Information Notice 1984-42, Equipment Availability for Conditions During Outages Not Covered by Technical Specifications
| ML070180078 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/05/1984 |
| From: | Jordan E NRC/IE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| IN-84-042, NUDOCS 8406050012 | |
| Download: ML070180078 (4) | |
SSINS No. 6835 IN 84-42 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION
AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, DC 20555 June 5, 1984 IE INFORMATION
NOTICE NO. 84-42: EQUIPMENT
AVAILABILITY
FOR CONDITIONS
DURING OUTAGES NOT COVERED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
Addressees
All holders of a nuclear power plant operating
license (OL) or construction
permit (CP).
Purpose
- This information
notice is provided to alert licensees
to the importance
of controlling
equipment
availability
for conditions.
during outages not covered by Technical
Specifications.
It is expected that recipients
will review the information
for applicability
to their facilities
and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar problems occurring
at their facilities.
However, suggestions
contained
in this information
notice do not constitute
NRC requirements
and, therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
of Circumstances:
On January 8, 1984, the Palisades
Nuclear Plant experienced
a complete loss of offsite and onsite ac power. The event was precipitated
by the need to isolate a faulty swit:hyard
breaker. To isolate the breaker, it was necessary
to interrupt
the offsite power supply to the plant. At the time of the event, Palisades
was in a refueling
outage with all fuel removed from the.reactor
and the 2 diesel generator (DG) inoperable.
The service water pump powered from the no. 1 (operable)
DG also was inoperable
as a result of maintenance.
When the shift supervisor
interrupted
the offsite power supply to the plant, the operators
did not realize cooling water to the operable DG was not available.
The control room alarm indication, which should have warned the operators, was apparently
masked by the large number of simultaneous
alarms received when the offsite power was interrupted.
Approximately
50 minutes later the DG overheated
and was manually tripped. Once the DG was tripped, all station power was lost, with the exception
of the station batteries
and their associated
dc and preferred
ac buses. The loss of ac power caused a loss of plant communications, fire protection, security, and habitability
systems as well as the fuel pool cooling system. (Compensatory
measures were promptly taken-upon
loss of the normal security systems.)
The loss of.communications
is considered
the most serious consequence
of this event. This loss of communications
will be further addressed
in a separate Information
840805CO 4C)012 ~hI~1 a IN 84-42 June 5, 1984 notice (IN). The restoration
of ac power was delayed as a result of an Inoperable
main transformer (out for maintenance)
and a malfunction
of one of the startup supply breakers.While operating
procedures
required two operable diesel generators
before removing offsite power, operating
procedures
did not specifically
delineate equipment
availability
requirements
for this defueled condition.
The shift supervisor
violated the procedure
and proceeded
with the evolution
after evaluating
fuel cooling. The fuel pool was known to heat up very slowly and to require days without active cooling before the high temperature
alarm would be reached. The shift supervisor, however, failed to fully recognize
the importance
of the other support systems (e.g., communication, fire protection)
to the overall safety of the plant. The procedural
requirements
were reviewed as part of the evaluation
of fuel cooling and it was determined
their intent was to minimize risk to fuel integrity
when the fuel was in the reactor vessel.Following
the loss of onsite and offsite ac power, the Emergency
Procedures
were not implemented
in a timely manner because the importance
of the various support systems had not been recognized.
The licensee initiated
many corrective
actions as a result of this event (see Palisades
Licensee Event Report (LER)84-001). Some of the more important
cor-rective actions by the licensee include: 1. A review of the management
control of equipment
for plant conditions
not covered by the requirements
of the Technical
Specifications.
The review will specifically
address electrical
system requirements
during cold shutdown to ensure sufficient
equipment
remains available
to maintain the plant in a safe condition
and to meet the commitments
of the Site Emer-gency, Security, and Fire Protection
Plans.2. *Establishing
minimum equipment
availability
for specific conditions
not covered by the Technical
Specifications.
3. Provide classroom
training for all operators
on the use and intent of the Site Emergency
Plan.4. Integrate
the use of the Site Emergency
Plan into simulator
training.5. Discuss the need for strict adherence
to operating
procedures
with all operations
personnel.
NRC has previously
identified
concerns with operability
of required equipment in IE. IN 83-56, "Operability
of Required Auxiliary
Equipment," and IN 80-20,"Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability
at Davis-Besse
Unit I While in a Refueling
Mode." If you have any questions
regarding
this matter, please
IN 84-42 June 5 , 1984 contact the Regional Administrator
of the appropriate
NRC Regional Office or this office.Edward ' Jordan, Director Divisi of Emergency
Preparedness
and gineering
Response Office of Inspection
and Enforcement
Technical
Contact: H. Bailey, IE (301) 492-7078 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued IE Information
Notices
I Attachment
IN 84-42 June 5, 1984 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION
NOTICES Information
Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 84-41 84-40 83-66 84-39 IGSCC in BWR Plants Emergency
Worker Doses Fatality at Argentine Critical Facility Inadvertent
Isolation
of Spray Systems Problems With Design, Maintenance, and Operation of Offsite Power Systems Use of Lifted Leads and Jumpers During Maintenance
or Surveillance
Testing Loosening
of Locking Nut on Limitorque
Operator BWR Post Scram Drywell Pressurization
Respirator
Users Warning: Defective
Self-Contained
Breathing
Apparatus
Air-Cylinders
06/01/84 05/30/84 05/25/84 05/25/84 05/17/84 05/10/84 05/01/84 04/23/84 04/23/84 All BWR reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP; research.and test reactor and fuel cycle licensees All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP; non-power reactor, critical facility,& fuel cycle licensees All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
holding.an OL'or CP; research and test; fuel cycle;and Priority 1 84-38 84-37 84-36 84-35 84-34 OL =Operating
License CP = Construction
Permit