Information Notice 1984-42, Equipment Availability for Conditions During Outages Not Covered by Technical Specifications
| ML070180078 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/05/1984 |
| From: | Jordan E L NRC/IE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| IN-84-042, NUDOCS 8406050012 | |
| Download: ML070180078 (4) | |
SSINS No. 6835IN 84-42UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENTWASHINGTON, DC 20555June 5, 1984IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 84-42: EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY FOR CONDITIONSDURING OUTAGES NOT COVERED BY TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS
Addressees
Purpose
- This information notice is provided to alert licensees to the importance ofcontrolling equipment availability for conditions. during outages not coveredby Technical Specifications. It is expected that recipients will review theinformation for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, ifappropriate, to preclude similar problems occurring at their facilities.However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constituteNRC requirements and, therefore, no specific action or written response isrequired.
Description of Circumstances
- On January 8, 1984, the Palisades Nuclear Plant experienced a complete loss ofoffsite and onsite ac power. The event was precipitated by the need to isolatea faulty swit:hyard breaker. To isolate the breaker, it was necessary tointerrupt the offsite power supply to the plant. At the time of the event,Palisades was in a refueling outage with all fuel removed from the.reactor andthe 2 diesel generator (DG) inoperable. The service water pump poweredfrom the no. 1 (operable) DG also was inoperable as a result of maintenance.When the shift supervisor interrupted the offsite power supply to the plant,the operators did not realize cooling water to the operable DG was notavailable. The control room alarm indication, which should have warned theoperators, was apparently masked by the large number of simultaneous alarmsreceived when the offsite power was interrupted. Approximately 50 minuteslater the DG overheated and was manually tripped. Once the DG was tripped,all station power was lost, with the exception of the station batteries andtheir associated dc and preferred ac buses. The loss of ac power caused aloss of plant communications, fire protection, security, and habitabilitysystems as well as the fuel pool cooling system. (Compensatory measures werepromptly taken-upon loss of the normal security systems.) The loss of.communications is considered the most serious consequence of this event. Thisloss of communications will be further addressed in a separate Information840805CO4C)012 ~hI~1 aIN 84-42June 5, 1984 notice (IN). The restoration of ac power was delayed as a result of anInoperable main transformer (out for maintenance) and a malfunction of one ofthe startup supply breakers.While operating procedures required two operable diesel generators beforeremoving offsite power, operating procedures did not specifically delineateequipment availability requirements for this defueled condition. The shiftsupervisor violated the procedure and proceeded with the evolution afterevaluating fuel cooling. The fuel pool was known to heat up very slowly andto require days without active cooling before the high temperature alarm wouldbe reached. The shift supervisor, however, failed to fully recognize theimportance of the other support systems (e.g., communication, fire protection)to the overall safety of the plant. The procedural requirements were reviewedas part of the evaluation of fuel cooling and it was determined their intentwas to minimize risk to fuel integrity when the fuel was in the reactor vessel.Following the loss of onsite and offsite ac power, the Emergency Procedureswere not implemented in a timely manner because the importance of the varioussupport systems had not been recognized.The licensee initiated many corrective actions as a result of this event (seePalisades Licensee Event Report (LER)84-001). Some of the more important cor-rective actions by the licensee include:1. A review of the management control of equipment for plant conditions notcovered by the requirements of the Technical Specifications. The reviewwill specifically address electrical system requirements during coldshutdown to ensure sufficient equipment remains available to maintain theplant in a safe condition and to meet the commitments of the Site Emer-gency, Security, and Fire Protection Plans.2. *Establishing minimum equipment availability for specific conditions notcovered by the Technical Specifications.3. Provide classroom training for all operators on the use and intent of theSite Emergency Plan.4. Integrate the use of the Site Emergency Plan into simulator training.5. Discuss the need for strict adherence to operating procedures with alloperations personnel.NRC has previously identified concerns with operability of required equipmentin IE. IN 83-56, "Operability of Required Auxiliary Equipment," and IN 80-20,"Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability at Davis-Besse Unit I While in aRefueling Mode." If you have any questions regarding this matter, please
IN 84-42June 5 , 1984 contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office orthis office.Edward ' Jordan, DirectorDivisi of Emergency Preparednessand gineering ResponseOffice of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contact:
H. Bailey, IE(301) 492-7078Attachment:List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
IAttachmentIN 84-42June 5, 1984LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDIE INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issue Issued to84-4184-4083-6684-39IGSCC in BWR PlantsEmergency Worker DosesFatality at ArgentineCritical FacilityInadvertent Isolation ofSpray SystemsProblems With Design,Maintenance, and Operationof Offsite Power SystemsUse of Lifted Leads andJumpers During Maintenanceor Surveillance TestingLoosening of Locking Nut onLimitorque OperatorBWR Post Scram DrywellPressurizationRespirator Users Warning:Defective Self-ContainedBreathing Apparatus Air-Cylinders06/01/8405/30/8405/25/8405/25/8405/17/8405/10/8405/01/8404/23/8404/23/84All BWR reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CP; research.and test reactor andfuel cycle licenseesAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CP; non-power reactor,critical facility,& fuel cyclelicenseesAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holding.an OL'or CP; researchand test; fuel cycle;and Priority 184-3884-3784-3684-3584-34OL =Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit