Finding | |
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| Title | LICENSEE-IDENTIFIED Violation |
| Description | Technical Specification 3.9.2, Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock requires immediately, with the refuel position one rod-out-interlock inoperable, that 1) control rod withdrawal be suspended, and 2) actions be initiated to fully insert all insert-able control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies. Contrary to this requirement, during control rod exercise testing on April 20, 2007, the reed switch which fed the one rod-out-interlock was inoperable for Control Rod 26-35 and immediate actions were not taken to suspend control rod withdrawal. Although unrecognized at the time by the operators - because the full core display position indication for Control Rod 26-35 did not change from green to amber in color, the one-rod-out interlock was not met and thus was inoperable. After completing testing for Control Rod 26-35 and while withdrawing the next control rod (26-31) in the test one notch (Position 02), the operators realized that the color change had not occurred for Control Rod 26-35. The operators immediately re-inserted Control Rod 26-31, stopped the test and notified management, and entered the issue into the corrective action program as CAP 01088836. This finding is of very low safety significance because at no time was more than one control rod withdrawn. |
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2007003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2007 (2007Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Winter S Orth S Thomas L Haeg R Lerch T Go J Tapp |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Monticello - IR 05000263/2007003 | |||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Monticello) @ 2007Q2
Self-Identified List (Monticello)
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