Information Notice 1984-42, Equipment Availability for Conditions During Outages Not Covered by Technical Specifications

Equipment Availability for Conditions During Outages Not Covered by Technical Specifications

ML070180078
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/05/1984
From:	Jordan E NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-84-042, NUDOCS 8406050012
Download: ML070180078 (4)

SSINS No. 6835 IN 84-42 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 June 5, 1984 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 84-42: EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY FOR CONDITIONS

DURING OUTAGES NOT COVERED BY TECHNICAL

SPECIFICATIONS

Addressees

All holders of a nuclear power plant operating license (OL) or construction

permit (CP).

Purpose

This information notice is provided to alert licensees to the importance of

controlling equipment availability for conditions. during outages not covered

by Technical Specifications. It is expected that recipients will review the

information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if

appropriate, to preclude similar problems occurring at their facilities.

However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute

NRC requirements and, therefore, no specific action or written response is

required.

Description of Circumstances

On January 8, 1984, the Palisades Nuclear Plant experienced a complete loss of

offsite and onsite ac power. The event was precipitated by the need to isolate

a faulty swit:hyard breaker. To isolate the breaker, it was necessary to

interrupt the offsite power supply to the plant. At the time of the event, Palisades was in a refueling outage with all fuel removed from the.reactor and

the *o. 2 diesel generator (DG) inoperable. The service water pump powered

from the no. 1 (operable) DG also was inoperable as a result of maintenance.

When the shift supervisor interrupted the offsite power supply to the plant, the operators did not realize cooling water to the operable DG was not

available. The control room alarm indication, which should have warned the

operators, was apparently masked by the large number of simultaneous alarms

received when the offsite power was interrupted. Approximately 50 minutes

later the DG overheated and was manually tripped. Once the DG was tripped, all station power was lost, with the exception of the station batteries and

their associated dc and preferred ac buses. The loss of ac power caused a

loss of plant communications, fire protection, security, and habitability

systems as well as the fuel pool cooling system. (Compensatory measures were

promptly taken-upon loss of the normal security systems.) The loss of.

communications is considered the most serious consequence of this event. This

loss of communications will be further addressed in a separate Information

840805CO

4C)012 ~hI~1

a

IN 84-42 June 5, 1984 notice (IN). The restoration of ac power was delayed as a result of an

Inoperable main transformer (out for maintenance) and a malfunction of one of

the startup supply breakers.

While operating procedures required two operable diesel generators before

removing offsite power, operating procedures did not specifically delineate

equipment availability requirements for this defueled condition. The shift

supervisor violated the procedure and proceeded with the evolution after

evaluating fuel cooling. The fuel pool was known to heat up very slowly and

to require days without active cooling before the high temperature alarm would

be reached. The shift supervisor, however, failed to fully recognize the

importance of the other support systems (e.g., communication, fire protection)

to the overall safety of the plant. The procedural requirements were reviewed

as part of the evaluation of fuel cooling and it was determined their intent

was to minimize risk to fuel integrity when the fuel was in the reactor vessel.

Following the loss of onsite and offsite ac power, the Emergency Procedures

were not implemented in a timely manner because the importance of the various

support systems had not been recognized.

The licensee initiated many corrective actions as a result of this event (see

Palisades Licensee Event Report (LER)84-001). Some of the more important cor- rective actions by the licensee include:

1. A review of the management control of equipment for plant conditions not

covered by the requirements of the Technical Specifications. The review

will specifically address electrical system requirements during cold

shutdown to ensure sufficient equipment remains available to maintain the

plant in a safe condition and to meet the commitments of the Site Emer- gency, Security, and Fire Protection Plans.

2. *Establishing minimum equipment availability for specific conditions not

covered by the Technical Specifications.

3. Provide classroom training for all operators on the use and intent of the

Site Emergency Plan.

4. Integrate the use of the Site Emergency Plan into simulator training.

5. Discuss the need for strict adherence to operating procedures with all

operations personnel.

NRC has previously identified concerns with operability of required equipment

in IE.IN 83-56, "Operability of Required Auxiliary Equipment," and IN 80-20,

"Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability at Davis-Besse Unit I While in a

Refueling Mode." If you have any questions regarding this matter, please

IN 84-42 June 5 , 1984 contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC Regional Office or

this office.

Edward 'Jordan, Director

Divisi of Emergency Preparedness

and gineering Response

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

H. Bailey, IE

(301) 492-7078 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

I

Attachment

IN 84-42 June 5, 1984 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to

84-41 IGSCC in BWR Plants 06/01/84 All BWR reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP

84-40 Emergency Worker Doses 05/30/84 All power reactor

facilities holding

an OL or CP; research.

and test reactor and

fuel cycle licensees

83-66 Fatality at Argentine 05/25/84 All power reactor

Critical Facility facilities holding

an OL or CP; non- power reactor, critical facility,

& fuel cycle

licensees

84-39 Inadvertent Isolation of 05/25/84 All power reactor

Spray Systems facilities holding

an OL or CP

84-38 Problems With Design, 05/17/84 All power reactor

Maintenance, and Operation facilities holding

of Offsite Power Systems an OL or CP

84-37 Use of Lifted Leads and 05/10/84 All power reactor

Jumpers During Maintenance facilities holding

or Surveillance Testing an OL or CP

84-36 Loosening of Locking Nut on 05/01/84 All power reactor

Limitorque Operator facilities holding

an OL or CP

84-35 BWR Post Scram Drywell 04/23/84 All power reactor

Pressurization facilities holding

an OL or CP

84-34 Respirator Users Warning: 04/23/84 All power reactor

Defective Self-Contained facilities holding

Breathing Apparatus Air .an OL'or CP; research

-Cylinders and test; fuel cycle;

and Priority 1 OL =Operating License

CP = Construction Permit