NRC Generic Letter 1984-01
- , 1-A --I.-..0 UNITED STATES iNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONWASHINGTON, D. C. 20555January 5, 1984TO ALL HOLDERS OF OPERATING LICENSES, APPLICANTS FOR OPERATING LICENSESAND HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCTION PERMITS FOR POWER REACTORSGentlemen:Subject: NRC Use of the Terms, "Important to Safety" and "Safety Related"(Generic Letter 84-01)As you may know, there has been concern expressed recently by the UtilityClassification Group over NRC use of the terms "important to safety" and"safety-related." The concern appears to be principally derived fromrecent licensing cases in which the meaning of the terms in regard to NRCquality assurance requirements. has been at issue, and from a memorandumfrom the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to NRR personneldated November 20, 1981.Enclosed for your information are two letters to the NRC from this Group,and the NRC response dated December 19,-1983. In particular, you shouldnote that the NRC reply makes it very clear that NRC regulatory jurisdictioninvolving a safety matter is not controlled by the use of terms such as"safety-related" and "important to safety," and our conclusion that pur-suant to our regulations, nuclear power plant permittees or licensees areresponsible for developing and implementing quality assurance programs forplant design and construction or for plant operation which meet the moregeneral requirements of General Design Criterion 1 for plant equipment"important to safety," and the more prescriptive requirements of Appendix Bto 10 CFR Part 50 for "safety-related" plant equipment.While previous staff licensing reviews were not specifically directed towardsdetermining whether, in fact, permittees or licensees have developed qualityassurance programs which adequately address all structures, systems and com-ponents important to safety, this was not because of any concern over thelack of regulatory requirements for this class of equipment. Rather, ourpractice was based upon the staff view that normal industry practice isgenerally acceptable for most equipment not covered by Appendix B withinthis class. Nevertheless, in specific situations in the past where we havefound that quality assurance requirements beyond normal industry practicewere needed for equipment "important to safety," we have not hesitated inimposing additional requirements commensurate with the importance to safetyof the equipment involved. We intend to continue that practice.8401050382
.I .z -;TICr F-2-The NRC staff is interested in your comments and views on whether furtherguidance is needed related to this issue. If you are interested in partici-pating in a meeting with NRC to discuss this subject, please contactMr. James M. Taylor, Deputy Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
Sincerely,(riginal signed byDarrell G. EisenhutDarrell G. Eisenhut, DirectorDivision of Licensing
Enclosure:
1. Two Letters from Utility SafetyClassification Group2. NRC Response dated December 19,1983DLMHungerb uhler:mcs12/3 /834; tL2/ 80E seItl 4/848HRDeon0if/ 5 8~VCC_ '6_-'e&a-liLI d-ap/
-,p 1UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONWASHINGTON, D. C. 20555January 5, 1984TO ALL HOLDERS OF OPERATING LICENSES, APPLICANTS FOR OPERATING LICENSESAND HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCTION PERMITS FOR POWER REACTORSGentlemen:Subject: NRC Use of the Terms, "Important to Safety" and "Safety Related"(Generic Letter 84-01)As you may know, there has been concern expressed recently by the UtilityClassification Group over NRC use of the terms "important to safety" and"safety-related." The concern appears to be principally derived fromrecent licensing cases in which the meaning of the terms in regard to NRCquality assurance requirements has been at issue, and from a memorandumfrom the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to NRR personneldated November 20, 1981.Enclosed for your information are two letters to the NRC from this Group,and the NRC response dated December 19, 1983. In particular, you shouldnote that the NRC reply makes it very clear that NRC regulatory jurisdictioninvolving a safety matter is not controlled by the use of terms such as"safety-related" and "important to safety," and our conclusion that pur-suant to our regulations, nuclear power plant permittees or licensees areresponsible for developing and implementing quality assurance programs forplant design and construction or for plant operation which meet the moregeneral requirements of General Design Criterion 1 for plant equipment"important to safety," and the more prescriptive requirements of Appendix Bto 10 CFR Part 50 for "safety-related" plant equipment.While previous staff licensing reviews were not specifically directed towardsdetermining whether, in fact, permittees or licensees have developed qualityassurance programs which adequately address all structures, systems and com-ponents important to safety, this was not because of any concern over thelack of regulatory requirements for this class of equipment. Rather, ourpractice was based upon the staff view that normal industry practice isgenerally acceptable for most equipment not covered by Appendix B withinthis class. Nevertheless, in specific situations in the past where we havefound that quality assurance requirements beyond normal industry practicewere needed for equipment "important to safety," we have not hesitated inimposing additional requirements commensurate with the importance to safetyof the equipment involved. We intend to continue that practice.(8401050382
-2-The NRC staff is interested in your comments and views on whether furtherguidance is needed related to this issue. If you are interested in partici-pating in a meeting with NRC to discuss this subject, please contactMr. James M. Taylor, Deputy Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
Sincerely,arel G. Een ut DrectorDivision of Ltcensing
Enclosure:
1. Two Letters from Utility SafetyClassification Group2. NRC Response dated December 19, 1983 HUNTON & WILLIAMS707 EAST MAIN STREET P. 0. BOX 1535* * & T SUILDING RICHMOXND, VI1GINIA 28212 1919 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.P. O. BOX 109 .P.O. BOX 9230RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA 27602 TELEPHON 804-788-8200 WASHINGTON, D.C. 2003691$- 628 -9371 202-223 -8650FIRST VIRGINIA BANK TOWERP. 0. BOX 3889 FILE NO.NORFOLK, VIRGINIA 23514ao4-82S-S501 August 26, 1983 DIRECT DIAL NO. 804 788-Mr. William J. DircksU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionMaryland National Bank Building7735 Old Georgetown RoadBethesda, Maryland 20814
Dear Mr. Dircks:
The Utility Safety Classification Group, a group repre-senting 30 electric utility owners of nuclear power plants,./seeks to bring to your attention an issue of major importanceand increasing prominence, namely that of certain definitionsused in systems classification. The regulatory terms "safetyrelated" and "important to safety" and the non-regulatory term"safety grade" have been consistently used synonymously by theindustry and the NRC over decades of plant design, construc-tion, licensing and operation.The Utility Group believes that various recent actionstaken within the NRC Staff signal a sharp departure from thei/ Members of the Utility Group are listed in Attachment A tothis letter. The Utility Group has retained the firm of KMC asits technical consultants and the law firm of Hunton & Williamsas its legal consultants.
HUNTON & WILLIAMSAugust 26, 1983Page 2long-standing meaning of the term "important to safety" tocover a much broader. and undefined set of plant structures,systems and components than is covered by the term "safety re-lated.' Redefining these terms without proper review wouldlikely have far-reaching, pervasive consequences for licensingand general regulation of nuclear plants. In particular, giventhe extensive use of the term "important to safety" in the Com-mission's regulations and Staff regulatory guides, NUREG docu-ments and other licensing documents, as well as licensee sub-mittals, the result of this sharp departure from the long-standing meaning of this term would be a largely unexamined andperhaps unintended expansion of the scope of the above docu-ments. The Utility Group believes it is vital that the Commis-sion be aware of this development so that steps can be taken toensure that if any changes to regulatory requirements and guid-ance are made, they are made only in a manner consistent withlegal requirements and after a thorough consideration of theirconsequences and ramifications. This process should includeconsideration by the Committee to Review Generic Requirements.Contrary to all this, the Utility Group understands that a ge-neric letter will soon be sent by the Director of the Office of HUNTON & WILLIAMSAugust 26, 1983Page 3Nuclear Reactor Regulation, requesting all licensees andapplicants to describe their current treatment of structures,systems and components "important to safety." Such a letterincorrectly assumes that "important to safety" is differentfrom "safety related."Since the introduction of these terms in the NRC's reg-ulations, nuclear plants have been designed and built by mem-bers of the nuclear industry, including the members of thisUtility Group and their contractors, using the terms "safetyrelated" and "important to safety" interchangeably.j/ Theterms "safety related" and "important to safety" are used inthe Commission's regulations.j/ Plants designed using this2/ A functional definition of these structures, systems andcomponents "important to safety" or "safety related" is foundin Part 100, Appendix A. They are those structures, systemsand components relied upon, in the event of a safe shutdownearthquake, to fulfill the three basic "safety functions" ofassuring (1) the integrity of the reactor coolant pressureboundary, (2) the capability to shut down the reactor and main-tain safe shutdown and (3) the capability to prevent or miti-gate the consequences of accidents which could result inoffsite exposure comparable to Part 100 exposure guidelines.10 CER Part 100, Appendix A, ¶¶ I, III(c).A/ To a lesser extent, the non-regulatory term "safety grade"is part of this issue. Safety grade is commonly regarded asbeing synonymous with "safety related" and "important to safe-ty." %
HUNTON & WILLIAMSAugust 26, 1983Page 4classification scheme were licensed by the NRC and, indeed, theNRC has recognized the equivalency of safety related and impor-tant to safety in many documents./The issue addressed by this letter is similar to, butdistinct from, that faced in the TMI-1 restart proceeding.There, the Union of Concerned Scientists, an intervenor, arguedthat certain components of TMI-1, previously classified asnon-safety related, should be upgraded in their design criteriato "safety grade" status. The arguments in that case, highlyfact-specific, were limited to the actual components at issue,were couched in terms of the non-regulatory term "safetygrade," and applied only to design requirements (as contrastedwith, e.g., QA requirements). Thus the decisions of the Li-censing Board (LBP-81-59, 14 NRC 1211 (1981)) and the AppealBoard (ALAB-729, May 26, 1983) in TMI-1, are not susceptible,upon close reading, of broader application to the "safety re-lated"/"important to safety" issue addressed by this letter.5/i/ See Attachment B to this letter for examples of instancesin which the NRC Staff has used these terms interchangeably.2/ The Appeal Board in the TMI decision, while upholding theStaff's distinction between the terms "safety grade" and "im-portant to safety," found the Staff's explanations "confusingand its attempt to define [those terms] somewhat belated."ALAB-729 at 137 (slip op.) n.288.
ItUNTON & WILLIAMSAugust 26, 1983Page 5Unfortunately, these decisions are being improperly cited with-in the Commission, in contexts different from TMI-1, to implyan enforceable regulatory distinction between the terms "safetyrelated" and "important to safety." Also, because the focus ofthe hearing in TMI-1 was so narrow, the record did not considerthe broader implications of an expanded definition of "impor-tant to safety,' nor did the record include facts establishingthe long-standing industry and NRC practice of equating 'impor-tant to safety" and "safety related."The present issue was framed by a November 20, 1981memorandum from NRR Director Harold Denton to all NRR person-nel, following the close of the TMI-1 record. This memorandum,which has never been circulated for public comment, argues thatthe category 'important to safety" is broader than "safety re-lated" (or "safety grade"). Significantly, the memorandum alsodisclaims any intent to alter existing regulatory requirements.Despite the disclaimer, revision of the definition of "impor-tant to safety" to make it a broader category than "safety re-lated" could have far-reaching, pervasive consequences for thelicensing and general regulation of these plants. The Dentondefinition of "important to safety" is plainly inconsistent HUNTON & WILLIAMSAugust 5, 1983Page 6with at least a decade of industry and regulatory usage, inrelianc on which dozens of plants have been designed, ordered,and bui t.In addition, a number of recent events have taken placeon the njustified assumption that the Denton distinction be-tween " afety related" and "important to safety" is correct.They in:lude, for example, the Staff's advocacy of the new, ex-panded meaning of the terms "safety related" and "important tosafety" in various licensing proceedings; proposal and promul-gation Of rules purporting to distinguish between "safety re-lated" nd "important to safety" equipment {e.g., ATWS, Envi-ronmentil Qualification); commissioning of various contractorstudies and issuance of various Staff documents premised on adistinction between the terms (eg., EG&G Draft Report on grad-ed QA). These are described in more detail in Attachment C tothis le-:ter. At the same time, numerous Staff documents, somemore re ent than the Denton memorandum, read fairly, presumethe cor inued vitality of the view that the terms "safety re-lated" nd "important to safety" are synonymous. Examples ofthese t ages are also described in Attachment B. Against thisbackgrc nd, the apparently impending issuance of a generic NRR HUNTON & WILLIAMSAugust 26, 1983Page 7letter requesting utilities to account for treatment of items"important to safety" can only exacerbate existing confusion.The impetus for the NRC Staff's efforts to expand thedefinition of "important to safety" seems to be a desire to ex-pand some measure of design and quality regulation beyond thetraditional scope of the NRC's regulatory authority. Whethersuch a desire is justified is not the direct focus of our let-ter. This Utility Group believes that a Staff redefinition ofa basic regulatory term such as "important to safety" in an in-ternal memorandum is not the appropriate means to accomplishthis goal. It is also important to note that while variationsexist in the details of practice, industry as a whole has gen-erally applied design and quality standards to non-safety re-lated structures, systems and components in a manner commensu-rate with the functions of such items in the overall operationof the plant. Moreover, we understand that numerous industryand professional groups, including AIF and ANS, are currentlyaddressing the issue of quality assurance and quality standardsfor the non-safety related set of structures, systems and com-ponents. This Group and other groups plan to work closely withthe NRC Staff to address the issue in a thoroughly andcarefully considered manner.
HUNTON & WILLIAMSAugust 26, 1983Page 8In light of all this, the Utility Group urges you andthe Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to delay indefinitelythe issuance of the proposed NRR generic letter and to pursueinstead a course of action on this issue which includes a con-sideration of the views and experience of industry on the ques-tion and the consequences of additional regulation before for-mally articulating any new definitions. In this way NRR canlearn in more detail whether such definitions will, in fact,impose new requirements rather than merely clarify existingones. Also, unforeseen and unintended consequences in theseand other areas of the regulations can be avoided and an ade-quate cost-benefit assessment can be made if the views of af-fected parties are obtained and considered in an orderlyfashion. Should the Staff decide nonetheless to issue the ge-neric letter, we request that this letter on behalf of theUtility Group and the attachments be enclosed with the genericletter and with any Board notifications that may be issued onthe subject.The number of ongoing activities potentially affectedby the definition of "important to safety" and the informal na-ture of the Denton Memorandum make it difficult to determine HUNTON & WILLIAMSAugust 26, 1983Page 9the appropriate procedural avenue to be pursued. Thedifferences in approaches reflected in Attachments B and C tothis letter may be the result of misinterpretation or misunder-standing that the Staff may be able to correct, as suggestedabove. On the other hand, if efforts to resolve this matter onthe Staff level fail, the most constructive way of advancingand clarifying thought on this important subject may be arulemaking proceeding. We would appreciate your prompt re-sponse so the Group can take the appropriate action.
Sincerelyyours,T. S. Ellis,.! III Do 1 .Donald P. Liwin ,Anthony F. Earley, Jr.Counsel for Utility SafetyClassification Group HUNTON & WILLIAMSAugust 26, 1983Page 10CC: Mr.Mr.Mr.Mr.GuyMr.Mr.Mr.Mr.Mr.Mr.Harold R. DentonRichard C. DeYoungRobert B. MinogueJohn G. DavisE. Cunningham, III,Victor Stello, Jr.Richard E. VollmerDarrell G. EisenhutThemis P. SpeisRoger J. MattsonHugh L. ThompsonEsq.
ATTACHMENT AMEMBERS OF THEUTILITY SAFETY CLASSIFICATION GROUPArkansas Power & Light Co.(representing also Mississippi Power &Light and Louisiana Power & Light)Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.Commonwealth Edison Co.Consumers Power Co.Detroit Edison Co.Florida Power Corp.Florida Power & Light Co.Illinois Power Co.Long Island Lighting Co.Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.Northeast UtilitiesNorthern States PowerPacific Gas & Electric Co.Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.Public Service Company of IndianaPublic Service Company of New Hampshire(representing also the Yankee Atomic ElectricPower Company)Public Service Electric & Gas Co.Rochester Gas & Electric Co.Southern California Edison Co.Sacramento Municipal Utility DistrictSNUPPS(representing Union Electric Co., Kansas Gas &Electric Co., Kansas City Power & Light Co.,and Kansas Electric Power Coop., Inc.)Toledo Edison Co.Wisconsin Electric Power Co.
ATTACHMENT BExamples of the Equivalent Usage of"Important to Safety" and "Safety Related"I. IntroductionSince the inception of its use, the term "important tosafety" has been consistently used synonymously with the term"safety related." The nuclear industry designed and built many-nuclear power plants based on the equivalency of these terms,and the NRC, in turn, reviewed and licensed these plants on thesame basis. This practice of equating "important to safety"and "safety related" has a sound basis in the NRC's regulations.and has been reflected in numerous NRC guidance documents. Thepurpose of this attachment is to describe examples of NRCregulations, regulatory guides, NUREGs and other guidancedocuments in which the terms "important to safety" and "safetyrelated" have been used inma way that evidences an intent toequate those terms. This list is not intended to becomprehensive; rather it includes only representative examplesof the synonymous usage of these two regulatory terms.
-2-II. NRC RegulationsA. Part 50, Appendix AAs proposed in 1967, Part 50's Appendix A did not usethe term "important to safety." See 32 Fed. Reg. 10,213(1967). In the version adopted in 1971, however, the termappeared in a number of places. The Federal Register noticeadopting Appendix A discussed the substantive changes betweenthe proposed and final rules. Significantly, this discussionof substantive changes did not mention the addition of the term"important to safety." This strongly suggests that thedrafters did not consider that the change in terminology madeany difference in scope or substance. See 36 Fed. Reg. 3256(1971). A comparison of the proposed and final rule revealsthat "important to safety" was merely substituted for a numberof similar terms referring to features that are now known as"safety related."The principal instance of this exchange of equivalentterms was the substitution of "structures, systems andcomponents important to safety" for "engineered safetyfeatures." "Engineered safety features," as defined inCriterion 37 of the proposed Appendix A, are those provided toassure the safety provided by the core design, the reactorcoolant pressure boundary and their protective systems. At aminimum, "engineered safety features" are designed to cope withall reactor coolant pressure boundary breaks up to and
-3-including the circumferential rupture of any pipe in thatboundary, assuming unobstructed discharge from both its ends.See 32 Fed. Reg. 10,216-17 (1967). In other words, "engineeredsafety feature" in the proposed Appendix A is essentiallysimilar to the current terminology of 10 CFR Part 100,particularly §§ 100.2(b) and 100.10(a) and (d), and it clearlyfalls within the ambit of "safety related" as that term isdefined in Appendix A to Part 100.Other examples exist of this substitution of "importantto safety" for "engineered safety features." Proposed GDC 3,which now applies to structures, systems and components"important to safety," specifically referred in an earlierversion to "critical" parts of the facility such as thecontainment and control room as "engineered safety features."See 32 Fed. Reg. 10,215. And GDC 4, which also now applies tostructures, systems and components "important to safety,"evolved from proposed versions of GDCs 40 and 42, which dealtwith "engineered safety features." See 32 Fed. Reg. 10,217(1967). By the same token, the current GDC 20 requires, inpart, that protection systems be designed to sense accidentconditions and to initiate the operation of systems andcomponents "important to safety." This portion of GDC 20evolved from an earlier, proposed version of GDC 15, whichrequired protection systems to sense accident situations and toinitiate the operation of necessary "engineered safetyfeatures." See 32 Fed. Reg. 10,216 (1967). Here again, there
-4-is an unmistakable equation of "important to safety" with"engineered safety features," a term that refers to safetyrelated features.The current GDC 44 requires a cooling water system totransfer heat from structures; systems and components"important to safety" to an ultimate heat sink. The coolingwater system requirements in GDC 44 evolved from proposed GDCs37, 38 and 39, which established the design basis of"engineered safety features" and stated the requirements forthem. See 36 Fed. Reg. 10,216-17 (1967). Thus, the coolingwater system referred to in GDC 44 is, in reality, the safetyrelated engineered safety feature necessary to support otherengineered safety features previously discussed in the proposedAppendix A.Yet another example is provided by existing GDC 16which requires a reactor containment and associated systems toassure that containment design conditions "important to safety"not be exceeded during postulated accident conditions.. ThisGDC evolved from GDC 10 of the proposed Appendix A, whichrequired the containment structure to sustain the initialeffects of gross equipment failures, such as a large coolantboundary break, without loss of required integrity and,together with other "engineered safety features," to retain foras long as necessary the capability to protect the public. See32 Fed. Reg. 10,215 (1967). In other words, the containmentdesign conditions in the proposed GDC dealt with loss of
-5-coolant accidents. Structures, systems and components neededto deal with a LOCA are, of course, safety related.A final example of the substitution of terms "importantto safety" for "engineered safety features" involves thecurrent version of GDC 17. It. requires offsite and onsiteelectric power systems for structures, systems and components"important to safety." This GDC evolved from proposed GDCs 24and 39, which required emergency power sources for protectionsystems and "engineered safety features." See 32 Fed. Reg.10,216-17 (1967).In addition to substituting items "important to safety"for "engineered safety features," the final version of AppendixA also used the term "important to safety" in place of otherphrases that fall within the safety related set. GDCs 1 and 2establish requirements for structures, systems and componentsimportant to safety. These criteria evolved from proposed GDCs1 and 5, and 2, respectively. Proposed GDCs 1 and 2 applied tosystems and components "essential to the prevention ofaccidents that could affect the public health and safety or tothe mitigation of their consequences." This language issimilar to that in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, which meanssafety related. Proposed GDC 5 applied to records foressential" components.Thus, this regulatory history of 10 CFR Part 50,Appendix A, demonstrates that "important to safety" wasinserted into Appendix A in lieu of a number of these terms to
-6-describe what are now known as "safety related" structures,systems and components, that the drafters believed there was nosignificant difference between "important to safety" and theterms used in the proposed version of the rule, and that thestructures, systems and components referred to in Appendix A,regardless of what they are called, perform those functions nowregarded as the safety related functions. Consequently, it isproper to conclude, and industry justifiably did conclude, that"important to safety" and "safety related" were equivalentterms.B. Part 50, Appendix BBoth the NRC Staff and industry agree that Appendix Bapplies only to safety related structures, systems andcomponents. This conclusion follows from the proposed andfinal versions of Appendix B which apply, by their terms, toactivities affecting the 'safety related" functions ofstructures, systems and components that prevent or mitigate theconsequences of an accident4/ 34 Fed. Reg. 6600 (1969); 35Fed. Reg. 10,499 (1970). Thus, unless a structure, system orcomponent has a safety related function, Appendix B does notapply to it. Appendix B also states that it applies to"structures, systems and components that prevent or mitigatei 'The prevention and mitigation of the consequences ofpostulated accidents, of course, are among the safety relatedfunctions of 10 CER Part 100, Appendix A.
-7-the consequences of postulated accidents that could cause unduerisk.to the health and safety of the public.." 10 CFR Part 50,Appendix B, Introduction. This definition of the scope ofAppendix B is essentially identical to the definition of"important to safety" found in the Introduction to Appendix A.Other evidence of the equality of "safety related" and'important to safety" is also found in the proposed Appendix Brulemaking. The notice of.proposed rulemaking stated that itsquality assurance criteria would supplement GDC 1 of proposedAppendix A, previously noticed in the Federal Register in 1967.34 Fed. Reg. 6600 (1969). It appears from this statement thatAppendix B was meant to specify, in detail, what the generalprovisions of GDC 1 meant. This interpretation is supported bythe fact that Appendix B was intended to "assist applicants (1)to comply with Section 50.34(a)(7) ..... Section50.34(a)(7) states that Appendix B "sets forth the requirementsfor quality assurance programs" (emphasis added), andpresumably "the requirements for quality assurance programs"include those of GDC 1. Thus, a reading of the regulatoryhistory implies that Appendix B is a more detailedspecification of the requirements contained in GDC 1, therebyequating "important to safety" with "safety related."C. Part 100, Appendix AThe interchangeability of the terms "safety related"and "important to safety" is vividly illustrated by a review of
-8-the regulatory history of 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, whichwas proposed on November 25, 1971. 36 Fed. Reg. 22,601. Theproposed rule included a number of passages that makeabsolutely clear (1) the category "important to safety" in 1971meant "safety related" and (2) the terms are to be usedinterchangeably. For example, in defining the "Safe ShutdownEarthquake," the proposed rule stated:(c) The "Safe Shutdown Earthquake" is thatearthquake which produces the vibratoryground motion for which structures, systemsand components important to safety aredesigned to remain functional.These structures, systems and components arethose necessary to assure:(1) The integrity of the reactor coolantpressure boundary,(2) The capability to shut down the reactorand maintain it in a safe shutdowncondition, or(3) The capability to prevent or mitigatethe consequences of accidents whichcould result in potential offsiteexposures comparable to the guidelineexposures of 10 CFR Part 100.36 Fed. Reg. 22,602 (1971) (emphasis added); see also id. at22,604. This definition of the "safety related" functions isthe same as that in the final (and current) version of therule, which is recognized as providing the basic definition ofthe "safety related" functions. See 38 Fed. Reg. 31,281(1973); 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, III(c).Although the reference in paragraph (c) of the proposedrule to "structures, systems and components important to
-9-safety" was changed in the final version to refer to "certainstructures, systems and components," there was no indication inthe Commission's discussion of changes between the proposed andfinal rules to indicate that this substitution represented achange in scope. See 38 Fed. Reg. 31,279 (1973). In fact, thefinal rule added a reference in its purpose section to GDC 2,which applies to structures, systems and components "importantto safety," thereby once again equating "safety related" and"important to safety."In addition to defining "important to safety" in termsof the "safety related" definition, the proposed version of 10CFR Part 100, Appendix A, used the terms "safety related" and"important to safety" interchangeably.Section VI(a) of theproposed rule reiterated the definition of structures, systemsand components important to safety quoted above and went on tosay "[i]n addition to seismic loads, ...loads shall be takeninto account in the design of these safety related structures,systems and components." 36 Fed. Reg. 22,604 (1971) (emphasisadded). Several other references to "these safety relatedstructures, systems and components" appeared within theparagraph dealing with equipment "important to safety." Id.Thus, the language in the proposed version of Part 100,Appendix A, made it abundantly clear that the terms "importantto safety" and "safety related" were interchangeable andequivalent.
-10-D. 10 CER, Part 72Part 72 of 10 CFR, adopted in November 1980, providesanother example of the equation of "important to safety" and"safety related." This regulation states, in part, thatapplications for a license for an Independent Spent FuelStorage Installation (ISESI) shall describe the qualityassurance program for the ISFSI: "The description of thequality assurance program shall identify structures, systems,and components important to safety and shall show how thecriteria in Appendix B to Part 50 of this chapter will beapplied to those safety related components, systems andstructures in a manner consistent with their importance tosafety." 10 CFR § 72.15(a)(14) (emphasis added). Although notdirectly related to nuclear power plants, the language of thisNRC regulation uses "important to safety" and "safety related"interchangeably.E. 10 CFR § 50.54As recently as January 1983, the Commission'sregulations have treated "important to safety" and "safetyrelated" as equivalent. On January 10, 1983, the Commissionamended 10 CER § 50.54 providing that "the NRC Staff conductsextensive reviews during the licensing process to ensure thatthe applicant's QA program description satisfies 10 CFR Part50, Appendix B. Once the NRC has accepted it, the QA
-11-program description becomes a principal inspection andenforcement tool in ensuring that the permit holder or licenseeis in compliance with all NRC quality assurance requirementsfor protecting the public health and safety." 48 Fed. Reg.1826 (1983) (emphasis added). In other words, implementationof a quality assurance program satisfying Appendix Bconstitutes compliance with all NRC quality assurancerequirements, including, necessarily, GDC 1. Again, as notedabove, Appendix B indisputably applies only to safety relatedstructures, systems and components. Thus, this January 1983regulation equates the scope of "safety related" in Appendix Bwith "important to safety" in GDC 1.F. 10 CER, Part 21Part 21 of 10 CFR uses the term important to safety ina very limited way but even that limited use demonstrates theequivalence of the terms safety related and important tosafety. Section 21.3(a)(3) notes that a "'basic component'includes design, inspection, testing, or consulting servicesimportant to safety ...." In discussing this portion of theregulation, the supplementary information published in theFederal Register with the regulation states that Part 21 covers"responsible officers of firms and organizations supplyingsafety related components, including safety related design,testing, inspection and consulting services." 42 Fed. Reg.28,892 (1977). Thus, this description evidently assumes that
-12-the use of the term important to safety in conjunction withdesign, testing, inspection and consulting services in §21.3(a)(3) is meant to be synonymous with safety related.This interpretation is confirmed in NUREG-0302,Revision 1, which provides information concerning variousaspects of 10 CFR Part 21. In explaining references toimportant to safety in Part 21,. the NUREG states in questionand answer form:§21.3 states -- In all cases "basiccomponent" includes design, inspection,testing, or consulting services"important to safety...". Clarify themeaning of this statement.Response:The broad scope of Section 206activities of construction, operation,owning and supplying in themselvesinclude activities such as design,consultation or inspection that areimportant to safety and are associatedwith component hardware ....Anorganization may accomplish all ofthese activities in-house or may chooseto authorize others to do some of thesafety-related activities; e.g.,consultation, design, inspection ortests, for it. When such contractualarrangements are made forsafety-related services theorganization accomplishing the serviceis within the scope of Part 21.NUREG-0302, Rev. 1, at 21.3(a)-5 (emphasis added). Inaddition, the NUREG expressly states that it applies only tosafety related structures, systems and components:
-13-Does Part 21 apply to only "safetyrelated" items?Response:Yes. Part 21 applies to any defectsand noncompliance which could create asubstantial safety hazard in activitiesthat are within the regulatoryauthority of the Nuclear RegulatoryCommission; therefore only those itemswhich are "safety related" are withinthe scope of Part 21.NUREG-0302, Rev. 1, at 21.3(a)-i to -2. Thus, this NUREGconfirms that in Part 21 "important to safety" and "safetyrelated" are equivalent. Importantly, it also confirms that,in general, the NRC's regulatory authority is limited to safetyrelated items. This is consistent with the long-standingindustry and NRC interpretation that important to safety meanssafety related wherever the term appears in the NRC'sregulations.III. Regulatory GuidesA. Regulatory Guide 1.105Regulatory Guide 1.105, "Instrument Setpoints"(Revision 1, November 1976), provides an unmistakably clearindication that the NRC Staff considered important to safetyand safety related to be equivalent. In this regulatory guide,systems important to safety" are defined as:those systems that are necessary to ensure(1) the integrity of the reactor coolantpressure boundary, (2) the capability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safecondition, or (3) the capability to prevent
-14-or mitigate the consequences of accidentsthat could result in potential offsiteexposures comparable to the guidelineexposures of 10 CFR Part 100, "Reactor SiteCriteria."Regulatory Guide 1.105, Rev. 1, at 1.105-2. Of course, this isprecisely the definition of safety related structures, systemsand components that appears in Appendix A to Part 100. Indeed,it is the definition of safety related that was endorsed by Mr.Denton in his November, 1981, memorandum on the subject ofsafety classification.A proposed Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.105, whichwas issued for comment in December, 1981, reiterates the NRC'sintention to equate safety related and important to safety.This revision to the regulatory guide would endorse a documentprepared by the Nuclear Power Plant Standards Committee of theInstrument Society of America (ISA) subject to severalclarifications. One of the clarifications states:The term "safety-related instruments" is usedthroughout the ISA Standard. This term shallbe understood to mean "instruments in systemsimportant to safety." The term "systemsimportant to safety" is defined in theIntroduction of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50as " ...systems ...that providereasonable assurance that the facility can beoperated without undue risk to the health andsafety of the public."Proposed Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.105, at 2. Onceagain, the language of this regulatory guide expressly equatessafety related with important to safety.
-15-Regulatory Guide 1.118Regulatory Guide 1.118, "Periodic Testing of ElectricPower and Protection Systems" (Revision 2, June 1978), alsoexplicitly equates important to safety and safety related.This regulatory guide adopts the definition of important tosafety set out in Regulatory Guide 1.105, Revision 1,. which, asnoted above, makes it clear that the terms are equivalent.Regulatory Guide 1.106Regulatory Guide 1.106, "Thermal Overload Protectionfor Electric Motors on Motor-Operated Valves" (Revision 1,March 1977), describes a fmethod acceptable to the NRC Staff forcomplying with certain regulatory requirements, including GDCs1 and 4, with regard to the application of thermal overloaddevices for electric motors on motor operated valves. BothGDCs 1 and 4 apply to structures, system and components"important to safety." This regulatory guide, however, dealsexplicitly and exclusively with safety related motor operatedvalves to "ensure that the thermal overload protection deviceswill not needlessly prevent the motor from performing itssafety related function." Thus, the clear implication of thisregulatory guide is that components important to safety underGDCs 1 and 4 are those components (in this case motor operatedvalves) which have been classified as safety related.
-16-Regulatory Guide 1.151Regulatory Guide 1.151, "Instrument Sensing Lines"(July 1983), states in the introduction of the regulatoryguide:Section 50.34, "Contents of Applications;Technical Information," of 10 CFR Part 50.requires, in part, that design criteria beestablished for structures, systems andcomponents important to safety that willprovide reasonable assurance that thefacility can be operated without undue riskto the health and safety of the public.Criterion 1 ...requires, in part, thatstructures, systems, and components beerected (installed) to quality standardscommensurate with the importance of thesafety functions to be performed.Regulatory Guide 1.151, at 1. After stating the pertinentregulatory requirements, the regulatory guide describes"a method acceptable to the NRC staff forcomplying with the Commission's regulationswith regard to the design and installation ofsafety-related instrument sensing lines innuclear power plants."Id. (emphasis added). Here again, therefore, the NRC hasexplicitly equated the terms. Significantly, the regulatoryguide also addresses only two classes of instrument sensinglines: "safety related" and "non-safety related."Consequently, the clear implication of this regulatory guide isthat only two classifications of equipment are used in thedesign of nuclear power plants and that by meeting certainstandards for safety related equipment, regulations which dealwith equipment important to safety are also met. This latter
-17-point implies the equivalence of important to safety and safetyrelated equipment.IV. NUREGsA. Safety Evaluation ReportsSafety Evaluation Reports for plants that have appliedfor construction permits or operating licenses are published asNUREG documents. In these NUREGs, the Staff routinely includesa number of statements equating safety related and important tosafety. Rather than focusing on specific plants and specificSERs, this section quotes from various SERs which are typicalof SERs published by the Staff.In discussing General Design Criterion 2 involvingseismic design requirements, the Staff typically states in SERsthat this GDCrequires that nuclear power plant structures,systems and components important to safety bedesigned to withstand the effects ofearthquakes without loss of capability toperform their safety function. These plantfeatures are those necessary to assure (1)the integrity of the reactor coolant pressureboundary, (2) the capability to shutdown thereactor and maintain it in a safe shutdowncondition, or (3) capability to prevent ormitigate the consequences of accidents whichcould result in the potential offsiteexposures comparable to 10 CFR 100 guidelineexposures.Of course, the plant features defined above are those coveredin Appendix A of Part 100, which are the safety related set ofstructures, systems and components. Moreover, if appropriate,
-18-the NRC Staff will conclude that a plant has been designed incompliance with Criterion 2 because classification ofstructures, systems and components conforms with guidancecontained in Regulatory Guide 1.29, "Seismic DesignClassification." This regulatory guide. is recognized byindustry and NRC as dealing with safety related structures,systems and components.Another example from an SER deals with turbinemissiles. One SER notes that "General Design Criterion 4requires that a nuclear power plant be designed againstinternally and externally generated missiles to assure no lossof function or damage to safety-related equipment essential fora safe plant shutdown." General Design Criterion 4, of course,applies to "structures, systems, and components important tosafety ....Consequently, this NRC statement in a SER mustbe interpreted as explicit recognition of the equality of thesetwo terms. Other SERs invite the same conclusion by discussingonly the protection given to safety related structures whenassessing whether the plant is protected from turbine missilesas required by GDC 4.B. NUREG-0302, Revision 1NUREG-0302, Revision 1, which deals with 10 CFR Part21, is discussed in Section II.F above.
-19-C. NUREG-0968NUREG-0968 is the Safety Evaluation Report for theClinch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR). In discussing seismicdesign requirements for CRBR, the Staff states:CRBR Principal Design Criterion (PDC)2, in part, requires that structures,systems, and components important tosafety be designed to withstand theeffects of earthquakes without loss ofcapability to perform their safetyfunctions. The earthquake for whichthese plant features will be designedis defined as the safe shutdownearthquake (SSE) in 10 CFR 100,Appendix A. The SSE is based upon anevaluation of the maximum earthquakepotential and is that earthquake whichproduces the maximum vibratory groundmotion for which structures, systems,and components important to safety aredesigned to remain functional.NUREG-0968, at 3-34 (emphasis added). As already noted, theset of features designed to remain functional in the event ofthe safe shutdown earthquake are the safety related set ofstructures, systems and components, as defined in 10 CER Part100, Appendix A.V. Other NRC Licensing DocumentsA. I&E Information Notice 83-41 (June 22, 1983)This I&E Information Notice is entitled "Actuation ofFire Suppression System Causing Inoperability of Safety-RelatedEquipment" (emphasis added). The stated purpose of this noticeis to "alert licensees to some recent experiences in which
-20-actuation of fire suppression systems caused damage to orinoperability.of systems important to safety" (emphasisadded.). Thus, as recently as June of this year, official NRCdocuments have used the terms important to safety and safetyrelated interchangeably.VI. Miscellaneous Industry DocumentsA. Institute of Electrical andElectronics Engineers (IEEE)A number of industry groups have become aware of theinconsistent use of the term important to safety in some recentNRC documents, including the Denton memorandum. In response tothese developments, the Nuclear Power Engineering Committee ofIEEE wrote a letter to Mr. Robert B. Minogue, Director of theOffice of Nuclear Regulatory Research, in May, 1982, making itclear that expansion of the scope of important to safety iscontrary to the long-standing interpretation of NRC-regulationsby both nuclear industry and the NRC Staff. The letter statesthat[O]ver the years, the terminology of theGeneral Design Criteria of Appendix A of 10CFR Part 50 has been understood throughcommon usage to equate systems important tosafety to safety related or safety systems.Repeated references within the General DesignCriteria to preservation of the safetyfunction being performed by "structures,systems, and components important to safety"enforces this equivalence of terms.Letter from R.E. Allen to Robert B. Minogue, dated May 10, 1982
-21-(attached), at 2. This letter also indicated that the NuclearPower Engineering Committee of IEEE opposed the expansion ofthe term important to safety.B. American National Standards InstituteThe Nuclear Standards Board (of the American NationalStandards Institute) Ad Hoc Committee on "Important to Safety"has made a recommendation to the full Nuclear Standards Boardof ANSI which is pertinent to the definition of important tosafety. The Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation follows:The current practice utilizing twomajor classifications, safety relatedand nonsafety related, for design,-construction, testing and operation ofnuclear power plants is acceptable andappropriate. This has occurred with ageneral understanding and usage thatthe terms "Important to Safety" and"Safety Related" are equivalent inmeaning. The current practice hasrecognized that within the nonsafetyrelated set, there are varying degreesof importance to safe and reliableoperation. For many or most items ofthis nature, standards have beenpromulgated to guide design,construction, testing and operation.Even so, the NRC may determine there isa need, for licensing purposes, toidentify a category of items, althoughnonsafety related, [that] are of moreimportance to the safe and reliableoperation of the plant than othernonsafety related items. If so, theterm "Important to Safety" should notbe used to designate this set of itemsbecause of the past history ofequivalence to the term "SafetyRelated". To apply the term,"Important to Safety" across the bodyof regulations to a new set of items
-22-would cause the term to become unclearas to the meaning of all currentregulation and licensing commitmentsthat stem therefrom.If this set of items is defined, itshould be on a functional basis (e.g.,ANS-51.1 and ANS-52.1). Requirementsin existing standards for suchfunctions, that are unique to specificfunctions, should be used.Letter from Walter E. D'Ardenne to George L. Wessman, datedMarch 30, 1983 (attached) (emphasis added). Thisrecommendation gives yet another unmistakable .indication thatthe nuclear industry has equated the terms important to safetyand safety related.
(as AMERICAN NUCLEAR S.OCIETYSTANDARDS COMMITTEEi, on £mdsm At usLbGMaP Par-t. Jtcia USATmuisu JIZ/3324liiSW= sw3n2March 30, 1983George L. Wessman "Chairman ANSI Nuclear Standards BoardTorrey Pines TechnologyP. 0. Box 81608San Diego, CA 92138
Dear George:
The Nuclear Standards Board Ad hoc Committee on uImportant toSafety" met on Tuesday 3/29/83 at ANSI Headquarters in New York,City. The objective of the meeting was to recommend to NSB anapproach on important to Safety" that all standards writingorganizations could follow. *That recommended approach isattached and represents unanimous agreement of those attendingthe Ad hoc Committee Meeting. Also attached is the list ofattendees at the meeting.
Sincerely,Walter H. D'Ardenne, ChairmanAd hoc Committee on Important to SafetyWHD:pab:cal/J03304Attachmentcc: G. F. Dawe, Jr.D. A. CampbellE. F. DowlingJ. LingJ. MilimanB. M. RiceR. E. AllenJ. F. CooperR. A. SzalayC. T. Zegers AD HOC COMMITTEE ON IMPORTANT TO SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONThe current practice utilizing two major classifications, safety relatedand nonsafety related for design, construction, testing and operation ofnuclear power plants Is acceptable and appropriate. This has occurredwith a general understanding and usage that the terms "Important toSafety" and 'Safety Related' are equivalent in meaning. The currentpractice has recognized that within the nonsafety related set, there arevarying degrees of importance to safe and reliable operation. For manyor most items of this nature, standards have been promulgated to guidedesign, construction, testing and operation.Even so, the NRC may determine there ts a need, for licensing purposes,to identify a category of items, although nonsafety related, are of moreimportance to the safe and reliable operation of the plant than other*nonsafety related items. If so, the term uImportant to Safetyu shouldnot be used to designate this set of items because of the past history ofequivalence to the term "Safety Related". To apply the term, .Importantto Safety" across the body of regulations to a new set of items wouldcause the term to become unclear as to the meaning of all current regulationand licensing commitments that stem therefrom.If this set of items is defined, it should be on a functional basis(e.g., ANS-51.1 and ANS-52. ). Requirements in existing standards forsuch functions, that are unique to specific functions, should be used.WHO: Dab: ca /lmn;- 1 4a()NAMEWalter H. D'ArdenneGeorge F. Dawe, Jr.Donald A. CampbellEdward F. DowlingJune LingJohn NillanBill M. RiceGeorge L. WessmanATTENDANCE LISTORGANIZATIONANSStoneANS-IEEEASHEASKEIEEEANSI& Webster Engineering Corp.WHO: pab/J03.305-211MA!0.2
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- uaftgi,8& q154t put WV"5C.4, ^"Jr.W Pm~0. *. ;t*Cua..qea Esi~c. MIUsilf Co.P k.C~. 4a u9 m ti* SN Cmatdowtamj&ta*e Cvii Ptsaw* P.D. IliasalqC4vmtm mcSCt':.. ".*Mt& 1-*ftigh & ComaeP raCiW.Lk* LkamW&UM3E.t,%* *%#&;C, Cg'.agAWAO'U?59a-w"i. Pla ;we. PFEg 1I*Q:1i o es*a9oSC4. S A&I. v. waftscS. low. YemSOMAMI *,J0C-15W.. Robert 5. KOffiva *f ,*u DaiRlatory RsarrbU.S. lcu a,ftar Mr. U :&-jft: Tase of eh. Tok Uj=ft rt;t tos fete21) ftoposed ftwiuum I rz FASMUaxcy'Guie 1.89w ftVirMeta1 Qualui..Cation at E1etric Equipment forg Power nants, FebcL=* a IL2) Proapoutd 5dv1so 2 t toelawrya~de 1.105. XTatVrt etpolatm1Decir, 1961.3) Draft Reglevtoty Ceie (Task tV 26-5),Instr=a= ImnSi line, Kareho 132.4 r fan U ld L Deatm toAll N Ferueel. Standard Defirtidfm CGzm=1y-Tad Safety ClassifttirnTerm., November 10, 18.) , tPpe we (4?FR=U,1/20182) 1vfcaenta1 alulifleat~mof Electric Equtpumt for Nuceartfer Plants.A wmdber of %went JEC doctmats kaft used the tampa to safety' to destribia the scope of etesand Vipmut to vbich the dctattt spplhs. fttableexsxples me the proposea Revision I of Regatory Gldde1.*8 ( terence 1)* the prposed Revislot 2 of lxeulaatryCaide 1.105 (Referene 2), and tke drat lte5datary CaldeOn Instruaent s5ssig Unes (T"k IC t1265) (Refere 3.
VA' .'Ibert S. lmiaage. biractot 4-~ way lot 196u.S.. VW-le=a bgulatoty comisrLon 612-C'O15Amforeste IA made to 10Cfl Part SO t the ao'wce of the termInalogy.* *O-Gr the years:* the tenmiuo"oyf the& GAenerd Souin Crdtarla of* Appsudlz A of tOCMl Part SO bea bena eaderstood through c~oam usaile to.eqivta systess laportant to wlfety to safety-'kmlated cm wafaty -systems.'The rqapaaco references witbin the Ckenral Destgn Criteria to proservation-of the safety, function being perforwid by KstazIzs.*r sywte=. andonupocents *npzaut to safety" 1siuforce this k~iaec of tonas.TMe current Mu Is~enti~n In teI MM8 Of the terM "AWOtAit to dafety0appears to be to frcada~n Cheatpaoef ejuIpuenzaddressed to Incude sorethan safety-related or safety syste=. In an linta~s1 NBC cmmraZAiM(Weereeze 4) Macald Denton dcfened Ugafetyu-celatgdd an a ube of'imapntimt to safmety S roadeuing tht usage of tbe term "important -toMiafezy" cc 4icompaaix an undefined aet of as:yst, xinadAitfnn to safety-relAted or aafety systma, icraasev caufasion to the dislzgue on current* 2~R= raquiremmme/lgotdance tad creates to wumwrkable situation. A clearuaderscaszin up of the prfecip1~.s for detemizing tihat Is included tad whatLi not tu'e1ud4 to Wayntema Ispartaist tit ufetf 13 uoim'd. 1eir example.,VAWu~azory Coutd* e.IO5, Tinstrumaes SttpulaLs, recs~e6 L'ehb the substitutionsytm b ortaxt to safety" fo 'ul -aeyritd~ TLLs*ubl)tlou of terms adds an unauzimm siater of systems to the set of* sysanas required to omat the draft MS standard.The IMFI through a-Nuclear Power EngInertug Camaittee MNEC) workinggrouip an standardis projeet P827. Ix atroapring to develop a setbdo4logy for Iass igning desIgn criteria based an a s.)'tem' u level of wLa~ocnce to safety.Altbmmh considerable progress ha beei umade an tCe sibJect In the lost YeAT* ~and a half,* the methodology bas mot bme developed to the -poin of WUineastily understood and usable. Unfortumately, the ew~2exitY Of the subJectprevents the methodology, as currently d.'telopeA, -from lbeing UnifoimlyinterpretrM and applied by individual users. &ork Is continuing cm our-vowEing -this, deficiencys -so that application msy be e6nsistent fz= user t*user and. enfarcaet. may be mtinfufrom f. aplicat ion to applcaticn. ThedifftIcuty in producing this acth~oologry underacor-es the seed for careful* choice of ter-ainoloty so that a baste is established to Prou~t* bmuntrnderstwndlag sAv~ not Co Introduce aildttlimul confusion.Unitil the P821 ewthoilology hasu passed through che I=E review (consenLRUA)process and the term "zst~z imortant to VafetY" has a c0M=lY understoodMelivg it to recovendc that. the M~C refrain fron using this te= virttwut£also includ~ing a clear definition of which systems are addressed. Thits tsexacrly wtat was done In the developumet df the Mub OR equfiP'met 'qualificatior*(aoference 5). Alternztively, co=u3ul u7Ynderstood ter=,, such as safety-relate,and terms defitwd Ln voluntary standards, sisch as safety "ytfts. Should be4=ployed. If it appears necessary to address systems beyond the scope of thesetorms, thou the-additianal. systems should be Clearly ideatfiled.It 'is re==4nded that the term 'nuclear..safety-relacedJ" be retained Inthe proposad Revision 2 to gegulatory Culate 1.105 .nd the proposed RegulatoryGaide an Iastruzrent Sensing LUna (Task IC 126-4) and that rhe term "ImporrcAmt-to safety" not be us*4 In these docmicatti.
-3-c. Preliminary versions of a final ATWS rule havecontained supplementary information discussing theclassification of ATWS related equipment. Some ATWS preventionand mitigation equipment will not be required to be "safetyrelated,' but must be classified "important to safety."I/Given the nuclear industry's and the NRC's synonymous use ofthese terms, the rule has the potential to create substantialconfusion. Utilities do not have a separate classificationcategory of important to safety, nor are there any NRCspecified standards to be applied to such a category (if thatcategory is assumed to be different from the safety relatedcategory). As with the Environmental Qualification rule, thisuse of the term important to safety was not included in any ofthe proposed versions of the rule. Thus, the implications ofchanging the NRC's classification scheme have not been fullyaired in the rulemaking.d. In the still-pending Shoreham case, docket 50-322(OL), the Staff supported the argument of intervenors on thesystems classification terminology. Although the Staffsupported the acceptability of the Shoreham design, the Staffposition on terminology was used by the intervenors to calli/ See Enclosure A to SECY-83-293 dated July 19, 1983. Atable entitled "Guidance Regarding System and EquipmentSpecifications" indicates that certain equipment need not besafety related, but a footnote to the table states that "thisequipment is in the broader class of structures, systems andcomponents important to safety ...
-4-into question over a decade of design of the Shoreham plant.This licensing case triggered a Differing Professional Opinion(DPO) by James E. Conran, a Staff witness at both Shoreham andTMI-1. The issue of "important to safety" has been raised byintervenors in other cases, including Diablo Canyon, Byron andSeabrook.e. Mr. Conran's DPO has recently been resolved(William T. Russell memorandum to Harold R. Denton, June 22,1983; Harold R. Denton memorandum to Themis P. Speis, July 11,1982) on a basis which includes proposals for a generic letterrelative to the "important to safety" concept. Mr. Russell'smemorandum twice stresses the presumption that use of the term"important to safety" should impose no new regulatoryrequirements. Whether that is, or can be, true, depends on thecontent of the generic letter which presumably will be issuedin the near future. If that letter endorses a definition of"important to safety" that is inconsistent with its historicalequivalency to "safety related," then, contrary to theresolution of the Conran DPO and the Denton Memorandum, therewill be new regulatory requirements imposed on all nuclearpower plants.f. The expanded definition of important to safety alsoappears in generic letter 83-28, issued as a result of theSalem incident. According to section 2.2.1.6, licensees andapplicants must provide the NRC Staff with certain information
- -5-regarding this category of equipment that is supposedly larger'than the safety related set. As already noted, utilites do nothave, nor do the NRC's regulations require, such an expandedcategory. Similarly, statements in NUREG-1000, which alsorelate to the Salem incident, incorrectly assume that importantto safety is a broader category than safety related.
IA S,.-&r. ftberr t. ogue, DrecwtorV.S. Nuclear Zsjulatory CwIistmIt is ao reco.awmded that tufet" replaced by "Class It elgraph of the introduction to the pi.4.may io, 1982,.82.C015le t laz+/-?1c equiment Imprmat toactric equlvettt" L the second pra-oposeA Revision I to aMSaUltory Guide 1.89.As an alternatbrae to thse two reae oadtifes, it Ls recGUI-ded thatthe general tex2= e replaced wtth a eci£fie tabulation of the tyiteaat* euipuelnt to uhich the reguatory guide is applkablo.4Wttr treatment should be =acoidd other 1UC regulatory decuwent*a the future, or until tme PA2? aethoolav Trches cOvneRns= In theVj~Clir -poer -commty.Vy vruy schairman. N7ICze: Paul 1. ShemmonMtmnn, Advis ry Cotbitee an Reactor Saftguards..Warld SL Ukeu, Diretor.Office of 2itdwar Reactor RegulaScloaEdu-ard C. Venzinger, ChiefInsru~entar5:on *d Control 'BranchOffice of Iuclear Reactor ReoulartonP0Letter Me ATTACHMENT CNumerous recent events have taken place on theunjustified assumption that the Staff/Denton distinctionbetween "safety related' and "important to safety" is correct.In light of the numerous examples cited in Attachment B,however, these actions ignore the historical evaluation of theterms and the long-standing interpretation and application ofthe NRC's regulations:a. The Commission approved a final rule on environ-mental qualification of electric components in January of thisyear. 48 Fed. Reg. 2729 (January 21, 1983). The rule, by itsterms, is applicable to electric equipment "important tosafety." That term includes safety related equipmentperforming the three safety functions defined in Part 100,Appendix A. (10 CFR § 50.49(b)(1)). It also includes,however,nonsafety-related electric equipment whosefailures under postulated environmentalconditions could prevent satisfactoryaccomplishment of safety functions specificedin [Part 100, Appendix A] by thesafety-related equipment.10 CFR § 50.49(b)(2). The important but subtle addition of theterm important to safety in defining the scope of the rule andthe addition of §§ (b)(2) and (3) were made in the last draftof the regulations, after the close of the public comment
, I-2-period. It is interesting to note that the scope of the rulecould have been defined as electric equipment within the threecategories listed in the rule ((b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3))without calling that equipment important to safety. Thus, thislast minute addition to the rule contravenes the historical useof the term important to safety without adding anything ofsubstance to the rule. The principal result of its use in theenvironmental qualification context is that it createssubstantial confusion about the meaning of the term.b. The Staff commissioned the Idaho NationalEngineering Laboratory to undertake a study of potential"graded QA" requirements reaching substantially beyond thescope of Part 50, Appendix B, and involving equipment importantto safety. Identification and Ranking of Nuclear Power PlantStructures, Systems and Components, and Graded QualityAssurance Guidelines -- Draft (November, 1982) (EG&G-EA-6109).This report received widespread criticism and has not beenissued in final form. The widespread criticism reflects thedifficulties utilities and the NRC Staff will encounter intrying to redefine the class of structures, systems andcomponents important to safety, if that term is ultimatelygiven a broader meaning than safety related. Significantly,the EG&G effort only addresses quality assurance requirements;the difficulties will be multipled if any new classificationscheme considers, as it must, the impact on plants for each ofthe many places in the regulations where the term appears.
I II} AZ TOx & WILL I AS :707 ass e.&-W SutCCT P. 0. Box 1"35R'-CxNoxDVjiR0Xzi'LA 23212 Gus.&w-ae...vCr w.* @ P.' .0SbC*9 mS. e 0)$?go.~~&0e~3t0 TELCPO940" 50' 75*SI CO os8aa0eS* * -* *w~D* 53,6a as¢ens v*Csrn ,,C* o@@ *vc*.'wou Ca-* tg.3 ,.C we.pa*. on abox D*@t *. S*S S* Ce" dOctober 27, 1983mr. Samuel J. ChilkSecretary -U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, D.C. 20555Attention: Chief, Docketing andService BranchComments of the Utility Safety ClassificationGroup on the ANPR for the Backfitting Rulemaking(48 Fe6. Reg. 44217)
Dear mr. Chilk:
The Commission published in the Federal Register an ad-vance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) on the revision ofthe backfitting process for nuclear reactors, 48 Fed. Reg.44217 (September 28, 1983). This rulemaking would establishrequirements fo; the long-term management of the NRC's processfor imposing new regulatory requirements for power reactors.The notice invited interested persons to submit written com-ments and suggestions by October 28, 1983. This letter willprovide the comments, in response to the ANPR, of the UtilitySafety Classification Group.
-2-'HUNTON & ILLIAMS; Although various members of the Utility Group will sub-mit additional comments on this ANPR either individually or asmembers of other organizations interested in the backfittingrulemaking, these- comments are intended to focus on the rela-tionship between the safety classification issue and thebackfitting rulemaking. In particular, the safety classifica-tion issue provides a useful example to consider in developingan appropriate definition for lbackfitting.' Other pertinentexamples, such as the administrative requirements contained inNUREG-0737, also demonstrate the 'need for the broad definitionof backfitting suggested in this letter. These other exampleswill not be addressed by the Utility Group but should be con-sidered in the rulemaking.Utility Safety Classification GroupThe Group is composed of 38 electric utility companiesthat have among them over seventy nuclear reactors currently inoperation or under construction. A-list of the Utility Group'smembers is attached. -The Utility Group's interest, and indeed its purpose ofexistence, is the issue of the NRC Staff's efforts to changecertain definitions used in systems classification. The regu-latory terms 'safety related' and 'important to safety" havebeen used synonymously by industry and the NRC over many yearsof plant design, construction, licensing and operation.
Ht;>;To. NVILL1A41SConstruction permits and operating licenses have been issuedbased on licensee commitments to and NRC acceptance of the syn-onymous use.of these terms. The Utility Group believes thatrecent NRC Staff actions signal a sharp departure from thislong-standing definition of the term important to safety' tocover a much broader and undefined set of plant structures,systems and components than is covered by the term 'safety re-lated." The Utility Group's concerns have been set out in de-tail in a letter from its counsel to William datedAugust 26, 1983.The impetus for the NRC Staff's efforts to expand thedefinition of "important to safety" seems to be a desire to ex-pand some measure of design and quality regulation beyond"safety related" equipment. It is important to note that whilevariations exist in the details of practice, industry as awhole has generally applied design and quality standards tonon-safety relat.ed structures, systems and components in a man-ner commensurate with the functions of such items in the over-all safety and operation of the plant. The Utility Group isconfident that these measures do adequately ensure thatnon-safety related equipment will perform its intended func-tion.
.Le @-4--TON & WILLlA2SDespite the existing measures applied to non-safety re-.lated structures, systems and components, redefining *importantto safetyO without proper review will have far-reaching, perva-sive consequences for licensing and general regulation of nu-clear plants, particularly for operating plants. Specifically,given the extensive use of the term Oimportant to safety" inthe Commission's regulations and Staff regulatory guides, NUREG* documents ar.d other licensing documents, as well as licenseesubmittals, the result of this sharp departure from the long-standing definition of this term would be a largely unexaminedand perhaps unintended expansion of the scope of the above doc-uments. Consequently, the Group is intensely interested inCommission efforts to control the imposition of new regulatoryrequirements.The Relationship of the Safety Classificationissue to the Eackfitting RulemakingQuestion l.a of the ANPR asks, in essence, whetherbackfitting management measures should apply to proposed hard-ware changes or whether the term should be more broadly definedto encompass other activities associated with a nuclear power* plant. The Utility Group urges the Commission to defineObackfitting' to encompass any change in a regulatory require-ment or its implementation which results in any change in thedesign, construction, testing or operation of a nuclear power
-5--' iENTON & WILLIAMSplant for which a construction permit or operating license hasbeen issued. A narrower definition of 'backfitting' would onlypartially accomplish the rulemaking's goal of injecting ratio-nal management into the process of imposing new regulatory re-quirements.In the case of safety classification, the widespreaduse of the term 'important to safety' throughout the Commis-sion's regulations, Staff regulatory guides, NUREG documentsand other licensing documents means that any change in thedefinition of "important to safety' would have ramificationswell beyond the imposition of new hardware requirements. Sucha change could, for example, affect such activities as qualityassurance programs, seismic and environmental qualificationprograms and training programs. Changes in these and otherprograms are cirtain to entail extensive expenditures of utili-ty resources. Thus, at a minimum there is an impact thatshould be weighed against the corresponding benefits. More-over, because utility-resources are finite, changes in suchprograms may well result in a dilution or diversion of a utili-ty's resources with a potential corresponding decrease in safe-ty. Consequently, it makes sense to give the term'backfitting' a broad interpretation to ensure that all aspectsof the imposition of new requirements, whether the result ofnew requlatfons or the clarification or interpretation ofexisting regulations, are effectively scrutinized.
-) , , XTN O & 'M7ILLIAMSThe Utility Group also urges the Commission to give abroad interpretation to what is considered a 'new requirement'in any revised backfitting rule. Question l.b. of the ANPRasks whether the Commission's interim directions to the VRCStaff provide a useful approach. These interim directions de-fine a backfit as a proposed new staff position or a proposedchange in an existing staff position. The Utility Groupbelieves that these directions should be expanded to includeIinstances in which the Staff cl~arifies" or 'reinterprets ex-isting staff positions or NRC regulations. The safety classi-fication issue provides a good example of why this should be60.The present issue was framed by a November 20, 1981memorandum from NRR Director Harold Denton to all NRR person-nel. This memorandum which has never been circulated for pub-lic comment and which argues that the category 'important tosafety' is broader than 'safety relatedO (or "safety grade'),disclaims any intent to alter existing regulatory requirements.Although the Utility Group believes that the NRC Staff's effortto expand the definition of important to safety' is an attemptto change the meaning of a regulatory term without benefit ofrulemaking or other appropriate procedure, some Staff membersdo not agree. According to them it is merely a clarificationsof the definition of important to safety. Despite the.
1 .XTO & NILL1AMSdisclaimer and the characterization, revision of the definitionof Oimportant to safety" to make it a broader category thanasafety related" could have far-reaching, pervasive conse-quences for the licensing and general regulation of nuclearplants. Thus, clarifications of existing staff positions ornew interpretations should be included within any definition of*backfitting."We hope these comments prove helpful. We will be happyto provide further information if you wish..
Sincerelyyours,* ~~Donald P. grwin MAnthony F. Earley, Jr.Counsel for Utility SafetyClassification GroupAttachmentcc: Chairman Nunzio J. PalladinoCommissioner James K. Asselstine-Commissioner Frederick BernthalCommissioner Victor GilinskyCommissioner Thomas M. RobertsWilliam J. DircksHerzel 1.E.'Plaine, Esq.(-..
UTILITY SAFETY CLASSIFICATION GROUPArkanas Power & Light Co.(representing also Mississippi Power &Light, and Louisiana.Power & Light)Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.Commonwealth Edison Co.Consolidated Edison Company of New YorkConsumers Power Co.Detroit Edison Co.Florida Power Corp.Florida Power & Light Co.Gulf States Utility Co.Illinois Power Co.Long Island. Lighting Co.Nebraska Public Power DistrictNiagara Mohawk Power Corp.Northeast Utilities Service Co.Northern States Power Co.Omaha Public Power DistrictPacific Gas & Electric Co.Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.Public Service Company of IndianaPublic Service Company of New Hampshire(representing also the Yankee Atomic ElectricPower Company, Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co.and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Co.Public Service Electric & Gas Co.Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.Southern California Edison Co.Sacramento Municipal Utility DistrictSNUPPS(representing Union Electric Co., Kansas Gas &Electric Co., Kansas City Power & Light Co.,and Kansas Electric Power Coop., Inc.)Toledo Edison Co.Wisconsin Electric Power Co.Wisconsin Public Service Corp.
.0 'fUNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONWASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 -*A ~DEC I19983T. S. Ellis,-_1JII, Esq.Hunton & Williani5707 East Main StreetP.O. Box 1535Richmond, Virginia 9?3212
Dear Mr. Ellis:
The Executive Director for Operations has asked me to respond to yourletter of August 26, l1933, in which you express concern, on behalf ofthe Utility Safety Classification Group, over the NRC use of the terms"important to safety" and "safety-related." Your concern appears to beprincipally derived from recent licensing cases in which the meaningof these terms in regard to \NRC quality assurance requirements has beenat issue, and my memorandum to NRR personnel of November 20, 1981.I agree that the use of these; terms in a variety of contexts over thepast several years has not been consistent. In recognition of thisproblem I attempted in my 1981 memorandum to NRR personnel to set forthdefinitions of these terms for use in all future regulatory documentsand staff testimony before the adjudicatory boards. As you are aware,the position taken in that memorandum was that "important to safety" and"safety-related" are not synonymous terms as used in Commission regulationsapplicable to nuclear power reactors. The former encompasses the broadscope of equipment covered by Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, the GeneralDesign Criteria, while the latter refers toaa narrower subset of this classof equipment defined "in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 Section VI(a)(l)and, more recently, in 10 CFR 50.49(b)(1). Based on such a distinctionbetween these terms, it generally has been staff practice to apply thequality assurance requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 only tothe narrower class of "safety-related" equipment, absent a specificregulation directing otherwise.More importantly, however, this does not mean that there are no existingNRC requirements for quality standards or quality assurance programs forthe broader class of nuclear power plant equipment which does not meetthe definition of "safety-related." General Design Criterion 1 requiresquality standards and a quality assurance program for all structures,systems and components "important to safety." These requirements, likethose of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, are "graded" in that GDC-l mandatesthe application of quality standards and programs "commensurate with theimportance of the safety functions to be performed," and expressly allowsthe use of "generally recognized codes and standards" where applicable T. S. Ellis -2-and sufficient. Documentation and record keeping requirements for suchequipment are likewise graded. Pursuant to our regulations, permitteesor licensees are responsible for developing and implementing qualityassurance programs for plant design and construction or for plantoperation which meet the more general requirements of GDC-l for plantequipment "important to safety," and the more prescriptive requirementsof Appendix B for "safety-related" plant equipment.This distinction between the terms "important to safety" and "safety-related" has been accepted in two recent adjudicatory decisions wherethe issue was squarely faced. In the Matter of Metropolitan EdisonCompany, et. al. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1),ALAB-729, _ NRC (May 26, 1983): In the Matter of Long IslandLighting Company (Sho reham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57,NRC (September 21, 1983). Moreover, the Commission itself recognizedand endorsed a distinction between the terms in promulgating the Seismicand Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants (see SectionVI(a)(l) and VIta)(2) of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100) and theEnvironmental Qualification Rule (see Supplementary Information and10 CFR 50.49(b)). Also, in preparing this response, members of thelicensing staff and legal staff reviewed all of the material on thissubject provided by your letter, and have also reviewed numerous otherregulatory documents, including both staff and Commission issuancesover the past several years in which the terms "safety-related" and"important to safety" are used. While it is apparent that some confusioncontinues to exist with regard to the distinction between the terms, thestaff is convinced that the position it has previously taken remains correct.The final point which I considered in responding to your letter is theconsistency of NRC staff practice over the years with our position on thisissue, and the technical basis for that practice. While previous stafflicensing reviews were not specifically directed towards determiningwhether in fact permittees or licensees have implemented quality assuranceprograms which adequately address all structures, systems, and componentsimportant to safety, this was not because of any concern over lack ofregulatory requirements for this class of equipment. Rather, our practicewas based upon the staff view that normal industry practice is generallyacceptable for most equipment not covered by Appendix B within this class.Nevertheless, in specific situations in the past where we have foundthat quality assurance requirements beyond normal industry practice wereneeded for equipment "important to safety," we have not hestitated inimposing additional requirements commensurate with the importance tosafety of the equipment involved. We intend to continue that practice.
7 .T. S. Ellis -3-;e note that in a more recent letter on this subJect (comments datedOctober 27, 1983 on the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking onBackfitting Requirements) you have stated that ... "industry as a wholehas generally applied design and quality standards to non-safetyrelated structures. systems and components in a manner commensuratewtth the functions of such items in the overall safety and operationof the plant." The principal difference, then, between the NRC Staffposition discussed above and that expressed in your letters appearsto be your view that such actions by the industry are purely voluntary,with no regulatory underpinning; whereas, we have been and remainconvinced that such actions are required by General Design Criterion 1.I want to make it very clear that NRC regulatory jurisdiction involving asafety matter is not controlled by the use of the terms such as"safety related" or "important to safety."A copy of your letters and this response are being sent to all permitteesand licensees for information.
Sincerely,Harold R. Denton. DirectorOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation