IR 05000247/2012004
| ML12313A432 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/08/2012 |
| From: | Mel Gray Reactor Projects Branch 2 |
| To: | Ventosa J Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| Gray M | |
| References | |
| IR-12-004 | |
| Download: ML12313A432 (47) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES ovember 8, 2012
SUBJECT:
INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT 2 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000247/2012004
Dear Mr. Ventosa:
On September 30, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 25, 2012, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
This report documents three NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green).
These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance, and because they are entered into your corrective action program (CAP), the NRC is treating these findings as non-cited violations (NCVs), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCVs in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room of from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely, /RA/ Mel Gray, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-247 License No. DPR-26
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000247/2012004 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
REGION I== Docket No.: 50-247 License No.: DPR-26 Report No.: 05000247/2012004 Licensee: Entergy Nuclear Northeast (Entergy) Facility: Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 2 Location: 450 Broadway, GSB Buchanan, NY 10511-0249 Dates: July 1, 2012, through September 30, 2012 Inspectors: O. Ayegbusi, Acting Senior Resident Inspector S. McCarver, Acting Resident Inspector R. Montgomery, Acting Resident Inspector C. Crisden, Emergency Preparedness Specialist J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist H. Gray, Senior Reactor Inspector T. OHara, Reactor Engineer L. Scholl, Senior Reactor Inspector Approved By: Mel Gray, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000247/2012004; 7/1/12 - 9/30/12; Indian Point Nuclear Generating (Indian Point) Unit 2;
Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments.
This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by region inspectors. The inspectors identified three findings of very low safety significance (Green), which were NCVs. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). The cross-cutting aspects for the findings were determined using IMC 0310, Components Within the Cross-Cutting Areas. Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green, or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, because Entergy personnel did not adequately implement procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Section 5.1, to assess the operability of safety related station batteries on June 4, 2012.
Specifically, Entergy personnel did not appropriately determine the impact on operability as a result of inadequate surveillance testing of the 21, 22 and 24 station batteries.
Entergy staff re-performed the operability determination, identified the issues as non-conforming and implemented compensatory measures. Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2012-4009.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, after inspectors questioned the operability determination, the non-conforming condition was identified and resulted in the station batteries being declared operable with required compensatory measures, revising calculations and implementing a modification to reduce battery load. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power," the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event.
The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance with the Decision Making attribute because Entergy personnel did not use conservative assumptions in decision making with regards to the non-conservative testing of safety related batteries and adopt a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action is safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate it is unsafe in order to disapprove the action. [H.1(b) per IMC 0310] (Section 1R15.1)
- Green.
The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, because Entergy did not assure that all testing required to demonstrate safety related batteries will perform satisfactorily was identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures. Specifically, temperature compensation for battery discharge testing was performed incorrectly which caused errors in the battery capacity calculations. Entergy staff immediately reviewed historical test results to confirm the batteries remained operable. Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2012-5338.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In addition, it was similar to Example 2c of NRC IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that the test control inadequacies affected multiple batteries and the issue was repetitive. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green)because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event.
This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources Component, because Entergy did not ensure that complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, the battery discharge test procedures did not ensure that temperature compensation was correctly applied to provide accurate capacity calculations. [H.2(c) per IMC 0310]
(Section 1R15.2)
- Green.
The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, because Entergy staff did not adequately implement procedure EN-OP-104 Operability Determination Process, section 5.1, to assess the operability of the 22 static inverter due to a degraded frequency meter on September 7, 2012. Specifically, Entergy personnel did not adequately evaluate the impact of the degraded meter on the operability of the static inverter. This condition caused the inverter to be inoperable. As a result of inspector questions, Entergy staff immediately declared the static inverter inoperable and replaced the frequency meter.
Entergy staff entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2012-5620.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the degraded frequency meter resulted in the static inverter being declared inoperable on September 10, 2012 to replace the frequency meter. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power," the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event.
The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance with the Decision Making attribute because Entergy personnel did not make safety-significant decisions using a systematic process, especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions, to ensure safety is maintained. Specifically, Entergy did not obtain interdisciplinary input and reviews in resolving degraded 22 static inverter frequency meter. [H.1(a) per IMC 0310] (Section 1R15.4)
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Indian Point Unit 2 began the inspection period at or near 100 percent power. The unit remained at or near full power for the duration of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
.1 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a review of Entergys readiness for the onset of seasonal high temperatures. The review focused on the auxiliary boiler feed pump building and the 21, 22, and 24 battery rooms. The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications, control room logs, and the corrective action program to determine what temperatures or other seasonal weather could challenge these systems, and to ensure Entergy personnel had adequately prepared for these challenges. The inspectors reviewed station procedures, including Entergys seasonal weather preparation procedure and applicable operating procedures. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the selected systems to ensure station personnel identified issues that could challenge the operability of the systems during hot weather conditions.
Documents reviewed for each section of the inspection report are listed in the .
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Impending Adverse Weather
a. Inspection Scope
Because severe weather was forecasted in the vicinity of the facility for September 18, 2012, the inspectors reviewed Entergys overall preparations/protection for the expected weather conditions. The inspectors walked down systems required for normal operation and shutdown conditions because their safety related functions could be affected, or required, as a result of flooding. The inspectors evaluated the plant staffs preparations in accordance with site procedures to determine if actions were adequate. During the inspection, the inspectors focused on plant specific design features and station procedures used to respond to adverse weather conditions. The inspectors also toured the site to identify loose debris that could become projectiles during a tornado. The inspectors evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those systems required to control the plant. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the UFSAR and performance requirements for the systems selected for inspection, and reviewed whether operator actions were appropriate as specified by plant specific procedures. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of CAP items to verify that Entergy identified adverse weather impact issues at an appropriate threshold and dispositioned them through the CAP in accordance with station corrective action procedures.
b. Findings
No findings were identified. ==1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial System Walkdowns
==
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: 23 emergency diesel generator (EDG) after post-maintenance testing on July 11, 2012 23 auxiliary boiler feed water pump (ABFP) while the 21 ABFP was out of service for planned maintenance on July 17, 2012 21 component cooling water (CCW) pump after post-maintenance testing on September 18, 2012 22 fan cooler unit after post-maintenance testing on September 27, 2012 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the UFSAR, technical specifications, work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether Entergy staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Full System Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
On September 25, 2012, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of accessible portions of the Unit 2 125 Volt DC distribution system to verify the existing equipment lineup was correct. The inspectors reviewed operating procedures, drawings, equipment line-up check-off lists, and the UFSAR to verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related condition reports and work orders to ensure Entergy appropriately evaluated and resolved any deficiencies.
b. Findings
No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection