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Category:E-Mail
MONTHYEARML24228A1922024-07-29029 July 2024
Request for Additional Information Response Due Date Extension E-Mail String
ML24192A3642024-06-21021 June 2024
State Rad Health Reply Email Re Draft Environmental Assessment for the Three Mile Island Unit 2
ML24011A2332024-01-11011 January 2024
Request for Additional Information - License Amendment Request (ML23058A064) (EPID L-2023-LLA-0026 - Three Mile Island, U2: Amendment Historic and Cultural Resources)
ML24130A2692023-08-30030 August 2023
TMI-2 Consultation Invitation Letter PSA Reply
ML24130A2652023-08-21021 August 2023
TMI-2 Consultation Invitation Letter Reply from CAP
ML23187A0202023-06-29029 June 2023
TMI Unit 2 – RAI Related to the Amended Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report
ML23135A3992023-05-12012 May 2023
(External_Sender) Section 106 Consultation - NRC NHPA for Three Mile Island Unit 2
ML23159A1642023-05-11011 May 2023
Email TMI-2 Pol Am. 67 SE Minor Discrepancies
ML23107A2232023-04-14014 April 2023
– Response Re State Consultation-TMI-2 Solutions - Draft EA Fonsi Criticality Exemption Request
ML23094A1482023-03-30030 March 2023
TMI-2 TS 6.0 Draft Wording Agreement
ML23090A2142023-03-30030 March 2023
Asnyder, NRC Email from Tdevik, Energysolutions, Three Mile Island, Unit 2 -Response Regarding MC&A TS Change, Modification
ML23094A0602023-03-30030 March 2023
TMI-2 Response on Draft TS Wording
ML23068A4682023-03-0909 March 2023
– Response Re State Consultation - License Amendment Request TMI-2 Solutions - Update Technical Specifications and Remove Certain License Conditions Applicable to Pdms
ML23057A0062023-02-24024 February 2023
State Consultation - License Amendment Request TMI-2 Solutions - Update Technical Specifications and Remove Certain License Conditions Applicable to Pdms
ML23051A0412023-02-15015 February 2023
Email from TMI-2 Solutions Regarding Commitment Date, Dated 02/15/2023
ML22364A1942022-12-30030 December 2022
Email Mitigation for Hydrogen Concerns Commitment, Dated December 30, 2022
ML22357A0142022-12-22022 December 2022
NRC Request for Additional Information Related to the TMI-2 Pdms Transition License Amendment Request
ML22321A0072022-11-16016 November 2022
Material Control and Accounting RAI Response Clarification Call Docket No 50-320
ML23069A1582022-09-22022 September 2022
– NRC Response TMI-2 Solutions Exemption Question
ML22214A0482022-08-0101 August 2022
TMI-2 Response: License Amendment Request TMI-2 Solutions Physical Materials Security Plan - Revised Modified License Condition 2.C(2)
ML22208A0492022-07-21021 July 2022
State Consultation Response: License Amendment Request TMI-2 Solutions Physical Materials Security Plan
ML22199A2762022-07-18018 July 2022
E-mail from A. Snyder, NRC, to B. Werner, PDEP, Regarding State Consultation Proposed Conforming Amendment Related to Proposed Exemption Request from Certain Record Retention Requirements
ML22199A2772022-07-15015 July 2022
E-mail Attachment: Federal Register Notice - Volume 87
ML22189A2032022-07-0808 July 2022
E-mail from A. Snyder, NRC, to B. Werner, PA Department of Environment Protection - Three Mile Island, Unit 2 - State Consultation - License Amendment Request TMI-2 Solutions Physical Materials Security Plan
ML22189A2042022-06-28028 June 2022
NRC-2022-0131-0001_Content - Federal Register Vol. 87, No. 123
ML22143A8902022-05-23023 May 2022
Request for Additional information- TMI-1 ISFSI Only Physical Security License Amendment Request
ML22131A1382022-05-10010 May 2022
E-mail from T. Devik, Energysolutions TMI-2, to A. Snyder, NRC, Physical Security Plan May 9 Submittal Typo Correction
ML22125A0162022-05-0303 May 2022
Email from T Devik to a Snyder: Three Mile Island 2 - Security Plan Proposed Revision License Condition 2.C.(2) (EPID: L-2021-LLA-0103) Proposed License Condition - May 3, 2022 Response Courtesy Copy
ML22125A0102022-05-0303 May 2022
Proposed Action- Proposed Fonsi for TMI-1 Exemption Request from 10 CFR 50.82(a)(8)(i)(A) and 10 CFR 50.75(h)(1)(iv) Notification of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Response
ML22125A0092022-05-0303 May 2022
Proposed Action- Proposed Fonsi for TMI-1 Exemption Request from 10 CFR 50.82(a)(8)(i)(A) and 10 CFR 50.75(h)(1)(iv) Notification of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
ML22125A0132022-04-28028 April 2022
Security Plan Proposed Revision License Condition 2.C.(2) (EPID: L-2021-LLA-0103) Proposed License Condition - Partial Response
ML22125A0122022-04-28028 April 2022
Clarification RAI Partial Response Email from C Smith to a Snyder
ML22110A0212022-04-19019 April 2022
Security Plan Proposed Revision License Condition 2.C.(2) (EPID: L-2021-LLA-0103) Proposed License Condition
ML22110A0202022-04-19019 April 2022
Unit 1 Request for Additional Information
ML22108A1762022-04-14014 April 2022
E-mail: Proposed Order Conditions for In-Direct Transfer of Licenses Held by Energysolutions, LLC (Zion, TMI Unit-2, La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor, Kewaunee, Energysolutions Radioactive Materials License, and Energysolutions Export Licens
ML22102A3062022-03-31031 March 2022
Email from T. Divik, Energy Solutions, to A. Snyder Clarification of Security License Condition Amendment Request
ML22094A1812022-03-22022 March 2022
Licensee High Confidence Dates for Submittals
ML22108A1022022-03-18018 March 2022
Email from A. Snyder, NRC to G. Van Noordennen, Energy Solutions, Clarification Request - September 21, 2021 Supplement- TMI-2 Physical Security Plan LAR
ML22090A0142022-03-17017 March 2022
TMI, Unit 1 - Commonwealth of PA Response to Request for Consultation on the Proposed Revision to the License and the Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications to Align to the Requirements for Permanent Removal of Spent Fuel from the Sp
ML22070A1202022-03-10010 March 2022
E-mail from S. Acker, PADEP, to A. Snyder, NRC - Three Mile Island Unit 1, State Consultation - License Amendment Request TMI-1 in Support of the ISFSI Only Security Plan License Amendment Request
ML22068A1792022-03-0909 March 2022
Email from a Snyder to Acker State Consultation- License Amendment Request TMI-1 in Support of the ISFSI Only Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme
ML22068A1672022-03-0909 March 2022
Email from a Snyder to Acker State Consultation - License Amendment Request TMI-1 in Support of the ISFSI Only Security Plan License
ML22068A1462022-03-0909 March 2022
Email from a Snyder to Acker Three Mile Island Unit 1, State Consultation- License Amendment Request TMI-1 in Support of the ISFSI Only Tech Spec License Amendment Request
ML22090A0232022-03-0909 March 2022
Email from A. Snyder, NRC to Craig Smith, Constellation Energy Generation, License Amendment Request - Proposed ISFSI-Only Technical Specifications, Dated March 9, 2022
ML22047A2392022-02-16016 February 2022
E-mail from D. Kenney to A. Snyder Dated 2/16/2022 TMI Unit 1 Typo Correction to February 8, 2022 Submittal
ML22038A9352022-02-0707 February 2022
TMI-2 Pdms LAR Email Dated 2/7/2022 from T. Smith, NRC to G. Van Noordennen
ML22034A6702022-02-0303 February 2022
LTR-22-0020 Eric Epstein, E-mail Follow-up on Decommissioning and Tax Question from December 8, 2021 on TMI Cleanup Funding, Docket Id NRC-2021-0230 - Region I Response
ML22343A1612021-11-0909 November 2021
SHPO Email 11-9-2021 Alowery to Gvannoordennen and Hpell
ML21256A1902021-09-10010 September 2021
NRR E-mail Capture - Exelon Generation Company, LLC - Request for Additional Information Regarding License Transfer Application
ML21230A3812021-08-18018 August 2021
TMI-1 ISFSI-Only Security Plan License Amendment Request
2024-07-29
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Text
Tully, Bridin From: Sent: To:
Subject:
Richard Andrews <dick0645@yahoo.com>
Friday, March 28, 2014 7:44 PM NRCExecSec Resource; OWH Cody Winchester Another NRC Blog, Remembering the TMI Accident Another blog I sent to the NRC after they brought up the anniversary of the TMI accident.
Lest We Forget-The NRC had a role in causing the accident at TMI I am glad the NRC is reflecting on the accident at Three Mile Island. They have although, conveniently failed to mention their role in contributing to this tragedy.
Inadequate reactor operator training was one of the root causes of the accident.
And of course we know that the NRC is responsible for the licensing and the training of every single licensed reactor operator.
More than this, the NRC's culpability goes even deeper. For years prior to the TMI accident the NRC created and perpetuated a dangerous operator mind-set.
The NRC focused on preventing the reactor cooling system from becoming overfilled and over pressurized.
They wanted operators to prevent the reactor cooling system from "going solid" at any cost. The NRC did not want system pressure relief valves to be actuated causing a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). While this sounds like a good thing, it lead operators to do exactly the wrong thing during their response to the TMI accident.
Let me try and explain.
Once the normal heat removal capability of the reactor cooling system failed, the reactor and the reactor cooling system heated up causing the level in the pressurizer (a surge tank connected to the coolant system and located at a position above the reactor) to increase and the pressure in the cooling system to increase.
The pressure reached the point where a pressure-relief valve automatically lifted as designed to relieve the over pressure.
Unknown to the operators the relief valve failed to re-close when pressure was reduced causing an on-going LOCA. As precious reactor cooling fluid was being lost from the system, automatic fluid makeup systems cut in, actuated by the low system pressure.
These makeup systems were doing exactly what they were designed to do-keep the fuel in the reactor covered and cooled with water. If these makeup systems had been allowed to continue operation the reactor fuel would never have melted and the TMI accident would not have occurred.
- However, the mind-set to avoid overfilling the coolant system, resulted in operator action that overrode the automatic response by throttling and then securing this vital makeup flow. The NRC inappropriately addressed only one aspect of nuclear safety at the expense of the big picture, that is keeping the reactor covered and cooled with water. This negative training directly lead to operator error that caused the accident.
To their credit the NRC made improvements to their regulatory process after TMI, but to my knowledge they have never fessed up to messing up the industry's operator training program.
And that is inexcusable.
1 Tully, Bridin From: Sent: To:
Subject:
Richard Andrews <dick0645@yahoo.com>
Monday, March 31, 2014 8:38AM NRCExecSec Resource Updated NRC Blog on the NRC's Role in Causing the Accident at TMI Dear Executive Secretary, I have included an updated blog I have attempted to place on the NRC Blog site. I consulted a fellow former NRC licensed senior operator who was directly involved in the licensed operator training program in the years leading up to the TMI accident.
Most of the changes I have made to the blog represent his first hand knowledge of the "negative training" that was imposed on all nuclear power plant licensees prior to the TMI accident.
Thanks for patiently putting up with my concerns.
Rich Andrews Lest*We Forget-The NRC played a role in causing the accident at TMI I am glad the NRC is reflecting on the accident at Three Mile Island. As we reflect we must take a look at our roles leading up to and during the accident.
The NRC has done a masterful job of pointing out the shortcomings of the industry they regulate.
It is human nature I think for us to find it easier to point the finger at others rather than at ourselves.
The NRC, to this very has not adequately pointed the finger at themselves for contributing to this accident They have conveniently failed to mention their role in this tragedy.
Inadequate reactor operator training was one of the root causes of the accident.
And of course we know that the NRC is responsible for the licensing and the training of every single licensed reactor operator.
More than this, the NRC's culpability goes much deeper. 1 For years prior to the TMI accident the NRC created and perpetuated a dangerous operator mind-set They mandated extensive training and annual re-training for all reactor operators at all nuclear power plants that emphasized the dangers of overfilling the reactor cooling system. The NRC training focused on preventing the reactor cooling system from becoming overfilled ancl over pressurized They wanted operators to prevent the reactor cooling system from going solid" at any cost. The NRC did not want system pressure relief valves to be actuated causing a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). While this sounds like a good thing/ it lead operators to do exactly the wrong thing during their response to the TMI accident.
Let me try and explain.
Once the normal heat removal capability of the reactor cooling system faileft the reactor and the reactor cooling system heated up causing the level in the pressurizer (a surge tank connected to the coole1nt system and located at a position above the reactor) to increase and the pressure in the cooling system to increase.
The pressure reached the point where a pressure-relief valve automatically lifted as designed to relieve the over pressure.
Unknown to the operators the relief valve failed to close when pressure was reduced causing an on-going LOCA. As precious reactor cooling fluid was being lost from the system/ automatic fluid makeup systems cut in/ actuated by the low system pressure.
These makeup systems were doing exactly what they were designed to do -keep the fuel in the reactor covered and cooled with water. If these makeup systems had been allowed to continue operation the reactor fuel would never have melted and the TMI accident would not have occurred
- However, the perpetuated operator mind-set to avoid overfilling the coolant system/ resulted in operator action that overrode the automatic response by throttling and then securing this vital makeup flow. The NRC inappropriately stressect in the operator training 2
program/
only one aspect of safety at the expense of the big picture/
that keeping the reactor covered and cooled with water. This negative training directly lead to operator error that caused the accident.
To their credit the NRC made improvements to their regulatory process after but to my knowledge they have never fessed up to messing up the reactor operator-training program.
And that is inexcusable.
3
