ML14251A609

Intervenors Motion to Amend and Supplement Contention No. 7 on Worsening Shield Building Cracking and Inadequate AMPs in Shield Building Monitoring Program

ML14251A609
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	09/08/2014
From:	Lodge T J Beyond Nuclear, Citizens Environmental Alliance of Southwestern Ontario, Don't Waste Michigan, Green Party of Ohio
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
References
50-346-LR, ASLBP 11-907-01-LR-BD01, RAS 26459
Download: ML14251A609 (27)

Text

UNITED STAT ES OF AMERICANUCLEAR REG ULATORY COMMISSION Before the At omic Safety and Licensin g BoardIn the Matter of

)Docket No. 50-346-L FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company)September 8, 2014 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1

))INTERVENORS' MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT CONTENTION NO

. 7ON WORSENING SHIE LD BUILDING CRACKI NG AND INADEQUATE AMPS IN S HIELD BUILDING MONITORING PROGRAM Now come Beyond Nuclea r, Citizens Environment Allianc e of Southwester n Ontario (CEA), Don' t Waste Michiga n, and the Gr een Party of Ohio (c ollectively

, Intervenors), by andthrough counsel, a nd move to amend a nd supplement their September 2, 2014 "Motion to Admit Contention No. 7 on W orsening Shield Building Cra cking and Inadequate AMPs in Shi eld Build-ing Monitoring Program." FirstEne rgy Nuclear Operating Company ("FENOC") has modified its Aging Management Plans ("A MPs") within its S hield Building Monitoring Prog ram in re sponseto a worse ning cracking problem in the rea ctor Shield Building at the Da vis-Besse Nucle arPower Station, Unit 1 ("Da vis-Besse"). /s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry J. Lodge (Ohio Bar #0029271) 316 N. Michig an St., Ste. 520 Toledo, OH 43604-5627Phone/fax (419) 255-7552 tjlodge50@

yahoo.comCounsel for I ntervenors MEMORANDUMAMENDED CONTENTION Intervenors amend the ir contention filed on Septembe r 2, 2014, by adding wording(italicized) as follows:

FENOC's revisions to the AMPs in its Shield Building Monitoring Program,dated July 3, 2014, acknowledge not only the risk, but the re ality, of aging-related1cracking propagation - that is, worsening

- in the alre ady severely cracked Shield Building, an admission which bring s the issue within the scope of this License RenewalApplication proc eeding. FENOC's proposed modifica tions to i ts Shield BuildingMonitoring Prog ram AMPs, reg arding the scope (areas of the Shield Building to beexamined), sample size (number of tests to be perf ormed), a nd the fre quency of itssurveillance activities, are woefully inadequa te. Signific antly more core bores, as we ll asa broader diversity of compleme ntary testing me thods should be require d, and at a muchgreater frequency than FENOC has propose

d. The c racking phenomena must be identified, ana lyzed and addr essed within the F inal Supplemental Environmental I mpactStatement for the lice nse renewal both in the consideration of alternati ves to granting the 20-year license e xtension for Davis-Be sse as well as in the Seve re Accident Mitigation Alternatives analysis (

SAMA). The crack ing problems do not support a conclusion that there is "reasonable assurance" that Davis-Be sse can be operated in a manne rprotective of the public health and safety under the A tomic Energy Act during the 20-y earproposed license extension period.

BACKGROUNDIn LBP-12-27 (December 28, 2012), the A tomic Safety and Licensing Board rejectedIntervenors' Contention 5 and its associate d amending and supplementa l filings, see kingconsidera tion of widespre ad laminar cracking and other concrete damage in the Shield Building walls to be viewe d as aging-related problems fa lling within the par ameters of this license re newalSee FENOC's "Reply to Request for Additional Information for the Review o f the Davis-Besse1Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, License Renewal Application (TAC No. ME4640) andLicense Renewal Application Amendment No. 51," Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, UnitNo. 1, Docket No. 50-346, License Number NP F-3, sent by FENOC to the attention of theDocument Control Desk at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on July 3, 2014, per 10CFR 54,

Enclosure:

Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 (Davis-Besse), Letter L-14-224, Enclosures 1 and 2, ADAMS No. ML14184B184 (hereinafter referenced as "FENOC's RAILetter, July 3, 2014").

proceeding:. . . I ntervenors must point t o the spec ific ways in which the Shield Building Monitoring AMP is wrong or inade quate to ra ise a genuine dispute with F ENOC's LRA.This they have failed to do.

Intervenors have provided no support for th eir argum entthat the cracking (1) is aging-related

, and (2) prevents safe ope ration of the pla nt. These claims amount to bare assertions, which the Commis sion has made c lear "are insuffic ientto support a contention.". . . H owever, a petitioner "'must prese nt sufficient infor mationto show a g enuine dispute' a nd reasonably 'indicating that a fur ther inquiry isappropriate.'"(Emphasis adde d). Id., LBP-12-27 at 30 (32 of .pdf

). However, in their "Motion for Admission of Contention No. 7" filed Septembe r 2, 2014, Intervenors exposed the distinct chang e of position of F ENOC. Applicant now c oncedes thatsignificant mistakes wer e made in remedia tion and in understanding the implications of the cracking phenomena which we re first noticed in 2011. FEN OC's latest, "ice

-wedging" crackingpropagation root ca use is an admission that the Shield Building cracking is aging-related, which brings it withi n the scope of this L RA proceeding. FENOC acknow ledged worsening cracking inAugust-September 2013; on July 8, 2014, FEN OC provided, at long last, the supposed root ca useof this worsening

, or "propagating," cracking - ice-wedging, per PII's 9/11/13 RC A-2. So nea rlyat the end of this LRA adjudicatory proceeding, FENOC has admitted what wa s clear toIntervenors since 2011: the c alculations of NRC staff engineers which sug gest that the Shield Building is permea ted by cracking which thre atens the c ontinued usefulness a nd stability of thestructure itself, and the bur geoning evidence of increasing cracking, must be c onceded validity

,and there are serious questions surrounding the basis for g ranting a 20-year extension of Davis-Besse's oper ating life which must be a djudicated in this license r enewal proceeding.FACTS WHICH REQUIRE EXPANDED NEPA C ONSIDERATION AND/OR UNDERCUT A FINDING OF 'REAS ONABLE AS SURANCE' The document identified as "

Enclosure 2," the "Full Appare nt Cause Evalua tion"(hereinafter "FACE") which is par t of the F ENOC RAI Letter dated July 3, 2014 but not2disclosed to the ASL B, Intervenors and the public until J uly 8, 2014, is the focus of this filing

.The facts which justify reworking of the NEPA doc ument for the lice nse extension, and which additionally undercut a finding of "reasonable assura nce" that the public hea lth and safe tywould be ade quately protected during the proposed 20-year license e xtension term ar e many.1. Water is satu rating the shi eld buildin g walls,but not all sou rces have been considered FENOC's consultant, Perfor mance Improvement I nternational ("PI I"), conducted the investiga tion and compilation of the Appa rent Cause Evaluation. PI I learned that ther e is wate rsaturating the Shield Building concrete at 10 inches of de pth. FACE, p. 34/98 of .pdf. I n 2012,FENOC or its contrac tors seale d bore hole s made for investiga tion into t he cracking, and waterfrom within the walls appe ared in them.

Id. PII conclude s that coating the outer w alls of the Davis-Besse Shield B uilding has "

prevented a finite amount of moisture from lea ving thestructure

. Until this moisture dissipates it contributes to the water accumulation mechanism required for Ice-Wedging." Id. at 35/98 of .pdf.

A petrographic examination of the core samples was a lso conducted.

Id. at 34/98 of .pdf.

Inspection under a Scanning Electron Mic roscope (SEM) re vealed the pre sence of microc racks.Id. A quantitative appr oach was developed to assess the micr ocrack density in the core samples.

Id. At multipl e depths, e vidence of Freeze-Thaw da mage and evidence of water transport in the form of Ettring ite crystals formation and micr ocracks emanating from pore s was found.

Id. TheNRC ADAMS No

. ML14184B184.2 maximum microcra ck density was near the outer most lay er of the conc rete (within the first 2 in).

The microc racks emanating from pores a t the laminar c rack locations wer e present at a lowe rdensity than shallower locations.

Id. On account of the w ater detection insi de the bor es, thewater analysis, and the pre sence of microc racks emanating from pores a t depths up to 10 in, the presence of excess water was confirmed.

Id. Ettringite is a hydrous calcium aluminium s ulfatemineral. F ENOC asser ted in its Februa ry 2012 Root Cause Analy sis that when ettring ite is found lining the a ir voids in shield buil ding concrete it "sug gests long-term exposure to moisture migrating through the conc rete." RRCA at 25.

Owing to a hig h content of sa lt within t he structur e's walls, there is an ong oing water-borne corrosive e ffect which e xceeds the corr osion from outside the Shield Building

. FACE, p.

39/98 of .pdf. The presence of corrosive agents has ser ious impl ications for r ebar embedded inthe Shield Building walls:Corrosion of embe dded metal is one of the main ca uses of fa ilure of c oncretestructure s (ACI 201.2R, ACI 222R). The c ritical ele ments neede d for corrosion to occ urare water, oxygen, and c hloride ions, which in turn make s permeability the main conc reteproperty that influence s corrosion resistance

. The hig h alkalinity (pH>12.5) of the concrete protects the thin iron-oxide film on the surfac e of the steel, thus making the steel passive to cor rosion."FENOC-Davis-Besse Nucle ar Power Station, Unit 1, S ubmittal of Contractor Root Cause Assessment Report - Sec tion 1," ADAMS No. ML 12138A037, pp. 180-181/257 of .pdf.

3In "Intervenors' Third Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 At 180-181/257 of .pdf, 2012 Revised Root Cause Analysis by PII: "Corrosion of embedded3metal is one of the main causes of failure of concrete structures (ACI 201.2R, ACI 222R). Thecritical elements needed for corrosion to occur are water, oxygen, and chloride ions, which inturn makes permeability the main c oncrete property that influences corrosion resistance. Thehigh alkalinity (pH>12.5) of the concrete protects the thin iron-oxide film on the surface of thesteel, thus making the s teel passive to corrosion."

(Shield Building Cracking

)" (July 16, 2012), they pointed out that there w as no examination of admitted cra cking of the Shield Building Dome, or the below-grade Shield Building w alls in the 2011-2012 investig ation, despite the re velation that the shield building dome

, built in 1973, was sealed in 1976 but not before it had display ed cracking (so three years' worth of w ater soakinginto dome, flowing down side wa lls occurr ed). Moreover, NRC RAI s in late 2011/ear ly 2012asked about the "B lizzard of 1977," w hich was ne arly as troublesome a s the "Blizzard of 1978."

Water inflow throug h the Shield Building dome might ha ve contributed to water in the walls which, once the blizz ards and other fr eeze-thaw events initiated cracking, propagated it via ice

-wedging. As Intervenors warned in 2012, the whitewa shing of the Shield Building has nowlocked the w ater in the walls. Thus, eve ry time it freezes, a nother 0.4 to 0.7 inche s of circ um-ferential ice-wedging crack spreading takes place, as Intervenors pointed out in their September 2, 2014 filing. This is ag ing-related, it ge ts worse with ea ch winter freeze-thaw cycle.In PII's 2012 Revised Root Cause Ana lysis, FENOC asse rts that a wa terproofingmembrane was installed below-grade on the shield building e xterior. RRCA p. 33. The RRCA also reve als that the dec ision was taken in 1969 to not seal the inter ior or exterior of the shieldbuilding, nor the below-grade shield building wa lls. So the Shield Building was left wide open to damaging water infiltration, from above

, the sides, and be low, as we ll as inside-out, probably foreconomic r easons. De spite these moisture intrusion pathway s dating to 40 years ago, FENOCpersists in excluding from the A MP discussion any examination of the dome or the be low-gradeshield building wa lls. Cracks in the dome, fa iled seala nt on the dome exterior, and c ertainly thesealant-lacking

, degraded water-barrier at the base, a nd unseale d below-g rade Shield Building walls, are all vulnera bilities to wate r inflow to the SB w alls, that could worse n ice-wedging crack propagation. PII conclude s that "the [ext erior Shield B uilding] coating has effectively blocked out external wate r intrusion and locke d in moist ure or water existing in the struc ture prior to thecoating. This condition will have an impact on the moisture move ment and distribution within the shield building wa ll as descr ibed." F ACE, p. 41/98 of pdf.

PII conclude s that "[w]

hile application of the coating has effectively prevented wate rfrom ente ring the shield building, its application has a lso prevente d a finite a mount of moisture from leaving the structure (failure mode 6). U ntil this moisture dissipates it provides the water accumulation mechanism requir ed for Ice-Wedging, and ther efore is identified as Causa l Factor2." FACE, p. 55/98 of .pdf. PI I reached this conc lusion after a dmitting gravely mistaken assumptions at the time the decision to coat the Shield B uilding wa s taken:

The presence of moisture is inhere nt in any concrete struc ture, and as in the ca seof the shield building, it wa s not believed to pose a ny challeng es to the coa ting effort.Water discover ed in plug ged bores prior to coa ting application was be lieved to have entered from the outside environment, howe ver the possibili ty of existi ng water withinthe shield building wa s posed as fe asible. Howe ver, the belief w as that had the watercome from inside of the shield building, the amounts discovere d were small enoug h topresent no adver se effect to the shield buildi ng.FACE, p. 63/98 of .pdf

.Until the moist ure within the walls "dissipates, it provides the wate r accumulation mechanism required f or ice-wedging, and therefore is identified as the Contributing Cause to thelaminar c racking propagation."

Id., p. 65/98 of .pdf. The moisture level in the Shield Building concrete increased from 65% a s measure d in 2011 to 90-100% as mea sured in 2013.

Id., 76/98 of

.pdf.2. There is an issu e of fact as to wheth er the Shield Building conform s to its l icensing basis PII conclude s that "[a] review of e ngineering analysis documentation develope dfollowing the initial laminar cra ck condition, demonstrate d that the shield building re mainedstructura lly adequate for the controlling load case(s) and is in compliance to the c urrent designand licensing bases." FACE, p. 55/98 of .pdf

. This statement is highly suspect, and pr obablyfalse.In a May 8, 2012 email from Timothy Riley of NRC's offic e of OCA to Ohio's two U.S.

Senators (Exh. A here to), Riley noted that FE NOC "concluded in its Shield Building Root Cause Report dated F ebruary 27, 2012, that the SB [Shield Building], with the laminar cr acking in itswalls, was ope rable but non-confor ming to the c urrent design and licensing bases with re gard tothe desig n stress ana lysis methodology

, and the torna do allowable stre ss values."

In an NRC I nspection Report c overing the period December 1, 2011 throug h May 9,2012, ref erenced in the Riley email, the NRC confirms that the Shield B uilding cr acking meantthat the building f ailed to meet its licensing basis:For the Dire ct Cause CA No. 2, the licensee will develop an e ngineering plan tore-establish desig n and licensing basis for the SB

. Hence, the lice nsee will meet their procedure requirements for a ddressing the Dire ct Cause (

Reference NOBP-LP-2011,"FENOC Cause Ana lysis"). Based upon the proposed a ctions and ong oing NRC reviews for this are a, the NRC team c oncluded that the c ontinued capa bility of the SB to pe rformthe desig n safety functions would be a ssured. I n particula r, the NRC L RA review s willinclude an e valuation of the pr ogram for monitoring of the shield building cr acking. TheNRC team also confir med that that license e had assigned site staff (

e.g., owners) to eac hDirect Cause CA with rea sonable due dates.ADAMS no. ML 12173A023.

In "Intervenors' Fifth Motion To Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking

)" (Aug. 16, 2012), the I ntervenors amasse d considera ble evidenc emostly gleaned from FOIA requests conce rning departures of the Shield Building f rom Davis-Besse's cur rent lice nsing basis (CLB). For example, Document B

/23 [11/17/11; Davis-Be sseContainment Sy stem Primary Steel Containment and Shield Building. (

1 page)], at Pag e 28 of101 on PDF counte r, contains the statement that "[t]

he shield building w as designed to withstand forces generated by design bases se ismic events," but this assertion is cha llenged, if not outrig htundermined, by Document B

/1's reve lations. I ntervenors cited NRC's admission, "The existingas-found condition of cra cking in the concr ete of the shield building ha s raised que stions on the ability of the struc ture to maintain its ability to perfor m its design func tions under conditions that would introduce a ctive for ces (such as a seismic event or potentially rapid changes in the environmenta l conditions)," as supportive of its call for a hearing on the merits of these issues.

At pp. 41-42 fr om Intervenors' Doc ument B/26 [11/22/11; Em ail from A. Sheikh, NRR to E. Sanchez Santiag o, RIII on Questions for the Confe rence Call. (1 pag e)] [beginning on Page39 of 101 on PDF c ounter], at p. 41 [NRC staffer] Sheikh's states: "The lice nsee is using numerous assumptions in his sum mary report and calculations that are not describe d in theUFSAR and A CI 318-63, and still calls it a desig n basis calc ulation. Can the licensee providejustification for this approa ch." From Intervenors' Doc ument B/36 [12/02/11; Em ail from B

. Lehman, NRR to S. Sakai, NRR et al. FW: Davis Be sse POP. (2 pag es)] [which beg ins at Pag e 52 of 101] [commencing atPage 55 of 101 on PDF counter]: "The licensee still has unre solved questions to answer regarding the desig n basis of the plant. B asically, when the SB was built the requir ements and codes it wa s built under wer e for an uncracked building. B ecause the building is now cra cked, the question of whethe r the SB still meets the re quirements as state d in the FSAR [Final Safety Analysis Report]

and licensing basis needs to be evaluated."

In Intervenors' sec tion discussing Doc ument B/44 [12/13/11; Em ail from M. Ga lloway,NRR to A. Sheikh, NRR et al., RE: Davis-B esse Shield B uilding. (1 pa ge)], at Pag e 66 of 101 on PDF counte r, they observed that "Abdul Sheikh admits 'Davis B essee [sic] shield building has not been de signed for containment acc ident pressure and temper ature.'" Abdul Sheikh also stated in Docume nt B/26 that "I am concerned that the conc rete will fail in this reg ion due to bending in this reg ion even unde r small loads."

Given that ac cording to PII in the FACE r eport, "the laminar c racking of the shield building is unique with respe ct to reinfor ced concrete" (FACE, p. 63/98 of .pdf

); that FEN OChas just belatedly admitted a complete reversal of its forme r positions and acknow ledged thatthere is an ong oing cracking problem rela ted to an as-yet unresolved conc rete water saturation situation; t hat coating the e xterior of the Shield Building has "apparently" visited unexpected complications upon FEN OC; and that continued c racking is so proba ble that a monitoring effortthroughout the 20-y ear license e xtension has bee n postulated, there is an issue of fa ct as towhether the Shield Building conforms to its current licensing basis.3) Inaction is not effec tive Corrective ActionThe "corrective action" which is propose d for the Shield B uilding is mere ly "monitoring the crack propagation condition." FA CE, p. 66/98 of .pdf.

FENOC's policy of opposing repairs of small exterior cra cks may be counte rproductive. The assertion that "the shield building coating was completed in October of 2012 and w ouldtherefore prevent subsequent wate r intrusion" ig nores the pote ntial for new outer-wall cracks asfissures to continue to foste r water intrusion.

Id., 40/98 of .pdf. On the sa me page, PII points out that "[t]

he Davis-Besse maintenanc e rule manual states that c racks 1/16 in or less do not need to be repaired." Id. FENOC's policy against repa iring cracks may promote the spre ad of new oradditional exterior wall cr acking.The remedy proposed by FENOC and PI I is minimal expansion of bores (4 more

) to try tocapture info on wha t the sever e 2013-2014 w inter weather might have caused to the Shield Building, to conduct annua l monitoring and sa mpling throug h 2018, then to g o to biannual monitoring a nd sampling throug h 2026, and ultimately to move to ever y-four-year monitoring and sampling at that point throug h 2037. FACE, pp. 67-68/98 of .pdf.

PII admits that "there are no Correc tive Actions being implemented to mitigate a dverseconditions," only shield building monitoring a ctivities which will be trac ked throug h theCorrective Action prog ram. FACE, p. 70/98 of .pdf.

In 2012, I ntervenors identified the micr ocracking phenomena and called for tests to investiga te for the m extensively. The PII "Revised Root Cause Ana lysis" of spring 2012 4mentioned micro-c racking, and Intervenors petitioned for a djudication to investiga te in detail the possibili ty that the cr acking problems wer e not containe d by coating the Shield Building and that they were indeed aging-related and thus within the scope of this LRA proceeding. PII andFENOC now admit that micro-c racking, caused by freeze-thaw cycles, is ag ing-related.Contemporaneously in 2012, FENO C was discover ing excessive w ater presence in test boring holes in the Shield Building a nd not telling the ASL B, the parties to this proce eding, orthe public, not even its contra ctor, PII, which discove red the water presence in bor e holes in late 2013. FACE, p. 22/98 of .pdf

. The two y ears of conc ealment of the presence of incre ased waterconcentrations in the Shield Building w alls, espec ially through the uniquely severe winter ofhttp://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1213/ML12138A037.pdf4 2013-2014, has a lmost certainly worsened the sprea d of cracking. PII's September 2013 F ACEadmits that there is 0.4 to 0.7 inches of circumferential cra ck growth per freeze and a cknow-ledges up to 10.8 inches of additional cra cking per two y ears because of the w ater presence andice-wedging it ca uses.By "Intervenors' Third Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking

)" (July 16, 2012), they brought microcra cking to the ASL B's5attention.

See id., pp. 3-5. I n "Intervenors' Motion to Amend and Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cra cking)" (July 23, 2012),

they mention micro-cr acking at6pp. 7-8, 27, 40, and 46.

In "Intervenors' Motion to Amend and Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking

)" (June 4, 2012),

Intervenors mentioned (a t p. 6):7The conclusion that "the B lizzard of '78 did it" is viewe d with skepticism because the engineering liter ature is disputed over how for ceful the delivery of precipitation must be for it to penetrate concrete. In an article, "Qua ntification of Water Pene tration I ntoConcrete Through Cracks by Neutron Radiog raphy," The 3rd ACF I nternationalConference-ACF/VCA 2008, 925, M. Ka nematsu, Ph.D., I

. Maruyama, Ph.D., T.

Noguchi, Ph.D., H. I ikura, Ph.D. and N

. Tuchiya, research engineers, found that:

[W]ater pene trates throug h the crack immediate ly after pouring and itsmigration speed a nd distribution depends on the moisture condition in the concrete. With another de tailed ana lysis, it i s understood that the wa ter hasreached around 50mm depth in the horizontal crac k, but 20-30mm depth in the vertical crack immediately after pouring water. From these re sult it is detecte d thatwater reaches to the 25-30mm depth in few minutes af ter it is expos ed to wate rand in 30 minutes it reac hes to the 80mm. This means wate r will be supplied to the rebar with few minutes' sca ttered showe rs. http://www.beyondnuclear.org/storage/3rd%20%20Motion%20COMPLET%20supp%20cracke5d%20concrete%20containment%20contention%20July%2016%202012.pdfhttp://www.beyondnuclear.org/storage/4th%20Motion%20PII%20COMPLET.pdf6http://www.beyondnuclear.org/storage/June%204%202012%20Motn%20to%20Amend%20Sup7p%20Contn%205%20COMPLETE-1.pdf (Emphasis supplied). I ntervenors asser ted furthe r in that filing tha t Davis-B esse has other wa terproblems inside the shield building, pointing out that in RAI response s dated May 24, 2011 (ML 11151A90), the N RC staff had noted a "history of ground water infiltration into the annular space between the conc rete shield building and stee l containment." And tha t during a 2011 AMP audit, NRC staff also re viewed doc umentation that:

[I]ndicated the pre sence of standing water in the annulus sand pocke t region. Thestanding water appears to be a r ecurring issue of g round water leakage and areas ofcorrosion were observed on the containment ve ssel. In addition, during the audit the staff reviewed photog raphs that indica te peeling of clear coat on the containment vesse lannulus are a, and de gradation of the moisture barr ier, concrete grout, and sea lant in the annulus are a that we re installed in 2002-2003.

Id. at 47/280 of .pdf.

"Intervenors' Motion to Amend and Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield B uildingCracking)" at 12.Intervenors submit now, as they did in 2012, that "there has been no considera tion nordiscussion which addre sses the possibilit y that much less than the dr ama of the Blizzard might have produced the damage." FENOC argued the "

Blizzard of '78" in 2012, to deny aging-rela-tedness and r ender Intervenors' challenges about c racking outside the scope of this procee ding.As Intervenors were suggesting on June 4, 2012 that g reater significance should attac h to mere "scattered showe rs" and their possible influence on the cr acking issue, FEN OC was either concealing, or, at be st, ignora nt of the sig nificance of, the presence of water in the walls.

FENOC had found wa ter in the bore holes "in 2012," PI I reported on September 11, 2013.

But FENOC had c onsidered it so little water a s to be insignific ant. And, F ENOC assumed, the water must have come in throug h the bore holes themselves, fr om the exterior SB side wa llsurface, due to rain. PI I in September 2013 c onfirmed that the w ater in the walls was inter nal in nature, not sneaking in throug h the bore holes on the exterior surfa ce. And PII also found that the water in the walls was sy mptomatic and a ke y cause of the ice

-wedging crack propagation. Without a full-spec trum investiga tion into water sourc es, it is not li kely that the dehy dration of the Shield Building walls ca n be accomplished. This source of standing groundwater identified above by Intervenors could we ll be wicking water up into the walls. PI I in the FACE trie s toassure that the wate r in the wa lls will dissipate over time, but there is no ex planation as to how this will happen, or when. The whitewash pr events the w ater in the walls from e scaping that way

.The standing water on the g round is a sourc e of which could we ll be moving into the wa lls.And so FEN OC, acknow ledged only in August-September 2013 tha t it had supposedly learned for the first time that the cr acking was getting worse. And it wa s not until July 2014 that the company disclosed this revela tory PII FACE report to the ASL B, the Intervenors, and the public. For two years the fac ts of water saturating the Shield Building

, with ice-w edging effectthrough the most difficult and bitterly cold winter of the 21 Century, was kept from the stLicensing Board, Intervenors, and the public.

LEGAL STANDAR DSa. Timeliness of this A mended/Supplem entation Under the ASLB panel's Initial Scheduling Or der ("ISO") in this proce eding, a newcontention must meet the re quirements of the former (that is, pre-August 2012) 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2)(i) throug h (iii), which provide d that Intervenors may submit a new conte ntion only with leave of the presiding off icer upon a showing that: (i) The information upon which the a mended or new contention is based was not previously available

(ii) The infor mation upon which the ame nded or ne w contention is based is mate riallydifferent than informa tion previously available

(iii) The a mended or new contention has bee n submitt ed in a timely fashion base d on theavailability of the subseque nt information.

8The presiding AL SB in this case state d at p. 12 of the I nitial Scheduling Or der, ASLBPNo.11-907 LR-BD01 (June 15, 2011) that "The B oard dire cts that a motion and propose dnew contention shall be dee med timely under 10 C.F

.R. § 2.309(f)(

2)(iii) if it is filed within six ty(60) days of the date when the ma terial infor mation on which it is based first bec omes availableto the moving pa rty through service

, publication, or any other mea ns."Intervenors respectfully submit t hat their a mendment and suppleme ntation of Contention 7 are timely filed bec ause this Motion has been f iled within six ty (60) days of the provision of the July 3, 2014 RAI letter a nd its enclosures by FENOC's counsel on July 8, 2014. CA's May 16posting da te and conforms with the ASL B's Initial Scheduling Or der. Shaw Areva MO XServices, Inc. (Mixed Oxide Fuel F abrication Facility), LBP-08-10, 57 NRC 460, 493 (2008). I ntervenors have also moved in a timely manner under 10 C.F

.R. § 2.309(f)(

2)(i)-(iii).1) Information not previously available The infor mation upon which I ntervenors' amendment and suppleme ntal facts are ba sedwas available f or the fir st time when distributed to the ASL B and the par ties by FENOC'scounsel on July 8, 2014. This filing is timely as it is being ma de on the f irst business day afterthe 60 day following July 8, which wa s September 6, 2014, whic h fell on a w eekend. 10 C.F.R.

th Licensing Board Order (Initial Scheduling Order) at 12 (June 15, 2011) (unpublished)8[hereinafter ISO].

§ 2.306(a)

. Although the ASLB panel stated in its J uly 25, 2014 order in this case that 9FENOC's modifications to Davis-B esse's Shield Building Monitoring Program were provided on July 3, 2014, Amendment No. 51 to the Da vis-Besse LRA actually was distributed on Jul y 8,2014. (See also fn. 1, infra). Intervenors could not file this contention re garding modifications 10to Davis-B esse's Shield Building Monitoring Program until they were placed in the public domain on J uly 8.If a contention satisfies the timeliness require ment of 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f

)(2)(iii), then, by definition, it is not subject to 10 C.F.R. 2.309(c)

, which spec ifically applies to nontimely filings.

The three (f)(2) factors are not mere e laborations on the "g ood cause

" factor of § 2.309(

c)(1)(I),since "good cause

" to file a nontimely contention may have nothing to do with the fac tors setforth in (f)

(2). Entergy Nucle ar Vermont Y ankee, LLC, and Entergy Nucle ar Operations, Inc

.(Vermont Yanke e Nuclear Power Station), L BP-06-14, 63 NRC 568, 573 (2006).

2) Materially different information The infor mation upon which this new conte ntion is based is materially different thaninformation pre viously available prior to J uly 8, 2014. The Atomic Safe ty and Licensing Board("ASLB") panel itself indicated as muc h in its own J uly 25, 2014 ruling by pointing out this opportunity for Intervenors to file a ne w contention. I n the July 25 order

, the ASL B wrote: "The last day of the period so computed is included unless it is a Saturday or Sunday, a Federal9legal holiday at the place where the action or event is to occur, or a day upon which, because ofan emergency clos ure of the Federal government in Washington, DC, NRC Head quarters doesnot open for business, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day that is not aSaturday, Sunda y, Federal legal holiday, or emergency cl osure."The Licensing Board acknowledged in the July 25, 2014 order that the July 3, 2014 letter from10FENOC's counsel to the ASLB and parties "is dated July 8, 2014. Enclosure 1 to the letter isdated July 3, 2014." Order, fn. 89.

To the extent that I ntervenors have proffered Contention 6 in advance of future modifications to the rele vant AMPs that they assume will occur as a result of the re centlyidentified structura l problems, it is premature. The Board notes that the modifica tions toDavis-Besse's Shield Building Monitoring Program, anticipated by the Intervenors, wer eprovided on July 3, 2014 in Amendment No. 51 to the Da vis-Besse LRA. Specific intervenor concerns regarding specific portions of L RA Amendment No. 51 may besubmitted to the B oard in a timely manner for its consider ation as spec ified by our InitialScheduling Order.11With the July 3, 2014 "modifica tions to Davis-Be sse's Shield Building Monitoring Program," FENOC saw it as nec essary to modify its moni toring program due to receivingconfirmation from its contractor

, PII, in August-September, 2013 tha t there w as previouslyundetected cracking, and wor sening cracking, in the Shield Building. PI I's "Full Appare nt CauseEvaluation" (

"FACE") represents signific ant, new, ma terial infor mation.3) Timeliness of the amended or ne w contention This new conte ntion has been submitted in a timely fashion, within six ty (60) days of theavailability of the subseque nt information, namely

, the July 8, 2014 notification to the ASL B andthe parties of modifications to Davis-B esse's Shield Building Monitoring Program, accompaniedby the disclosure of PII's "Full Appare nt Cause Evalua tion.".ADMISSIBILITY CRITERIAContentions mus t meet the admissibility criteria set for th in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)

,which requires ea ch contention to: (1) provide a spe cific state ment of the issue of la w or fact tobe raised; (2) provide a brief explanation of the basis for the contention; (3) de monstrate that the issue raised in the c ontention is withi n the scope of the proc eeding; (4) demonstra te that the issue MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (

Denying I ntervenors' Motion for Admission of Contention11No. 6 on Shield Building Concrete Void, Cracking and Br oken Rebar Problems), FirstEnergyNuclear Operating Company (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), Docket No. 50-346-LR, ASLBP No

. 11-907-01-LR-BD01, July 25, 2014, Page 16

, internal citations omitted.

raised in the c ontention is material to the finding s the NRC must m ake to support the lice nsingaction; (5) pr ovide a c oncise stateme nt of the alleg ed facts or expert opinions in support of the petitioner's position on the issue and on which the petitioner intends to rely at hearing; and (6) provide suff icient information to show that a g enuine dispute e xists with t he applica nt/licensee on a mater ial issue of law or fact, with refe rence to spec ific disputed portions of the a pplication.

A failure to meet a ny of these c riteria r enders the contention inadmissible. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(I)-(vi). These admissibili ty criteria are addressed in turn be low.1) Specific stateme nt of the issue of law or fact to be raised The propose d contention appe ars below. Amended w ording appears in italics.

FENOC's revisions to the AMPs in its Shield Building Monitoring Program, dated July 3,2014, acknowledge not only the risk, but the re ality, of aging-related cracking propagation - that 12is, worsening

- in the alre ady severely cracked Shield B uilding, an a dmission which brings the issue within the scope of this L icense Renewal Application proce eding. FENOC's proposed modifications to its S hield Building Monitoring Prog ram AMPs, reg arding the scope (areas ofthe Shield Building to be examined), sample size (number of tests to be per formed), and the frequency of its surveillance activities, are woefully inadequa te. Signific antly more core bores, aswell as a broader diversity of compleme ntary testing me thods should be require d, and at a muchgreater frequency than FENOC has propose

d. The c racking phenomena must be identified, analyzed and addr essed within the F inal Supplemental Environmental I mpact Statement for thelicense r enewal both in the consideration of alternati ves to granting the 20-y ear license extension for Davis-Besse as well as in the Sev ere Accident Mitigation Alternatives analysis (SAMA). The crack ing problems do not support a conclusion that t here is "reasonable assurance" that Davis-Besse can be ope rated in a manner protec tive of the public health and safety under the A tomic Energy Act during the 20-y ear proposed lice nse extension period.

The FACE evalua tion provided as Enc losure 2 to FE NOC's Jul y 3 RAI letter ve rifies to a degree of scientific certainty, aging-related cracking is spreading through the Shield Building walls, which buttresse s Intervenors' Septembe r 2, 2014 Contention 7 filing a nd ensure s that this issue falls within the scope of this License Renewal Application proce eding. FENOC's proposed See "FENOC's RAI Letter, July 3, 2014," Enclosure 2. 12 modifications to its S hield Building Monitoring Prog ram AMPs, reg arding the scope (areas ofthe Shield Building to be examined), sample size (number of tests to be per formed), and the frequency of its surveillance activities, are woefully inadequa te. Signific antly more core bores, aswell as a broader diversity of compleme ntary testing me thods should be require d, and at a muchgreater frequency than FENOC has propose

d. The c racking phenomena must be identified, analyzed and addr essed within the F inal Supplemental Environmental I mpact Statement for thelicense r enewal, both as par t of the Sever e Accident Mitiga tion Alternatives ana lysis (SAMA) and as pa rt of the c onsideration of a lternatives to a 20-year operating lice nse extension. .

Moreover, the pre sence of unresolved and c ontinuing cr acking of the Shield Building

,which per forms seve ral key safety and prote ctive func tions relative to the Da vis-Besse nuclea rreactor, should be he ld not to suffice to provide "

adequate assura nce" as required by 10 C.F.R. § 54.29: A renewed license ma y be issued by the Commiss ion up to the full term authorized by

§ 54.31 if the Commissi on finds that:

(a) Actions have been ide ntified and ha ve been or will be take n with respec t to thematters identified in Para graphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section, such tha t there is reasonable a ssurance that the a ctivities authorized by the renewed license w ill continue to be conduc ted in acc ordance with the CL B, and that any changes made to the plant' s CLBin order to c omply with this parag raph are in accord with the Act and the Commission'sregulations. These matter s are:(1) managing the effects of a ging during the period of e xtended ope ration on the functionality of structure s and compone nts that have be en identified to re quire reviewunder § 54.21(

a)(1); . . . .

2) Provide a brief e xplanation of the basis for the contention In light of the revelations in August-Septe mber 2013 of pr eviously undetected cracks andthe conclusion that they were worsening (propagating), Intervenors challenge the adequacy ofFENOC's Shield Building Monitoring Program AMPs proposed f or the 2017-2037 lice nse extension period. Specifica lly, FENOC's testing f requency is inadequate

, and may become lessadequate over time (via re laxed, less freque nt testing). T he Shield Building walls are saturate dwith water

, and ther e is no forma l explanation as to how tha t circumstanc e, which he lps to cause cracking of the c oncrete walls, will be re medied. I n light of r ecently-misidentified cra cking,which was underestimated, investiga tory inspections and conc rete sample ana lysis must takeplace on a more frequent basis than biannua lly or every fourth y ear, which F ENOC proposes.

The number of core bores to be examined should be signific antly increased over the mea gernumber propose d by FENOC. Vast ar eas of the Shield Building surface area, and volume, would fall outside of F ENOC's Monitoring Program AMPs, as cur rently construed, in lig ht of the meager sampling prog ram propose

d. The scope of the testing should also be sig nificantly expanded.

Given the importanc e of the Shield Building to ra diologica l containment, such a s theproper functioning of the Emer gency Ventilation Sy stem, as well as a biolog ical shield, and a 13tornado a nd missil e shield, and thus to public health, saf ety, and envir onmental protec tion, and 14 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station/License Renewal Application/Technical Information,13section 2.3.3.13 Emergency V entilation System. Page 2.

3-88 [184/1,810 on pdf counter]. Thisdocument, dated August 30, 2010, appears to have not been posted at ADAMS nor assigned anML number. Ho wever, it is posted at the following link on NRC' s website:http://www.nrc.gov/rea ctors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications/davis-besse/davis-besse-lra.pdf. At section 2.4.1 CONTAINMENT (INCLUDING CONTAINMENT VESSEL, SHIELD14BUILDING, AND CONT AINMENT INTERNAL STRUCTURES)-SEISMIC CLASS I

, of theDavis-Besse Nuclear Power Station/License Renewal Application/Technical Information,FENOC states: "The Shield Building is a concrete structure surrounding the Containment Vessel.It is designed to provide biological shielding during normal op eration and from hypotheticalaccident conditions. The building provide s a means for collection and filtration of fission productleakage fro m the Containment Vessel following a hypothe tical accident through the EmergencyVentilation System, an engineered safety feature designed for that purpose. In addition, thebuilding provide s environmental protection for the Containment Vessel from adverse in considera tion of the alre ady severe, and worsening, cracking of the Shield Building

, theseinadequacies in the Monitoring Program AMPs are unacceptable, a nd must be rec tified.3) Demonstration that the issue raised in the contention is within the scope of the procee dingFENOC has re versed its former position on cra cking of the Shield Building and conside rsthere to be ag ing-related risks of cr acking propagation. As previously noted, 10 C.F.R. § 54.29 allows a lice nse renewal if the Commis sion finds that "(a)

Actions have been ide ntified and ha vebeen or will be taken . . . suc h that there is reasona ble assura nce that the activities authorized by the renewed license w ill continue to be conducte d in accordance with the CL B, and that any changes made to the plant' s CLB in orde r to comply with this parag raph are in accord with the Act and the Commission's re gulations." These matters include "

(1) managing the effects of a gingduring the period of extended opera tion on the functionality of structure s and compone nts. . . ."

Respecting the NEPA portions of the c ontention, I ntervenors seek Severe AccidentMitigation Alterna tives (SAMAs). F ENOC's consulting contractor, PII, considers the crackingof the Da vis-Besse Shield Building to be "unique."

FACE, p. 63/98 of .pdf

. Since the cr acking isclearly site-spec ific, NEPA re quires SAMAs as a Category 2, site-spec ific, consider ation. 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)

(3)(ii)(L). SAMAs are the only Category 2 issue with respec t to severe accidents. Florida Power &

Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear G enerating Plant, Units 3 & 4),

LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 160-161 (2001).

Respecting a more serious inquiry into alternatives to continued ope ration of Da vis-atmospheric conditions and external missiles." Page 2.4-3 [263 of 1,810 on PDF counter]This Davis-Besse NPS/LRA/Tech. Info. document, dated August 2010, is posted athttp://www.nrc.gov/rea ctors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications/davis-besse/davis-besse-lra.pdf.

Besse, it is a g iven that the Commissi on may accord substantial weig ht to FENOC's pr eferencesand economic goals. Nuclear Manage ment Co., LLC (Monticello Nucle ar Generating Plant),LBP-05-31, 62 NRC 735, 753 (2005). B ut an agency must not craft a set of alter natives so narrowly as to rende r it a for egone conclusion that the proposed ac tion will be deemed supe rior.Exelon Generation Company (Early Site Permit for Clint on ESP Site), LBP-05-19, 62 NRC 134, 158 n.77 (2005). NE PA does not require an applica nt to look at every conceivable alter native,but rather requires only considera tion of fea sible, nonspeculative, r easonable alter natives.Respecting the compromised Shield B uilding, "r easonable consider ation of alter natives" should mean that a n accurate economic c osting of the replacement of the Shield Building should be included in the NEPA a nalysis, along w ith other reme dial steps, such as r eplacement of por tionsof the re inforced concrete walls. "Reasonable alternatives for lice nse renewal proceedings arelimited to discre te options that are f easible te chnically and available commer cially, as well as the GEIS requireme nt that the "no-a ction" alter native addr ess energy conservation. Entergy Nucle arOperations, Inc.

(Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 & 3), L BP-08-13, 68 NRC 43, 205 (2008).Legalistically

, Intervenors' contention controver sies fall we ll within t he scope of thisLRA proceeding.4. Demonstration that the issue raised is material to t he findings the NRC must make to support the licensing action The NRC is mandated by the Atomic Ener gy Act and N ational Environmental Policy Actto provide re asonable assurance of public health and sa fety, and envir onmental protec tion, during the proposed 20-year license e xtension at Davis-B esse, and to take a "

hard look" at environ-mental impacts, as by making predictive safe ty findings and conduc ting an environmenta l

analysis regarding the safe ty and envir onmental impacts of the 20-year license e xtension.The Shield Building at Davis-B esse is cr itical to radiolog ical conta inment during reactoremergencies, such as meltdowns or othe r radioactive r eleases. It can filter radioa ctivity to acertain extent before it is expelled to the ext ernal atmosphere, a nd it is also essential to defending the Inner Stee l Containment Vessel, and Rea ctor Pressur e Vessel against ext ernal threats, such a stornadoes or missiles. The Shield Building f urther pr ovides biologic al shielding during normaloperations. (See fns. 12 and 13 infra).The severe, and finally

-admitted incre ased cracking of the Shield Building threatens tofail the Shield Building from per forming its vital design safety and envir onmental func tions. Intervenors challenge the adequacy of FENOC's Shield Building Monitoring Prog ram AMPs to guarantee the Shield B uilding fulfills its vital safety functions, as re quired by applicable laws and regulations.

Also, the NEPA document r equires a realistic Severe Accident Mitigation Alterna tivesanalysis which includes among its assumpti ons a flaw ed Shield Building which may not meet its current licensing basis (CL B). The requisite decisions on the issues raised by this contention are dir ectly material to alicense e xtension decision for D avis-Besse. 5. Concise statement of the allege d facts or expe rt opinions i n support of the petitioner's position and on w hich the petitioner intends to rely at hearing Intervenors incorpor ate herein by reference and re-allege as if w ritten here in "Intervenors'Motion for Admission of Contention No. 7 on W orsening Shield Building Cra cking andInadequate AMPs in Shi eld Building Monitoring Program," and the se ction infra entitled "F actsWhich Require Expanded NEPA Consideration and/or U ndercut a Finding of 'Reasonable Assurance.'" 6. Showing of a genuine dispute between the lice nsee on a m aterial issue of law or f act, with reference to specific disputed portions of the application There are several genuine disputes. F ENOC's cr edibility as nucle ar manager and operatorof Davis-Besse is broug ht squarely into focus by the revelations that the root ca use(s) (for therehave been two prior to the c urrent "apparent cause") do not ade quately encompass or explain the cracking phenomenon.

There is a dispute over w hether Davis-Besse conforms to its curre nt licensing basis(CLB) merely by providing a slightly more engaged monitoring program. Part of that dispute is how and why FENOC intends principally to take samples f rom areas where there already areknown cracks, as opposed to sampling f rom a more dispersed se t of locations on the Shield Building exterior.

The scope of causation of the wa ter satur ation within the Shield Building wa lls isdisputed; I ntervenors contend tha t insufficiently

-inclusive ana lysis of potential water sources hasbeen unde rtaken. There is a dispute over w hether the SAMA portion of the NEPA doc ument for the lice nserenewal must take c ognition of the deterior ating state of the Shield B uilding. The re is a dispute over whether the NEPA-r equired "hard look" at alter natives to a 20-y ear license e xtension has been achieved in light of the r eversal of position by FENOC that admits the cra cking problems are likely to be per manent and inc reasingly intrusive into the structural integ rity of the Shield Building.CONCLUSION If FENOC cannot assure D avis-Besse's safety, then the plant must be per manently shut down, not g ranted a 20-year license e xtension. I t has bec ome incre asingly clear that Da vis-Bessefails the re asonable assurance of adequate protec tion test, given its Shield Building

's aging-related degradation, its severe and worsening cracking, and its susceptibility to not properly perform vital desig n functions. FE NOC cannot be allowed to e ndanger the public throug hout itsregion by operating Davis-Besse for 20 a dditional y ears in such a deg raded, and wor sening, state.WHEREFORE

, Petitioners pray the Atomic Safe ty and Licensing Board panel allow the amendments a nd supplementation as explained her einabove, and that it admit Contention 7 as amended and supplemente d for full adjudication.

Executed according to 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(

d)/s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry J. Lodge (Ohio Bar #0029271) 316 N. Michig an St., Ste. 520 Toledo, OH 43604-5627Phone/fax (419) 255-7552 tjlodge50@

yahoo.comCounsel for I ntervenorsCONSULTATIO N PURSUANT TO 10 C.F

.R. § 2.323(b)

Undersigned counsel he reby certifies that he made a sincere attempt to consult wit hopposing c ounsel for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff and for FirstEne rgy NuclearOperating Company in an ef fort to re solve the conc erns raised in the for egoing Motion. Counsel for FirstEnerg y Nuclear Operating Company indicated in an e mail on September 8, 2014 that FENOC would oppose I ntervenors' Motion. Counsel for the NRC Staff state d that the Staff did not oppose I ntervenors' rig ht to file this Mot ion, give n the ASL B's mention of the possibilit y inits July 25, 2014 order

, but reser ved the r ight to oppose it upon re view.

Executed in Ac cord with 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(d)

/s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry J. LodgeCounsel for I ntervenors UNITED STAT ES OF AMERICANUCLEAR REG ULATORY COMMISSION Before the At omic Safety and Licensin g BoardIn the Matter of

)Docket No. 50-346-L FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company)September 8, 2014 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1

))CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the for egoing "INTERVENORS' MOTI ON TO AMENDAND SUPPL EMENT CONTEN TION NO. 7 O N WORSENING SHIELD BUILDINGCRACKING AND INADEQUATE AMPS I N SHIELD BUILDING MONITORINGPROGRAM" was deposited in the N RC's Electronic I nformation Exchang e this 8 day ofthSeptember, 2014 a nd was ser ved upon all par ties of re cord.Executed in Ac cord with 10 C.F.R. § 2.304(d)

/s/ Terry J. Lodge Terry J. Lodge (Ohio Bar #0029271) 316 N. Michig an St., Ste. 520 Toledo, OH 43604-5627Phone/fax (419) 255-7552 tjlodge50@

yahoo.comCounsel for I ntervenors-27-