ML15167A320

Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Reliability and PRA Subcommittee Meeting - February 20, 2015

ML15167A320
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	06/15/2015
From:	David Pelton Plant Licensing Branch III
To:	Bettis A B Plant Licensing Branch III
Snodderly M R
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Download: ML15167A320 (182)

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS WASHINGTON, DC 20555 - 0001 June , 2015 ACRS Members MEMORANDUM TO: FROM: Michael R. Snodderly, Senior Staff Engineer Technical Support Branch, ACRS

SUBJECT:

CERTIFIED MINUTES OF THE RELIABILITY AND PRA SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEBRUARY 20, 2015 The minutes for the subject meeting were certified on June 7, 2015, as the official record of the proceedings of that meeting. Copies of the certification letter and minutes are attached.

Attachment:

As stated cc w/o

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M. Banks cc w/

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ACRS Members UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS WASHINGTON, DC 20555 - 0001 MEMORANDUM TO: Michael Snodderly, Senior Staff Engineer Technical Support Branch, ACRS FROM: John W. Stetkar, Chairman Reliability and PRA Subcommittee

SUBJECT:

CERTIFICATION OF THE MINUTES OF THE ACRS RELIABILITY AND PRA SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON FEBRUARY 20, 2015, IN ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND I hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the minutes of the subject meeting are an accurate record of the proceedings for that meeting. ___________R/A___________________6/ 7 /15 John W. Stetkar, Chairman Date Reliability and PRA Subcommittee ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS MINUTES OF THE ACRS RELIABILITY AND PRA SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING FEBRUARY 20, 2015 The ACRS Reliability and PRA Subcommittee held a meeting on February 20, 2015 in TWFN 2B1, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The meeting convened at 8:33 a.m. and adjourned at 11:30 a.m. The entire meeting was open to the public. Ed Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists requested time to make oral statements. No written comments were received from members of the public related to this meeting. ATTENDEES ACRS Members John Stetkar, Chairman Ronald Ballinger, Member Dennis Bley, Member Charles Brown, Member Joy Rempe, Member Michael Ryan, Member Stephen P. Schultz, Member Gordon R. Skillman, Member NRC Staff Michael Snodderly, Designated Federal Official Ed Hackett, ACRS Michel Call, NMSS Mary Drouin, RES Rich Correia, RES John Nakoski, RES Richard Dudley, NRR Joseph Giitter, NRR Lawrence Kokajko, NRR Aby Mohseni, NRR Natreune Jordan, NRR Donald Harrison, NRO Mark Lombard, NMSS Meraj Rahimi, NMSS Joseph Rivers, NSIR Randy Sullivan, NSIR Other Attendees Michael Tschiltz, NEI John Butler, NEI Jana Bergman, Curtiss-Wright/Scientech Stanley Levenson, AREVA Tom Hiltz, DOE Other Attendees (Continued) Jim O'Brien, DOE Ed Lyman, UCS SUMMARY The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the status of the staff's plans for responding to direction from former-Chairman Jaczko to review NUREG-2150, "A Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework," and provide a paper that would identify options and make recommendations, including the possible development of a Commission policy statement. The meeting transcripts are attached and contain an accurate description of each matter discussed during the meeting. The presentation slides and handouts used during the meeting are attached to these transcripts. SIGNIFICANT ISSUES Issue Reference Pages in Transcript 1.J. Giitter, Director of Division of Risk Assessment, provided an openingstatement for the staff where he outlined the presentation, provided introductions and mentioned the key objective to inform the Subcommittee on the staff's efforts in evaluating a possible Risk Management Regulatory Framework. 6-9 2.R. Dudley discussed background and implementation options the staff isconsidering for a possible Risk Management Regulatory Framework for power reactors. He also discussed plans for moving forward. 10-69 3.Member Bley asked the staff to confirm that the Commission's directionwas to perform an agency-wide evaluation. 11 4.Member Skillman asserted that security is a subset of safety.13 5.Member Schultz asked about establishing goals and objectives to allowfor evaluation of comparative risks. 20 6.Chairman Stetkar asked about a previous draft policy statement. R.Dudley confirmed that one was published and a public meeting was held to solicit feedback but the staff has moved on from that version. 23 7.Member Brown asked what distinguishes Option 2 from the RiskPrioritization Initiative. Member Rempe asked about the PRA needed to support Option 2 versus Option 3. 29 8.Member Skillman and the staff discussed the importance of plantconfiguration control and how the plant is modeled in the PRA. 32-38 9.Chairman Stetkar questioned the staff about the specified criteria used tosupport Option 2 versus Option 3. 39 10.R. Dudley begins discussion of Option 3.44 11.Member Skillman asked what a hypothetical Option 3 plant would look likecompared to a currently operating 10 CFR 50 Appendix A plant. 47 12.Member Brown, the staff and various ACRS Members discussed theability of the PRA to model potential self-approved changes to digital I&C systems that may appear to be less than the 10-7 acceptance criteria but may not be because they violate certain firewall design criteria. 52-59 13.Member Rempe asked if the staff considered additional specified criteriathat potential changes not exceed 5 percent or 10 percent of overall plant risk to address advanced plants like the AP-1000 with relatively lower core damage and large early release frequencies. 60 14.D. Harrison reminded the Subcommittee that at some point the staff'sgoing to have to address the ideas of defense-in-depth, safety margins and that type of thing when developing specified criteria. R. Dudley mentioned that the Commission Paper to address NTTF Recommendation One had some substantial recommendations for improving the definition and criteria for adequacy of defense-in-depth. He suggested that the staff would likely include that effort into one or more of the proposed options. 68 15.J. Rivers provided insights into NSIR's activities to risk-inform security.70-102 16.In response to a question from Chairman Stetkar on uncertainty, J. Riversdescribed the activities of the Intelligence Liaison and Threat Assessment Branch. He described how this branch assesses terrorist activities worldwide and informs the Commission on whether the design basis threat needs to be revised. These activities include estimating likelihood and relative risk rankings. Member Bley extolled the benefits of relative risk rankings in this area. 76 17.Chairman Stetkar asked about a cyber security risk model beingdeveloped at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. This model also includes the physical plant. 81 18.J. Rivers stated that ARES Corporation has developed simulation modelsof two or three nuclear sites. He mentioned that the staff is trying to determine what role these models could play in supporting a risk-informed regulatory framework. 84 19.Member Rempe asked if the material attractiveness model consideredadversaries who may just want to wreak havoc. 87 20.Member Brown asked about the application of Regulatory Guide 5.71.91 21.J. Rivers mentioned the three-day workshop on vulnerability assessmenttools scheduled for September 2015. Member Bley asked about Department of Energy involvement. 98 22.Member Brown and Member Schultz asked about access points andbarrier evaluation. 100 23.M. Call provided insights into NMSS activities to risk-inform spent fuelstorage and transportation. These activities include investigating adequate defense-in-depth. 103-113 24.Member Ballinger asked if NMSS was interfacing with NRR licenserenewal staff to evaluate cask performance during extended periods and long term dry storage. 107 25.M. Tschiltz of NEI provided his perspective on the staff's RMRF effortsand his concern about limited public and industry involvement in the development of the potential options. 114-118 26.M. Tschiltz suggested that RMRF should be considered and prioritizedthrough the joint Risk-Informed Steering Committee along with issues such as: treatment of uncertainty in decision making, aggregation of risk and development of external event PRAs. 117 27.E. Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists provided his perspectiveon the staff's RMRF efforts including the concept of risk minimization versus risk management. 119-123 28.Chairman Stetkar asked for public comments. There were none.124 44.Chairman Stetkar asked the subcommittee for final comments.125-127 45.Chairman Stetkar adjourned the meeting.127 ACTION ITEMS Action Item Reference Pages in Transcript 1.The Subcommittee suggested that the next meeting on this matter wouldbe after the NRC staff's white paper has been issued and they have held the proposed public meeting. 127 Documents provided to the Subcommittee 1.NUREG-2150, "A Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework," April 2012(ML12109A277)2.Memorandum from Gregory B. Jaczko, "Evaluating Options Proposed for a More HolisticRisk-Informed, Performance-Based Regulatory Approach," June 14, 2012(ML121660102)3.SECY-13-0132, "NRC Staff Recommendation for the Disposition of Recommendation 1of the Near-Term Task Force Report," December 6, 2013 (ML13329A336)4.SRM-SECY-13-0132, "NRC Staff Recommendation for the Disposition ofRecommendation 1 of the Near-Term Task Force Report," May 19, 2014(ML14139A104)5.Memorandum from Michael Snodderly, "Certified Minutes of the Meeting of theReliability and PRA Subcommittee on October 17, 2014," dated January 20, 2015,Closed Meeting Not Publically Available6.Federal Register 78 FR 70354, "Conceptual Example of a Proposed Risk ManagementRegulatory Framework Policy Statement," dated November 25, 2013 (ML13273A493)

Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Title: Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Reliability and PRA Subcommittee Meeting Docket Number: (n/a) Location: Rockville, Maryland Date: Friday, February 20, 2015 Work Order No.: NRC-1400 Pages 1-129 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC. Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433 1 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2 + + + + + 3 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 4 (ACRS) 5 + + + + + 6 RELIABILITY AND PRA SUBCOMMITTEE 7 + + + + + 8 FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 2015 9 + + + + + 10 ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND 11 + + + + + 12 The Subcommittee met at the Nuclear 13 Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room 14 T2B1, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 8:30 a.m., John W. 15 Stetkar, Chairman, presiding. 16 COMMITTEE MEMBERS: 17 JOHN W. STETKAR, Subcommittee Chairman 18 RONALD G. BALLINGER, Member 19 DENNIS C. BLEY, Member 20 CHARLES H. BROWN, JR. Member 21 JOY REMPE, Member 22 MICHAEL T. RYAN, Member 23 STEPHEN P. SCHULTZ, Member 24 GORDON R. SKILLMAN, Member 25 2 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL: 1 MICHAEL SNODDERLY 2 3 ALSO PRESENT: 4 EDWIN M. HACKETT, Executive Director, ACRS 5 MICHEL CALL, NMSS 6 MARY T. DROUIN, RES 7 RICHARD DUDLEY, NRR 8 JOSEPH G. GIITTER, NRR 9 DONALD G. HARRISON, NRO* 10 MARK D. LOMBARD, NMSS 11 ED LYMAN, UCS* 12 JOSEPH RIVERS, NSIR 13 MICHAEL TSCHILTZ, NEI 14 15 *Present via telephone 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 3 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 C O N T E N T S 1 Page 2 Opening Remarks and Objectives.....................4 3 Presentation on Status of White Paper on 4 Responding to Risk Management Regulatory 5 Framework Recommendations..........................8 6 Status of Risk-Informed Activities Regarding 7 Common Defense and Security.......................71 8 Status of Risk-Informed Activities Regarding 9 Spent Fuel Dry Storage...........................104 10 Status of Risk-informed Activities Regarding 11 Nuclear Materials Licensing......................110 12 Industry Comments................................115 13 Union of Concerned Scientists Comments...........121 14 Public Comment...................................126 15 Discussion.......................................127 16 Adjourn..........................................129 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 4 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 P R O C E E D I N G S 1 8:33 a.m. 2 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: The meeting will now 3 come to order. This is a meeting of the Advisory 4 Committee on the Reactor Safeguards Subcommittee on 5 Reliability and Probabilistic Risk Assessment. I'm 6 John Check -- John Stetkar, Chairman of the 7 Subcommittee. 8 (Laughter) 9 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It's cold and the mouth 10 doesn't work well under optimum circumstances. 11 Members in attendance today are Steve Schultz, Dick 12 Skillman, Dennis Bley, Mike Ryan, Ron Ballinger and Joy 13 Rempe. And I've been told we will be joined by Charlie 14 Brown. 15 The purpose of today's meeting is to 16 continue discussions on the status of the staff's plans 17 for responding to direction from Chairman Jaczko to 18 review NUREG-2150, a proposed Risk Management 19 Regulatory Framework. And provide a paper that would 20 identify options and make recommendations, including 21 the development of a Commission Policy Statement. 22 The meetings are open to the public. This 23 meeting is being conducted in accordance with the 24 provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. 25 5 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Rules for the conduct of and participation in the 1 meeting have been published in the Federal Register as 2 part of the notice for this meeting. 3 The Subcommittee intends to gather 4 information, analyze relevant issues and facts and 5 formulate proposed positions and actions as 6 appropriate for deliberation by the full Committee. 7 Mr. Michael Snodderly is the designated Federal 8 Official for this meeting. 9 A transcript of the meeting is being kept 10 and will be made available as stated in the Federal 11 Register notice. Therefore, it is requested that all 12 speakers first identify themselves and speak with 13 sufficient clarity and volume so that they can be 14 readily heard. And I'll remind all of you to please 15 silence all of your little beeping devices. 16 We have received a request to make oral 17 statements from Michael Tschiltz of the Nuclear Energy 18 Institute and Ed Lyman of the Union of Concerned 19 Scientists. I understand that there may be 20 individuals on the bridge line today who are listening 21 in on the proceedings. 22 The bridge line will be closed and placed 23 on mute so that those individuals may be listen in -- 24 may listen in. At the appropriate time later in the 25 6 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 meeting, we'll have an opportunity for public comments 1 from the bridge line and from members of the public in 2 attendance. And also, we'll open the bridge line 3 periodically. 4 I understand that there are members of the 5 NRC staff also on a separate line that we'll make sure 6 that we open that to have comments from you. Also, if 7 any of the presenters want help from any of the staff, 8 just let me know and we'll get that line open. 9 We'll now proceed with the meeting and I'll 10 call upon Joe Giitter of the Office of Nuclear 11 Regulation -- Reactor Regulation, to open the 12 presentation. Joe? 13 MR. GIITTER: Thank you John. I 14 appreciate the opportunity for the staff to come here 15 and discuss their efforts in evaluating a possible Risk 16 Management Regulatory Framework. 17 Since the NRC Commission issued PRA Policy 18 Statement nearly 20 years ago, the staff has been slowly 19 moving towards a more risk-informed approach to 20 decision making. In the oversight area we rely on the 21 significance determination process to determine the 22 appropriate level of inspection. 23 In the licensing area we have made strides 24 in risk-informing fire protection requirements and in 25 7 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 improving change to allow outage times and surveillance 1 frequencies. However, many of our regulations are 2 still based on deterministic criteria that do not 3 consider risk insights. 4 One of the main recommendations of the 5 National Academy's report on the Fukushima accident is 6 that the NRC should incorporate modern risk concepts 7 into the regulations. And that the NRC and industry 8 should strengthen their capabilities for identifying, 9 evaluating and managing risks from beyond the found 10 basis of that. 11 There may be no better time for the Agency 12 to move toward an approach that would allow us to 13 consistently consider risk in our decisions. We last 14 discussed the Risk Management Regulatory Framework in 15 the Subcommittee on October 17, 2014. At that meeting 16 we described a two-phase effort focusing first on power 17 reactors. 18 Then after obtaining Commission feedback 19 on RMRF Options for power reactors, we planned to 20 evaluate the merits of an Agency wide RMRF Policy 21 Statement. And my understanding is that the 22 Subcommittee was concerned that addressing power 23 reactors first, might ultimately limit or constrain 24 potential options for an Agency wide Policy Statement 25 8 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 addressing all NRC regulated program areas. 1 Since last October, we've had a number of 2 senior management meetings on this topic and are now 3 pursuing a slightly different approach. We still plan 4 to propose several RMRF power reaction implementation 5 options to the Commission in the initial RMRF SECY 6 paper. But we've also decided to ask for a Commission 7 decision on whether we should also pursue an 8 overarching Agency wide Risk Management Policy 9 Statement. And you'll hear more about that from the 10 staff today. 11 So, today we plan to present a brief 12 overview of what an Agency wide Risk Management Policy 13 Statement might contain. And an update on our power 14 reactor implementation options. And then finally a 15 summary of our plans to move forward. 16 And also, because we're now considering an 17 Agency wide Policy Statement, we're also providing 18 presentations on the status of risk-informing the 19 program areas of security, spent dry fuel storage and 20 other areas within our regulatory purview. 21 With that I'm going to ask Dick to go ahead 22 and start the staff's presentation. 23 MR. DUDLEY: Thank you Joe. Starting 24 with slide two. What I'm going to talk about is just 25 9 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 the background and the current approach. First I'll 1 describe a little bit of what we're thinking on the 2 Agency wide policy statement. Then I'll discuss the 3 implementation options for Risk Management Regulatory 4 Framework for Power Reactors that we're currently 5 considering. And Then I'll briefly touch on our plans 6 to move forward. 7 After I speak, Joe Rivers will talk about 8 the status of risk-informed activities regarding 9 common defense and security. Following him Michel 10 Call will talk about the status of risk-informed 11 activities regarding dry spent fuel -- spent fuel dry 12 storage. And also Michel Call will speak about the 13 status of risk-informed activities regarding nuclear 14 materials licensing. 15 Michael is sitting in for Dennis Damon who 16 was on official travel. So detailed questions might 17 not be -- if you have a detailed question and we can't 18 answer it, we'll take it down and we'll get the answer 19 back to Mike Snodderly to distribute to the 20 Subcommittee. 21 On slide three, as Chairman Stetkar said, 22 the Chairman's Tasking Memo of June 2012 directed the 23 staff to review NUREG-2150 and provide a paper to the 24 Commission that would identify options and make 25 10 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 recommendations, including the potential development 1 of a Commission Policy Statement. 2 Furthermore, the Commission's May 2004 SRM 3 on Near Term Task Force Recommendation One, directed 4 the staff to reevaluate our proposed Improvement 5 Activities -- Improvement Activity One to establish a 6 new design basis extension category of regulations. 7 And Improvement Activity Two to define and establish 8 criteria for adequacy of defense-in-depth to 9 reevaluate those Improvement Activities within the 10 context of the Commission's direction on a long term 11 risk management regulatory framework. 12 The Commission's SRM also closed Near Term 13 Task Force Recommendation One and it increased the 14 scope of the RMRF SECY paper by adding a requirement 15 that we describe the relationships between the ongoing 16 risk-informed activities. As a result in the change 17 of scope, the staff requested an extension of the due 18 date for the RMRF SECY paper until December 2015. 19 And as Joe said, since we talked to you last 20 in October, management has reevaluated our approach to 21 evaluating an Agency wide risk management regulatory 22 framework. And now we're currently considering three 23 power reactor specific implementation options for a 24 risk management regulatory framework. But we will 25 11 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 also in parallel with that, this paper will ask the 1 Commission to consider an overarching Agency wide risk 2 management policy statement. 3 The next few slides are sort of an overview 4 of what this policy statement might look like. 5 MEMBER BLEY: Dick, excuse me. Wasn't 6 that part of your original charter? 7 MR. DUDLEY: To? 8 MEMBER BLEY: The Agency wide aspect of 9 this. 10 MR. DUDLEY: I mean, that was -- that was 11 the Chairman's Tasking Memo. 12 MEMBER BLEY: Yes. 13 MR. DUDLEY: Said to make recommendations 14 regarding an Agency wide policy statement. That's 15 correct. Or to consider that. 16 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. But now you're going 17 back to the Commission to say there's a way we could 18 do that or something? 19 MR. DUDLEY: Yes. 20 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. 21 MR. DUDLEY: And so what I'm going to 22 describe in the next few slides are just of -- it's sort 23 of a bulletized summary of what this might look like. 24 We didn't want to spend too many resources developing 25 12 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 a detailed policy statement and find out that the 1 Commission didn't want us to spend all the resources 2 to do that. 3 So, we're sort of walking a fine line 4 between trying to get enough detail to describe to the 5 Commission what such a policy statement might look like 6 to allow them to make an informed decision. But yet 7 not use up all -- expend a lot of resources on something 8 and have them say well no, that's really not what -- 9 we didn't want you to do that. So, that's the balance 10 we're trying to strike in evaluating the policy 11 statement. 12 So, what we have is we believe that this 13 policy statement of course would be applicable to all 14 NRC regulated program areas, applying both to 15 radiological safety and to security. We believe that 16 -- a risk management approach would be used to ensure 17 adequate protection of public health and safety and to 18 promote the common defense and security for all Nuclear 19 Regulatory activities. 20 In a risk management approach, safety and 21 security are ensured by understanding the risks and the 22 hazards associated with NRC regulated activities. And 23 using that information to make regulatory decisions. 24 Onto slide five. 25 13 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 The risk management approach would use a 1 structured process to identify issues, develop and 2 analyze options and make decisions and monitor the 3 effectiveness of Regulatory programs to -- and make 4 appro -- go back and make improvements to them if we 5 found that to be necessary. It would ensure 6 appropriate Regulatory controls and oversight are in 7 place that recognize the variety of risks associated 8 with the different uses of radioactive materials. 9 And it would employ risk-informed decision 10 making in which risk insights of both qualitative risk 11 insights and quantitative risk insights would be 12 considered together with other non-risk factors 13 commiserate with their importance to public health and 14 safety and common defense and security. 15 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Dick, may I ask you to 16 go back to slide four please. 17 MR. DUDLEY: Yes. 18 MEMBER SKILLMAN: In your second bullet, 19 you've identified safety independently from security. 20 Isn't security a subset of safety? 21 MR. DUDLEY: There is a safety/security 22 interface where actions that you take to ensure 23 security of a facility from external attacks or that 24 sort of thing, there is a relationship between the two. 25 14 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Ultimately, a security event, the consequences would 1 perhaps be radiological. Joe, do you want to -- 2 MEMBER SKILLMAN: I'm well aware of that. 3 What I'm trying to do is get clear in my mind what I 4 think is a distinction that you're drawing here between 5 safety, in terms of nuclear safety, SSCs, CDF, LERF, 6 that type of thing. Contrasted against force on force, 7 bad guys, terroristic threat to the facility or to fuel 8 facilities. Is that the distinction you're making 9 here? 10 MR. DUDLEY: It would -- well, we would -- 11 this policy would apply to both. 12 MEMBER SKILLMAN: But are you trying to 13 have two policies or one policy? 14 MR. GIITTER: Dick, maybe I can take a stab 15 at that. You know, the Agency's traditionally talked 16 about safety and security separately. But of course 17 we understand that security can be a subset of safety 18 especially when you're looking to design basis threats. 19 For some facilities, Cat 1 facilities for 20 example, for reactors it's radiological sabotage. But 21 for Cat 1 facilities, you're concerned about theft and 22 diversion of special nuclear material. 23 So, we do understand the nexus, the point 24 you're raising. But traditionally, the Agency has 25 15 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 discussed security, although it can be a subset of 1 safety as you indicated, as something separate and 2 distinct from security -- safety and security is two 3 separate and distinct things. Although we understand 4 the interrelationship. 5 MEMBER BLEY: Mr. Giitter though, it is 6 traditional, I agree with you. But on at least three 7 occasions over the last six, seven years, the 8 Commission has issued SRMs urging the staff to 9 integrate their concerns with safety and security. 10 MR. GIITTER: Yes, we agree. 11 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. 12 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Joe thank you. 13 Understand. Dick, thank you. 14 MR. DUDLEY: Okay. On slide six now, 15 under an Agency wide policy statement, the technical 16 analysis supporting the risk management approach 17 should be based on sound data, information and 18 methodologies, including the consideration of 19 uncertainties. It should use techniques or 20 combinations of techniques that are appropriate for the 21 hazards and the complexity of the issue. 22 It should be as realistic as practicable 23 considering the specific application. And it should 24 promote and utilize advances in science and technology 25 16 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 as practicable. 1 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Dick, back to six 2 please. Items one and two, at least in my view, have 3 the attribute of metrics. You can measure them. You 4 can figure out what you're talking about. You can put 5 numbers, percentages, some form of measurable scale for 6 one and two. Both three and four have the word 7 practicable. 8 And what I see as practicable and what you 9 see and what the other members of the public might see 10 as practicable, might be vastly different. What can 11 be done to make sure that there's a metrification there 12 so that the measurement standard is understood and is 13 defendable? 14 MR. DUDLEY: I think you've hit on the 15 challenge. An Agency wide policy statement, we have 16 certain programs where we have quantitative tools and 17 safety goals. And we have other programs which rely 18 more on qualitative risk assessments. I can't really 19 tell you how we're going to bring them or even if we 20 can bring them all into a quantitative arena. 21 I don't believe that is likely possible. 22 But what you hit on I think, is the major challenge of 23 an Agency wide policy statement. 24 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Are we pumping against 25 17 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 the tide? Is this a go nowhere riddle that we're going 1 to be involved in? 2 MR. DUDLEY: No, I don't think so. I mean 3 we can certainly address activities in a quantitative 4 fashion if that's appropriate. In a qualitative 5 fashion if quantitative tools are not yet available. 6 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Okay. Thank you. 7 MS. DROUIN: This is Mary Drouin. 8 Another way to look at that third bullet and 9 interpreting the work practical, is that not every 10 analysis that we do needs to be completely realistic. 11 You know, there will be some analysis because of how 12 you're applying it, you don't need to be as realistic. 13 So this is you know, be as realistic as it's 14 commiserate with the application or the decision that 15 you're trying to support. 16 MEMBER BLEY: That makes sense to me Mary. 17 And if I look up the work practicable, it just means 18 is it possible to do it, right. What you're saying is, 19 does it make sense? Which is a different concept. And 20 if that's where you folks are headed, maybe you ought 21 to polish up the language a little. 22 MR. DUDLEY: I haven't looked up 23 practicable in the dictionary. I need to do that and 24 maybe we want a different word. 25 18 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MS. DROUIN: Yes. And recognize that you 1 know, all these bullets that Dick has put up there, we 2 will envision that over time you know, as we have more 3 dialog, among the staff, as we go out for public review 4 and comment. You know, these words are going to be 5 massaged and worked through. This is not the end 6 product that you're seeing here. 7 MEMBER RYAN: One thing that might be 8 helpful, and I'm sure others will have, you know enjoy 9 seeing a glossary that takes all these terms, 10 practicable, practical, you know, any one of two or more 11 dozen words you want to define to help give people at 12 least some idea of what your intention for the meeting 13 is and the document. I think that would be a useful 14 addition. 15 MR. DUDLEY: Again, I want to emphasize, 16 this is our very first draft. 17 MEMBER RYAN: Sure. 18 MR. DUDLEY: It's very early on. There 19 will be multiple levels of management review. Clearly 20 if the Commission supports such an approach, just what 21 you said, we'll have to dissect these words very 22 carefully. We'll have to have them clearly defined. 23 But at this point, we're just not there. 24 We're trying to give the Commission enough of an idea 25 19 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 of what this policy might look like so that they can 1 make an informed decision as to whether or not they want 2 the staff to pursue it. But yet, not use too many 3 resources to develop a policy statement that perhaps 4 the Commission chooses not to have us do. 5 MEMBER RYAN: Well, that's a fair way to 6 look at it. Yes. And to proceed. 7 MR. DUDLEY: Right. 8 MEMBER RYAN: Thank you. 9 MR. DUDLEY: Great. 10 MS. DROUIN: This is Mary Drouin again. 11 Your point is very well taken. And the working group 12 has started a glossary you know, on this. So, we have 13 anticipated that and there's already some terms that 14 we have defined and we are actually starting a glossary. 15 MEMBER RYAN: Okay, great. 16 MS. DROUIN: And I think Dick has that as 17 a backup slide. 18 MR. DUDLEY: Yes, we have defined a number 19 of terms. 20 MEMBER RYAN: Excellent. 21 MR. DUDLEY: And practicable or perhaps 22 some other adjective would be added to that if that's 23 not the right word. 24 On slide -- 25 20 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MEMBER SCHULTZ: Dick, before we go 1 forward. 2 MR. DUDLEY: Yes? 3 MEMBER SCHULTZ: In the last -- in these 4 three slide where you've talked about the statement and 5 then the approach and technical analysis, in order to 6 get to the point where this is being utilized beyond 7 the evaluation and then getting into decision making, 8 are we also promoting an approach that would be 9 evaluating comparative risks associated with the 10 technology and the decisions and so forth? In order 11 to make good decisions related to this technology, the 12 nuclear technology versus other technology? 13 MR. DUDLEY: You mean comparing nuclear to 14 this? 15 MEMBER SCHULTZ: Well, establishing the 16 metrics that would allow decision making to happen. We 17 haven't talked about that. It's not talked about here, 18 establishing the goals and objectives. 19 MR. DUDLEY: That's correct. That will 20 be easier to do for some programs then for others. And 21 again, that was Member Skillman's point I think. We 22 clearly have quantitative tools and safety goals for 23 certain regulated areas. We have qualitative tools 24 and goals in other regulated areas. 25 21 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 I am not sure if all regulated areas will 1 ever make it to qualitative tools and acceptable levels 2 of risk. 3 MEMBER SCHULTZ: You mean quantitative? 4 MR. DUDLEY: Quantitative, um-hum. 5 MEMBER SCHULTZ: Quantitative then. 6 MR. DUDLEY: Quantitative, I apologize, 7 yes. I'm not sure that those who have qualitative 8 tools and measures will make it into quantitative. So 9 I can't necessarily -- perhaps your question was can 10 you compare risk from one regulated area to another 11 regulated area using the same scale? Was that where 12 you were coming from? 13 MEMBER SCHULTZ: Well, I'm focusing on the 14 attribute of decision making. And you can do 15 comparative evaluations and analysis. But all of this 16 appears to be in internal focus associated with what 17 is being done within this Agency. And I'm also looking 18 for an understanding of what is done outside the Agency 19 in terms of the same types of decision making. I'm not 20 seeing it here. 21 MR. DUDLEY: I mean, if one -- if you're 22 postulating tools that would allow one to compare the 23 risk to the public from electrical power generated by 24 nuclear versus risk to the public of electrical power 25 22 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 generated by burning coal, we're not going to be doing 1 that. I personally think that would be very 2 interesting. I have seen some studies on that. 3 But, that's not I think within -- I don't 4 have an OGC representative here. But I don't know that 5 that's within our charter. 6 MR. GIITTER: Yes Dick, just let me try to 7 clarify a little bit. For the harm part of Agency wide 8 policy statement, that was not envisioned. We do that 9 as you know of course, to a certain extent with the 10 safety poll policy. But whether we would do that would 11 certainly -- would be a Commission decision, a policy 12 decision. 13 But it's currently not something that's 14 envisioned for RMRF at this point. 15 MEMBER SCHULTZ: Thank you. 16 MR. DUDLEY: That concludes the very -- 17 the preliminary work that we've done regarding an 18 Agency wide policy statement. We -- the management 19 decision to pursue that was made in January. 20 So we haven't been looking at this very 21 long. So it is -- 22 MEMBER BLEY: Just last month? January? 23 MR. DUDLEY: Yes. That's correct. So 24 and it is very preliminary. 25 23 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: You have circulated a 1 draft policy statement back last year, didn't you? For 2 comments? Or did the -- I guess I never -- no, it was 3 released. 4 MR. DUDLEY: There was one published, a 5 risk management. Yes, that's correct. 6 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Did you get public 7 feedback on that? 8 MR. DUDLEY: Yes, we did. 9 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. 10 UNKNOWN: And? 11 MR. DUDLEY: I answered the question. 12 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And I didn't follow up 13 and silence is interpreted as move on quickly. 14 (Laughter) 15 MR. DUDLEY: No, seriously I -- I'm 16 assuming we -- I think this Committee, this 17 Subcommittee was very pleased with the work. 18 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes. We were briefed 19 on it in that October meeting. 20 MR. DUDLEY: Right. So yes, this 21 Committee was pleased with that. There were other 22 members of the public that perhaps were not so 23 supportive. But -- so feedback was mixed. But yet as 24 you say, this Subcommittee was very positive with 25 24 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 respect to that policy statement. 1 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. Thank you. 2 MR. DUDLEY: Okay. The slide seven 3 starts the three power reactor risk management 4 regulatory framework implementation options that we 5 are currently considering. Option One is to maintain 6 our existing current regulatory framework. 7 Option Two would be to institute a 8 voluntary, alternative, risk-informed licensing 9 basis. And Option Three would be a plant specific risk 10 management regulatory framework, essentially the 11 framework recommended in NUREG-2150 for power 12 reactors. 13 These three Options were also described to 14 you essentially in the same form when we came here in 15 October. But when we were here in October, we had a 16 fourth option that we have dropped. The option that 17 we had, that we dropped, was to continue to risk-inform 18 our regulations on a generic basis. 19 That activity includes things like 20 finishing up 5046(a), the risk-informed ECCS rule. 21 Maybe looking at the coupling LOOP from LOCA. And 22 under that Option we were going to more aggressively 23 and more thoroughly go through our regulations and see 24 if there are others that could be risk-informed on a 25 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 generic basis. 1 I don't know that that would have been 2 successful. Ultimately management decided we would 3 drop that Option to simplify the paper. 4 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: In a sense, one could 5 argue that's part of Option One anyway, right? 6 MR. DUDLEY: You could argue that under 7 Option One, we've gone about as far as we can go. 8 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. 9 MR. DUDLEY: And I think that probably is. 10 At least that's my view. By the time we complete 11 5046(a), and then perhaps look again at LOOP -- 12 separating LOOP from LOCA. 13 Any other questions? 14 (No response) 15 MR. DUDLEY: Okay. So those are the three 16 Options. Our description of these three Options 17 should essentially be similar to the description that 18 we gave you back in October. 19 Under maintain the current regulatory 20 framework, we would not revise our framework. We 21 believe and even NUREG-2150 states, in Chapter 4, 22 Option A, that the current power reactor regulatory 23 framework meets the criteria for a risk management 24 regulatory framework. 25 26 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 We have the Commission Safety Goal Policy 1 statement which sets forth a risk management objective. 2 Our current regulations implement sufficient 3 protection, defense-in-depth and safety margins that 4 they would provide, that would correspond to meeting 5 the 2150 risk management goal. 6 NRR has a licensing instruction, LIC-504, 7 which has a risk-informed decision making process in 8 it very similar to the one recommended in NUREG-2150. 9 And in addition, the NRC has numerous monitoring and 10 feedback mechanisms that we use to gauge the efficacy 11 of our regulatory decisions and to identify new 12 information that should be considered within the 13 regulatory framework. 14 And I believe when I met with this 15 Subcommittee once before to talk about Near Term Task 16 Force Recommendation 1, we had a little over an hour 17 presentation where we talked to you about our existing 18 programs that do this. The Operating Experience 19 Program, the Generic Issues Programs, the Agency Action 20 Review Meeting. So, we have discussed these programs 21 with this Committee before. 22 And finally, we like to always emphasize 23 that maintaining our current regulatory framework is 24 not a do nothing option. Under our current framework, 25 27 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 we have complete freedom to make safety improvements 1 based on risk insights or whatever considerations we 2 would choose whenever it's deemed necessary. And we 3 can make changes using our existing regulatory 4 processes. 5 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But I think that just 6 for the record that does tend to be more of an ad hoc 7 process, issue specific, rather then a comprehensive 8 integrated Agency wide approach. 9 MR. DUDLEY: It is -- 10 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Even within the narrow 11 focus that you've emphasized here, even within the 12 power reactors area. 13 MR. DUDLEY: I would say that's correct. 14 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. 15 MR. DUDLEY: I would not disagree. 16 Power Reactor Option Two. Under Option 17 Two, the Voluntary Alternative Risk-Informed Licensing 18 Basis, we would maintain our existing generic 19 regulatory structure as it is, but we'd issue a rule 20 allowing licensees who volunteer or choose to upgrade 21 their PRAs. They could apply for approval of a 22 licensing basis that would support a performance based, 23 risk-informed alternative to certain deterministic 24 regulations that their PRA would show might have low 25 28 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 safety benefit at their specific facilities. 1 So these licensees would be allowed to 2 select a plant specific set of design changes or 3 compliance issues, shown to be of low risk, from which 4 they could deviate from our current deterministic 5 requirements. Some of these would require NRC 6 approval. Some of this might allow -- in some cases 7 we might allow licensees to approve low risk changes 8 themselves without our approval, as long as they also 9 search for and mitigate all plant specific risk 10 vulnerabilities that would meet NRC specified 11 criteria. 12 So, if you want to take this approach and 13 do your PRA and try to reduce or eliminate some low risk, 14 significant requirements, you will have had to look for 15 risk outliers and other things that maybe have specific 16 risk at your facilities, even though they're in 17 compliance with the current regulations. You would 18 then have to under this alternative, mitigate that risk 19 before you could then take the benefit of making the 20 facility changes to change the existing deterministic 21 requirements that were not risk significant at your 22 facility. 23 MEMBER BROWN: Isn't this -- the first -- 24 the second measure bullet, I guess it -- that sounds 25 29 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 like part of the prioritization type stuff where you 1 have -- I mean that's -- I'm just connect -- trying to 2 connect the dots with these. They sound very similar 3 where you can avoid safety benefit, you can then 4 prioritize and do some stuff on a lower level basis then 5 you did as a -- 6 MR. DUDLEY: They are. There is a 7 similarity. 8 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. I mean, is that -- 9 why is the prioritization separated out? I know we're 10 going to do that this afternoon, but -- 11 MR. DUDLEY: These activities are 12 related. Prioritization is the first step. 13 MR. GIITTER: Yes, let me try to address 14 that. What you're going to hear this afternoon is 15 focused primarily on -- at least initially, on 16 scheduling. So if licensing has a modification in 17 front of them, whether it's something they're required 18 to do or something that they are taking it upon 19 themselves to do because they think it's going to 20 improve their reliability at the plant, they will -- 21 it provides a methodology for them to make decisions 22 on what should come first. And what can be deferred 23 to later. 24 What we're talking about here, similar in 25 30 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 concept because you're using risk insights to determine 1 what's more important, but fundamentally it's 2 different in that we're looking at actual changes to 3 the license and the licensing basis for the plant. So 4 it's a more permanent and substantial change then the 5 risk prioritization effort that you'll hear about this 6 afternoon. 7 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. Thanks. 8 MEMBER REMPE: If I compare Option Two and 9 Option Three, and I know you've not fleshed out all the 10 details, but in your mind, it would the same amount of 11 upgrades to the PRA be needed for Option Two and Option 12 Three? 13 MR. DUDLEY: Let's see, I'm -- I'm not 14 sure. 15 MR. GIITTER: That's -- yes, I can talk a 16 little bit about that We envision that there's going 17 to be upgrades to the PRA required for both Option Two 18 and Three. It may be a matter of degree. 19 For Option Two, certainly you're going to 20 have to upgrade your PRA to a level that is necessary 21 in order to make the right decisions. In other words, 22 if you're looking at what all of the hazards are for 23 the facility, you're going to need to have external 24 event models for example. You'd need to understand how 25 31 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 they play in. 1 Now whether you actually have to do for 2 example, a flooding PRA or something like that, there 3 may be some flexibility in how you do that. You may 4 be able to because right now the state of the art doesn't 5 really support flooding PRA. You may be able to use 6 qualitative insights or some other methods similar to 7 what we did for the IPEEE to make those kind of 8 decisions. 9 But you are going to have to have 10 information necessary in order to make the right 11 decision. Whatever that decision might be. 12 MEMBER REMPE: Okay. Thank you. 13 MS. DROUIN: Let me just also add to that. 14 It's also going to be dependent on what your acceptance 15 criteria is. I mean in Option Two, you may keep your 16 acceptance criteria for example to reactors CDF and 17 LERF. Or maybe you know, just to release those. So 18 then you'd only require you know, a level two. 19 Now the level of detail in the scope that 20 goes with it would probably increase. But when you go 21 to Option Three, you know, if you're starting to talk 22 about using for example a frequency consequence curve, 23 then you're talking about having to do a level three 24 PRA. Versus just keeping your PRA the CDF and LERF. 25 32 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Dick, let me make an 1 observation and then ask a question. Option Two 2 provides what I view as a very great benefit to 3 licensees. But, I spent about ten years consulting. 4 And most of my consulting was engineering effectiveness 5 in relationship of engineering for the plant culture. 6 Whether it's the work management program or operations. 7 And what I observed in those ten years is 8 some plants that were very well run, there was a very 9 strong relationship between the corrective action 10 program, their work management program and just an 11 honest to goodness understanding of Appendix B to 10 12 CFR 50. All 18 points, including record keeping and 13 configuration control. 14 And unless a licensee is firmly set on a 15 configuration control program that ensures the plant's 16 configured the way it's supposed to be and its 17 documentation shows that configuration, unless the PRA 18 model reflects the current configuration, this can be 19 a red herring. Because they can be asking for change 20 under what they believe to be an appropriate PRA model 21 when the plant isn't reflective at all of that model. 22 So my question is, what is the discipline 23 that ensures that before an option like this is granted 24 to a licensee, they are really where they are supposed 25 33 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 to be in configuration control, commitment to 10 CFR 1 50, Appendix B? They are really doing it? 2 MR. DUDLEY: Well, we have a very active 3 reactor oversight program and onsite inspectors. And 4 I think that's the tool that we would use. And that 5 we are using right now. 6 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Do you believe that's 7 effective? 8 MR. DUDLEY: I'm not an expert on the 9 oversight program. I can't speak to that. I assume 10 it's effective or we would be improving it. But I think 11 our existing oversight program is likely adequate for 12 that. If you would like us to get some additional 13 information or if you're at a future meeting, something 14 about that, we can put that together for your. But -- 15 MEMBER SKILLMAN: That is not really what 16 I'm driving towards. What I'm driving towards is the 17 notion that if Option Two were to become a viable option 18 that there needs to be part of that Option Two a 19 recognition of the importance of compliance with the 20 other regulations that ensure that the plant 21 configuration and the PRA model are in alignment. 22 MR. DUDLEY: So perhaps what you're 23 suggesting is, if the plant implemented Option Two, one 24 of the conditions of that might be a special inspection 25 34 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 prior to that approval to make sure that their actual 1 configuration was consistent with the configuration 2 that was modeled in the PRA. Maybe that's something 3 we should consider. 4 MR. GIITTER: Well, yes, Dick let me just 5 -- I agree with your comment. And with any model or 6 PRA model, it's only as good as the understanding of 7 how the systems operate, your ability to model systems, 8 failure modes of course. So, that is critical. 9 And how that's done, it's a very good 10 point. I don't know that we would necessarily want to 11 do a detailed PRA inspection. I mean, that's certainly 12 a possibility we could look at. But there are -- it 13 is something that we would have to have a high degree 14 of assurance that the PRA model is -- represents the 15 plant condition. 16 And there are -- and then Mary can talk 17 about this more. You know, there are peer reviews that 18 are done of course anytime you upgrade your PRA. That 19 doesn't go into the level of detail that you're talking 20 about. But -- so this is a very good point and it's 21 something we'll take into consideration. 22 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Can I just -- let me make 23 one more point. The real concern I have is that the 24 more clever your team is at the site -- the more clever 25 35 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 the operating team and the engineering team is at the 1 site, the potential for gaming the system increases. 2 And it's that that I'm really both aware of and 3 concerned about. 4 I think it's great to give the licensees 5 freedom to use a PRA tool to reduce perhaps the burden 6 where the value of some of the issues that they are 7 protecting against is very low. I understand that 8 concept. But I also am aware of organizations that 9 have the potential to game the system. 10 And hence there needs to be at least in my 11 mind, the ability to make sure that the rigor and 12 discipline are there. So that a freedom is given on 13 Option Two, we are confident that the licensees are 14 where they're supposed to be. That's what I'm saying. 15 MR. DROUIN: One thing to note is that you 16 know, there is the PRA standard now. You know, we have 17 reviewed that standard and endorsed it in one point or 18 another. If the Commission decided to go forward with 19 Option Two, we would have to relook at that standard 20 you know, in the light of does it provide us enough that 21 we're going to have the right technical acceptability 22 in that PRA to support an Option Two. 23 Now one part of the standard is not just 24 the technical requirement for doing the PRA. A big 25 36 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 piece of that standard is the configuration control of 1 that PRA. So the standard does get into requirements 2 you know, of how to you know, maintain the configuration 3 of the PRA such that it appropriately reflects you know, 4 the design and operation of the plant. 5 So we would have to -- we would go back and 6 look at those requirements and make sure that those are 7 strong enough, you know, to support this kind of 8 application. 9 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Thank you Mary, Joe, 10 Dick. 11 MEMBER SCHULTZ: So, again, that gets to 12 the PRA and the analysis portion of the discussion that 13 Dick was raising. And I think what you're saying Dick, 14 is that the other important parts of this are the 15 relationship of that particular analysis to the 16 configuration control, the maintenance, the plant 17 programs, including operations and training and all of 18 those elements that result at the analysis for the PRA 19 for that facility. 20 But also maintain it over the lifetime of 21 the plant, which is what we're asking the licensee to 22 do here. 23 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Yes, let me give you a 24 word picture that might even be more clear. I worked 25 37 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 at a plant where the plant changed from their old 1 electrical load model, I think it was ohms to ETAP. 2 ETAP is the we're told and is a very, very complicated, 3 very detailed program. It's probably on a par with 4 BRA. ETAP is a very complicated program. 5 In this particular plant, ETAP, this 6 Electrical Transient Assessment Program, was being 7 maintained by a college coop three months of the year. 8 And it was the flagship program for protecting the load 9 configuration at this particular nuclear power plant. 10 And so the leadership of that plant had 11 determined that it was acceptable for a part time 12 college student to maintain the database. And that's 13 the program upon which ECCS loading, current flows, 14 breaker protection, breaker relay alignment was 15 established. And that was an alarming finding. 16 But it was so deep in the culture, one had 17 to really dig for it. 18 MS. DROUIN: I think you raise excellent 19 issues. And these are you know, some of the challenges 20 that are going to be faced. I'm not trying to harp on 21 this standard. It does require the licensee to develop 22 a PRA configuration control program. It doesn't get 23 into details. 24 But what that might translate to mean is 25 38 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 that we as the NRC may need to come back and write a 1 perhaps a Regulatory Guide to give accept -- you know, 2 our acceptable staff position of what constitutes an 3 acceptable PRA configuration control program. 4 So these are all you know, questions that 5 you know, we're going to have to explore and answer. 6 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Okay. Thank you Mary. 7 Thank you Dick. 8 MR. DUDLEY: Back to slide nine. So, 9 licensees who would choose this alternative would have 10 to go out and look for risk outliers or plant specific 11 vulnerabilities. And meeting NRC specified criteria 12 and mitigate them even if they were in compliance with 13 our existing deterministic regulations. 14 And so things that those licensees find, 15 new information on the mitigation of these events or 16 sequences would have to be documented. And they would 17 become part of their FSAR in accordance with the 18 50.71(2) FSAR update requirements. 19 And we also, licensees taking this option 20 would have to implement mandatory, monitoring and 21 feedback as described in Reg Guide 1.174 to ensure that 22 the changes and risks which were deemed acceptable at 23 the time that they were made, to ensure that they remain 24 acceptable over the lifetime of the facility. 25 39 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Now monitoring and feedback would perhaps 1 catch issues with maintenance. In other words if there 2 are maintenance inadequacies at the plant, licensees 3 would have to track the reliability of certain 4 equipment. And if the reliability of that equipment 5 was different then what was assumed in their PRA, they 6 would have to go back and recalculate and make sure that 7 the change in risk was acceptable associated with this 8 change throughout the life of the plant. 9 And so, that might require them to increase 10 the reliability of certain equipment and change the 11 maintenance. Or make some other corresponding change 12 in the facility to reduce risk to an acceptable level. 13 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And I realize these are 14 basically pretty high level talking points at the 15 moment. But the -- when I look at Option Two and I think 16 about Option Two that and, which you have appropriately 17 highlighted in red there, meeting NRC specified 18 criteria, that to me sounds an awful lot like the -- 19 if you ever get to it, Option Three, the RMRF framework 20 that says well, below some area we feel the risk is 21 acceptable. 22 So therefore, that -- is that the notion 23 of these NRC specified criteria? Or is this left up 24 to the NRC saying well, despite the fact that we know 25 40 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 that large LOCAs aren't important to risk, we still 1 think you need to have certain criteria for large LOCAs? 2 MR. DUDLEY: Well, no, I mean -- 3 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Because that -- so I'm 4 trying to understand what the notion of these NRC 5 specified criteria are. Are you setting the 6 acceptable risk thresholds? 7 MR. DUDLEY: Well I mean -- Joe, can you 8 give your example about the fire protection inspections 9 and the vulnerability that was uncovered under 10 NFPA-805? 11 MR GIITTER: Oh okay. Well, there's -- 12 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I'm not talking about 13 the second point of identifying vulnerabilities. I'm 14 talking about the notion that the NRC is going to 15 specify some sort of threshold criteria. 16 MR. DUDLEY: We would have to -- it 17 actually probably would be two thresholds. We'd have 18 to figure out what's the threshold that you have to take 19 action? And then what is the -- then it might be a 20 different threshold that you have to reduce the risk 21 to. 22 So, that's an implementation detail that 23 we don't have at this point. 24 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Right, but in the 25 41 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 notion of if I look at 2150, that to me starts to sound 1 like the three kind of bands in 2150, isn't it? 2 MR. GIITTER: There are similarities to 3 2150. 4 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. 5 MR. GIITTER: The biggest difference 6 John, is that we're looking at Option Two as an option 7 in between the do nothing option and full 8 implementation of RMRF. 9 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Sure. Sure. 10 MR. GIITTER: And so Option Two does 11 include an incentive if you will for licensees to move 12 towards a more risk-informed framework where I'm not 13 sure that Option Three does that as well. Especially 14 if it requires development of a level three PRA. 15 But there are similarities. And the point 16 there, without getting into a lot of detail, is if 17 licensees are going to identify deterministic 18 requirements of low risk significance, whatever it 19 might be, tornado, missiles, or you know, who knows. 20 Then they should also seek out and look for risk 21 outliers. 22 So we don't -- what we're saying is we 23 shouldn't allow licensees to -- it's an untoward. You 24 don't want them to just take advantage without looking 25 42 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 holistically at okay, with the clearer picture of risks 1 that I now have, are there things that are treated in 2 a deterministic world in my -- that we might do 3 differently based on some risk insights. 4 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I understand that 5 completely. And I'm obviously running the NFPA-805 6 stuff in the back of my head. And people who went 7 through that exercise indeed did find vulnerabilities 8 that their deterministic 10 CFR 50, Appendix B stuff, 9 nobody even thought about. 10 MR. GIITTER: Right. 11 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: What I'm curious about 12 though is, if I use that analogy, when you say that they 13 must mitigate all plant specific risk vulnerabilities, 14 meeting NRC specified criteria, do you have an example 15 of what that means in the context of NFPA-805? Because 16 NFPA-805 just looked at Reg Guide 1174. 17 MR. GIITTER: Right. 18 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It said you know, if 19 you -- 20 MR. GIITTER: Right. 21 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: In that context, you 22 use that basically as your metric for determining 23 whether or not the change was acceptable to the state. 24 MR. GIITTER: And really, what we're 25 43 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 envisioning here is something very similar to what we 1 did for NFPA-805. 2 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. Okay. That's 3 -- I was hoping that's what those words meant. 4 MR. GIITTER: Yes, I -- 5 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And their capability. 6 MR. GIITTER: Right. 7 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. Because you got 8 into the 1174 in terms of the monitoring and feedback 9 and all of that part of the process. I was just kind 10 of hanging up on those criteria. Thanks. 11 MR. DUDLEY: On slide ten now. This is 12 still Option Two. And this is kind of what you wanted 13 to hear. The regulatory processes under Option Two for 14 self approval of certain plant specific changes would 15 be similar to NFPA-805 approval process. 16 Which I believe risk-informed changes are 17 allowed to license requirements without prior NRC 18 approval if the change in risk -- the increase in risk 19 where changing CDF is no more then minimal, less then 20 ten to the minus seven per year. And changes with risk 21 increases more then minimal would require NRC approval. 22 Plant licensees are expected to have an 23 upgraded, high quality PRAs to support this 24 risk-informed alternative licensing basis approach. 25 44 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 We haven't defined exactly what that is. And we would 1 submit -- 2 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, but you have in 3 the sense of Reg Guide or in the sense of NFPA-805. I 4 mean they're basically supposed to comply with Reg 5 Guide 1.200, which you know, endorses the ASME NS 6 standard. 7 So, there is precedent to -- for 8 understanding of what that upgraded, high quality PRA 9 means. In current regulatory space. I mean, this 10 isn't something that needs to be -- you might -- as Mary 11 said, you might want to elaborate on some particular 12 issues. But this isn't something that needs to be 13 crafted out of nothing. 14 MR. DUDLEY: Are there any more questions 15 on Power Reactor Option Two? 16 (No response) 17 MR. DUDLEY: Okay. Option Three is the 18 recommended compliant specific, risk management 19 regulatory framework implementation option from 20 NUREG-2150. Under Option Three we would require 21 operating licen -- all operating plants to have PRAs 22 and upgrade them periodically. And establish -- and 23 use them to establish a plant specific licensing base 24 basis, which would be based on their plant specific risk 25 45 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 profiles and NRC specified risk management -- an NRC 1 specified risk management objective. 2 We would require licensees to use a 3 structured risk-informed decision making process. We 4 would require that both for licensees and for the NRC 5 under Option Three. And based on the plant specific 6 risk profile, licensees could implement the plant 7 specific licensing basis by determining how they want 8 to meet the risk objective. 9 Then they would have to ensure that the 10 necessary protections are in place to meet the risk 11 management goal. They'd have to establish the 12 risk-informed decision making process. And they'd 13 have to establish the monitoring and feedback process. 14 And there would also have to be a reporting process 15 associated with this plant specific approach. 16 Let me go to the next slide before the 17 questions start. Because I might answer some of them. 18 (Laughter) 19 MR. DUDLEY: So each plant's licensing 20 basis would consist of technical requirements that 21 would be based upon this plant specific attributes. 22 And applicant selected design specific elements. It 23 would include the rationales or the technical basis for 24 why the technical requirements adequately address risk 25 46 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 and defense-in-depth in light of the plant specific 1 attributes and design elements. 2 And FSAR level description of the plant 3 specific attributes and the applicant selected design 4 elements would -- and the input assumptions for the 5 above rationales would also have to be maintained. And 6 the process for maintaining the validity of the 7 rationales, the technical basis through the lifetime 8 of the plant would also have to be included in this 9 plant's licensing basis. 10 So licensees would be required to use the 11 structured process with monitoring and feedback to 12 ensure that the plant specific licensing basis remained 13 consistent with the risk profile of the plant, which 14 could change over time. 15 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Dick, let me ask. Just 16 conceptually, how would this be implemented? There 17 are what about 67 sites, 104 plants, 100 plants? All 18 part 50 plants are designed to Appendix A. Part 50 19 plants are designed to Appendix A at 10 CFR 50. 20 Does the first bullet imply some form of 21 change to that? 22 MR. DUDLEY: This implementation approach 23 could result in I could think significant differences 24 between the design of one plant to another plant. 25 47 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Plants that were initially identical might end up with 1 designs that are significantly different. 2 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Plants have designs 3 that are different. They might have different 4 licensing basis. But because of the differences in 5 those designs -- 6 MR. DUDLEY: Their licensing basis could 7 change and they -- that might include changes in the 8 design. In certain aspects of the design. 9 MEMBER SKILLMAN: I'm confused. I don't 10 understand those words. I understand what John said. 11 MR. GIITTER: Yes, let me try to clarify 12 it a little bit. Every plant now pretty much has a 13 unique licensing basis even though we you know. 14 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Right. Sure. 15 MR. GIITTER: So, it isn't as radical as 16 it may sound. But this approach would allow some sites 17 to have a more risk-informed licensing basis then other 18 sites. And so you would have some variability if you 19 take for example two standardized plants, which we 20 really don't have any in the United States, but 21 theoretically if we did, one could have a risk-informed 22 licensing basis, the other one might have a licensing 23 basis that's largely deterministic. 24 And so I -- and we have that today, okay. 25 48 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 We have plants that have transitioned to NFPA-805 that 1 have made modifications to the plant. They've added 2 additional auxiliary feed water trains, non-safety 3 grade. And then you have plants that are 4 deterministic. 5 Well, so you might have a four-loop 6 Westinghouse plant with -- I'm getting into too much 7 detail here, but with two motor-drive aux feed pumps 8 and a turbine driven aux feed pump. And you might have 9 another plant that because of the vulnerability of fire 10 in a particular area of the plant, they might have an 11 additional non-safety grade aux feed water pump that 12 the other plant doesn't have. 13 So there will -- Dick's right, there will 14 be design differences. But you know, fundamentally 15 you're looking a different licensing basis for a 16 risk-informed plant versus a deterministic plant 17 because you determined based on risk insights that you 18 may need some additional systems or modifications that 19 you didn't have in the deterministic plant. 20 You may also determine that there are some 21 particular design features in the risk-informed plant 22 that aren't as necessary because they're not safety 23 significant. 24 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Okay, let me ask this. 25 49 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 To what extent would Option Three require a rewrite of 1 the FSAR or rewrite of the Tech Specs? 2 MR. GIITTER: Well, we definitely require 3 a rewrite of the FSAR. 4 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Okay. 5 MR. GIITTER: The Tech Specs at a lot of 6 plants are going to be changed anyway because of 7 risk-informed Tech Specs. 8 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Okay, so let's talk 9 about rewrite of the FSAR. Isn't that a swamp that is 10 just -- that is just endless opportunity for error? 11 MR. GIITTER: Well, FSARs are rewritten 12 all the time based on -- 13 MEMBER SKILLMAN: In piecemeal based on 14 amendments that are -- 15 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But isn't that a swamp 16 that the piecemeal cannot be tracked correctly so that 17 you get inconsistencies in your FSAR? 18 MEMBER SKILLMAN: If your configuration 19 control program is poor, yes. Exactly. 20 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay but that's -- 21 that's the current situation. 22 MEMBER BLEY: I mean I agree with a lot of 23 your points Dick. But I also note as you did with your 24 ETAP plant, this isn't a problem with Option Three or 25 50 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 with the PRA, it's a problem that applies to essentially 1 everything in the plant. All the analysis, all the 2 equipment. And if you don't have a good program, it 3 isn't going to be what you thought it was. 4 MEMBER SKILLMAN: I agree. 5 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: If you have a good 6 program, you have a good program. If you don't have 7 a good program, -- 8 MEMBER SKILLMAN: That isn't Option 9 Three's fault, that's the plant's fault. And nobody's 10 going to fix that. 11 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Will Option Three fix 12 it? 13 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Option Three would at 14 least require you to take a comprehensive look at your 15 plant and the licensing basis for your plant. Which 16 currently isn't required. It's done piecemeal. 17 So in some sense it would at least provide 18 that catalyst in my mind that would prompt perhaps you 19 know, comprehensive reexamination of your licensing 20 basis. And given the fact that it's at one time, you 21 know, you wouldn't have this necessarily piecemeal 22 changes over the course of you know, several years. 23 So it could actually provide a catalyst to 24 take some of the -- if you want to characterize them 25 51 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 as marginal performers in terms of comprehensive look 1 at their facilities and give them a shock in a sense 2 to look at things. 3 MEMBER SCHULTZ: It's hard to believe that 4 would not happen given at least this description. 5 MEMBER RYAN: It would seem to me that 6 there'd be some kind of a feedback mechanism too if the 7 staff isn't you know, not just doing this in a vacuum. 8 There's going to be some feedback, the reactor would 9 feedback, they adjust. And that's a cycle that goes 10 on you know, really robust program that's healthy. 11 So I'm just trying to -- so how do you 12 describe a healthy program? And if a program is 13 healthy by whatever measure or structure you send up 14 to make that -- or set up to make that evaluation, you 15 know, you can demonstrate what you're trying to 16 demonstrate. 17 I mean, I take your point that if it's not 18 exercised properly it's probably not worth much. That 19 it could be worth less. So I think it's -- it really 20 gets down to how do you judge the program? How do you 21 decide it's a good program or needs its work? I don't 22 know. 23 Does that make sense Dick? 24 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Yes. 25 52 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MR. DUDLEY: Yes. Are there any more 1 questions on Power Reactor Option Three? 2 MEMBER BROWN: Your next is just a path 3 forward, right? 4 MR. DUDLEY: Yes. Right. 5 MEMBER BROWN: Can I go back to Option Two? 6 MR. DUDLEY: Sure. 7 MEMBER BROWN: The -- I guess the page ten, 8 slide ten is the one of interest. The self-approved 9 certain plant changes list conformed to add to the 10 license requirements without prior NRC approval of the 11 CDF -- Delta CDF is no more then -- is less then one 12 times ten to the minus seven. 13 Which always gives me a little bit of pause 14 for thought. Because somebody's got to model ten to 15 the minus seven to get there. And I guess I was trying 16 to come up with an example that I could phrase my 17 question to make it clear. 18 Right now in my world, the I&C world, we're 19 dealing with the issue of how you transmit data out of 20 a plant and whether it's a unidirectional hardware 21 based or whether it's a firewall which has software 22 involved in it. 23 The initial efforts in some of the early 24 designs when we first looked and we were first talking 25 53 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 about these five years ago, six years ago, the comment 1 was that oh, well because we've got a firewall there 2 and we've got anti-virus software, we've got malware 3 detection, Trojan horse, and everybody thinks this 4 stuff is the hot -- theirs is the hottest stuff that 5 ever walked the face of the earth. 6 So, we've been trying -- there's been a 7 forcing function to try to get people to more consider 8 you know, strictly hardware based transmissions. So 9 there is no external capability to get in. 10 And I'm looking downstream, you get a plant 11 configured like that and now you come along later, five 12 years later and management or somebody in the plant 13 decides gee, we're spending a lot of effort because we 14 have to have people come into the plant, bring hardware 15 down, go down to the cabinets. You know open them up, 16 put you know, a lap top in connection with it. 17 It would be far more efficient to be able 18 to send this from the vendor directly via the internet 19 into the plant, into the server, the network system and 20 then down to the maintenance cabinet. And then into 21 cabinets you know, to change whatever you want to 22 change. 23 So that would require a firewall to 24 software as opposed to a hardware based one way. And 25 54 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 I can easily envision the computer weenies that think 1 their virus software and protection software is so 2 perfect that they will easily meet the one times -- it 3 will be easily be one times ten to the minus 12, the 4 way they'll advertise this. 5 They'll change that fire -- that barrier 6 to a software based barrier and nobody will ever see 7 it. And I don't know how as a regulator there are 8 certain boundary conditions I would have a hard spot 9 with allowing free you know, self approval. On the 10 program I came from nobody changed it without 11 headquarters while were the designers as well as the 12 regulator. But we had to be careful of that. 13 So, I just you know, that one just -- there 14 are some things that it would probably work just fine 15 for. But there are others that are fraught with peril 16 in my own mind. So I don't know how you balance that. 17 I'm not saying you don't go forward. But 18 it seems to me there have got to be some look at what 19 somebody's doing. As it chose to without prior NRC 20 approval are very strong words. And self approval 21 means nobody -- effectively nobody looks at it or has 22 to look at it. 23 MR. GIITTER: I can address that Dick. 24 Currently what the process laid out here is exactly what 25 55 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 we do for NFPA-805. 1 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And other things. 2 MR. GIITTER: And other things, thank you. 3 Yes. I agree with your comment on the degree of 4 precision sometimes when you come up with a 5 quantitative value for core damage frequency. That 6 people who practice PRA understand there are 7 limitations and that you can't you know, when you get 8 really small numbers like that you have to be careful. 9 But the point is that we have to ensure that 10 there would be only minimal increases in risk or even 11 preferably decreases in risk in the modifications that 12 are being made. So it's -- what you're really looking 13 at is the relative order of magnitude. You want to make 14 sure that the risk increase if there is one is actually 15 very small to allow licensees to self approve. 16 And we do audit that. It's not like we're 17 not taking a look at it. We do you know, that is 18 something we will look at. And through the audit 19 process or through our regular oversight process. But 20 at some point you know, we have to kind of let go of 21 things that are of very low risk significance because 22 -- 23 MEMBER BROWN: Well, I don't think that -- 24 what I -- the example I gave is not a low risk 25 56 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 assessment. 1 MR. GIITTER: No, but what we're talking 2 about is. 3 MEMBER BROWN: Not even close. 4 MR. GIITTER: No and I understand that. I 5 understand that. But what we're talking about is, is 6 items that are clearly of low risk significance. Or 7 preferably if you're even looking at modifications that 8 improve safety and decrease risk. That wouldn't 9 require NRC approval unless it changes the licensee 10 basis of the plant. 11 So, there is precedent here. We're not 12 just making this stuff up. It's based on the you know, 13 the regulatory infrastructure we have in place. And 14 we've implemented it and NFPA-805 in other areas as 15 well. 16 MEMBER SCHULTZ: So would the example that 17 Charlie has brought up, would that be caught in the 18 first bullet where we're talking about maintaining 19 compliance and insuring that NRC's specific specified 20 criteria are met? In other words, what Charlie is 21 saying is there's certain things that you would not want 22 to fall out of the control process because someone's 23 come up with a great idea that reduces a particular 24 system vulnerability they think to a low, low level and 25 57 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 they're wrong. 1 So, he's looking for a backstop that will 2 catch that and prevent it from happening. 3 MEMBER BROWN: And I don't think an audit, 4 I mean, audits or spot checks. And I am just not sure 5 that an audit would catch them. And obviously I have 6 strong feelings on this particular incident. 7 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's a bit of the 8 problem is that you have strong feelings about one 9 particular aspect of the digital I&C design. A 10 materials guy has one -- has his own strong feelings 11 about one particular materials issue. A pump guy -- 12 everybody has their own strong feelings about 13 individual issues. 14 And everybody is not equally got. Now the 15 nice thing about risk assessment is you look at 16 everything under the same umbrella. 17 MEMBER BROWN: Well, and all I'm saying is 18 I got the risk -- 19 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And you see that the 20 risk models may be less, the current risk models may 21 be less capable of evaluating with six significant 22 figure in numerical precision, elements of software in 23 digital I&C programs. And that's true. 24 On the other hand, they can also evaluate 25 58 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 uncertainties. And in many cases the differences 1 don't make any difference. 2 MEMBER BROWN: I guess I would think that 3 -- I understand you point. 4 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But part of this -- 5 MEMBER BROWN: But I think -- 6 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Part of this notion 7 without pointing fingers, is to remove I think in my 8 opinion, a bit of that issue specific focus among 9 designers, you know, maintainers, regulators, 10 everybody and say let's at least use the risk assessment 11 process to look at all the contributors to risk. 12 MEMBER BROWN: My only point is and my -- 13 and this again, like you say, I have a very parochial 14 thought process and very focused on the areas for which 15 I have -- my greatest interest. But software is very 16 amorphous. It is not predictable. 17 The way people program it varies from 18 individual to individual. What one guy thinks is 19 satisfactory in terms of how he structures his software 20 is fine. Another guy has a different way of doing that 21 because he thinks the other guy is not doing it the right 22 way. 23 And I think that's a far greater 24 vulnerability then in some of the more hardware, what 25 59 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 I call the blacksmith tech -- I know, I'm not being 1 facetious, I mean the blacksmith you know, materials, 2 et cetera, et cetera. It's a little bit more amenable 3 to looking at small variations because they're just not 4 as intractable as the variability of software is. 5 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: You talk to sump pump 6 designers and they say they'd like to have a factor of 7 three margin or net positive suction head available 8 divided by net positive suction head required. Other 9 people say no, maybe one and a half, maybe you could 10 get down to one. Maybe a little bit of cavitation is 11 okay. What's the difference? 12 MEMBER BROWN: That is not the same. I 13 don't think those -- 14 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's a -- okay. 15 Okay. 16 MEMBER BROWN: That's like moral 17 equivalence. Okay, I don't think they're totally. I 18 understand your point but they are not equivalent, 19 okay. You can put your hand on that. You can't on the 20 software. It's buried in ones and zeros. 21 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. 22 MEMBER REMPE: Since you went back to this 23 one -- 24 MEMBER BROWN: I'm sorry. Excuse me, go 25 60 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 ahead. 1 MEMBER REMPE: Well there's one point I 2 thought about mentioning and didn't. But more then 3 minimal, ten to the minus seven per year is different 4 for an AP1000 perhaps then an older plant. And so why 5 did you decide to go with something like that to 6 quantify more then minimal then saying like ten percent 7 or five percent or something like that of the frequency? 8 And have you thought about changing that type of 9 statement to have a percentage of the core damage 10 frequency for example? 11 MR. DUDLEY: Well, these are based on what 12 we do for NFPA-805. And Joe, do you want to apply that 13 to -- can you expand that to other new plant designs 14 or any? 15 MR. GIITTER: Well, yes, without getting 16 into new plant designs, it's a metric that's consistent 17 with how we measure risk. So, if you look at a 18 percentage, I mean, you could always do that. But the 19 way that the standards are written and the regulatory 20 guidance is written and the standard practice within 21 the PRA community is to look at core damage frequency 22 or other as measures. 23 So it's -- I understand your point, why 24 don't you look at it in relative terms because you have 25 61 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 -- 1 MEMBER REMPE: You may have a small 2 modular reactor coming in. 3 MR. GIITTER: You may have a small modular 4 reactor which has a much lower risk profile then an 5 operating -- currently operating reactor. You know, 6 it's something we will -- you know, we can consider. 7 I understand your point. 8 MEMBER REMPE: Okay. I just thought I'd 9 mention it. 10 MR. GIITTER: Quite frankly I don't think 11 we've given it any thought. But -- 12 MEMBER REMPE: It's just something to 13 think about. 14 MR. GIITTER: Yes. 15 MEMBER REMPE: Okay. 16 MEMBER BROWN: Also, don't take my 17 comments that I'm not against some relaxation to allow 18 people to do stuff on their own. I mean that's -- we 19 can over complicate stuff and drive costs out of sight. 20 So I understand that. 21 I just, along with Steve's comment about 22 backstops. I just think that somewhere at the higher 23 level, but not down in the lower levels. I mean, I can 24 look at stuff going on in the I&C where some changes 25 62 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 they make would be perfectly acceptable without going 1 through your thing. 2 But if there's certain boundary conditions 3 I think that ought to be put in place on some things. 4 I quit. 5 MEMBER REMPE: The Charlie Brown software 6 rule. 7 MR. DUDLEY: I had one more slide. And 8 maybe I can just do that before the break. Again, this 9 last slide is on our path forward. 10 We had written a draft white paper that we 11 had hoped we could have made public prior to this 12 meeting. And we were unable to do so. 13 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: We were pretty hopeful 14 that would have occurred too. I'll just put that on 15 the record. 16 MR. DUDLEY: Right. 17 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And we're pretty 18 disappointed that we didn't get to see that. 19 MR. DUDLEY: Right. Right. That paper 20 is now under review by NRC Senior Management. We will 21 incorporate management comments into an updated draft 22 of that white paper as soon as we can. And we will 23 publically release it and the Committee will get it at 24 that time. 25 63 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 We'll have a public meeting to discuss the 1 white paper probably in April, maybe late April to 2 discuss the white paper. At one point -- at some point 3 along the process we'll solicit written comments on a 4 version of the white paper. It probably won't be the 5 first version. We'll probably want to iterate on it 6 a little -- a time or two so that we have a little more 7 fully developed paper when we go out for public comment. 8 So, I can't tell you exactly when we'll ask 9 for public comments. The paper will be available as 10 it evolves over time on the Regulations.gov, the 11 Federal rule making website. And at some point we will 12 ask for written public comments. 13 We will then receive those comments, 14 summarize those comments and I think that that's 15 probably the best time for us to come back and meet with 16 you. But we're certainly open to discussions as to how 17 you would like the interactions to take place. But we 18 think that can happen sometime this summer. 19 And the due date for the SECY paper we're 20 tasked with providing is December 18, 2015. This date 21 was established before this op -- of this effort evolved 22 to include an Agency wide policy statement. So I am 23 not a hundred percent certain -- 24 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Wait, until you return 25 64 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 to the original tasking memo, which required an Agency 1 wide policy statement? 2 MR. DUDLEY: Well the SRM 1 recommendation 3 would change the scope also and there were some -- there 4 were some redirections associated with that. But 5 you're right. I -- December 18 is the current date. 6 I will strive to try to meet that date. Depending upon 7 how much detail we get into on an Agency wide policy 8 statement and how long it takes to reach Management 9 agreement on that, will determine whether or not I think 10 we can meet that date. 11 And that completes my presentation on the 12 status of our activities on the risk management 13 regulatory framework. 14 MEMBER BLEY: We'd sure like to see the 15 white paper as soon as we can. 16 MR. DUDLEY: Yes. We understand that and 17 we're providing it as soon as possible. 18 MEMBER BLEY: Do you have a date set for 19 the public meeting? 20 MR. DUDLEY: No. 21 MEMBER BLEY: How far before the public 22 meeting do you have to have the paper? 23 MR. DUDLEY: We generally -- well, I think 24 we're going to have like a 60-day public comment period. 25 65 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 So we usually like to have the public meeting right in 1 the middle of the public comment period. 2 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. 3 MR. DUDLEY: So that people have had time 4 to read the paper. And then they can come to the 5 meeting and we can have our discussions and then they 6 can produce -- then they still have time to produce 7 informed comments. 8 So the public meeting should be right about 9 in the middle of the public comment period, about 30 10 days after we've released the -- 11 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: So you're looking 12 roughly a month from now at the latest if this late -- 13 late April date for the public meeting is -- 14 MR. DUDLEY: That is correct. Yes, I'm 15 one of the Senior Managers and I've asked Senior 16 Managers to provide their comments to me on this current 17 draft by next Tuesday. I'm not sure how many 18 iterations we'll go through. 19 That would depend some -- once I see the 20 first round of comments I'll have an idea of whether 21 we're converging or whether we're still -- have 22 differing views that we need to work out. 23 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Anything else for -- 24 MEMBER SCHULTZ: Just to clarify Dick, I'm 25 66 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 confused by these different versions that you intend 1 to create. Isn't one version going out for public 2 comment? Or are you going to iterate on the version 3 sometime during the public comment period? 4 MR. DUDLEY: As soon as we get a white 5 paper that is approved by Management, we'll release it 6 to the public, post it on Regulations.gov. 7 MEMBER SCHULTZ: Got you. 8 MR. DUDLEY: Over time, as we work with 9 that, we'll update that white paper so that the 10 publically available version will evolve. And when we 11 get to the point we think it's appropriate that we've 12 got enough detail in that particular version of the 13 white paper, then we will solicit formally written 14 public comments. 15 So the public can follow this entire 16 process on Regulations.gov by looking at -- each white 17 paper will be there. And as it evolves from time to 18 time, members of the public will be able to see that. 19 After -- 20 MEMBER SCHULTZ: But they're not 21 providing comment? 22 MR. DUDLEY: Only at one point when we 23 think there's -- we have the proper amount of detail 24 in that paper, then we would solicit written public 25 67 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 comments. But only one time. But the paper is out 1 there available hopefully, you know, in two or three 2 weeks. And as it evolves over time, we will continue 3 to make the updated versions available on 4 Regulations.gov. 5 MEMBER SCHULTZ: and then there'll be a 6 public comment period of some duration of -- 7 MR. DUDLEY: And we will meet after 60 8 days. 9 MEMBER SCHULTZ: And then we'll meet again 10 after the public comments have been provided but not 11 resolved, most likely. 12 MR. DUDLEY: Right. We'll summarize for 13 you the public comment. 14 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, I think the 15 Subcommittee probably would want to meet before that. 16 When you say we, the full ACRS certainly -- well, I can't 17 speak for the full ACRS. But the Subcommittee would 18 want to engage, you know, earlier rather then later. 19 MR. DUDLEY: That sounds good. 20 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: The full ACRS you know, 21 that's up to the Committee. 22 MR. DUDLEY: Yes, this next meeting will 23 be a Subcommittee meeting. 24 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Anything else for 25 68 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Dick? 1 (No response) 2 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, what I've done 3 is, I know we have some staff members out on -- we have 4 two bridge lines set up for this particular meeting. 5 And I know we have some staff members on one of them. 6 And I've asked that that line be opened up. We'll open 7 up the meeting for public comments closer to the end 8 of the meeting. 9 But because we're finishing this general 10 discussion on the RMRF and the different Options, I'll 11 just ask if anybody from the staff is out there, if you 12 want to add anything to the discussion, you've been on 13 mute. So this is your opportunity. 14 MR. HARRISON: This is Donnie Harrison. 15 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Hi Donnie. 16 MR. HARRISON: Hi. As we were going 17 through the slides and the discussion on like backstop, 18 it dawned on me that we need to recognize in both Options 19 Two and Three, at some point the staff's going to have 20 to deal with or struggle with the ideas of 21 defense-in-depth, safety margins and that type of 22 thing. 23 Since we're not risk-based, we're 24 risk-informed. So, the discussions on the slides are 25 69 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 all geared towards risks and there's other factors we 1 need to include. 2 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: That's a good point. 3 I mean you know, 1174 addresses those issues. But 4 perhaps not as quantitatively as you might want. 5 MR. DUDLEY: And the paper on Near Term 6 Task Force Recommendation One had some substantial 7 recommendations for improving our definition and 8 criteria for adequacy of defense-in-depth. So we 9 would likely include that sort of an effort into one 10 of these options if we were to you know, if we were to 11 recommend it. Although so that it would be a 12 risk-informed and not risk-based approached. 13 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well, Donnie's right. 14 I mean, it applies both to Options Two and Three as 15 they're -- 16 MR. DUDLEY: That's correct. 17 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: As they're cast now. 18 MR. DUDLEY: But we have to have better 19 handle on defense-in-depth, safety margins and other 20 related facets. 21 MR. HARRISON: Right. I didn't want to 22 leave the impression that just because someone could 23 say a large LOCA with one train of safety systems is 24 always going to be a low ten to the minus seven, 25 70 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 therefore I can get rid of the second train. 1 MR. DUDLEY: Right. 2 MR. HARRISON: We would have a -- we'd have 3 to add defense-in-depth metrics as well to say what's 4 the minimum interpretation of defense-in-depth so 5 those things wouldn't happen. 6 MR. DUDLEY: Right. Right. 7 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Good. Anybody else 8 from the staff out there? 9 (No response) 10 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: If not, we'll cut you 11 off again and put you on mute. And we'll take a recess 12 until 10:15. 13 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter 14 went off the record at 10:01 a.m. and 15 resumed at 10:16 a.m.) 16 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: We are back in session. 17 I guess you're up Joe. 18 MR. RIVERS: Okay, we basically thought 19 that it would be a good opportunity to give you folks 20 on the ACRS some insights into some of our activities 21 on trying to risk-inform security. This dates back to 22 probably about 2009 where we started actively working 23 in this area when former Chairman Klein and that time 24 Commissioner Klein gave a talk at a November 2009 ANS 25 71 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 meeting and one of his statements he made in that 1 presentation was that NSIR needs to better risk-inform 2 security. 3 And so the next day I was called into Jim 4 Wiggins' office and Jim said Joe, you have a new area 5 of responsibility. Get to work. 6 And so that sort of -- and we have been 7 doing things related to this before, but not formally 8 talking about it as risk-informed in security. So we 9 can go to the next slide. 10 But one of the first things we did is we 11 worked with the Office of Research to put together a 12 workshop. We had Sandia actually conduct the workshop 13 for us. It was actually held at a classified level. 14 That was held at Sandia in the fall of 2010. 15 And essentially what came out of that 16 workshop was six sort of areas of opportunities were 17 identified to potentially risk-informed security. 18 One was the uncertainty of initiating events. Always 19 the -- one of the bigger challenges in security. 20 Simulation tools, collaboration between 21 safety and security, cyber security, improving metrics 22 and also the possibility of a demonstration project 23 like WASH 1400. So, once that workshop was complete, 24 that was about the time that the Risk Task Force that 25 72 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 was headed up by Commissioner Apostolakis began. 1 And so we decided to lay low a little bit 2 there to see what came of that Task Force before we 3 proceeded in any of these initiatives. Next slide 4 please. 5 One of the things we found from the 6 workshop that Sandia hosted was that it cost us a lot 7 of money. So I came up with the brilliant idea that 8 we ought to get a professional society to host one of 9 these. And essentially it would cost us travel costs 10 and registration fees. 11 And so we asked them to host a workshop 12 on risk-informing security. It was initially 13 scheduled for October 2013. The Government shutdown 14 sort of impacted us there. We rescheduled it for 15 February 2014. And these were the five general areas 16 that we worked on that workshop. Next slide please. 17 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Joe, what is INMM? 18 MR. RIVERS: It's the Institute of Nuclear 19 Materials Management. 20 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Thank you. 21 MR. RIVERS: So it's that along with the 22 American Nuclear Society are probably the two that 23 cover most of the activities, but that this Agency's 24 involved at. 25 73 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 So, the area of safety and security risk 1 assessment is we had discussion at PRA and NRC. We had 2 some other presentations, one by Los Alamos on an 3 extensible risk-informed decisions work method. 4 Another lab person presented on implications of 5 security challenges for safety assessment tools. 6 And then DNDO presented on some of its risk 7 models that it actually develops under Executive Order 8 requirements. Next slide please. 9 Then I convened a panel on material 10 attractiveness, an effort that we've got to try to 11 understand what special nuclear material was -- how 12 attractive it is to potential adversaries. We made a 13 presentation on the NRC approach that was under 14 development. 15 DOE provided some technical support for 16 that NRC approach. We had Matt Bunn provided some 17 thoughts on where he thought that approach ought to go. 18 Industry gave some insights that they had. 19 The United Kingdom gave comments on their 20 concepts for dilution, which is the primary focus of 21 our approach. And the French provided a presentation 22 on security in civilian facilities. 23 One thing to make note of is that at the 24 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, the U.S., France and the 25 74 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 United Kingdom gave -- made the commitment to have a 1 workshop on material attractiveness and this workshop 2 and this specific panel actually met that commitment 3 that was made at that Nuclear Security Summit. Next 4 slide please. 5 The likelihood of event -- 6 MEMBER BLEY: Before you do that. 7 MR. RIVERS: Yes? 8 MEMBER BLEY: There's a conference coming 9 up in March, is that -- that's associated with -- 10 MR. RIVERS: I'm going to talk about it. 11 MEMBER BLEY: Oh, you've got that coming 12 up. I didn't see it when I -- I didn't flip far enough. 13 Okay, I'll wait. 14 MR. RIVERS: Okay. Very good. We've got 15 several conferences coming up. 16 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. 17 MR. RIVERS: So, after we've done that, of 18 course the real challenge we have here is that unlike 19 in the safety world where we tend to think that things 20 will happen randomly and security it's actually a -- 21 when the aberrant started to think -- thinks it's a good 22 opportunity to do it and he has the best chance of 23 success. And so, that tends to be somewhat of a 24 challenge. 25 75 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 So we had presentations on possible 1 approaches and options. Just how some of those 2 approaches might be used. And then DoD funds an effort 3 out of the University of Maryland on -- at the National 4 Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 5 Terrorism Approach that has some insights on how they 6 might consider doing that type of a thing. 7 So there's no clear cut way of doing it. 8 There will be a lot of uncertainty if you try to do that. 9 And that's generally one of the reasons in the security 10 world we either do things based on a conditional risk 11 or focus on trying to look at the consequences that 12 might be associated with an event. Next slide. 13 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Joe, is some of that 14 thought changing though? 15 MR. RIVERS: I don't think it's changing 16 that much. We're trying to introduce as many risk 17 insights as we can. But for example when DHS is doing 18 its integrated terrorism risk assessment models, 19 especially the Rad Nuc Terrorism Risk Assessment, they 20 go to the intel community and say what is the likelihood 21 that there is going to be an initiating event? 22 And when they do that, what they find -- 23 you find is that you get a number. But really, what 24 is the -- I mean the uncertainty around that number, 25 76 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 and it's probably plus or minus 100 or 200 percent. 1 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Sure. But I mean, you 2 know, in the safety arena we deal with that also. And 3 in some senses, although the uncertainties may be very, 4 very large, you still may be able to rank order threats 5 if you will relative to one another. 6 MR. RIVERS: Yes. We -- you know, we used 7 the -- you know, NRC has the Intelligence Liaison and 8 Threat Assessment Branch and their job is to try to 9 understand, you know, we look at the terrorist 10 activities worldwide. And then we try to assess what 11 is the likelihood that they're going to show up on our 12 doorstep. 13 And so we do some of that and then we inform 14 the Commission. And the Commission makes some 15 determination as to whether or not we need to adjust 16 the design basis threat or not based on that. 17 So there are things that are happening in 18 other parts of the world that we don't assess will 19 happen here in the United States. 20 MEMBER BLEY: I kind of like what you're 21 doing there. Because I -- this guy's done a lot of 22 PRAs. I disagree with many of my colleagues on this 23 part. You can get some kind of comparative stuff that 24 would be useful by doing the whole thing at once. But 25 77 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 this is unusual from most of our other kinds of analysis 1 in that that initiating that first strike, is a time 2 varying thing. 3 And trying to keep -- I mean, taking 4 advantage of the government agencies that are tracking 5 that and trying to be up to date on that makes a lot 6 of sense to me. 7 MR. RIVERS: And we have a lot of 8 activities that we work and the interagency with the 9 White House that if certain things become evident in 10 the chatter and things like that and the intelligence 11 understanding of things that we have approaches that 12 we can use to immediately implement certain 13 requirements that we wouldn't normally consider as 14 being appropriate. So, we do work within the 15 interagency to try to be able to effect those types of 16 changes if something pops up. 17 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: My only -- the only 18 reason for my bringing up the topic is that a focus only 19 on consequences and protection against what are deemed 20 to be severe consequences can sometimes overlook I'll 21 call them scenarios that might have not as severe a 22 consequence as your worst possible focus, might have 23 a higher frequency. You know, opportunistic attacks 24 -- 25 78 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MR. RIVERS: Well, and I think that -- 1 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And that's the notion 2 of trying to understand you know, the more integrated 3 some of that. 4 MR. RIVERS: I think we debated some about 5 of that at the Y12 incident -- 6 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes. 7 MR. RIVERS: Where it was the protesters. 8 You know, when I think back to the '80s, long before 9 9/11, before Oklahoma City, you know, I can recall that 10 the security -- DOE Security Manager Rafi Flasch used 11 to have all the Saint's Days, she had her little 12 church's calendar up on her door and she highlighted 13 the ones she thought the nuns would be showing up for. 14 And so that was fairly common back in those 15 days. And we really focused a lot back in the '80s on 16 these protests that would take place. At the Nevada 17 test site we had a you know, certain procedure that we 18 worked with the protesters that they would cross a line, 19 they'd get arrested. The next group would cross a 20 line, they'd get arrested. 21 But I think 9/11 and Oklahoma City and 22 other events caused us to put more of a focus on the 23 big major terrorist events. But I think the Oak Ridge 24 event, the Y12 event, caused us to relook that. And 25 79 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 I know that we as a government are working closely with 1 the British and the French to try to understand what 2 is the best way to actually prepare for those types of 3 civil disobedience type things and how do we address 4 those in an appropriate fashion. 5 So that's an ongoing challenge right now. 6 Okay, one of the things I know coming from the DOE world, 7 you know, DOE world is very heavily and actively 8 involved in using VA simulation tools. A lot of those 9 tools actually were developed by the same people that 10 developed the PRA tools that we use in the safety world. 11 What I also realized is that my likelihood 12 of getting a regulatory requirement to force them to 13 use these tools was probably slim to none. And so what 14 I did is I worked with the vendor communities who 15 encouraged them to approach the reactor utilities to 16 talk about how their tools might actually be useful. 17 Both ARES Corporation with AVERT and Rhino 18 Corporation with Simajin actually have done that. And 19 so that -- I'll talk about that in a few minutes. But 20 at this workshop we had both of them make presentations. 21 Also Sandia and DTRA on some of their modeling aspects. 22 And then also Pacific Northwest National Laboratories 23 developing a tool that sort of merges cyber and physical 24 type security within the tool. So it's a fairly 25 80 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 interesting development there. Next slide please. 1 Cyber security of course is a new and 2 ever-changing environment. We had some discussion on 3 the pros and cons and challenges of risk-informing 4 cyber security. NRC talked about our regulatory 5 program. And PNNL talked a bit about their cyber 6 model. Next slide please. 7 Okay, basically post that workshop, what 8 we've done is we've you know, I wanted to highlight some 9 of the things that we're working on. Risk 10 prioritization initiative and of course I won't mention 11 that, talk about too much now as we're talking about 12 it this afternoon. 13 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Joe, I have to 14 interrupt you in deference to Charlie who's not here. 15 If I go back to the cyber security, the previous slide, 16 and you don't have to go back to it. Is that -- that's 17 an ongoing -- 18 MR. RIVERS: Essentially the -- 19 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: You said PNNL and those 20 -- 21 MR. RIVERS: Well, Jim and I talked about 22 cyber risk model, but if we're looking at the regulatory 23 program, of course we put requirements into place. 24 It's big -- it's not fully implemented now. 25 81 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: But if I stay away from 1 the regulatory part of it and just put my sort of 2 engineer hat on, you said PNNL talked about a cyber risk 3 model or they actively -- 4 MR. RIVERS: They're actively pursuing 5 this. 6 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: They are? 7 MR. RIVERS: Yes. 8 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. Thanks. 9 That's what I wanted to -- oh, thank you. 10 MR. RIVERS: So, I'll talk about each of 11 these individually. But this is sort of what's going 12 on right now and what I'm working on in risk-informing 13 security. So you can go to the next slide. 14 Risk prioritization initiative of course 15 we'll talk a bit more about it this afternoon. But one 16 of the things that we find is that they do a really 17 reasonable job on looking at the safety aspects of risk 18 prioritization. 19 But trying to get the industry to better 20 understand how to actually look at the security risk 21 is somewhat of a challenge. And then trying to -- how 22 to integrate that with the safety risk is also not the 23 easiest thing. But it's something that we've 24 committed to work with industry on. Next slide please. 25 82 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Joe, before you change. 1 Would you comment on attempting to prioritize emergency 2 preparedness? 3 MR. RIVERS: Well, that also -- basically 4 if we look at the industry initiative, they are looking 5 at safety, security, emergency preparedness and 6 radiation protection, all of those. What you tend to 7 find is that the emergency preparedness and radiation 8 protection tend to be not as risk significant generally 9 as the security and the safety elements. 10 Emergency preparedness of course is trying 11 to mitigate if something does happen. So you've 12 already had an event. So, what -- 13 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: We'll hear it -- we'll 14 hear a bit more about this this afternoon. 15 MEMBER SCHULTZ: But your point is that 16 security and emergency preparedness, they are 17 different -- 18 MR. RIVERS: Yes, they are different. 19 MEMBER SCHULTZ: In terms of 20 characterization with regard to risk prioritization -- 21 MR. RIVERS: Right. 22 MEMBER SCHULTZ: And with regard to the 23 way in which one can benefit from application of 24 risk-informed preparation. 25 83 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MR. RIVERS: Right. Generally the 1 emergency preparedness is how do we mitigate if 2 something actually does happen. Security, what you 3 find is that you can have security events that can cause 4 the same types of things that safety events might cause. 5 And so -- 6 MEMBER SCHULTZ: Correct. 7 MR. RIVERS: Trying to figure out how to 8 actually integrate the safety and security things, it's 9 somewhat of a challenge because one of the things I 10 think we found was that the people that were generating 11 the -- initially generating the industry sort of model 12 for risk prioritization didn't actively involve a lot 13 of their security people. So they didn't have the 14 understanding of how security actually fit into the 15 process. 16 But you can ask more about that this 17 afternoon when it's probably a better venue to do that. 18 Next slide, okay. 19 Risk Management Regulatory Framework 20 Working Group, that's what we're here right now for. 21 We've been actively involved with that to make sure that 22 the security aspects of things are appropriately 23 addressed within the working group. Next slide 24 please. 25 84 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Okay, they used the simulation modeling. 1 Essentially through some of my efforts we have at least 2 two of the vendors, ARES Corporation and Rhino Corp that 3 are actively working with industry right now to look 4 at how simulation modeling can actually help in them 5 securing their facilities and also addressing 6 regulatory issues. ARES Corporation is actually 7 modeled two or three of the nuclear sites to date. 8 And we're trying to work with industry to 9 better understand what is -- what do we need to have 10 here at NRC in the way of oversight of that to allow 11 that to fit into the regulatory program? So, you know, 12 I think one of the concerns, we have to understand how 13 the facilities were modeled, how the data was generated 14 to do that. 15 And I heard earlier this morning about the 16 concern about gaming the PRA type models. The same 17 thing can be done on the security models. And so, we 18 want to make sure that we have an understanding of you 19 know, what's common and data elements drive the models 20 so that we can focus our attention on those elements 21 in our oversight process. 22 MEMBER BROWN: If this -- excuse me. Is 23 this the physical plant? This modeling? 24 MR. RIVERS: Well, I could talk about the 25 85 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 fact that at least one of the National Laboratories, 1 Pacific Northwest National Lab is actually trying to 2 develop a cyber risk model. And also one that 3 integrates cyber and physical. 4 MEMBER BROWN: Yes, I see you haven't 5 gotten to that slide yet. I just wanted to see if there 6 was a separate that this was being applied to. 7 MR. RIVERS: Okay, so next slide please. 8 Material attractiveness. This is something I actually 9 worked on when I was at the Department of Energy and 10 when I came here to NRC I was asked to continue working 11 in this area. 12 But it's essentially taking what we -- how 13 we categorize material and security for predominately 14 the fuel cycle facility, but it will also impact the 15 research and test reactor facilities. Where you know, 16 is all uranium and all plutonium the same? And the 17 answer is no. 18 One example would be that if I have five 19 kilograms of high enriched uranium metal in a button 20 versus five kilograms disbursed in soil on a railcar, 21 do they require the same protection? And the answer 22 is no. The adversary is going to focus on the metal 23 button more so then that five kilograms disbursed in 24 a railcar. 25 86 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 And so that's what this approach is looking 1 at. Next slide please. 2 To support that we actually conducted a 3 study at Los Alamos National Laboratory. They 4 developed a logic module that sort of put things into 5 four phases. One is acquiring the special nuclear 6 material. Looking at a wide variety of facilities and 7 types of material that might be present in those 8 facilities. What type of processing is required to 9 take that material that's acquired at those facilities 10 to convert it into a weapons useful form. 11 Then weaponization goes from a design of 12 an improvised device to engineering that improvised 13 device. And then one of the questions that I've always 14 been asked over the years by the policy makers is, okay, 15 that's what Los Alamos and Livermore can do, but what 16 can a real adversary do? And so we actually have an 17 approach in that model to perform a yield reduction 18 based on some understanding that they aren't going to 19 be necessarily as skilled as one of our National 20 Laboratories. 21 And then in the end what it does is it 22 provides yield -- an estimate of the likelihood of an 23 actual nuclear detonation and also a yield associated 24 with that detonation. 25 87 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MEMBER REMPE: For a minute if you don't 1 mind going back to slide 13 with the material 2 attractiveness and your statement. That's assuming 3 that the adversary is going to do something with the 4 material for alternative uses when you make that 5 assumption about which -- whether they'll go for 6 disbursed materials or not disbursed materials. And 7 they may have other priorities. 8 MR. RIVERS: Well from a security 9 standpoint, when we're looking at this specific 10 approach, we're predominately focused on the theft of 11 that material to potentially be used in an improvised 12 nuclear device. Essentially a mock up of that. 13 MEMBER REMPE: Right. And so what -- are 14 you considering other types of adversaries who may just 15 want to reek havoc? That the disbursed material would 16 be just as attractive to them. 17 MR. RIVERS: Well we -- one of the things 18 we look at and that we're also looking at in this rule 19 making for material attractiveness standpoint is, of 20 course with the radioactive materials, we put in 21 certain requirements in 10 CFR Part 37 to address the 22 potential use of that material in a disbursal device 23 and exposure device or other things. And a lot of it's 24 based on the IAEA Code of Conduct concept of what's 25 88 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 important. 1 Given that some of these special nuclear 2 materials could also be used in a disbursal device, we 3 as part of the study that we had conducted at Los Alamos 4 and also one conducted at Sandia National Laboratories, 5 we looked at what comparable quantities of special 6 nuclear material could produce similar effects to those 7 radioactive materials? 8 And so trying to align the protection 9 requirements for those smaller quantities of special 10 nuclear material, generally in the category three 11 realm, where if we were just protecting them from an 12 improvised nuclear device threat, we probably wouldn't 13 put a lot of requirements on because you wouldn't have 14 enough to do anything. But you might have enough to 15 actually disburse and cause problems. 16 And so in the rule making that's currently 17 under development, we would actually add some 18 requirements to some of those nuclear materials that 19 could have a radiological fence price. Okay, so the 20 next slide. 21 So essentially, what we've done is we've 22 developed this model and based on a lot of information 23 that we got from this model that Los Alamos developed 24 for us we identified you know, what are the appropriate 25 89 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 protection mechanisms? It led us to determining that 1 probably the best property of material to be used in 2 an attractiveness concept is probably dilution. 3 And so that's essentially how we you know, 4 developed the material attractiveness approach for the 5 ongoing rule making. Next slide. 6 MEMBER BALLINGER: But you're limiting 7 now this to the special nuclear materials? 8 MR. RIVERS: This is special nuclear 9 material. Cyber security, this panel discussed a 10 number of things that we talked about. We're looking 11 at -- some of the things that we're looking at are 12 reactor cyber security implementation that's underway. 13 Highest consequence, critical visual assets are 14 addressed. 15 And we're trying to use a consequence based 16 approach to consider lesser requirements for critical 17 visual assets with lower consequences. So, in the 18 implementation to meet the NRC requirements, there are 19 eight milestones essentially that all of the plants 20 have implemented for seven milestones. The last 21 milestone is focusing on those lower consequence 22 critical digital assets. 23 And we're in the process of trying to 24 understand do we need to implement all of the same 25 90 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 requirements on those final visual assets that we did 1 for all of the previous ones? And I think the general 2 direction is to try to do it in a more risk-informed 3 approach where you probably wouldn't expect all the 4 same security measures to go into place for these lesser 5 assets then you would in the previous ones. 6 MEMBER BROWN: How do I phrase this? When 7 you say implementation is underway at the plants, what 8 are the elements? What kind of elements of that 9 implementation are there? 10 I mean if -- I mean, we've had absolutely 11 no, I don't think we have, any discussion of that, of 12 how you're looking at implementing the you know, the 13 5.71, Reg Guide 5.71 where it talks about CDAs or 14 critical digital assets. But nobody's gone through 15 and okay, when we're looking at this from the top down 16 and looking at the plant, what are the elements? Where 17 -- is there a level of work through? You're talking 18 about reactor cyber security, what does that mean? 19 MR. RIVERS: Well, basically we right now 20 only our -- have an active requirement at nuclear power 21 plants. All of the other ones were in a process of 22 deciding how much cyber security is appropriate for 23 each of those. 24 MEMBER BROWN: You mean fuel facilities 25 91 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 and things like that? 1 MR. RIVERS: Just for example there is -- 2 MEMBER BROWN: I'm looking -- I'm only 3 asking about reactor -- nuclear power plants right now. 4 MR. RIVERS: Looking at nuclear power 5 plants, Reg Guide 5.71 is what we tend to be using. It 6 tends to focus on essentially the NIST process for 7 addressing cyber security which has several hundred 8 elements that they're supposed to look at for each of 9 these digital assets. 10 They put together a cyber security plan. 11 We evaluate that. We send inspection teams out to 12 assess whether or not they're implementing the plan 13 appropriately. This isn't my area of special 14 expertise. 15 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. So I shouldn't ask. 16 MR. RIVERS: So, I can't give you a lot of 17 detail on that. But I'm sure that if you'd like to talk 18 to our cyber security folks, Barry Westreich is the 19 Director of the directorate. He or his deputy would 20 be very happy to talk to you. 21 MEMBER BROWN: Okay, so we've got a 22 meeting coming up if I remember correctly in a month 23 or so? 24 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Fuel cycle facilities. 25 92 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MR. RIVERS: It's for fuel cycle 1 facilities. 2 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It's not nuclear power 3 plants. 4 MR. RIVERS: But I'm sure that because 5 you'll have the right people there that they can answer 6 your questions on reactors and such. 7 MEMBER BROWN: But we could -- we'll have 8 to talk more. 9 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Well PNNL apparently 10 is developing some models for cyber security. At least 11 Oconee for example ought to have in place. Remember 12 there aren't too many operating plants in the country 13 that have the integrated safety and you know, 14 protection control systems. Oconee is one though. So 15 if we're interested to find out you know, what they've 16 actually done in terms of hardware and otherwise. 17 MEMBER BROWN: Well, I was interested also 18 not just -- you know, not just looking at the 19 plant/plant type stuff. But you know the other 20 activities that are conducted within you know, what I 21 call the overall governance and management of the plant 22 and how is that looked at if you're not -- 23 MR. RIVERS: Right, but I'm not the expert 24 on that. 25 93 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MEMBER BROWN: That's fine. I 1 understand. I'm not going to go -- we're not going to 2 do that. 3 MR. RIVERS: Sorry. So -- 4 MEMBER BROWN: We just -- I think we need 5 to. 6 MR. RIVERS: Well I think you can talk to 7 our folks that are involved in that because we have to 8 address all of the things including their business 9 systems and their access authorization systems. All 10 of those things get factored into. 11 MEMBER BROWN: Yes, my concern is how 12 those would integrate down into the configuration 13 control and other plant management to interact. You 14 know, how they interact because right now they're not 15 supposed to electronically interact but they -- 16 MR. RIVERS: That's right. They're 17 supposed to be -- 18 MEMBER BROWN: But we can pursue that 19 separately. 20 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes. That's a good 21 idea. 22 MEMBER BROWN: All right. We might even 23 have to have a separate meeting on that. 24 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Another Subcommittee. 25 94 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 MEMBER BROWN: But I'm not sure we'll have 1 enough time if the other one's just a half day. 2 MR. RIVERS: So anyway, on the fuel cycle 3 essentially that's gone to the Commission. We've got 4 I think three of the four votes back on that. So we'll 5 be waiting an SRM on that. 6 We're also had -- there's a paper that was 7 developed on research and test reactors. Then we'll 8 also be looking at radioactive materials as well. So 9 we're trying to look at all of those. But the first 10 initial focus was on power plants because they have the 11 biggest potential consequence. Next slide please. 12 I chair an IAEA Coordinated Research 13 Project in Vienna that's been ongoing for a couple of 14 years right now on the development of essential 15 guidance on how to conduct security assessments. So 16 it fits right into this idea of risk-informing 17 security. 18 So the intent is to develop sort of two 19 levels of guidance. One that is a more complete type 20 guide that would sort of supporting nuclear power 21 plants or category one fuel cycle facilities. And a 22 lesser guide that would be a little bit more 23 straightforward to be able to be used by a wider variety 24 of facilities. 25 95 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 A lot of times for example if I get to an 1 irradiator facility, the person doing the security is 2 a radiation safety officer. And so he's not going to 3 have either the interest or the knowledge to 4 necessarily understand a very complex guide that you 5 might use in a nuclear power plant. 6 To support this we're also doing case 7 studies that help people understand how to implement 8 it within their own type of facility. And the five that 9 we currently have ongoing are nuclear power plant case 10 study, an irradiator facility, radioactive material 11 transport, and LEU fuel fabrication facility and a 12 spent fuel storage facility. 13 To basically figuring that a general 14 guidance document generally a lot of times isn't 15 enough. That you need to have these case studies that 16 can be used to support those guidance documents and also 17 potentially support training activities. Next slide. 18 Also, we've got a number of workshops that 19 will be carried out this year. These are the three 20 workshops. Next slide please. 21 The INMM and Reducing Risk Workshop is 22 actually the seventh in a series of reducing risk 23 workshops that INMM has put on. This one will be put 24 on at GW University next month, the week after the RIC. 25 96 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 It will have four panel discussions. One of them will 1 be on cyber security. 2 I've set the cyber security panel 3 discussion to focus on essentially risk associated with 4 security -- cyber security at a nuclear power plant. 5 It will have panel members from NRC Cyber Security 6 Directorate, three of the National Laboratories and 7 also industry. 8 There will be three other panels during the 9 workshop. One will be on insider mitigation. A third 10 one will be on perception of risk. And a fourth one, 11 because we're doing this in conjunction with the 12 Elliott School of International Affairs, will be on 13 essentially the changing relationship with the 14 Government of Russia. 15 Given with what's been happening in the 16 Ukraine and things like that. So it will be a fairly 17 diverse workshop. Next slide please. 18 MEMBER BLEY: Are you getting mostly the 19 people you interact with anyway? Or are you getting 20 some -- a bigger cross section? You've gotten some 21 good ideas coming out from these? 22 MR. RIVERS: We tend to get a bigger cross 23 section. We also get a lot of international fly in on 24 some of these workshops. I know that one of the names 25 97 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 I've seen that's registered is Philippe Galland from 1 Russia, not from Russia, from France, from CEA. 2 Usually we get representation from the UK, from Japan, 3 from other governments that will send people to these 4 workshops. 5 We also try to open them up so that we get 6 non-governmental organization participation. For 7 example, on the perception of risk work panel 8 discussion, Ed Lyman will be a participant on that. 9 We'll have a couple of folks from NRC that will 10 participate. And so that -- I think somebody from 11 Monterey will also be on that panel. 12 So, we try -- when I do these workshops I 13 try to do it in such a way that we get a very wide and 14 diverse group up in the panel so that we get a lot of 15 participation from the workshop participants as well. 16 One of the things to come out of both the 17 Sandia and the Stone Mountain workshop were that we 18 needed to really engage the risk, safety and security 19 people. So working with Nathan Su and John Nakoski in 20 research, we identified that an ANS meeting that was 21 being given at Sun Valley, Idaho in April as being a 22 targeted opportunity that will have a lot of the safety 23 risk analysts at that meeting. 24 And so, we are working with ANS to put on 25 98 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 a one day workshop on the day prior to the ANS meeting 1 to have a day of engagement between the safety and 2 security risk professionals. Next slide please. 3 One of the things that has never really 4 taken place is actually a real workshop on 5 vulnerability assessment tools. And since I think 6 when I mentioned it to Chris Lui and my boss that we 7 had set up the ANS INMM one on safety and security, she 8 walked in the next day and said well, when are you going 9 to do one on vulnerability assessment tools. 10 So, we got the INMM to agree to put on this. 11 It will be a three-day workshop in Boston in September. 12 We'll have a discussion of VA tools that will talk about 13 the validation, verification and accreditation of 14 tools, of software tools. It will have a discussion 15 of modeling issues. A discussion of data. 16 We'll have a demonstration by vendors. 17 And this is one where I'm actually pulling in the NUSAM 18 project I mentioned before where there's a case study 19 on nuclear power plants where we'll actually give the 20 vendors that are participating the case study on 21 nuclear power plants. So each of them can demonstrate 22 how their tool assesses the security effectiveness at 23 that nuclear power plant. 24 We'll also give a half day for the vendors 25 99 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 to actually interact directly with all of the workshop 1 participants. Then we'll have some panel discussions 2 at the end where we'll have users, regulators, industry 3 and vendors discuss these vulnerability assessment 4 tools. 5 MEMBER BLEY: Is DOE coming? Are they 6 part of this? 7 MR. RIVERS: DOE is actively working, 8 supporting me in setting this workshop up. 9 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I haven't heard of this 10 one Joe, what are the dates in September? Do you have 11 them? That's all right, we can get them. 12 MR. RIVERS: It's mid-September time 13 frame. If you go to the INMM website, www.INMM.org, 14 it has a -- in the upcoming events, you can click on 15 this and get the dates for it. 16 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. Thank you. 17 MR. RIVERS: And probably in the next week 18 or so, we'll probably put up the draft agenda for the 19 workshop on the website as well. 20 Okay. And I think that's the last slide 21 other then the questions slide. If you have any 22 questions, I would be happy to answer them. 23 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Anything more for Joe? 24 MR. RIVERS: But basically we're not 25 100 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 sitting idle and you know, we have our initiatives 1 ongoing in the security world to try to better 2 risk-inform security. 3 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Thank you. 4 MEMBER BROWN: Just one question. You 5 said this earlier and I just probably missed it. The 6 risk-informing security, there's some aspects of that 7 are a little tenuous. I mean how? 8 MR. RIVERS: Well I think it's you know, 9 my training is you know, as a statistician. So you 10 know, risk has certain consequences, expected loss 11 basically is what risk is. 12 But knowing that we can't necessarily do 13 all of that real well in the security world, it's trying 14 to look at those elements of risk that can help us do 15 a better job in security. You know, and I gave some 16 examples of some of the ongoing activities. 17 You know, some of them include trying to 18 get more use of simulation modeling at nuclear power 19 plants. Trying to better understand what can an 20 adversary really do. Trying to understand what 21 consequences can actually be achieved because that's 22 very important to understand. So, all of those types 23 of things. 24 MEMBER BROWN: Is access -- I mean, access 25 101 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 points are a big part of maintaining a secure 1 environment. 2 MR. RIVERS: Correct. 3 MEMBER BROWN: And I mean is -- at least 4 that's a high level. 5 MR. RIVERS: Yes. 6 MEMBER BROWN: Is a way to look at it. I 7 mean, is that part of the modeling in terms of trying 8 to look -- I mean, if you're a plant, how many access 9 points do you have? 10 MR. RIVERS: Well, when you look at -- one 11 of the issues that you have at a nuclear power plant 12 or a category one facility is, is you do control access. 13 Adversaries can use a number of approaches to getting 14 into the facility. Some of it can be through deception 15 where they actually fake credentials, steal 16 credentials or whatever to try to get in to get in 17 through certain levels. But you may also just use 18 brute force where you just basically crash through the 19 fences and use explosives to breach walls and things 20 like that. 21 So, all of those have to be considered when 22 you're looking at security risks. 23 MEMBER BROWN: Okay. Thank you. 24 MR. RIVERS: Yes, and one of the things if 25 102 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 you look at the material attractiveness thing that 1 we're working on right now in the fuel cycle facilities, 2 one of the thoughts is that if we actually determine 3 that some materials that are currently put into the 4 material access areas in those secured areas don't 5 really credibly have to be there. Those activities 6 that are performed at those plants can be performed in 7 less secure areas which means that fewer people are 8 gaining access to the most secure parts of the facility. 9 So, we're looking at a lot of those types 10 of elements and risk-informing security. 11 MEMBER SCHULTZ: I think the most 12 important feature that -- well one of the most more 13 important features that you'd be looking at, I didn't 14 see it in a conference, but probably it's in the 15 discussions is barrier evaluation and development. 16 MR. RIVERS: Yes, if you look up -- yes. 17 MEMBER SCHULTZ: Because the consequences 18 are interesting. But in fact minor consequences could 19 have a major impact on industry. So, the important 20 features would be to assure that the event doesn't come 21 to fruition. 22 So, a varied evaluation and opportunities 23 to dissuade. 24 MR. RIVERS: The barrier analysis is a 25 103 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 very important part of this. It's a development of a 1 lot of the things that I talked about. 2 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I need to keep us 3 moving here a bit because we have time slotted for a 4 presentation by the industry. Another turn by UCS. 5 And I need to get public comments and comments from the 6 Committee. And I need to leave Michael enough time so 7 that he doesn't have to speak too rapidly. So Michael? 8 MR. CALL: Thank you. Just wanted to give 9 you a brief overview of some efforts that we're doing 10 in the area of spent fuel storage in my division, which 11 is the Spent Fuel Management Division in NMSS. This 12 effort is relatively young. And so there hasn't been 13 too much that's gone forward in it yet. So it's just 14 we'll be bringing up to speed on the general outline 15 of what it's like, what we're doing and the significant 16 workshop that we had last month. 17 This effort we're looking to try to set up 18 as a goal, we have a framework -- aiming for a framework 19 to better enable risk-informed regulatory decisions in 20 the areas of us looking at both spent fuel storage and 21 transportation. But with the interest being mainly in 22 transportation right now, we felt it's important to 23 focus our efforts initially in spent fuel dry storage. 24 The reasons you know, like I said, this is 25 104 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 relatively new. Some of the reasons for taking on this 1 effort is partly because of understanding the 2 NUREG-2150. Come out of the follow up efforts that 3 we're talking about here today as well as public 4 interactions where we present but we've received a 5 petition for rule making from NEI where they felt if 6 we made -- they proposed certain changes that they felt 7 would be useful to make Part 72 of the storage 8 regulations more risk-informed. 9 In our reports we're looking at trying to 10 set up this framework through a process -- in taking 11 seven major steps, looking to see what risk information 12 is out there already. For example, you may be familiar 13 with, there are a couple of PRAs that have been done. 14 NRC did their own pilot PRA, which is NUREG-1864 as well 15 as EPRI had done a PRA of their own. 16 So, just trying to identify what 17 information is available. And the next step which is 18 where our workshop from last month comes in, was to try 19 to see where a defense-in-depth, how we would go about 20 defining defense-in-depth for purposes of application 21 and spent fuel storage. I believe that's the next 22 slide. Yes, it's right there. 23 So, we had -- this workshop we had, held 24 it on the 15th. It was well attended by both we had 25 105 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 NEI participation and a number of public participants 1 both in person as well as through the webinar that we 2 had. In fact we had so many trying to register in that 3 we -- assignment of a system telling people that we were 4 overloaded, we can't take anymore. 5 So, maybe next time we have a public 6 webinar we'll expand the number of lines that we make 7 available for that. The NRC and NEI, we asked NEI to 8 make a presentation on their views of what 9 defense-in-depth would look like as well as presenting 10 our own, and that is discussed a little bit more on the 11 next slide. 12 For NRC we are looking and thinking in 13 terms of threes. We're looking at three layers to 14 ensure performance of three safety functions. And 15 understanding how operations of spent fuel storage 16 occur. Breaking that out as far as how we looked at 17 it in terms of three different phases of operation. 18 NEI's is more a -- applying more succinct way of looking 19 at it in terms of identifying barriers, controls, 20 personnel and so forth to prevent and contain or 21 mitigate exposure to radioactive materials. 22 As I said, we had a number of public 23 comments ranging from you know, in favor of you know, 24 the NRC is looking at this as a good thing because it 25 106 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 can help enhance and make the framework we've got now 1 being more clear. And to help us identify what's 2 really needed to be looked at in terms of certifying 3 casks for storage. 4 There were some questions about the level 5 of detail and some questions about different things 6 such as well how are you going to determine if you have 7 adequate defense-in-depth. And so there were some 8 discussions on those points. 9 So that's where we are at this point. We're 10 looking at taking the comments that we had from that 11 meeting and putting together some kind of brief paper 12 to consolidate that thinking. And then move to the 13 next step which would be like I said, there are seven 14 steps that we're looking at. I think we're looking at 15 what are we going to use of making decisions, decision 16 metrics. And how those would play into a decision 17 process. 18 Eventually we're going to lay out a 19 preliminary framework and then use a pilot -- selected 20 a pilot to run that through and see where we need to 21 make changes to that and finalize our approach before 22 going forward with that. 23 So, if there are any questions? I know 24 that that was a brief presentation. But this is where 25 107 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 we are in terms of a significant activity in spent fuel 1 storage. 2 MEMBER BALLINGER: Are you interfacing 3 with the folks that are looking at license renewal for 4 these casks and long term dry storage and things like 5 that? 6 MR. CALL: License -- well, I realize -- 7 MEMBER BALLINGER: You have a unique 8 opportunity here. 9 MR. CALL: Right. I think I -- when we've 10 been looking at these things as far as looking at what 11 elements might be in each of these layers, we're not 12 just looking at an initial storage period, but also 13 looking at what might be things in a renewal period 14 also. So there is some thinking toward that effort. 15 Like I said, we're relatively -- this is 16 a relatively young and so as we go forward, we can 17 definitely keep those things in mind to make sure that 18 we reach out to that adequately. 19 MEMBER BALLINGER: I would encourage you 20 to do that. Because there's a huge effort on defining 21 what kind of inspections are going to be needed. And 22 expensive. Very expensive inspections and technology 23 which need to be balanced against other types of 24 inspection which ensure that you don't get released 25 108 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 material. 1 MR. CALL: Okay. Yes, we will definitely 2 keep -- 3 MR. LOMBARD: Actually if I may Ron, Bill 4 Demoross. 5 MEMBER BALLINGER: Demoross, who is that? 6 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Identify yourself sir. 7 MR. LOMBARD: I need records for a 8 schedule of management. He can schedule management 9 within NMSS and the folks who are developing HMS 10 programs, managing regulatory framework are the same 11 division, same compliance. 12 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I'm sorry, we need your 13 name on the record too. 14 MR. LOMBARD: Mark Lombard. 15 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Thank you. 16 MR. LOMBARD: Yes, we deal very closely 17 with NEI, the same folks who interfaced with us on other 18 spent fuel storage issues almost on a weekly basis. 19 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Any other questions? 20 (No response) 21 MR. CALL: And just moving on, as Dick 22 mentioned earlier, I'm filing in for Dennis Damon. 23 He's the NMSS Risk Analyst that would normally be making 24 this kind of presentation. Just wanted to give you 25 109 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 again, a brief informational presentation about some 1 efforts that have gone on that are NMSS wide as well 2 as just point to some things that are active in the 3 different divisions within the NMSS. 4 Sometime ago there was a risk task group 5 that was organized and developed a guidance document 6 that's referred to as the Risk-Informed Decision Making 7 document or RIDM. The current revision is -- we have 8 one that was put out in February 2008. 9 But the activity started much earlier in 10 a response to the SRM on SECY-99-0100. In that SECY 11 just to give you a little bit of information, the 12 staff's proposal to implement a framework for using 13 risk assessment in regulating nuclear material uses and 14 disposal was approved along with the proposal for 15 addressing risk management issues in those areas 16 including development of risk metrics and goals. And 17 then there was a joint ACRS/ACNW subcommittee that was 18 established to peer review those staff efforts. 19 The document itself has four objectives. 20 To provide a step by step procedure on how to make 21 risk-informed regulatory decisions. To suggest 22 quantitative health guidelines. And provide a 23 discussion of three regions of risk, which would be 24 considered negligible, acceptable or tolerable I 25 110 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 should say, not acceptable and negligible are the terms 1 that they were using. And then to discuss how the RIDM 2 method would be applied to nuclear material and waste 3 regulatory areas. 4 In the SRM on SECY-04-0182, the Commission 5 approved staff's plan to continue to apply 6 risk-informed methods to these activities, materials 7 and the waste repository activities and directed that 8 the staff should consider applying the guidance in the 9 document to planned and emergent activities. Next 10 slide please. 11 So as I mentioned, part of the guidance 12 that was developed and in the document itself there are 13 quantitative health guidelines. They developed six. 14 Two of which will look similar to the guideline -- to 15 the goals that are for the reactor safety goals. 16 They're all in terms of individual risk. 17 So that there are six. Three for the public, three for 18 workers. In addition to acute fatality and serious 19 injury or like in cancer fatality, the serious injury 20 guideline was also adopted or suggested. 21 I would note that these are not -- unlike 22 the safety goals for reactors, these are not endorsed 23 by any type of Commission policy statement. And what 24 they are, you'll notice that we've called them 25 111 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 guidelines instead of goals. Instead of conveying a 1 sense that these would be something that would need to 2 be met at some point in the future or at some day, these 3 are more of guidelines which would be anticipated 4 according to the guidance document levels below which 5 do you really need to consider doing much more to ensure 6 that the risks are any lower then this. 7 MEMBER SKILLMAN: So these are thresholds 8 for action? 9 MR. CALL: Kind of. Looking at -- yes. 10 And they're not really -- it's not a hard and fast. 11 It's kind of -- it's like I said, it's a guideline to 12 suggest considering whether any further effort is 13 needed. So whether you're in the negligible risk area 14 and need to do anymore or not. Of course there will 15 be other considerations that may weigh into that. But 16 from a risk values perspective, that's where this is 17 looking at. 18 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Thank you. 19 MR. CALL: On the next slide. To see if 20 you know, since that time we note that these guidelines 21 are not widely known or incorporated into 22 risk-informing applications within the NMSS programs. 23 However, there's various concepts have you know, the 24 different groups are aware of the various other 25 112 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 concepts in the guidance and made use of those as they 1 felt was deemed appropriate. Just describing some of 2 that here with the different organizations. The 3 Economic Directorate, my division in terms of spent 4 fuel storage, the fuel cycle and the materials and 5 decommissioning. 6 And some of these are in terms of ongoing 7 efforts. For example, in fuel cycle they're looking 8 to revise their oversight program. And they feel that 9 some of the milestones that they've set up for 10 activities there would be well suited to employ 11 guidance from, or consider guidance from the RIDM 12 document. 13 On the next slide. In addition to that, 14 just wanted to also make you aware that there have been 15 various activities both past and ongoing within the 16 different divisions that are risk-informing in nature 17 or that support risk-informing efforts. Many of these 18 if not all I would imagine are or have been or are 19 currently listed on the NRC's public website. And it 20 describes the different risk-informing activities of 21 the Agency. 22 And then I've listed here some examples for 23 the different areas. You'll see that this covers the 24 range of what we regulate at NMSS. 25 113 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 And then that's the last slide, so if there 1 are any questions? 2 MEMBER SCHULTZ: Michael, are you 3 familiar enough with the fuel cycle effort with regard 4 to the integrated safety -- the overall plan as to know 5 what the schedule is there? 6 MR. CALL: For the revised oversight 7 program? 8 MEMBER SCHULTZ: Yes, exactly. 9 MR. CALL: That I'm not aware of the 10 schedule, no. I just know that they are working 11 towards some. They have an effort engaged in that 12 area. 13 MEMBER SCHULTZ: I'll look it up. 14 Thanks. 15 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Any other questions 16 for Michael or the staff? 17 (No response) 18 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: If not, thank you all. 19 It's good overview of not only the RMRF initiative, but 20 what's going on in the other areas that would be 21 affected by the integrated policy statement and 22 regulatory framework. 23 With that I'd like -- we have next on the 24 agenda a slot for NEI. If you have some comments to 25 114 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 come up. 1 Mike, we haven't received any material 2 from the slide or whatever. 3 MR. TSCHILTZ: No. No. 4 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Or is it just -- okay. 5 It will be on the record. 6 MR. TSCHILTZ: Certainly. I 7 contemplated developing slides for this discussion, 8 but when I was initially asked to come and speak before 9 the Committee, it was under the presumption that the 10 paper would be available and the industry would have 11 an opportunity to comment. 12 And so I think my comments won't be so much 13 aimed at the content or the presumed content of the 14 paper, but more at a higher level as to where we're going 15 with this initiative and where the industry may come 16 out as far as seeing the benefit or not seeing the 17 benefit. I guess just looking at the process for 18 moving forward, you know, Dick Dudley described the 19 white paper followed by a public comment period 20 followed by potentially a meeting to discuss a 21 resolution of comments. 22 One perspective I would offer is that these 23 initiatives seem to be voluntary initiatives. And 24 they're not something that would be imposed upon the 25 115 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 licensee, it would be something that they would 1 voluntarily apply for and implement similar to NFPA-805 2 or Option Two was the example that was given there. 3 So, the observation that I would have is 4 that NUREG-2150 was developed and written by an NRC Task 5 Force with little public involvement. The development 6 of the white paper, the Options is being developed with 7 little public involvement. Just one opportunity it 8 appears for stakeholder feedback on the white paper. 9 So, my concern is that there's going to be 10 a lot of effort potentially put into the development 11 of Options that there's no clear identified person or 12 utility that would implement it. So to me, it seems 13 that it needs to be more closely linked to the people 14 -- the development of the Options need to be more 15 closely linked to the people who would ultimately 16 implement that. 17 So, in separation of those two activities, 18 I think is problematic. And the reason that I wouldn't 19 offer more detailed comments I think are the devil's 20 in the details. I think whether these Options are 21 looked upon favorable and then people decide to 22 implement them are largely based upon the details that 23 are going to be developed for the Options. 24 So in that regard I think it's very 25 116 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 important that you know, we allow sufficient time in 1 the development of these Options for meaningful 2 interactions. And I would say it would be beneficial 3 to look at a potential examples of applications for 4 Option Two. 5 Just looking at Option Three on the 6 surface, it would appear that it's what I would 7 characterize as a heavy lift. And with all of the other 8 activities going on in the post-Fukushima era here, 9 there's a lot to consider. So, someone's volunteering 10 to take that on, at this stage I think that would be 11 questionable. But I think that's something that we 12 need to explore as we move forward. 13 The other observation I would offer is that 14 the industry and the NRC have formed risk-informed 15 steering committees. And there's joint meetings where 16 the industry's steering committee meets with the NRC's 17 steering committee. And they identify the issues that 18 they think are most important to be addressed in the 19 near term as far as risk-informed regulation. 20 And I think if you look at what we focused 21 on in the past year and the things that we're focusing 22 on in the coming year, it's going to identify the things 23 that are really issues that people face right now that 24 they need answers to. For example, this year one of 25 117 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 the issues was PRA realism. And to a large degree that 1 was as a result of some of the issues that arose during 2 the development of fire PRAs for NFPA-805. 3 And the industry has a sense of urgency in 4 the need to resolve those issues with fire PRAs because 5 of the consequences of having these conservatisms. So 6 -- and the potential negative consequences and 7 diversion of resources to things that don't have a true 8 safety benefit. 9 So, I would say the risk-informed steering 10 committee is a good place and this is -- this issue, 11 the RMRF is one of the topics that the staff steering 12 committee has raised as a potential, one to be 13 considered in 2015. But I think the industry is 14 looking at more practical application, things that can 15 be used in the near term. The treatment of uncertainty 16 in decision making. Aggregation of risk and 17 development of external vent PRAs. 18 The flooding PRAs being an issue. I know 19 you've heard of the challenges that the industry and 20 the staff has faced with evaluating flooding hazards 21 to the deterministic methods that are used per site in 22 new reactors and the challenges that are created by 23 that. And not having a risk-informed or accepted 24 risk-informed method for dealing with those hazards. 25 118 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 So, I would say that being said, I mean, 1 we're ready. I have a small working group formed to 2 review the paper when it's issued. And we'll provide 3 our comments and engage the staff. 4 I think the general belief out there I 5 think from when NUREG-2150 was initially issued was 6 that the regulatory framework doesn't really need to 7 be revamped at this stage. That our efforts would be 8 better spent encouraging and sustaining the existing 9 policies that have been put in place with the PRA policy 10 statement that exists. 11 And there's still a lot of work to be done. 12 We heard comments today on defense-in-depth. It has 13 just been out there since the initial implementation 14 of misconformed regulation. And people still struggle 15 with how to apply those concepts. So I think we can 16 clearly make progress in those areas in an evolutionary 17 way as opposed to a revolutionary way of reframing the 18 regulations. 19 So I'll stop there and take any questions. 20 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Any questions for 21 Mike? 22 (No response) 23 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Thank you very much for 24 your comments. And again, I share your frustration 25 119 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 about not having something more substantive to actually 1 comment on. But, that's the way it is. We will have 2 that opportunity in the future. And I'm sure you'll 3 be back. 4 MR. TSCHILTZ: Thanks. 5 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: And we have a request 6 from Union of Concerned Scientists. So I believe Ed 7 Lyman is here. Is Ed here? Oh, is he on -- okay. Ed 8 is apparently out there screaming at his communication 9 device. Ed, we'll get the line open for you in a second 10 here. 11 MR. LYMAN: Hello? 12 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Ed, are you there? 13 MR. LYMAN: Yes. Can you hear me? 14 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes, we can. 15 MR. LYMAN: Yes. I apologize for not 16 being there in person today. 17 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: No. That's fine. 18 MR. LYMAN: So, as always we appreciate 19 the opportunity to provide comments. But I don't want 20 to pile on here. But again, we were also expecting to 21 get the white paper to comment on. And so without 22 having that, my remarks are just going to be reactions 23 to some of what I've heard this morning. 24 With regard to the risk management 25 120 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 regulatory framework, I guess there are two separate 1 aspects here. One is the -- is it appropriate to 2 implement this policy statement Agency wide for all 3 aspects, even those where there may not be a clear or 4 useful application of risk management concepts? And 5 I think the answer to that is no from our perspective. 6 One clear example being security. I am 7 glad to hear that there doesn't seem to be an effort 8 to try to quantify the unquantifiable with regard to 9 initiating events for security. But that's certainly 10 something we would not support. 11 The other aspect is are the -- is what we 12 heard with regard to the Power Reactor Options on 13 appropriate. And I think the answer to that is also 14 no. I think there is a great need for the Agency to 15 clarify the way risk is being used to clear up some of 16 the issues and inconsistencies. And it doesn't sound 17 like this particular vehicle is going to accomplish 18 that. And you may not hear this very often, but I 19 totally agree with the NEI speaker about I think the 20 -- 21 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: There's laughing going 22 on in the room Ed, if you can't hear it. 23 MR. LYMAN: But I actually am going to say 24 the same thing. I don't see how what the elements of 25 121 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 the policy statement that were presented are any 1 improvement over the PRA policy statement. In fact I 2 think it may be a step backward. 3 For instance, I'm concerned about the 4 first bullet which sounds to me would perhaps the plant 5 adequate protection or equate adequate protection with 6 the idea that that's really risk management. And I 7 don't think you can really justify and I think risk 8 management is the only aspect of adequate protection. 9 And I'm concerned about the implications, the legal 10 implications of a statement like that. 11 I would say adequate protection is 12 probably closer to risk-minimization. Or that would 13 be our hope then risk management. You could always 14 keep in mind that you know, the public is one of the 15 customers of this policy statement and I think the 16 Agency needs to focus on improving the priority with 17 how it applies in it's decision making. And I don't 18 see that happening here. 19 One aspect I think that highlights it, we 20 heard how NFPA-805 was actually it sounds like it's 21 leading to greater inconsistencies between those who 22 voluntarily choose to implement it and sign 23 vulnerabilities that require correction and those who 24 don't. And that seems to be going in the wrong 25 122 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 direction. 1 So until that problem is fixed, it doesn't 2 seem like it's a good model for going forward. And I 3 don't see how Option Two, clearly industry is not going 4 to want to go on a hunt for unrectified vulnerabilities 5 that they're going to have to pay to fix. So that -- 6 to expect that that's going to be a reasoned outcome 7 of this process is not a reasonable expectation. So 8 if it were going to happen, I think it would have to 9 be a mandatory Option Three type. 10 We've made pitches in the past for a new 11 vulnerability, you know, systematic vulnerability 12 assessment across the whole fleet so that you can at 13 least get consistency. And it seems to increase 14 inconsistency by allowing this process to be voluntary 15 would make matters worse. 16 So I think that's all I have to say on that. 17 On risk-informing security, we have some views on the 18 material attractiveness rule making that Joe Rivers is 19 well familiar with. I won't rehash them here, but I 20 think Dr. Rempe's comment goes to one of our main 21 concerns, that material attractiveness is not an 22 intrinsic aspect of material properties. 23 But it does imply some modeling or 24 presumption of an adversary, their capabilities and 25 123 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 their contentions. And that has to be accounted for 1 better in the rule making process to make clear that 2 there is some target adversary in mind when you're 3 talking about what materials are attractive and what 4 are less attractive. 5 The last point I wanted to make has to do 6 with defense-in-depth for spent fuel. I think here is 7 this is an area where there might be some value in 8 considering risk. And we think that if you apply the 9 defense-in-depth, the metric for evaluating the 10 expedited fuel transfer issue as I said before, that 11 that would make expedited fuel transference dry casks 12 look more attractive then if you've done a cost benefit 13 analysis expected. 14 So I would hope that that program would 15 also be applied not just to spent fuel in dry storage 16 but also comparative of risks of densely packed spent 17 fuel pools compared to dry storage. 18 And I think that's all I have. Thank you. 19 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Thank you very much. 20 I've lost track of what lines are open. Was Ed on the 21 general public line? 22 MR. SNODDERLY: No. Ed was on the staff 23 line. 24 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Was on the staff line. 25 124 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Okay. Let me ask, as long as we have the staff line 1 open, are any other members of the staff out there that 2 wanted to make any comments on anything? As long as 3 we have your line open. 4 MR. HARRISON: No comments here. 5 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. Thank you. 6 What we'll do then is open up the other line, which is 7 the public line. And while we're doing that, let me 8 ask if is there anyone in the room that has any comments 9 that you'd like to make? Please come up and do so. 10 Now, if there's a member of the public out 11 there, because of our high tech system here, could you 12 just please say something, hello or anything so that 13 we can confirm that your line is open. 14 (No response) 15 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It's always 16 troublesome. 17 MR. SNODDERLY: There wasn't anybody. 18 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. We have 19 indications that there isn't anyone on the public line. 20 And if that's the case, then thank you all for your 21 comments. And again, NEI and Ed Lyman, you're on the 22 record for the meeting. So, we have your comments. 23 What we always do at the end of one of these 24 Subcommittee meetings, I'll go around the table and ask 25 125 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 each Member if you have any final comments that you'd 1 like to make. And also, if -- ask whether you think 2 that at this stage in the game it merits bringing the 3 issue before the full Committee. 4 I always like to get a little feedback from 5 other Members on that topic in terms of timeliness. 6 And because Joy got a chance to go last a few days ago, 7 you can go first today. 8 MEMBER REMPE: Oh. I wanted to thank you 9 for the presentations and comments. I look forward to 10 the white paper when it's released. I would encourage 11 us to have another Subcommittee -- my viewpoint is we 12 should have another Subcommittee meeting after the 13 white paper is released. And then I would take it to 14 the full Committee. I think at this time that we're 15 going before the paper is released to the full 16 Committee. 17 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Charlie? 18 MEMBER BROWN: Same comment on the 19 presentations. Got something out of it. And I agree 20 with Joy that we ought to get the white paper done first 21 before we go to the full Committee. 22 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Ron? 23 MEMBER BALLINGER: Same. 24 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: It's going quick. 25 126 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 Mike? 1 MEMBER RYAN: It's a work in progress. 2 And I agree with the comments from my colleagues. 3 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Dennis? 4 MEMBER BLEY: I agree with them except we 5 might want to wait until the public comments are in on 6 the white paper before we take it to the full Committee. 7 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Okay. Dick? 8 MEMBER SKILLMAN: Yes, I agree with Dr. 9 Rempe. I'd like to hear again after we see the white 10 paper, after the public comments, that would probably 11 be better. But I also want to thank Dick and Joe for 12 putting up with my focused questions. Thank you Dick 13 Dudley and Joe. 14 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Steve? 15 MEMBER SCHULTZ: I appreciate the 16 presentations and also the -- got the involvement by 17 both the staff and the other organizations that have 18 provided input to us today. And would suggest that we 19 have the Subcommittee meeting as we get the additional 20 information and join in with the public comment period. 21 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: Yes. My inclination 22 -- thanks. You have -- well, my inclination is to do 23 that Dick. Is that you're path forward that identified 24 interactions with the Subcommittee I think during the 25 127 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 summer period. I think we want to probably interact 1 with you earlier then that so that you have the benefit 2 of the Subcommittee feedback in parallel with the 3 public comments. 4 And then see where we go after all of the 5 public comments are in and you have a final version of 6 the paper you know, later in the year. So, I think 7 we'll probably be looking at scheduling a Subcommittee 8 meeting in the April/May time frame. Well have to 9 figure out a slot to put that in. But I think earlier 10 the better I think is what you're hearing from us. 11 MEMBER BLEY: You want to wait until after 12 they have that meeting I would think. 13 CHAIRMAN STETKAR: I think we want to wait 14 until after they have that meeting. But not 15 necessarily wait until they have all of the public 16 comments and are working on the you know, the final 17 draft. 18 And with that, if there are no other 19 comments, we are adjourned. 20 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter 21 went off the record at 11:30 a.m.) 22 23 24 25 128 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433 1 2 Staff Recommendations Regarding a Risk Management Regulatory Framework February 20, 2015 Briefing for ACRS Subcommittee Outline of Staff Presentation on Risk Management Regulatory Framework (RMRF) Background and Current Approach (R. Dudley) Agency-wide Policy Statement Implementation Options for Power Reactors Path Forward Status of Risk-Informed Activities Regarding Common Defense and Security (Joe Rivers) Status of Risk-Informed Activities Regarding Spent Fuel Dry Storage (Michel Call) Status of Risk-Informed Activities Regarding Nuclear Materials Licensing (Dennis Damon/Michel Call) 2 Summary: Background and Current Approach to Evaluate Risk Management Regulatory Framework Chairman's Tasking Memorandum of June 14, 2012 directed staff to "review NUREG-2150 and provide a paper to the Commission that would identify options and make recommendations, including the potential development of a Commission policy statement." Commission's May 19, 2014 SRM on Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 1: Directed staff to reevaluate objectives of Improvement Activity 1 (new design-basis extension category) and Improvement Activity 2 (adequacy of defense-in-depth) within context of Commission direction on long-term Risk Management Regulatory Framework Closed NTTF Recommendation 1 Increased scope of RMRF SECY paper (describe relationships between ongoing risk-informed activities) Staff has requested extension of due date until December 2015 Management has re-evaluated the staff's approach to evaluating agency-wide RMRF Staff will consider 3 RMRF implementation options for power reactors Staff will also ask Commission to consider an overarching, agency-wide risk management policy statement 3 Overview of Agency-wide Policy Statement Applicable to all NRC-regulated program areas (radiological safety and security) A risk management approach would be used to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety and promote the common defense and security for all NRC regulatory activities. In a risk management approach, safety and security are ensured by (1) understanding the risk associated with NRC-regulated activities and (2) using that risk information to make regulatory decisions. 4 Overview of Agency-wide Policy Statement (continued) The risk management approach would: 1.Use a structured process to identify issues, develop and analyze options, make decisions, and monitor the effectiveness of regulatory programs to make improvements as necessary, 2.Ensure appropriate regulatory controls and oversight are in place recognizing the variety of risks associated with different uses of radioactive materials, and 3.Employ risk-informed decision-making, in which risk insights are considered together with other factors commensurate with their importance to public health and safety and common defense and security. 5 Overview of Agency-wide Policy Statement (continued) The technical analyses supporting the risk-management approach should: 1.Be based on sound data, information, and methodologies, including consideration of uncertainties, 2.Use techniques or combinations of techniques appropriate for the hazards and complexity of the issue, 3.Be as realistic as practicable, and 4.Promote and utilize advances in science and technology, as practicable. 6 Three Power Reactor Implementation Options Option 1 - Maintain Current Framework Option 2 - Voluntary Alternative Risk-Informed Licensing Basis Option 3 - Plant Specific Risk Management Regulatory Framework from NUREG-2150 7 Power Reactor Option 1 - Maintain Current Framework No overall revision of NRC's regulatory framework The current power reactor regulatory framework meets the RMRF criteria in NUREG-2150, Chapter 4 - Option A Commission Safety Goal Policy sets forth the "risk management objective" Current regulations implement sufficient protections (e.g., defense-in-depth and safety margins) corresponding to NUREG-2150 "risk management goal" NRR's LIC-504 sets forth a risk-informed decision process with steps consistent with those described in NUREG-2150 NRC has numerous monitoring and feedback mechanisms to (1) gage the efficacy of regulatory decisions and (2) identify new information that should be considered within the regulatory framework Not a "do nothing" option -- staff would still make safety improvements (based on risk insights or other considerations) whenever deemed necessary using existing regulatory processes 8 Power Reactor Option 2 - Voluntary Alternative Risk-Informed Licensing Basis Maintain existing generic regulatory structure Issue rule allowing licensees who upgrade PRAs to apply for approval of a licensing basis that would support a performance-based, risk-informed alternative to certain deterministic regulations of low safety benefit Licensees allowed to select a plant-specific set of design changes/compliance issues of low risk-significance that would deviate from current deterministic requirements (NRC or self-approval) and must search for and mitigate all plant-specific risk vulnerabilities meeting NRC-specified criteria New information on mitigation of risk-significant events and/or accident sequences (risk vulnerabilities) must be documented in an updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71 (e) requirements Mandatory monitoring and feedback (as described in RG 1.174) to ensure changes in risk remain acceptable throughout the lifetime of the facility 9 Power Reactor Option 2 - Voluntary Alternative Risk Informed Licensing Basis (continued) Regulatory process for licensees to self-approve certain plant-specific changes would be similar to NFPA-805 approval process, i.e., risk-informed changes allowed to license requirements without prior NRC approval if risk increase is "no more than minimal" (e.g., < 1E-7/year) Changes with risk increases "more than minimal" (e.g., > 1E-7/year) require NRC approval Plant licensees are expected to have upgraded, high quality PRAs to support this risk-informed alternative licensing basis approach 10 Power Reactor Option 3 - Plant-Specific RMRF from NUREG-2150 Require PRAs and establish plant-specific licensing basis based on: Plant-specific risk profiles NRC-specified risk management objective Structured, risk-informed decision-making process used by both NRC and licensees Based on the risk profile, licensees would implement the plant-specific licensing basis by: Determining how the risk objective is met Ensuring that the necessary protections are in place to meet the risk management goal Establishing the risk-informed decision-making process Establishing the monitoring/feedback and reporting process 11 Power Reactor Option 3 - Plant-Specific RMRF from NUREG-2150 (continued) Each plant's licensing basis would consist of: "Technical requirements" based upon plant-specific attributes and applicant-selected design specific elements/constraints Rationales (technical bases) why the technical requirements adequately address risk and defense-in-depth in light of the plant-specific attributes and design specific elements/constraints FSAR-level description of the plant-specific attributes and applicant-selected design specific elements/constraints that are the inputs/assumptions for the above rationales (technical bases) which must be maintained Process for maintaining the validity of the rationales (technical bases) throughout the operating lifetime of the facility. Licensees would be required to use the structured process with monitoring and feedback to ensure that the plant-specific licensing basis remained consistent with the risk profile of the plant, which could change over time. 12 Path Forward on RMRF Draft white paper and outline of policy statement now being reviewed by NRC Senior management Incorporate management comments into updated draft white paper and release to public Public meeting (late April) to discuss draft white paper Solicit written public comments on later version of white paper via www.regulations.gov Summarize public comments and meet again with ACRS (summer) RMRF SECY paper currently due to Commission on December 18, 2015 13 Backup Slides 14 Definitions To ensure a common understanding of this example policy statement, it is important to know the differences between the terms "risk management," "risk assessment", and "risk-informed approach." Risk management is the recognition of the threat or danger involved with the use of nuclear materials and establishing controls and oversight to manage the potential threat or danger. That is, it is coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk. [From ISO 31000, "Risk Management - Principles and Guidelines"] Risk assessment is the evaluation of what can go wrong, how likely is it, and what would be the consequences? This consideration may be addressed either qualitatively or quantitatively. [From SRM-SECY-98-144, "White Paper on Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Regulation," March 1999] 15 Definitions (continued) Risk-informed approach to regulatory decision-making represents a philosophy whereby [quantitative and qualitative] risk insights are considered together with other factors to establish requirements that better focus licensee and regulatory attention on design and operational issues commensurate with their importance to public health and safety. A risk-informed approach enhances the deterministic approach which is used to define many of the design and operational requirements for NRC licensees. Risk-informed approaches lie between the risk-based and purely deterministic approaches. [From SRM-SECY-98-144, "White Paper on Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Regulation," March 1999] 16 NUREG-2150 Hierarchy and Structured Decision-making Process 17 Joe Rivers, NSIR February 20, 2015 ACRS Subcommittee Meeting NRC Sandia Workshop 2010 Six Areas of Opportunity Identified -Uncertainty of initiating events -Simulation tools -Collaboration between safety/security -Cyber Security -Improved metrics -Demonstration project like WASH 1400 2 February 2014 INMM Workshop Safety/Security Risk Approaches Material Attractiveness Likelihood of Event VA Simulation Tools Cyber Security 3 Safety/Security Risk Approaches Discussion of PRA at NRC Presentation of an extensible risk informed decision support method Implications of security challenges for safety assessment tools DNDO risk models 4 Material Attractiveness NRC approach under development DOE support for NRC approach NGO thoughts on approach Industry thoughts UK comments on concept of dilution French presentation on security at civilian facilities 5 Likelihood of Event Surveys of possible approaches and options Discussions of how approaches might be used National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism approach 6 VA Simulation Tools ARES Corporation - AVERT Rhino Corp - Simajin Sandia modelling DTRA modelling PNNL tool to address physical and cyber attacks 7 Cyber Security Discussion of pros, cons and challenges of risk informing cyber security NRC regulatory program PNNL cyber risk model 8 Current Activities Risk Prioritization Initiative Risk Management Regulatory Framework Working Group Use of Simulation Modelling Material Attractiveness Cyber Security NUSAM 9 Risk Prioritization Initiative Attempt to prioritize plant projects informed by risk associated with safety, security, emergency preparedness, and radiation protection Industry Pilots conducted 10 Risk Management Regulatory Framework Working Group Addressing recommendations of RMRF Task Force First, focus on reactor safety Expand to other disciplines Include concept of defense in depth Look at beyond design basis accidents 11 Use of Simulation Modelling Industry initiative to incorporate vulnerability assessment modelling tools into regulatory process Industry pilot to model a number of NPPs NRC staff assessing process to determine requirements for use in regulatory process 12 Material Attractiveness Development of an approach to grade security based on the attractiveness of the nuclear material to the adversary Approach allows alternative measures to be applied for varying levels of dilution Will apply to fuel cycle facilities and RTRs 13 Los Alamos Model Logic model developed Four modules -Acquisition -Processing -Weaponization -Yield reduction Provides an estimate of likelihood 14 Cyber Security Reactor cyber security implemantation under way Highest consequence critical digital assets (CDAs) adressed using a consequence based approach to consider lesser requirements for CDAs with lower consequences 15 NUSAM IAEA Coordinated Research Project Develop guidance on the conduct of security assessments Case Studies -NPP -Irradiator Facility -Rad Material Transport -LEU Fuel Fabrication Facility -Spent Fuel Storage Facility 16 Upcoming Workshops INMM Reducing Risk Workshop INMM/ANS Workshop on Safety/Security Risk INMMWorkshop on VA Tools 17 INMM Reducing Risk Workshop March 2015 in Washington, DC Session on Cyber Security Focus on risk approaches that might apply to cyber security 18 ANS/INMM Workshop on Safety/Security Risk April 2015 in Sun Valley, Idaho Engage safety and security risk professionals in a discussion of risk applied to their discipline 19 INMM Workshop on VA Tools September 2015 in Boston Discussion of VA Tools Discussion of VV&A Discussion of modelling issues Discussion of data Demonstration by Vendors Discussion by users Panel Discussion 20 Questions ? 21 Risk Informing Spent Fuel Dry Storage Michel Call Division of Spent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Risk-Informing Effort Prompted by agency activities and stakeholder interactions Goal - framework to better enable risk-informed regulatory decisions Focus - initially on spent fuel dry storage Approach - 7 major steps Defense-in-Depth Public Workshop Definition and application in dry storage, one major step Held public workshop Jan 15, 2015 Well attended with good public and industry participation NRC and NEI presentations Defense-in-Depth Approaches NRC 3 layers (engineered, programmatic, and mitigating controls) 3 safety functions (sub-criticality, radiation exposure, radioactive materials release) 3 operations phases (loading/transfer, storage, unloading) NEI Barriers, controls, etc. to prevent, contain, mitigate exposure to radioactive materials Risk Informing in NMSS Michel Call Division of Spent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Risk-Informed Decisionmaking (RIDM) Guidance document developed by NMSS Risk Task Group Current Revision (Rev 1) from February 2008 (ML080720238) Response to SRM-SECY-99-0100 4 objectives of the RIDM document Commission Approval in SRM-SECY-04-0182 Quantitative Health Guidelines (QHGs) 6 Guidelines

Not endorsed by Commission policy statement Guidelines vs. Goals Public Worker Acute fatality -7/yr -6/yr Latent cancer fatality -6/yr or 4 mrem/yr -/yr or Serious injury -6/yr -6/yr Use of RIDM & QHGs QHGs are not widely known or incorporated into risk-informing applications NMSS programs Yucca Mountain - risk-informed regulation and guidance in place, pre-dates RIDM and QHGs Dry Spent Fuel Storage - consideration in effort to risk-inform dry storage Fuel Cycle - consideration/application in revised oversight program development Materials and Decommissioning - have made use of various concepts from RIDM Other NMSS Risk-Informing Efforts Variety of Activities past and present Current activities described on NRC's website Examples of Activities (past and present) NUREG-1556 Series - Guidance about Materials Licenses Part 61 rulemaking - Land disposal of radioactive waste Fuel Cycle - Integrated Safety Assessment, Part 70 Subpart H Yucca Mountain - Part 63, Performance Assessment Spent Fuel Transportation - Fire Studies