ML16357A526

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Byron/Braidwood Nuclear Stations, Revision 16 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 10, Steam and Power Conversion System
ML16357A526
Person / Time
Site: Byron, Braidwood  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/15/2016
From:
Exelon Generation Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML16357A264 List: ... further results
References
RS-16-248
Download: ML16357A526 (156)


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B/B-UFSAR 10.1-1 REVISION 9 - DECEMBER 2002 CHAPTER 10.0 - STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM 10.1 SUMMARY DESCRIPTION 10.1.1 System Layout Equipment arrangement and fluid flows are shown diagrammatically in Figure 10.1-1 along with major line sizes and safety categories. Table 10.1-1 summarizes important design features and safety aspects. Figure 10.1-2a and 10.1-2b are the heat balance diagrams for the uprated power conditions. The units are designed to operate under the economic generation control system.

10.1.2 Design After passing through the turbine, the steam exhausts into the shell side of a condenser, where the normal average backpressure is approximately 3.5 in. Hg abs. The condensed steam is pumped via condensate/condensate booster and feedwater pumps through seven stages of feedwater heating and back to the steam generators. In its passage through the turbine, the steam undergoes a moisture separation and reheating process; portions of the steam are extracted from the main turbine to the feedwater heaters for regenerative heating of the feedwater. The steam is condensed in the main condenser by circulating water flowing through the condenser tubes; the heat added to the circulating water is then rejected to a natural draft cooling tower at Byron Station, and a cooling lake at Braidwood Station, before the water returns to the main condenser. The steam and power conversion system is a closed cycle. Condensate is drawn from the hotwell of the condenser and pumped via the condensate pumps through the steam jet air ejector condensers and gland steam condensers. This condensate is pumped via the condensate booster pumps through four stages of low pressure feedwater heaters. This flow is then mixed with the discharge of the heater drain pumps and the combined flow passes through a fifth and sixth stage of low pressure feedwater heaters. From this point the water is pumped via the feedwater pumps through one stage of high pressure feedwater heaters through the feedwater regulating valves to the steam generator. In the steam generators the feedwater is converted to steam. The steam exits the steam generators via the main steamlines which are equipped with power-operated atmospheric relief valves, safety valves, and isolation valves. From this point the steam passes via piping inside a tunnel through combination stop and throttle valves and governor valves to the high pressure turbine. High pressure turbine exhaust is routed through two stage moisture separator reheaters, reheat stop valves, and interceptor valves to the low pressure turbine.

B/B-UFSAR 10.1-2 REVISION 7 - DECEMBER 1998 Throughout the portion of the steam cycle downstream of the isolation valves, steam is extracted at various points to operate auxiliaries and to supply heat to the condensate and feedwater heaters. Steam used for these purposes is returned to the cycle for reuse. Steam exhausted from the low pressure turbine at approximately 3.5 in. Hg is condensed to condensate in a surface type condenser and the condensate drains to the hotwell where the cycle begins again. 10.1.3 Governing Design Codes for Steam and Power Conversion System The design of piping, valves, containment penetrations, and equipment on the steam generator side of the containment isolation valves, including the isolation valves, in both the main steam and feedwater lines is Safety Category I, Quality Group B. The design of piping, valves, and equipment in the remainder of the steam and power conversion system is Safety Category II, Quality Group D.

10.1.4 Instrumentation Instrumentation systems for the normal operating conditions of the steam and condensate systems are designed in accordance with accepted secondary cycle design for safe and reliable control, requirements for performance calculations, and periodic heat balances. Instrumentation for the secondary cycle are also provided to meet recommendations by the turbine supplier and ASME Standard No. TWDPS-1 Part 2, 1973, "Recommended Practices for the Prevention of Water Damage to Steam Turbines." Other recommendations by the NSSS supplier for prevention of water hammer in the steam generator are also part of the design bases. Continuous sampling system instrumentation and grab sample points are provided for maintaining acceptable limits of water chemistry in the secondary cycle as required by the NSSS and turbine suppliers. Condenser conductivity sampling is provided for tube/sheet leakage detection to meet requirements to identify and promptly isolate leakage in the condenser. Safety-related instrumentation systems for steam generator level and main steamline pressure are designed and supplied by the NSSS supplier and identified in Chapter 7.0.

B/B-UFSAR 10.1-3 TABLE 10.1-1 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM DESIGN FEATURES ITEM SAFETY-RELATED COMMENTS Main Steam Piping Yes Piping is Safety Category I from steam generators to and including main steam isolation valves. The remainder of the piping is Safety Category II. Main Steam Relief and Safety Valves Yes Safety Category I Steam Generator Blowdown System Yes System is Safety Category I from the steam generators to the outermost containment isolation valve. The remainder of the system is Safety Category II. Main Turbine No Switch contacts are provided as interface with Reactor Protection System in event of turbine trip. Generator No Turbine Protection System No Reheat Steam System No Condenser No Turbine Steam Dump System No Turbine Gland Sealing System No Main Condenser Evacuation System No Circulating Water System No Condensate System No B/B-UFSAR 10.1-4 TABLE 10.1-1 (Cont'd) ITEM SAFETY-RELATED COMMENTS Feedwater System Yes Feedwater lines are Safety Category I between the FW bypass isolation valves and the steam generators.

B/B-UFSAR REVISION 5 - DECEMBER 1994

Attachments 10.A and 10.B have been deleted intentionally.

B/B-UFSAR ATTACHMENT 10.C AN EVALUATION OF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM SECTION 10.4.9 OF THE STANDARD REVIEW PLANS AND BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION ASB 10-1

B/B-UFSAR 10.C-i TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION SUBJECT 10.C.1 Evaluation to the Standard Review Plan Section 10.4.9 10.C.2 Evaluation to the Branch Technical Position ASB 10-1

B/B-UFSAR 10.C-1 REVISION 13 - DECEMBER 2010 10.C.1 An Evaluation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System to Section 10.4.9 of the Standard Review Plans (for ESF Pump Trains Only) The evaluation of the auxiliary feedwater system to the guidance of Section 10.4.9 of the Standard Review Plans is provided in the subsections that follow. Each subsection identifies a separate recommendation and provides a response that shows compliance with that recommendation.

10.C.1.1 Recommendation System components and piping have sufficient physical separation or shielding to protect the essential portions of the system from the effects of internally and externally generated missiles. Response Byron/Braidwood system components and piping satisfy physical separation and shielding requirements relating to internally and externally generated missiles. See Subsections: 3.5.1.1 Internally Generated Missiles (Outside Containment), 3.5.1.4 Missiles Generated by Natural Phenomena, 3.5.1.5 Missiles Generated by Events Near the Site, 3.5.1.6 Aircraft Hazards, 3.5.2 Systems to be Protected, and 3.5.3 Barrier Design Procedure.

10.C.1.2 Recommendation The system satisfies the recommendations of Branch Technical Position ASB 3-1 with respect to the effects of pipe whip and jet impingement that may result from high or moderate energy piping breaks or cracks (in this regard the AFS is considered to be a high energy system). Response The auxiliary feedwater system is not used for normal startup and shutdown at Byron and Braidwood and is, therefore, considered to be a moderate energy system and satisfies BTP ASB 3-1. See Section 3.6 and Subsection 10.4.9.2.

B/B-UFSAR 10.C-2 10.C.1.3 Recommendation The system and components satisfy design code requirements as appropriate for the assigned quality group and seismic classifications. Response Byron/Braidwood Station system and components satisfy design code requirements for assigned quality group and seismic classifications. See Subsections:

10.4.9.1 AFW System Design Basis and 10.4.9.2 AFW System Description. 10.C.1.4 Recommendation The failure of nonessential equipment or components does not affect essential functions of the system. Response Nonessential systems interfacing with the auxiliary feedwater system are: 1. The condensate storage tank: Failure of the condensate storage tank or suction lines is accommodated by essential service water backup supply to each auxiliary feedwater pump suction.

2. Station air system: Failure of the air system is accommodated by failing air operated flow control valves open on loss of air. Therefore, failure of nonessential equipment does not affect the essential functions of the auxiliary feedwater system. 10.C.1.5 Recommendation The system is capable of withstanding a single active failure. Response The auxiliary feedwater system is capable of withstanding a single active failure.

B/B-UFSAR 10.C-3 See Subsections: 7.2.2.2.3b Single Failure Criteria (Electrical),10.4.9.2 AFW System Description (Mechanical), and Table 10.4-4 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. 10.C.1.6 Recommendation The system possesses diversity in motive power sources such that system performance requirements may be met with either of the assigned power sources, e.g., a system with an a-c subsystem and a redundant steam/d-c subsystem. Response The auxiliary feedwater system possesses diversity in motive power sources and the capability for feeding two or more unfaulted steam generators at the required rate concurrent with a single active failure. In the event of loss of both onsite and offsite a-c power, the diesel-engine driven pump will deliver feedwater to the steam generators. See Subsections: 10.4.9.1 AFW System Design Basis, 10.4.9.2 AFW System Description, and 7.3.1.1.6 AFW System Operation.

10.C.1.7 Recommendation The system precludes the occurrence of fluid flow instabilities, e.g., water hammer, in system inlet piping during normal plant operation or during upset or accident conditions (see SRP Section 10.4.7). Response Byron/Braidwood auxiliary feedwater system includes water hammer prevention capabilities. See Subsections: 10.4.7.3 Water Hammer Prevention Features and 10.4.9.3.1 Auxiliary Feedwater System General Safety Evaluation.

B/B-UFSAR 10.C-4 10.C.1.8 Recommendation Functional capability is assured by suitable protection during abnormally high water levels (adequate flood protection considering the probable maximum flood). Response The functional capabilities of systems are assured as stated in Section 3.4. 10.C.1.9 Recommendation The capability exists to detect, collect, and control system leakage and to isolate portions of the system in case of excessive leakage or component malfunctions. Response Pump seal leakage is directed to the auxiliary building equipment drain system. Visual periodic inspections will provide indication of system leakage. The piping and valving in the auxiliary feedwater system is sufficiently diverse to allow component isolation for malfunction and repair while still maintaining the essential functions of the auxiliary feedwater system.

10.C.1.10 Recommendation Provisions are made for operational testing. Response Provisions are made for operational testing of Byron/Braidwood Stations auxiliary feedwater as outlined in Subsection 10.4.9.4. 10.C.1.11 Recommendation Instrumentation and control features are provided to verify the system is operating in a correct mode. Response Technical Specifications require verification by flow demonstration or valve position verification for proper operating alignment. Instrumentation is available to verify system alignment by either means from the control room. See Subsection 10.4.9.5.

B/B-UFSAR 10.C-5 10.C.1.12 Recommendation The system is capable of automatically initiating auxiliary feedwater flow upon receipt of a system actuation signal. Response The auxiliary feedwater system is capable of automatic initiation. See Subsections; 10.4.9.3.1 AFW System General Safety Evaluation, 7.3 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System, 7.2.1.1.2.e Low-low Steam Generator Water Level Trip. 10.C.1.13 Recommendation The system satisfies the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.62 with respect to the system capability to manually initiate protective action by the auxiliary feedwater system. Response The commitment to comply with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.62 is found in Appendix A, page A-1.62-1. 10.C.1.14 Recommendation The system design possesses the capability to automatically terminate auxiliary feedwater flow to a depressurized steam generator and to automatically provide feedwater to the intact steam generator. Response The flow orifices in the auxiliary feedwater lines automatically limit flow to a depressurized steam generator and ensure flow to unaffected steam generators. See Subsection 10.4.9.3.1.

10.C.1.15 Recommendation The system possesses sufficient auxiliary feedwater flow capacity so that a cold shutdown can be achieved.

B/B-UFSAR 10.C-6 REVISION 10 - DECEMBER 2004 Response Subsection 10.4.9.1 states a minimum of approximately 212,000 gallons is necessary to cool down to residual heat removal system initiation. Technical Specification 3.7.6 states the limiting condition for operation for the condensate storage tank. This limit is based on a sufficient volume of water in the condensate storage tank to meet the design basis requirements for cooldown, and includes the time needed for completion of placing residual heat removal (RHR) into service. In addition, sufficient water volume is available from the essential service water system to achieve cold shutdown.

10.C.1.16 Recommendation The Applicant's proposed technical specifications are such as to assure the continued reliability of the AFW during plant operation, i.e., the limiting conditions for operation and the surveillance testing requirements are specified and are consistent with those for other similar plants. Response Byron/Braidwood Technical Specifications have been developed from the Standard Specifications for Westinghouse plants.

B/B-UFSAR 10.C-7 10.C.2 An Evaluation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System to Branch Technical Position ASB 10-1 (for ESF Pump Trains Only) The evaluation of the auxiliary feedwater system to the guidance of Branch Technical Position ASB 10-1 is provided in the subsections that follows. Each subsection identifies a separate recommendation and provides a response that shows compliance with the recommendation.

10.C.2.1 Recommendation The auxiliary feedwater system should consist of at least two full-capacity, independent systems that include diverse power sources. Response Byron/Braidwood auxiliary feedwater system consists of one 100% capacity emergency a-c powered motor-driven pump and one 100% capacity diesel driven pump (capable of supplying water independent of a-c power availability). See Subsections: 10.4.9.1 AFW System Design Basis, 10.4.9.2 AFW System Description, and 10.4.9.3 AFW System Safety Evaluation.

10.C.2.2 Recommendation Other powered components of the auxiliary feedwater system should also use the concept of separate and multiple sources of motive energy. An example of the required diversity would be two separate auxiliary feedwater trains, each capable of removing the afterheat load of the reactor system, having one separate train powered from either of two a-c sources and the other train wholly powered by steam and d-c electric power. Response Motor-operated valves in each auxiliary feedwater train employ diversity in power supplies. All motor- and air-operated valves employ the same diversity of supplies. This diversity is discussed in Subsection 10.4.9.3 In addition, Chapter 8.0 specifically addresses electrical power from all aspects applicable to train separation and diversity of power. All motor-operated and air-operated

B/B-UFSAR 10.C-8 REVISION 9 - DECEMBER 2002 valves are normally open, with the exception of essential service water suction and recirculation valves which are normally closed. 10.C.2.3 Recommendation The piping arrangement, both intake and discharge, for each train should be designed to permit the pumps to supply feedwater to any combination of steam generators. This arrangement should take into account pipe failure, active component failure, power supply failure, or control system failure that could prevent system function. One arrangement that would be acceptable is crossover piping containing valves that can be operated by remote manual control from the control room, using the power diversity principle for the valve operators and actuation systems. Response A common header in the suction to the AFW pumps exists where the supply lines from the condensate storage tank combine. The line then splits to supply suction to the individual AFW pumps. A common header exists where the auxiliary feedwater enters the steam generator. This is downstream of the flow control valves on the discharge of the pumps (see Drawing M-37). Any of the AFW pumps can be aligned to supply any of the steam generators by operating motor-operated valves from the control room.

10.C.2.4 Recommendation The auxiliary feedwater system should be designed with suitable redundancy to offset the consequences of any single active component failure; however, each train need not contain redundant active components. Response See response to Item 10.C.1.5.

10.C.2.5 Recommendation When considering a high energy line break, the system should be so arranged as to assure the capability to supply necessary emergency feedwater to the steam generators, despite the postulated break of any high energy section of the system, assuming a concurrent single active failure.

B/B-UFSAR 10.C-9 REVISION 7 - DECEMBER 1998 Response See response to Item 10.C.1.2 of the previous section.

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PARALLELFACES*I\\\\\"".........fULTRASONICCOVERAGE/"(BOTHSIDES)-",1/II'i__I,1---.:---\FINALRIMI"'---+--+---CONFIGURATIONI./,.,--r-ULTRASONICCOVERAGE(BOTHSIDES)L...--l_1RIM_1_*BYRON/BRAIDWOODSTATIONSUPDATEDFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORTFIGURE10.2*1ULTRASONlCINSPECTIONOFROUGHMACHINEDTURBINEDISCS B/B-UFSAR Figures 10.2-2 through 10.2-3 have been deleted intentionally. REVISION 9 -DECEMBER 2002 B/B-UFSAR Figures 10.2-4 through 10.2-7 have been deleted intentionally. REVISION 12 -DECEMBER 2008 B/B-UFSAR REVISION 9 - DECEMBER 2002 Figure 10.3-1 has been deleted intentionally.

B/B-UFSAR REVISION 9 - DECEMBER 2002 Figures 10.4-1 through 10.4-2 have been deleted intentionally.

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