. The permittee is the Clement J. Zablocki VA Medical Center, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. This event is reported under 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1) in that the package, an ammo box being used to deliver radioactive materials, had approximately 11,000 disintegrations per minute per square centimeter removable radioactive contamination on the outside. The contamination was limited to one small spot on the ammo box exterior. The interior of the box was not contaminated. The contamination was identified as 99M-Tc. The Cardinal Health Nuclear Pharmacy Services delivered the package. The permittee Radiation Safety Officer notified the vendor about the package. There was no personnel contamination involved. |
| ENS 41057 | 20 September 2004 09:45:00 | The following information was received via e-mail. The theft occurred at a temporary job site. The shipping container for the moisture density gauge was found to have the hasp pried off and the case and gauge stolen. The gauge was last seen at close of business on September 17, 2004, and discovered stolen on September 20, 2004. The keys were not taken. The police have been notified. The owner is considering offering a reward. The State of Florida is investigating. The moisture density gauge was a Troxler Model 3440 (serial #25279). Source activity is listed at 8 millicuries Cesium-137 and 40 millicuries Americium-241. The Florida Bureau of Radiation Control and the State Warning Point were notified. |
| ENS 41058 | 20 September 2004 14:42:00 | The following information was provided by the State of California Department of Health Services via e-mail: Four nuclear moisture density gauges were stolen from a locked construction trailer near Simi Valley (Ventura County, CA) over the weekend of 9/18-19/04. In addition to the gauges, the thieves stole other equipment in the trailer belonging to the licensee (Construction Testing and Engineering) as well as construction equipment from a number of other contractor trailers at the construction site. Two of the nuclear gauges were Campbell Pacific Nuclear model MC3 (serial numbers # M390104780 and # M300105431), one was a Troxler model 3440 (serial # T34417651), and the fourth was a Troxler model 3411B (serial # T3414200). Each gauge contained small quantities of the radioactive materials cesium-137 and americium-241. While it is possible to utilize radioactive materials from a large number of such gauges to make a terrorist radioactive dispersion device (RDD), this theft does not appear to have targeted the nuclear gauges, but rather to have included the nuclear gauges in a theft motivated by the resale potential of the general construction materials that were taken. The thefts are being investigated by the Simi Valley police, who reported that there have been a number of such thefts of construction equipment that have occurred in the area, and it is possible that the equipment is resold in Mexico. DHS/RHB (Department of Health Services Radiological Health Branch) inspected this facility within the last few weeks, and did not identify any significant security issues related to the storage of the nuclear gauges at this site. The theft was reported to the federal government (Nuclear Regulatory Commission), who reviews such reports for possible national trends. Because of the possibility that the stolen materials may be resold in Mexico, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was requested to notify Mexican radiological authorities of the theft. |
| ENS 41060 | 21 September 2004 11:17:00 | The following information was provided to the NRC from the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control via e-mail. A Troxler soil moisture density gauge (Model #3411-B; Serial #8598) was damaged when it was run over by a front end loader. The source rod was broken off and the cesium source was detached from the rod. Investigators searched and recovered the source. The gauge and source will be sent to Troxler for repair. No further action will be taken on this incident. The Troxler source strength is 8 millicuries Cesium-137 and 40 millicuries Americium/Beryllium. There were no personnel exposures. |
| ENS 41081 | 30 September 2004 14:02:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile: At 1445 (hrs. EDT) on September 8, 2004 Crystal River Unit 3 experienced an invalid actuation of the B-Train of the Emergency Feedwater System. This occurrence is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(6) using the optional process described in 50.73(a)(1). A complete actuation of the B-Train of Emergency Feedwater occurred and the train started and functioned successfully. The A-Train of Emergency Feedwater was operating at the time, and it continued to operate successfully during and after the B-Train actuation. The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector. See retraction of Event #41027 for related information. |
| ENS 41082 | 1 October 2004 12:00:00 | At 7:30 a.m. (CDT) on October 1, 2004, an automatic reactor scram occurred as a result of an electrical fault on the main generator output lines that caused a main generator trip and turbine trip. All control rods inserted. Approximately 13 minutes prior to the fault, a loss of one station service transformer had occurred. This resulted in an automatic start of the Division 1 diesel generator and a loss of power to some plant auxiliaries, including the feedwater level regulation isolation valves. The loss of reserve station service no. 1, combined with the trip of the main generator, caused a loss of power to two condensate pumps and one main feedwater pump. The remaining two feedwater pumps tripped on low suction pressure. The reactor containment isolation cooling pump (RCIC) steam supply isolated during the scram transient, so the control room operators manually started the high-pressure core spray system (HPCS) pump for level control. The injection valve was closed as level had already reached the high water level isolation setpoint for that valve. It was later reopened manually as level approached the low level setpoint (level 2), which would have automatically opened the valve. The level 2 setpoint was reached briefly after the valve was already open. Reactor pressure is being controlled manually with safety relief valves (SRV's). The main steam isolation valves (MSIV's) were manually closed due to lowering pressure from steam loads in the plant that could not be immediately isolated because of loss of power to their valves. RCIC is also running in CST (condensate storage tank) to CST mode, to augment pressure control. The electrical load center which supplies power to the instrumentation and valves needed for feedwater operation was cross-tied to an alternate power source, and feedwater was restored to operation and is presently controlling reactor water level. During the event, standby service water also initiated. This is the presently known information. Further information will be provided as the investigation continues. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41083 | 1 October 2004 16:30:00 | The following was received from the licensee via facsimile: A 56-year old male AREVA contractor died from a heart attack. A report of potential heart attack was made at 1242 (EDT) to the control room. Off-site medical assistance was used and the contractor was transported to South Miami-Homestead Hospital at 1340 (EDT). (The) contractor was pronounced dead at 1415 (EDT). The licensee also reported that the individual was not contaminated and was stricken while working in a contractor trailer located near the facility administration building. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the Occupational Safety Health Administration (OSHA). |
| ENS 41101 | 7 October 2004 15:29:00 | The licensee provided the following information via facsimile: (The) Maine Emergency Management Agency (was notified) of an unscheduled release that occurred during the 24 hour period ending at midnight on Thursday, 10/07/04. Maine Yankee identified a minor release of 3.18 E-6 Curies of liquid from the site. This release exceeded the value projected for this period and is therefore classified as unscheduled. The total liquid release resulted in a minor exposure value of 2.21 E-5 millirem. The cause of the release resulted from groundwater intrusion of the outfall piping during soil remediation and failure of the clay barrier that was installed. (The) release occurred from 9/30/04 until 10/6/04. The outfall piping is being removed and the area backfilled to eliminate liquid releases via this pathway. The licensee stated that the radionuclides involved were Cesium-137, Bismuth-214, and Lead-214. The licensee has notified the NRC Region 1 (Roberts). |
| ENS 41102 | 7 October 2004 20:24:00 | A single point vulnerability has been identified in the dousing system for the Emergency Containment Filter (ECF) System that could have resulted in dousing all filter units with borated water during an accident. Inadvertent dousing of the filters could adversely impact the methyl-iodide removal efficiency of the ECFs assumed in the plant safety analyses. This condition applies to both Turkey Point units. However, it is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 only with respect to Unit 4 since Unit 4 is currently in operation while Unit 3 is in a refueling outage. The design deficiency has been evaluated in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 91-18. The ECFs have been determined to be operable but nonconforming and reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)and (D). A design change is being prepared to correct the vulnerability on both units. The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| ENS 41104 | 8 October 2004 14:14:00 | The licensee experienced an apparently spurious actuation of the CO2 (carbon dioxide) suppression system in the North Anna Unit 1 turbine building (specifically the main turbine, low pressure turbine, and exciter area). The licensee responded and determined there was no fire and secured the CO2 release within two minutes. The event was classified as an unusual event per item K.13 of the emergency action levels due to onsite release of a toxic gas. The licensee has pulled the actuation fuses on the system, isolated the CO2 storage tank, and is in the process of ventilating the area. A fire watch has been posted and the licensee is checking CO2 levels throughout the area. There were no injuries as a result of the discharge and no significant operational impairment. The licensee has notified appropriate state and local authorities as required due to the declaration of an unusual event. The licensee will also notify the NRC resident inspector.
The licensee terminated the unusual event at 14:45 EDT following inspection of the turbine building and confirmation that CO2 levels did not represent a personnel hazard. R2DO (Ogle); NRR EO (Reis); NSIR IRD (Wilson); FEMA (Dunker); and the DHS senior watch officer have been notified. |
| ENS 41105 | 8 October 2004 15:38:00 | A natural gas pipeline was broken by a backhoe while digging at a location between 300 to 400 feet outside the protected area fence southwest of the plant. The licensee made offsite notifications to local fire departments and Rochester Gas and Electric which have responded to the scene and are in the process of isolating the line break. The broken gas line is 2.5 inches in diameter and the licensee does not consider the break a threat to the plant and will continue normal operation. The licensee is monitoring the situation and is monitoring for excessive natural gas concentrations. The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| ENS 41106 | 8 October 2004 22:58:00 | At 2120 (hrs. CDT) on October 8, 2004, while performing the 'Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Test,' which verifies the integrity of the control room envelope, it was determined that the positive pressure requirement of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches water gauge for the control room envelope in Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.7.4.4 could not be met for all specified test points. As a result, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition A was entered. Recently completed surveillance testing has demonstrated that a positive pressure ranging from 0.056 to 0.301 inches water gauge is being maintained in the control room envelope; therefore it is expected that the safety function is being met. However, this notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System is a single train safety system and the Technical Specification requirement is not met. The affect of the failure to meet the Technical Specification requirements on the ability to perform the safety function is continuing to be evaluated. The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| ENS 41117 | 12 October 2004 19:45:00 | During a review of post trip activities associated with MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO A STEAM LEAK IN THE TURBINE BUILDING (Event 41110) on 10/10/04, it was determined that Technical Specifications actions requirements were inappropriately applied. With both loops of RHR in suppression pool cooling (necessary with SRV's controlling reactor pressure), procedural guidance requires that the affected loop of RHR be declared inoperable when in a secondary mode of operation. With both loops of RHR thus inoperable, the applicable Technical Specification Action TS 3.6.2.3 Action b requires that the plant be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours. In accordance with the Technical Specification, this action was entered on 10/10/04 at 1831. The required time to cold shutdown was incorrectly noted as 0631 on 10/12/04. The required time was based on the combination of the 12 hours to hot shutdown and 24 to cold shutdown (or 36 hours). Because the plant was already in hot shutdown, the action should have been to place the plant in cold shutdown within 24 hours or by 1831 on 10/11/04. As a result of this error, planning activities and cooldown to cold shutdown condition was predicated on a target time of 0631 on 10/12/04 resulting in the plant exceeding the 24 hour AOT. This constitutes a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. The plant achieved cold shutdown on 10/12/04 at 0509 hours. In addition, Emergency Classification Guide (ECG) Initiating Condition 8.5 states that the inability to reach required operational condition within Technical Specification Limits and requires the declaration of an Unusual Event if the plant is not brought to the required Operational Condition within the Technical Specification required time limit. There are no safety consequences associated with this error. There were no issues associated with the transition to cold shutdown that would have constituted an emergency condition requiring initiation of the Emergency Plan. The missed LCO and subsequent classification was based on an erroneous TS Action time and, as such, exceeding the specification occurred as a result of scheduling not plant conditions. The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. |
| ENS 41118 | 13 October 2004 19:14:00 | This is all 8 hour notification being made to report exceeding the design basis for the reactor coolant leakage outside of containment. The event is being reported under paragraph (b)(3)(v) of 10 CFR 50.72. On 10/13/04 at 1541, the control room was notified that tight system isolation boundaries could not be achieved on the 23 Charging pump (positive displacement pump). The pump was tagged to support maintenance. Although the leak rate has not been quantified, it is suspected that it was greater than the UFSAR limit for ECCS leakage outside containment. With leakage greater than the UFSAR allowed limits (greater than 3840 cc/hr), GDC-19 limits for control room habitability cannot be assured. Actions have been completed to restore system integrity. The affected positive displacement charging pump is not a safety related pump and is not required for accident mitigation; however it is exposed to the ECCS recirculation flow path during the cold leg injection phase of the accident mitigation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this event. The local township will also be notified. The licensee stated that the leakage has been isolated; there was no indication of an increase in radiation levels during the leakage; and that the duration of the leakage was approximately 3 hours. |
| ENS 41143 | 22 October 2004 15:26:00 | Patient scheduled to receive template-guided transperineal prostate interstitial brachytherapy for clinical localized prostate cancer was to receive 72 I-125 seeds, instead received 47 seeds resulting in underexposure of greater than 20%. The cartridges carrying 15 seeds each were loaded into a 'Mick' applicator. Transrectal ultrasound was used for localization of the prostate and implant needles; fluoroscopy was used very little during the procedure to minimize staff exposure. As each seed was injected into the prostate, it was recorded both on paper and in computer system and final tabulation was 77 seeds were implanted. However, x-rays taken after the procedure showed only 47 seeds had been implanted, although distribution appeared satisfactory. |
| ENS 41150 | 27 October 2004 13:05:00 | Illegal drug use was detected during a random drug test of a non-licensed employee. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the HOO for additional details. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee. |
| ENS 41151 | 27 October 2004 13:55:00 | On October 19, 2004, McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 2 experienced an inadvertent actuation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDCA) Pump. This event occurred when the steam supply valve to the pump failed open due to low pressure in the nitrogen supply to the valve's actuator. Further evaluation determined that the inadvertent actuation of the TDCA Pump was not in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for actuation of the pump. Since the TDCA Pump was not started in response to a valid signal, this represented an invalid actuation reportable per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv) (A). However, as per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), McGuire is providing a telephone notification of this invalid actuation instead of submitting a written LER. The following additional information is being provided as part of the telephone notification of this event: - The Unit 2 TDCA Pump actuated and injected water into all four of the Unit 2 Steam Generators - The actuation of the Unit 2 TDCA Pump was successful and complete. The licensee stated the total injection time was approximately 16 minutes and that a very small power increase was observed during the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee. |
| ENS 41152 | 27 October 2004 15:21:00 | In accordance with the requirements and guidance of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), a telephonic report of an invalid signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system is being submitted. This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), automatic actuation of a system listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B), in lieu of a written LER. At 0911 hours, on 09/15/2004, while operating at full power, the plant experienced a loss of power to eight process radiation monitors. The loss of power was caused by the failure of an internal radiation monitor system power supply, PS-100. The affected radiation monitors actuated, where applicable, their associated safety and non-safety related components. The safety related components affected included eight containment isolation valves and the plant's auxiliary building special ventilation system equipment. The containment isolation valves were: - 4 steam generator blowdown system isolation valves (inside and outside containment isolation valves for each of the plant's two, 'A' and 'B' steam generators). - 4 steam generator sampling system isolation valves (inside and outside containment isolation valves for each of the plant's steam generators' sample system lines). All the components affected operated as designed. The effect on plant operation was not significant. The power supply was replaced and the ventilation systems, sampling and blowdown piping systems were realigned to normal. The power supply failure and subsequent closure signal to the noted containment isolation valves is an example of an invalid signal. No full or partial containment isolation signal was generated. None of the valve closures were needed to mitigate the consequences of the power supply failure. The investigation to determine the cause of the power supply failure continues. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41154 | 28 October 2004 03:29:00 | At 0052 on 10/28/04 the Unit 2 reactor was manually tripped after an electrical fault caused Shutdown Bank D control rods to drop into the core. An automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater system occurred when water levels in all four Steam Generators reduced to the Lo-Lo level setpoint. A letdown isolation occurred on Lo Pressurizer level resulting from the cooldown of the primary system after the Auxiliary Feedwater system start. Reactor Coolant system temperature has been recovered and the plant has been stabilized at Hot Shutdown conditions. The licensee stated that there were no complications during the trip. All systems functioned as required. No significant safety systems were out of service when the trip occurred. No primary or secondary relief valves lifted during the transient. Decay heat is currently being removed using aux feedwater to the steam generators steaming to the main condenser. Tave dropped to a low point of 540 degrees F during the transient. The reactor was manually tripped in approximately 18 seconds after the shutdown bank dropped. The licensee plans to remain in mode 3. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will also notify state and local authorities in North and South Carolina. |
| ENS 41168 | 2 November 2004 20:22:00 | On November 2, 2004, at 11:05 PST, with Diablo Canyon Unit 2 in Mode 6 (Refueling), Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2-1 auto started on an unplanned actuation signal from a valid 4160 volt Bus G undervoltage signal. All equipment responded as designed. After the EDG started, the auxiliary feeder breaker opened, and loads were automatically sequenced onto the EDG. At the time of the event, test equipment was being connected in preparation for an instrumented manual test start of EDG 2-1 prior to maintenance. On November 2, 2004, at 1708 PST, operators transferred Bus G to auxiliary power and shutdown DG 2-1. Prior to the event, Bus G was being supplied by auxiliary power, with startup power cleared for planned maintenance. Bus G was being prepared to be cleared for maintenance, therefore, required equipment was in-service on the other buses. Buses F and H were unaffected by this event and remain operable on auxiliary power, with EDG 2-2 (Bus H) and 2-3 (Bus F) operable. The following decay heat removal trains are powered from Bus G: Residual Heat Removal Pump 2-1 remained in standby, Component Cooling Water Pump 2-2 started on the transfer to EDG, and Auxiliary Saltwater Pump 2-2 re-started. Unit 2 is in day 9 of a refueling outage, with the reactor head removed, the refueling cavity filled, and the upper internals installed with rods latched. Unit 1 was unaffected and continues to operate in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 percent power. The cause of the Bus G undervoltage signal is being investigated. The licensee stated that no undervoltage was seen on any other equipment but the undervoltage relays on Bus G did sense an undervoltage. Residual Heat Removal was unaffected by the event. Bus G has been returned to its pre-event configuration and is considered operable. The other EDGs were fully operable at the time of the event and there were no significant LCOs at the time. All systems functioned as required. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector |
| ENS 41185 | 10 November 2004 00:33:00 | The radiation safety officer (RSO) for the licensee reported that he discovered a mass thickness measuring gauge (NDC Model # 1107 containing an 80 milliCurie Am-241 sealed source) removed from its normal location with its shutter open and people working in the vicinity. The gauge is normally mounted on machinery and used to measure paper thickness for the licensee's pulp mill operations. The mill operation was apparently shut down at approximately 0730 a.m. on 11/09/04 for maintenance. Evidently, the radioactive gauge shutter was not closed when the operation was shut down. Furthermore, the gauge was then moved from its mounted location an placed near a walkway as part of the maintenance activities. The licensee's RSO discovered the condition at approximately 3:30 pm on 11/09/04 and immediately closed the shutter on the gauge. The RSO stated that the shutter on the gauge is opened and closed procedurally without any automatic safety closure when not in operation. The RSO also stated that there are numerous signs and postings that alert personnel to inform and involve the RSO when any activities take place that are in the vicinity of the gauge. The RSO stated that investigation is just beginning and that details or estimates on potential exposures have not yet been determined. The RSO noted that the maintenance crew in the area consisted of 10 (or less) people. Based on preliminary discussions, it is estimated that the maximum exposure to the gauge was less than 0.5 hours at a distance of 6 to 12 inches. None of the maintenance personnel were wearing dosimetry so all exposures will have to be estimated. The RSO reported this event without a specific CFR report category. |
| ENS 41188 | 10 November 2004 11:22:00 | The licensee reported that approximately 1000 gallons of "rain water" was being discharged into the licensee's storm drain. The licensee's storm drains discharge into the discharge canal. The licensee noticed a frothing and foaming at the discharge canal as the rain water container was being pumped out. The pumping was discontinued and the licensee is attempting to analyze what substance was in the rain water that might be causing the foaming condition. At this time, the licensee has no information on what substance was discharged or the quantity of the substance that was discharged. The licensee was unable to state how much of the 1000 gallons of rain water had already been discharged. The licensee's discharge canal has a slick boom at the end of the canal but no other mechanism to prevent release of the unknown substance. The licensee notified the Coast Guard, the National Response Center, and the Connecticut Chemical Spill Unit. The licensee also planned to notify the NRC Regional Inspector for the site. |
| ENS 41190 | 11 November 2004 09:26:00 | The licensee's RSO reported an OHMART OD-120 paper thickness measuring gauge malfunction that resulted in the gauge shutter remaining open. The gauge contains a 300 millicurie Krypton-85 source. The RSO has cordoned off the area around the gauge and contacted a repair contractor. The measured radiation level was 1.6 millirem per hour at a distance of 1 foot from the gauge. The RSO stated the gauge is routinely serviced and maintained. The last time the gauge experienced a problem with the shutter was May 13, 1999 (due to a screw jam). The RSO was uncertain as to the specific CFR reporting criteria but during discussions with the RSO he concluded that that 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) is likely to be the applicable CFR reporting requirement. The RSO also planned to notify the Virginia Department of Health Radiological Health Program. |
| ENS 41204 | 17 November 2004 23:46:00 | Initiation of a Unit 2 shutdown commenced at 2050 on November 17, 2004, as required by Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.3 because both trains of containment cooling were declared inoperable as of 1615. Each train of Prairie Island's Containment Cooling System includes two containment fan coil units (CFCUs), for a total of four CFCUs. TS 3.6.5 requires two trains of containment cooling to be operable. Leakage from the 23 CFCU was determined to render one train of containment cooling inoperable at 1551. At 1615, the 22 CFCU (one of two CFCUs in the opposite train of containment cooling) was also determined to be leaking rendering the second train of containment cooling inoperable. Two CFCUs are fully capable of removing the design basis heat load; however, as the two remaining operable CFCUs are in different trains, neither train of containment cooling could be considered operable. Both inoperable CFCUs have been isolated to restore containment integrity and facilitate repairs. TS LCO 3.6.5 does not have a Condition for both containment cooling trains inoperable, therefore TS LCO 3.0.3 was entered. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41208 | 19 November 2004 11:37:00 | The State of Kentucky Radiation Control Branch reported a stolen radiography camera AEA Model 880D with a 40 Curie Ir-192 source (Camera Serial#D1121; Source Model 424-9; Source Serial #16663-B). The Camera is owned and licensed to H&H X-Ray Services that has an office located in East Point, Kentucky. The camera was located in the radiographer's truck which was in the town of Corbin, Kentucky in preparation for a job. The radiographer lent the truck to the assistant radiographer on Wednesday night (11/17/04). The assistant radiographer did not return with the truck all day Thursday. Without any contact with the assistant radiographer since Wednesday night, the radiographer reported the truck and camera stolen this morning (11/19/04). The local police believe they saw the truck parked at a home in the Corbin area. The camera was locked in the truck but the assistant radiographer has a key to the camera so the current status is unknown. The State has notified NRC Region 1 (Sheri Minnick). In addition to the other Federal agencies notified above, contacted the National Response Center (Ms. Jones).
The abandoned vehicle containing the radiography camera was recovered in Wise, VA after the assistant radiographer contacted another company employee providing information as to its location. Mr. Slaughter inspected the camera and found no indication of tampering. The camera is enroute to the East Point, KY office and will later be returned to the West Monroe, LA main facility. The licensee informed the KY Department of Homeland Security (Lt. Joe England). Notified R1DO(Dimitriadas), NMSS(Gillen), IRD(Wessman), TAS Duty Officer(Whitney), NSIR(Weber, Zimmerman), Chairman Diaz(Fragoyannis), EDO(Hsia), DHS(Evans), DOE(Smith), EPA(Baumgartner), USDA(Comeau), HHS(Miller), FEMA(Caldwell) and FBI. |
| ENS 41216 | 23 November 2004 03:01:00 | This ENS notification is made to report that on November 22, 2004 at 17:30 PST the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was rendered inoperable when its inboard steam supply containment isolation valve inadvertently closed during the performance of a routine surveillance procedure. The surveillance procedure was stopped and plant operators entered the appropriate Technical Specification Action Statements. The RCIC system was restored to its normal standby lineup and declared operable two hours and three minutes after the isolation. NRC guidance in NUREG 1022 (Rev. 2), 'Event Reporting Guidelines,' and NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2001-14, 'Position on Reportability Requirements for Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Failure,' indicates that RCIC failures are not reportable unless the RCIC system is specifically credited in the plant's Final Safety Analysis Report for mitigating the consequences of a Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA). Columbia Generating Station has determined that the current licensing basis and docketed correspondence is not clear regarding RCIC credit for CRDA mitigation. Proposed FSAR changes were recently submitted by Energy Northwest to the NRC that would clarify that RCIC is not credited for CRDA mitigation. However, the NRC staff has not yet approved these proposed changes. Therefore, Columbia Generating Station has decided to conservatively report this event under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). A follow-up LER will be issued under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D). The licensed has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41238 | 2 December 2004 16:00:00 | The following information was received via facsimile from the Texas Department of State Health Services Radiation Branch: A contamination incident occurred at NSSI the morning of December 1, 2004. The incident involved the breaching of a sealed source as it was being removed from a device. The source involved was a 50 mCi Am-241Be source that was a part of a water salinity test device. The NSR-N source is inside an 8 inches long aluminum tube of about 1.5 inches diameter and is held in the center of the tube by two concentric tubes inserted from each end of the primary tube and pinned in place. The aluminum tube also contains a neutron detector to measure the backscatter neutrons when measuring the water in the device. In preparation for disposal of the source, the neutron tube is removed and discarded and the aluminum tube holding the source is removed from the water device. At the time of the incident, two persons were involved: The person operating the saw and the health physics monitor. A third person was in the machine shop area and about 4 feet away doing other work. The source rupture was noted immediately and health physics support was called to the area. Health physics personnel conducted initial surveys and removed the three personnel from the area. The involved personnel were surveyed out of the area, suited in PPE (personal protected equipment) and were escorted to the hot lab shower area. Nose wipes were collected for assay and each of the personnel showered to remove contamination and surveyed. (Water from this shower is captured in a tank for recovery and treatment.) After completing the release surveys, the involved personnel were released and sent home. The Texas Department of Health was contacted by the Headquarters Operations Center and added the following information. The source was apparently mispositioned in the tube and was cut by a band saw during the extraction process. Two of the individuals that were contaminated had nasal smears of 0.1 and 0.2 nanocuries. The third individual did not have any indication of contamination in the nasal smear. The contaminated individuals are scheduled to receive whole body counts.
The following was emailed as an update to Event 41238: Decontamination efforts are performed and coordinated by specialized team and monitored each week by DSHS staff. To date some 50 pallets of materials and equipment has been removed from the warehouse. These items were surveyed by agency staff with using alpha scintillation and taking random swipes. More than 90% of these items have been decontaminated with the remainder being shipped for disposal at appropriate facilities. An order impounding all sources of the model involved in the event have been impounded in place since December 10, 2004. All 50mCi Am/Be sources have been properly inventoried and ten of them were allowed to be sent to another licensee for removal and inventory. These were individually identified in the presence of agency staff. No contamination has been found outside of the warehouse and airborne activity inside is far below permissible levels and is being monitored with continuous air monitors (CAM)s. All that remains is a small, heavily contaminated area and that should be cleaned up in a couple of weeks. NSSI will survey and perform final decontamination of the building after which, Agency staff will perform a thorough survey to verify decontamination is adequate. Notified R4DO (Pick) and NMSS (Gillen)
The State provided the following information via email: Additional information received from Licensee, indicates two of the employees involved in the initial event, received Committed Effective Dose Equivalent exposures exceeding the annual limit. One employee, designated HP received 5.82 Rem and the other, designated Operator, received 10.7 Rem. In the letter transmitting this information, the licensee indicated it would be 3-4 weeks before the personnel monitoring supplier would have dose data from personnel monitors for the employees. Texas has requested additional information from the licensee regarding methodology used to determine CEDE for the employees. The licensee is also being required to submit the estimated Total Effective Dose Equivalent for each of the employees involved in the incident. Texas is continuing its investigation of this incident and will send a final report when the investigation is complete. Notified R4DO (Pruett) and NMSS (Hickey) |
| ENS 41239 | 2 December 2004 20:10:00 | On December 2, 2004, at 17:30 p.m. CST, River Bend Station commenced a plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications. This action was made necessary by the loss of the Division 2 safety-related 125 volt battery charger. The cause of the failure has not been determined. Actions are ongoing to restore the charger to service. The pertinent Technical Specification action statement was entered at 1236 CST on 12/02/2004, and requires the plant to be in Mode 3 by 0036 CST on 12/03/2004 and Mode 4 by 0036 CST on 12/04/2004. This event is being report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i). The licensee added that the Division 1 electrical system is available and fully capable of supporting all reactor safety-related protective functions. The licensee is still trouble shooting the cause of the charger malfunction. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41240 | 2 December 2004 21:39:00 | PSEG Nuclear announced, via a press release, that based on Delaware River conditions and the potential for oil from the Athos I oil tanker spill to reach the plant circulating and service water intake structures, it has been decided to take both units at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station offline. Hope Creek Generating Station is currently offline in a refueling outage. PSEG Nuclear currently plans to begin reducing power on both Salem Units on Friday December 3, 2004. PSEG Nuclear is continually monitoring river conditions and tracking the progress of the oil spill. Today, PSEG Nuclear began placing booms around the water intake structures at both Salem and Hope Creek nuclear generating stations. The boom is a barrier placed approximately 18 inches deep in the water and is relatively effective in controlling the spread of oil that is on top or close to the surface. However, since the oil spilled in the Delaware River was crude oil, it is expected that the heavier oil might be suspended in the river at varying depths, increasing the potential that oil could reach the plant intake structures. Since the potential exists to adversely impact the plant cooling systems if oil was entrained in the plant cooling water, both Salem 1 and 2 are going to be shutdown. This report is being made due to the press release and the possibility that this release will generate public interest. No power reduction has been started at this time. At this time there has been no adverse impact noted on either Salem Unit 1 or 2 due to the oil spill. No injuries have resulted from this condition. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector, LAC Township, and representatives of the states of NJ and Delaware. |
| ENS 41241 | 3 December 2004 17:13:00 | At 1555 hours on 12/03/04, Indian Point Unit 2 commenced a plant shutdown at 200 MW/Hour. Plant shutdown will be completed within 5 to 6 hours. This shutdown is due to a crack on an unisolable secondary steam pressure instrument line on the H.P. (high pressure) turbine (PT-412B). The reactor is expected to remain critical at approximately 4% power on auxiliary feedwater. The plant is expected to be restarted within 24 hours following repair to the (3/4 inch) instrument line. The licensee noted that the crack was visually observed during rounds but was not yet blowing steam. The licensee plans to issue a press release. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41245 | 5 December 2004 15:54:00 | This is an 8-hour notification being made to report exceeding the design basis for the reactor coolant leakage outside of containment. The event is being reported under paragraph (b)(3)(v) of 10CFR50.72. On 12/05/04 at 1015 the control room was notified of leakage from a gasketed flange area on the 11 Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger. The leak rate has been conservatively quantified at 0.68 gpm, which is greater than the UFSAR limit of 2100 cc/hr (0.009 gpm) for ECCS leakage outside containment. With leakage greater than the UFSAR allowed limits, GDC-19 limits for control room habitability cannot be assured. Actions are in progress to torque the flange bolts to reduce the leakage. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident inspector of this event. Salem Unit One is in Mode 4 with the Residual Heat Removal system in service removing reactor decay heat. No ECCS system actuations occurred. No one was injured as a result of the leak. |
| ENS 41248 | 7 December 2004 18:54:00 | On December 7, 2004 at noon, the (Radiation Safety Officer) RSO contacted the (State of California Radiological Health Branch) Office to report a nuclear density gauge (Troxler model 3440, serial #15945) with a nominal 40 mCi Am:Be source (serial #47-11302) and a nominal 8 mCi Cs-137 source (serial #50-4969) had been stolen out of a locked construction trailer at Blossom Housing site off of Flynn Springs Road in the County of San Diego sometime between 11 am on Monday, December 6, 2004 and 7 am on December 7, 2004, when the theft was discovered. The gauge was last seen by the gauge user when he locked it up on Friday (12/03/04) at 3:30 pm in a trailer owned and used only by Geocon, Inc. A job foreman with another company reported he had noticed the trailer was locked shortly before he left the job site on Monday, December 6, 2004 at 11 am. Besides being inside the locked trailer, the case containing the gauge was locked with a padlock and the case was chained and locked to the trailer. The dead bolt lock on the trailer door had been drilled out and the gauge, gauge case, chain and lock, along with the door lock had been removed from the premises. A police report was filed with the San Diego County Sheriff's office (case #04084256A). A reward will be offered for the return of the nuclear gauge. The FBI was apparently informed of the theft by the San Diego Sheriff's office, as the licensee reported receiving a call from the FBI. The California report number for this event is 120704. |
| ENS 41256 | 13 December 2004 17:36:00 | Event: During refueling operations, containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere, closed by manual valves, was not maintained during fuel movement. - On 12/4/04 the five containment closure valves in question were verified closed during the initial establishment of conditions to perform refueling. - On 12/7/04 a steam drain valve checklist was performed in preparation for establishing vacuum which opened the five valves required to be closed by containment closure for fuel handling. - On 12/12/04 during performance of the 100 hour refueling containment closure checklist five containment closure valves were found in the OPEN position. These five valves are to be tagged closed during the time when refueling containment closure is required. - On 12/12/04 at approx 2100 a question as to if refueling containment closure was established on the steam generators was raised. It was investigated. And determined at 1245 on 12/13/04 that refueling containment closure was not established on the inside or outside of containment for the steam generators. Initial Safety Significance: This event is being reported as a condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures that are needed to control the release of radioactive material. The requirements on containment penetration closure ensure that a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment. Section 15.11.2.2 of the Oconee UFSAR addresses a Fuel Handling Accident inside Containment. The 1977 analysis concludes that the worst case release is appropriately within 10 CFR 100 limits but does not take any credit for containment. For this event the potential flow rate would be restricted due to the size of the open valves, the diameter of the piping from one open 3/4 inch valve in the Containment building to the four open 2 inch valves and one 3 inch valve in the Turbine Building, and the absence of a significant differential pressure. Oconee wishes to note that a TS amendment incorporating Alternate Source Terms has been approved, but is currently awaiting implementation, which would only require refueling containment closure during movement of recently irradiated fuel (i.e. fuel moved within 72 hours of criticality). This event began on day 59 of the current refueling outage. Thus the potential for a significant release of radioactive material as a result of a postulated fuel handling accident during this time period was greatly reduced. Corrective Actions: At the time of discovery fuel handling operations were no longer in effect. On 12/13/2004 at 1245 it was determined that refueling containment closure was not established, fuel handling operations were complete at 0358 on 12/13/2004. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41260 | 14 December 2004 20:03:00 | Notified by (deleted) of the Oswego County Warning Point that the tone alert system (prompt notification system) was out of service for more than one hour as of 18:43 on 12/14/04. This requires a notification to the NRC for a major loss of notification capability in accordance with 10CFR50.72. The notification (from the County Warning Point) occurred on 12/14/04 at 19:07 via the RECS line (Radiological Emergency Communications System). Route Alert has been verified available (as backup to the tone alert system) and actions to restore (the tone alert system) are in progress. The licensee states that the malfunction on the prompt notification system only rendered the tone alert radio system inoperable. The emergency sirens are not affected. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Oswego County authorities. The licensee has also notified the Fitzpatrick nuclear power plant.
The prompt notification tone alert system was restored to operable at 21:45 EST on 12/14/04. Fitzpatrick and Oswego county are informed. |
| ENS 41262 | 14 December 2004 23:09:00 | A representative from the North Carolina Radiation Materials Branch called to report the loss of a Humboldt Portable Nuclear Gauge (Serial #254; Model 5001) due a severe truck crash on or near highway 52 close to Winston-Salem NC. The accident occurred around 15:00 on 12/14/04. The gauge is believe to have a 10 milliCurie Cs-137; 40 milliCurie Am-241,Be source. A truck carrying the gauge had an accident and rolled multiple times. It is believed that the gauge was ejected and probably in brush or woods in the vicinity of the crash site. A search was conducted until dark and will resume tomorrow (12/15/04) at around 0600. The licensee for the gauge is a company named Engineering Techtonics licensed by NC. The State of NC has contacted the RSO for the company.
The gauge was recovered at 0742 EST 12/15/04 and is in the possession of the licensee. The gauge was still in its transport case. The case was still locked, the gauge was still locked, and there was no visible damage to the gauge. Radiation surveys of the area are normal. The licensee plans to ship the gauge to the manufacturer for further inspection. Notified NMSS (J Hickey) and R1DO (K Jenison). |
| ENS 41277 | 22 December 2004 09:30:00 | At approximately 04:55 on December 22, 2004, Unit 2 experienced a malfunction of Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) system resulting in opening of main turbine bypass valves and resultant loss of reactor pressure. The reactor automatically shutdown on RPS with the completion of a Group I isolation signal (Reactor pressure 850 prig and Reactor mode switch in RUN) resulting in a closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). Reactor level lowered to (ECCS) initiation set-point of -48 inches and High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system and Reactor Core Isolation Coolant (RCIC) system automatically initiated and restored level. When reactor level lowered below the 1 inch set-point, Group II and III Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) signals initiated. All Unit parameters are stable and RPS/PCIS/ECCS systems performed as designed. MSIVs remain closed. Reactor level and pressure are stable with HPCI and RCIC systems in control. Group I, II, and III isolations have been reset. The EHC malfunction is presently under investigation by Station Management. All systems functioned as required. The reactor water level is now at 23 inches and stable and the licensee is conducting a slow depressurization to Mode 4 to investigate the EHC system malfunction. The level transients experience during the scram would be expected with the closure of the MSIVs. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41284 | 23 December 2004 08:52:00 | The Maryland Department of Environment Radiological Health Program reported that a Troxler moisture density gauge (Model 3430) was run over by a dump truck at a construction site in Prince Georges county (near the intersection of highway 410 and 295). The gauge contained an 8 milliCurie Cs-137 and 40 milliCurie Am-241/Be source. A representative of the Maryland Radiological Health Program responded to the scene and conducted a test for leakage and contamination. The gauge source was determined to be undamaged and in the shielded position. The gauge was packaged for transport and will be sent to the Troxler repair facility. |
| ENS 41285 | 23 December 2004 09:46:00 | The licensee reported a confirmed positive (random) fitness for duty test of a licensed supervisor. The individual has been removed from licensed duties and denied access to the facility. A work performance investigation has been completed. Worked performed by the individual has been verified to meet all standards and compliances. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. |
| ENS 41290 | 24 December 2004 03:07:00 | At 2345 on 12/23/04 both reactor recirc pumps down shifted from fast to slow speed which resulted in reactor power reducing from 100% to 44%. At 2354 an automatic scram occurred from the activation of the Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) instrumentation. After the scram all safety systems responded as designed. Cause of the reactor recirc pump downshift is still under discovery. All rods fully inserted. No safety relief valves lifted during the transient. The licensee was in no major LCO at the time. Pressure control is via the steam bypass valves. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41297 | 27 December 2004 18:49:00 | The licensee reported a "manual reactor trip due to low steam generator level caused by feedwater control system malfunction." The licensee stated that it manually tripped the reactor with steam generator water level at approximately 40% and decreasing. Steam generator water level control was restored following the trip using auxiliary feedwater. All rods fully inserted on the trip. No safety or relief valves lifted. Auxiliary feedwater was manually actuated and decay heat is currently being discharged via the atmospheric dump valves. Unit 1 is at full power and unaffected and the grid is stable. The plant was in no major LCOs at the time. All systems functioned as required. The licensee is still investigating the feedwater control system malfunction. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The original notification stated that decay heat was being discharged via the atmospheric dump valves post-trip when the decay heat removal mechanism being used was steam dump to the condenser via the steam bypass control system. Additionally, although the auxiliary feedwater system was used to deliver water to the steam generators post-trip, the main feedwater system was available for this function. The investigation into the feedwater malfunction is still in progress. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. R2DO (Moorman) notified. |
| ENS 41306 | 4 January 2005 10:47:00 | A truck carrying radiopharmaceuticals for Cardinal Health had an accident on Eastbound Route 50 near the Cape St. Claire exit in Annapolis MD. Police, Fire Department and an ambulance responded to the scene. The licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) also responded. Survey indicated contamination over an area of approximately 100 feet. It was determined that an 8 mCi vial of Tc99 MAA had been damaged and spilled during the accident. The Maryland Department of Environment and Hazmat were summoned. The area was decontaminated with a high-powered water spray. However, further investigation determined that an ammo can containing two vials of TC99m and TC99 MAA was missing at the accident scene. The two vials had a total activity of 566 mCi as of 0400 on 1/01/05. An extensive search of the area was unable to locate the ammo can with the two missing vials. Neither the licensee nor the Maryland Department of Environment believe that the vials pose any health risk since the Tc99m has a 6 hour half life. |
| ENS 41309 | 5 January 2005 17:06:00 | The Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) will be taken out of service for an approximate 2 week period to implement a planned modification. The current PPCS is being replaced and the computer outage is required to allow cutover to the new PCCS. During this time period ERDS and SPDS will not be available. Also, a small portion of the plant annunciator system (Trouble Light Alarms) will not be available. Regulatory Guide 1.97 Category 2D Containment Temperature and Category 3D Component Cooling Water Temperature indicators will not be available in the Control Room, although other instrumentation is available to monitor these parameters. This is an 8-hour reportable event per 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) Major Loss of Assessment Capability. The operation of plant systems will not be affected due to this planned action. ERDS and SPDS parameters will be monitored by control board indications. Compensatory actions have been developed. The PPCS outage is expected to commence around 0700 CST on 1/6/05. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
The Plant Process Computer System was restored at 0005 CST on 01/20/05. ERDS and SPDS are now available. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (A.M. Stone). |
| ENS 41314 | 7 January 2005 09:26:00 | The State of Nebraska reported that 19 tritium exit signs that were held under general license by Albertsons Grocery Store are missing from a store location in Omaha. The signs were manufactured by NRD, Inc., Model T-4001, with each sign containing 19.8 Curies of tritium in 1991. The State was informed in October of 2004 by Albertsons that the Omaha store had been sold to a "No Frills" supermarket chain. The State contacted "No Frills" in November 2004 and was informed that the signs could not be located. Investigation determined that the signs were removed by Albertsons in 2002 when the store was remodeled and replaced with electrical exit signs. The Albertsons store manager at the time of the remodeling was not aware of what was done with the signs. The State also confirmed that with NRD, Inc. that the signs had not been returned to the manufacturer. The State believes that the signs were probably sent to a landfill and plans to close the investigation. |
| ENS 41315 | 7 January 2005 11:22:00 | The licensee reports that it discovered an Aerosol Technology Machine (manufactured by CH Technologies Incorporated, Westwood NJ) was missing from its inventory. The machine is used to eliminate static electricity and contains a 10 milliCurie Nickel-63 foil strip. The machine was last confirmed to be present around October 2003 when it moved out of a laboratory space into a hallway. It is possible that the machine was disposed of but the licensee is still searching for the device. The licensee has notified NRC Region 1 (Tom Thompson). |
| ENS 41329 | 13 January 2005 13:18:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile: At approximately 05:04 CST on 01/13/2005, CaIlaway Plant became aware of a partial loss of commercial out-going offsite communication ability and the ENS, HPN, and ERDS lines. Contact (capability) was established with the NRC Operations Center via commercial phone lines. Internal and in-coming (commercial) communications are not affected and a number out-going lines are available for emergency use. Callaway is currently reassigning available out-going lines to emergency facilities. Backup communication methods to offsite State and Local agencies remains available. ENS communication will be conducted via commercial phone lines to the NRC Operations Center. At approximately 05:30 CST Callaway was notified that the communications failure was the result of a severed fiber optic cable at an unknown location. At approximately 09:45 CST Callaway was informed that approximately 4000 feet of fiber optic cable was lost when a bridge near St. Louis, MO., collapsed due to flood waters. At this time there is no estimate for the completion of repairs, but the condition is expected to last up to one week due to inaccessibility resulting from rising flood waters. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local government agencies.
The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile: The licensee received confirmation at 11:21 CST on 3/15/2005 that permanent repairs were completed to fiber optic lines supporting offsite communications including ENS, HPN and ERDS lines at 06:00 CST on 03/13/2005. This repair replaces a temporary repair established at approximately 14:24 CST on 1/13/2005, and includes the preventive measure of burying the lines below the river bed to prevent subsequent washouts. In addition, the original notification is being corrected to reflect that the fiber optic lines were washed-out from beneath the bridge as opposed to the bridge having collapsed as was originally reported to the licensee. The NRC Resident Inspector was updated. Notified Reg 4 RDO Farnholtz |
| ENS 41330 | 13 January 2005 13:32:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile: At 0849 hours on January 13, 2005, during testing of Essential Bus D1 (Undervoltage Units monthly functional test) (the) Potential Transformer secondary fuse blew. This caused an Essential 4160 VAC Bus D1 undervoltage condition. Emergency Diesel Generator #2 auto started due to the undervoltage condition on Essential Bus D1. This auto start of EDG #2 is reportable IAW (in accordance with) 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(a). (The licensee entered) into Technical Specification 3.0.3 with a loss of Essential 4160 VAC Bus D1 (with) plant shutdown required within 1 hour if the Essential Bus and DC battery chargers 2P and 2N are not restored. At 0949 hours, (the licensee) commenced plant shutdown to comply with Technical Specification 3.0.3. The initiation of the plant shutdown is reportable IAW 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i). (At) 1049 hours, (the license) re-energized Essential 4160 VAC Bus D1 and verified battery chargers 2P and 2N energized. (At)1051 hours, (the licensee) exited Technical Specification 3.0.3 and stopped plant shutdown. (The licensee also noted that) at 0855 hours, EDG #2 was shutdown when the #2 Service Water pump did not start. (At) 1144 hours, Service Water Pump #2 (was started and the licensee) declared Service Water Loop 2 OPERABLE. The license has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, will notify local government agencies, and expects to make a press release. |
| ENS 41332 | 13 January 2005 17:19:00 | The State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control reported information received from Los Angeles County Radiation Management concerning a truck-trailer that was stolen in Miami. Included in the cargo of the stolen trailer were approximately 100 RIA (believed to stand for radioimmunoassay) kits containing an estimated 113 microcuries of Iodine-125. The State of Florida reported that the licensee for the kits is "Diagnostic Products" located in the State of California but had no additional information. The State of Florida will ensure that law enforcement is informed about the radioactive material included in the theft of the trailer. The State of Florida incident report number is FL05-009. |