ML17264A849

Proposed Tech Specs 3.7.12 Re Spent Fuel Pool Boron Concentration

ML17264A849
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	03/31/1997
From:	ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17264A848	List: ML17264A847 ML17264A849 ML17264A851 ML17309A614
References
NUDOCS 9704070040
Download: ML17264A849 (29)

Text

SFP Boron Concentration 3.7.12 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7. 12 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)

Boron Concentration c,- t.)

LCO 3.7.12 The SFP boron concentration shall be a 0 ppm.

APPLICABILITY:

When fuel assemblies are stored in the SFP and a SFP verification has not been performed since the last movement of fuel assemblies in the SFP.

ACTIONS CONDITION RE(UIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

-A.

SFP boron concentration not within limit.

---

NOTE-------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

A. I AND A.2.1 OR Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the SFP.

Initiate action to restore SFP boron concentration to within limit.

Immediately Immediately A.2.2 Initiate action to perform SFP verification.

Immediately 9704070040 97033i PDR ADOCK 05000244 P

PDR R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 307 27 Amendment No.

61

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3.'7 PLANT SYSTEMS

~ a.~+a.hi~ o.~o

'3 7.13 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)

Storage SFP Storage 3.7.13 LCO 3.7. 13 Fuel assembly storage in the spent fuel pool shall be maintained as follows:

C

~ X ~'L

-:a.

Fuel assemblies in Region 1 shall have a K-infinityof

~ 1.458.

and "b.

Fuel assemblies in Region 2 shall have initial

'enrichment and burnup within the acceptable area of the Figure 3.7.13 l. ~

APPLICASILITY:

Whenever any fuel assembly is stored in the spent fuel pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

"-A.

Requirements of the A. 1 LCO not met for either region.

---

NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.3 is not'applicable.

Q.X ~ 1 Initiate action to move the noncomplying ue asse rom app >cable region.

Immediately

+o ~ ~~~~<

X'4~QAi R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.7-29 Amendment No.

61'

SFP Storage 3.7.13 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

.SR 3.7.13.1 NOTE Not required to be performed when transferring a fuel assembly from Region 2

to Region.l.

Verify by administrative means the K-infinityof the fuel assembly is ~ 1.458.

Prior to.

storing the fuel assembly in Region 1

SR 3.7.13.2 Verify by administrative means the initial enrichment and burnup of the fuel assembly is in accordance with Figure 3.7. 13~

, 2.

Prior to storing the fuel assembly in Region,:2 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.7-30 Amendment No.

61

SFP Storage 3.7.13 40000 ACCEPTABLE 30000 O.

=E rD

-m 20000 P

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UNACCEPTABLE 10000

OFA Fuel 6 Exmn Fuel

---

5'1D Fuel 1.8 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.8 4.2 Nominal U Enrichment(w/o) 6.0 Figure 3.7.13~

Fuel Assembly Burnup Limits in Region 2

R.f. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.7-31 Amendment No.

61

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I A1 - Acceptab rnup domain for storage in any location in Region 2.

A2. - AcceptableMurnup domain for storage. face-adjacent to ype A1 or A2 assembly, or a water cell.

B

- Acceptable burnup domain for storage face-adjacent to a Type A1 assembly or a water cell.

C

- Acceptable-burnup domain for storage:face-adjacent,to a water cell only.

Storage 3.7.13, Region 2.Loading,Ciuve.

cate M 30000 8=

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Figure 3.7:13-2 I uel Assembly Burnup Limits in Region 2" RK..Ginna.Nuclear..Power Plant 3.7-3gQ

Design Features 4.0

4. 0 DESIGN FEATURES 4.2 Reactor Core (continued)

-4.2.2 Control Rod Assemblies The reactor core shall contain 29 control rod assemblies.

The control material shall be silver indium cadmium.

-4.3 Fuel Storage 4:3.1 4:3. l.I The spent fuel storage racks are designed and shall be-maintained with:

>>a.

Fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of 5.05 weight percent;

..b.

k,<< s 0.95 if fully flooded with unborated water, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.1 of the UFSAR; C,a.a c ~

Consolidated-rod storage canisters may be stored in the spent fuel storage racks provided that the fuel assemblies from which the rods were removed meet all the requirements of LCO 3.7.13 for t e re ion in which the anister is to be store However e consol ate ro storage canister located i Region RGAF2 may ex eed these re u' The a erage ecay ea o

the ue assembly from which the rods were removed for all consolidated fuel assemblies must also be s 2150 BTU/hr.

4.3.1.2 The new -fuel storage dry racks are'esigned and shall be maintained with:

a.

Fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of 5.05 weight percent; b;

-k,<< z 0.95 if fully flooded with unborated water, which includes.an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section 9.1 of the UFSAR; and c.

k,<< s 0.98 if moderated by aqueous foam, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section

9. 1 of the UFSAR.

(continued)

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 4;0-2 Amendment No.

61

Design Features 4.0

(

4.0 DESIGN FEATURES (continued)

-4.3 Fuel Storage (continued)

.4.3.2

~Dnaina e

The spent fuel pool is designed and shall be maintained to prevent inadvertent draining of the pool below elevation 257'0" (mean sea level).

.4.3.3

~Ca acit "The spent fuel pool is designed and shall be maintained with-a storage capacity limited to.no more than Qgg fuel assemblies.

la~a

~4 R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 4.0-3 Amendment No.

61

P Boron'oncentration B 3.7;12

'ASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The postulated accidents in the SFP can be divided into two basic categories (Ref.

3 and 4).

The first category are events which cause.

a loss of cooling in the.SFP.

Changes in the SFP temperature could result in an increase in positive reactivity.

However, the positive reactivity is ultimately limited by voiding (which would result in 'the addition of negative reactivity) and the SFP geometry which is designed assuming use of unborated water even though soluble boron is available (see Specification 4.3. 1.1).

The second category is related to the movement of fuel assemblies in.the SFP (i:e a fuel handling accident) and is the most limiting accident scenario with respect to reactivity.

The types of accidents within this category include an incorrectly transferred fuel assembly (e.g., transfer from Region 1 to Region 2 of.an unirradiated or an insufficiently depleted fuel assembly) and a dropped fuel assembly.

However, for both of these accidents, the negative reactivity effect of the soluble boron compensates for the increased reactivity.

By closely controlling the movement of each assembly and by checking the location of each assembly after movement, the time period for potential accidents which credit use of the soluble boron may be limited to a small fraction of the total operating time.

The concentration of dissolved boron in the SFP satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO

+5~

The SFP boron concentration is required to be a 00 ppm.

-The specified concentration of dissolved boron in the SFP preserves the assumptions used in the analyses of the potential critical accident scenarios as described in References 3 and 4 (i.e.,

a fuel handling accident).

This concentration. of dissolved boron is the minimum required concentration for fuel assembly storage and movement within the SFP until the fuel assemblies have been verified to be stored correctly.

R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.7-'87 (continued)

Revision 0

FP Boron Concentration B 3.7.12 BASES (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7.12.1 This.SR verifies that the concentration of boron in the SFP is within the limit. -'As long as this SR is met, the analyzed accidents are fully addressed.

The 31 day.

Frequency is appropriate because the volume and boron concentration in the pool is normally stable and all water level changes and boron concentration changes are controlled

, by plant procedures.

This SR is required to be performed prior to fuel assembly movement into Region 1 or Region 2 and must continue-to;be performed.until the necessary SFP verification is accomplished (i.-e.,

SR 3.7.13.1 and 3;7.13:2).

'EFERENCES I.

ANSI N16.1-1975, "American National Standard for Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materials Outside Reactors."

"2.

Letter from B.K. Grimes, NRC, to All 'Power Reactor Licensees,

Subject:

"OT Position for Review.and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications," dated April 14, 1978.

.3.

Westinghouse, "Criticality Analysis of the R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Fresh and Spent Fuel

Racks, and Consolidated Rod Storage Canisters,"

dated June 1994.

4.

UFSAR, Section 15.7.3.

3.

Framatome Technologies, Inc.,""R:E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant,

~

Spent Fuel Pool Re-racking Licensing Report," Section 4, February 1997.

R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.7-89 Revision 0

SFP Storage B 3.7.13 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.13 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)

Storage

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BASES BACKGROUND

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.'K-a~Wet~

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'The spent fuel pool (SFP) is divided into two separate and distinct regions (see Figure B 3.7.13-1) which, for the purpose of criticality considerations, are considered as separate pools (Ref. I).

Region 1, with gsWagstora e

positions, is d 'o accommodate new or spen fuel utilizing a checkerboard arran ement fuel

.assem i

an enric

~

w. can be stored at any available location in Region 1 since the accident analyses were performed assuming that Region 1 was filled

, with fuel assemblies of this enrichment.

A fuel assembly with an enrichment

> 4.05 wt% U-235 can also be stored-in Region 1 provided that integral burnable poisons are resent in the assemblies such that k-infinity is. s 1.458.

he exis ing esign uses ntegra ue Burna e

sorbers IFBAs the poison for fuel assemblies with enrichments

> 4.05 wt%.

IFBAs consist of neutron absorbing material which provides equivalencing reactivity holddown (i:e.,

neutron poison) that allows storage of higher enrichment fuel.

The neutron absorbing material is a non-removable or integral part of'he fuel assembly once it is applied.

The infinite multiplication factor, K-infinity, is a reference criticality point of each fuel assembly that if maintained s 1.458, will result in a k,<< z 0.95 for Region 1.

'The K-infinitylimit is derived for constant conditions of normal reactor core configuration (i.e., typical geometry of fuel assemblies in vertical position arranged in an infinite array) at cold conditions (i.e., 68'F and 14.7-psia).

egion 2, wi 840 s orage positions, is designed to accommodate fue of various initial enrichments which have accumulated minimum burnups i hin the acceptable domain according to Figure 3.7. 1

, in the accompanying LCO.

.The

~$~

s orage o

ue hich are within the acceptab e

ran e of Figure 3.7.13 in Region 2 ensures a K,<< s 0.95 in this region.

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(continued)

R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.7-90 Revision 0

'Fuel assemblies with initial enrichments and burnups within domain A1.of Figure 3.7.13-2 may be stored in any location in Region.2.

Fuel assemblies with initial enrichments and burnups within domain A2 of Figure 3.7.13-2 shall be stored face-adjacent to a'Type A1 or A2 assembly, or a water cell (empty cell).

Fuel assemblies with initial enrichments and burnups within domain B of Figure

'.7.13-2 shall be stored face-adjacent to a'Type A1 assembly or a water cell (empty cell). Fuel assemblies with initial enrichments and burnups within domain C of Figure 3.7.13-2 shall be stored face-adjacent to a water cell (empty cell) only. 'The word "face-adjacent" on Figure 3.7.13-2 is defined to mean that the flat surface of a fuel assembly in one cell faces the Bat surface of the assembly in the next cell.

///40!:caeno.vp; /IS/Ã

SFP Storage B 3.7:13 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

O Consolidated rod tor ge nisters can also be stored in either-region i t rovi burnu of Figure 3:7.13-1 et.

In addition, all canisters p ace n o service a

er 1994 must have-z 144 rods or a 256 ro (Ref. '.2).

e canis ers. are s

a n ess s ee con ainers contain the fuel rods of a maximum-of two fuel assemblies (i;e., 358 rods).

All bowed, broken, or otherwise. failed fuel rods.are first stored in;a.stainless steel tube of 0.75 inch outer diameter before being placed in:a canister.

Each canister will accommodate 110 failed fuel rod~tubes.

The water in the'SFP normally contains soluble boron, which "

results in large subcriticality margins under actual operating conditions.

However, the NRC guidelines, based upon the accident.condition in which all.soluble poison is assumed to have been lost, specify that.a limiting k,<< of 0;95 be maintained in the abs'ence of soluble boron.

Hence, the design of both regions is based on the use of unborated water. such that configuration control (i..e., controlling the movement.of the fuel'ssembly and checking the location. of.

each assembly after movement) maintains each region in.a subcritical condition during normal operation with the regions fully loaded.

The double contingency principle discussed in ANSI N16.1-1975 (Ref.,3) and Reference 4 allows credit for soluble boron under abnormal or accident conditions, since only a single accident need be considered at one time.

For

example, the most severe accident scenarios are associated with the movement of'fuel from Region 1 to Region 2, and accidental misloading of a fuel assembly in Region 2.

Either scenario could potentially increase the reactivity of Region'2.

To-mitigate these postulated criticality related accidents, boron is dissolved in the pool water.

Safe operation of the storage. racks with no movement of-assemblies may therefore be achieved by controlling the location of each assembly in-accordance with this LCO.

Within 7 days prior-to movement of an assembly into a SFP region, it is necessary to perform SR 3.7.12.1.

Prior to moving an assembly into a SFP region, it is also necessary to perform SR 3.7. 13. 1 or 3.7. 13.2 as applicable.

R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B:3.7-91 (continued)

ReVision 0

SFP Stor'age B 3.7.13 BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The postulated accidents in the SFP can be divided into two basic categories (Refs.

2 and 5).

The first category are events-which cause a loss of cooling in the SFP.

Changes in the SFP temperature could result in an increase in positive reactivity.

However,-the positive reactivity is ultimately limited-by voiding (which would result in the addition of negative reactivity) and the SFP geometry which is designed assuming use of unborated water even though soluble..boron is available (see Specification 4.'3. 1. 1).

The second category i's related.to the movement of fuel assemblies in the SFP (i;e a fuel handling accident) and is the most limiting

.accident scenario with respect to reactivity.

The types.of accidents-within this category include an incorrectly transferred fuel assembly (e.g., transfer from Region 1 to Region 2 of an unirradiated or an insufficiently depleted fuel assembly) and a dropped fuel assembly.

However, for both of these accidents,"the negative -reactivity effect of the soluble boron compensates for the increased reactivity.

By closely controlling the movement of each assembly and by checking 'the location of each assembly after movement, the time period for potential accidents which credit use of the soluble boron may be limited to a small fraction of the total operating time.

The configuration, of fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool satisfies Criterion 2 of the NRC Policy Statement.

LCO The restrictions on the placement of fuel assemblie's within the SFP ensure the k,<< of the SFP will always remain

< 0.95, assuming the pool to be flooded with unborated.water (Specification 4.3.1. 1).

For fuel assemblies stored in Re ion 1, each assembl must have a K-infinity,of s 1.458.

or fuel assemblies stored in Region 2, ins sa enric men and burnu shall be within the acce tab e

h ~

3.7.

he x-axles o

is the nominal enrichment wt% whic does not include the + 0.05 wt%

tolerance that is allowed for fuel manufacturing and listed in Specification 4.3.1.1.

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R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.7-92 Revision 0

SFP Storage B 3.7.13

.BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY This LCO applies whenever any fuel assembly is stored in the SFP.

ACTIONS A.l When the configuration of fuel assemblies stored in.either Region 1 or Region 2 of the SFP is not within the LCO limits, the immediate action is to initiate action to make the necessary fuel assembly movement(s) to bring t

~ r~ P Hc configuration into compliance with Specif n-4.3. 1. 1.

This compliance can be made by rel in the fuel assembl to a different regio~

+

Required Action A.l is modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 'does not apply since if the LCO is not met while moving irradiated fuel assemblies in MODE 5 or-6, LCO 3.0.3 would not be applicable.

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, 3, or -4, the action is independent of'reactor operation.

Therefore, inability to move fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require.a reactor shutdown.

'SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.7

~ 13.1 This SR verifies by administrative means that the K-infinity of each fuel assembly is ~ 1.458 prior to storage in Region

l. If the initial enrichment of a fuel assembly is

~ 4.05 wtl, a K-infinityof s 1.458 is always maintained.

For fuel as'semblies.with enrichment

> 4.05 wt%,

a minimum number of IFBAs must be present in each fuel assembly such that k-infinityz 1.458 prior to storage in Region 1.

This verification is only required once for each fuel assembly since the burnable poisons, if required, are an integral part of the fuel assembly and will not be removed.

The initial enrichment of each assembly will also not change (i.e., increase) while partially burned assemblies are less reactive than when they were new (i.e., fresh).

Performance of this SR ensures compliance with Specification 4.3. 1. 1.

(continued)

R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.7-93 Revision 0

SFP Storage 8 3.7.13 BASES SURVEILLANCE RE(UIREHENTS SR 3.7.13.1 (continued)

Though not required for this LCO, this.SR mu also be performed after completion of fuel movement -HAe Region

exit the Applicability of I.CO 3.7.12, "SFP Boron~ ~'ta ~

Concentration."

This SR is modified by a Note which states that, this verification is not required when transferring a fuel assembly from Region 2 to Region 1.

The verification is not required since Region 2.is the limiting SFP region, and as

such, the fuel has already been verified to be acceptable for storage in Region. l.

.SR 3.7.13.2 This SR verifies by administrative means that the initial enrichment and burnup of the fuel assembly is in accordance with Fi ure 3.7. 13-in the accompanying LCO prior.to s orage in Region, Once a fuel assembly has been ver~fied to be within the acceptable range of Figure 3.7.13 ~

further verifications are no longer required since the

'initial enrichment or burnup will not,adversely change.

For fuel assemblies in the unacceptable r'ange of Figure 3.7.13-1, performance of this SR will ensure compliance with.Specification 4.3.1.1.

Though not required for this LCO, this SR mu iso be performed after completion of fuel movement 'egion 2 to exit the Applicability of LCO 3.7. 12.

REFERENCES

,1.

UFSAR, Section 9.1.2.

2.

Westinghouse, "Criticality Analysis of the R.E. Ginna

. Nuclear Power Plant Fresh and Spent Fuel

Racks, and Consolidated Rod Storage Canisters,"

dated June 1994.

3.

ANSI N16.1-1975, "American National Standard for Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fispionable Haterials Outside Reactors."

2.

Framatome Technologies, Inc., "R. E. Ginna Nudear Power Plant, Spent Fuel Pool Re-racking. Licensing Report," Section 4, February 1997.

(continued)

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 8 3.7-94 Revision 0

,SFP Storage B 3.7.13 Spent Fuel Storage Racks 3 'wA1ERBOXEs Q rroaNmczus RCKORAQS CAPhCtTYSN

~TOTALCAPACflYCN6FUELARKMBUES R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Figure B 3.7.13-1 Spent Fuel Pool B 3.7-96 Revision 0

SFP Storage B 3.7.13 Norfh Fuel Elevator Area Reciion.2 1,075'Spent Fuel Cells Receion-1 294'Spent'Fuel Cells Cas Area figure B 3;7.13-1 Spent Fuel Pool R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant B 3.7-96a Revision XX

Included Pages:

Attachment III Proposed Technical Specifications 3.7-.27 3.7-'29 3.7-30 3.7-31 3.7-31a 4.0-2 4.0-3

P Boron Concentration 3.7.12 3."7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.12 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)

Boron Concentration LCO.3:7.12 The SFP boron concentration shall be a 450 ppm.

APPLICABILITY:

When fuel assemblies are stored in the.SFP and a

SFP verification has not been performed since the last movement of fuel assemblies in the SFP.

-ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

~A..SFP boron concentration not

-within limit.

---

NOTE-------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

"A.'.1 Suspend movement of fuel assemblies in the SFP.

AND Immedi ately

.A.2..1 Initiate action to restore SFP boron concentration to within limit.

Immediately

'OR A.2".2 Initiate action,to perform SFP verification.

Immediately R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.7-27 Amendment No. Q

(g a

,.SFP Storage 3.7.13 3'".7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.13 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Storage LCO.3.7.13 Fuel assembly storage in the spent fuel pool shall be maintained as follows:

-a.

Fuel assemblies in Region 1 shall have.a K-infinityof

~ s 1.458-and shall have initial enrichment'and burnup within the acceptable area. of Figure 3.7.13-1; and

-. b.

Fuel assemblies in Region 2 shall have initial enrichment and burnup within the acceptable area of the Figure 3";7.13=2.

APPLICABILITY:

Whenever any fuel assembly is stored in the spent fuel pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 4A.

Requirements of the LCO not met -for either region.

-A:1

---

NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Initiate action to

.move the noncomplying fuel assembly.to an

.acceptable storage location.

Immedi ately R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.7-29 Amendment No. Q

V

(4 SFP Storage 3.7.13 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7. 13.1 Verify by administrative means the K-infinity-of the fuel assembly is ~ 1.458 and that the initial enrichment and burnup is in accordance with Figure 3.7.13-1.

Prior to storing the fuel assembly in Region.1 SR '3.7.13:2 Verify by administrative means the initial enrichment and burnup of the fuel assembly is in accordance with Figure'3;7.13=2.

Prior to storing the fuel assembly in Region.2 R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.7-30 Amendment No. Q

SFP Storage 3.7.13 30000 t

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Assembly InitialEnrichment, Wt%

A - Acceptable burnup domain for storage in any location within Region 1.

B - Acceptable burnup domain for storage in cells with lead-in funnels only.

Figure 3.7.13-1 Fuel Assembly Burnup Limits in Region 1

R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.7-31 Amendment No. Q

SFP Storage 3.7..13

j A

-g4 50000 CO

+ le+4 20000

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Al - Acceptable burnup domain for storage in, any location-within Region 2.

-A2 - Acceptable burnup domain for storage face-adjacent to a Type Al or A2 assembly,- or-a water cell.

B - Assembly burnup domain for storage face-adjacent to a Type Al assembly or a water cell.

C - Acceptable burnup domain for storage face-adjacent to a water cell only.

Figure 3.7.13-2 Fuel Assembly Burnup Limits in Region 2

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 3.7-3la Amendment No. Q

o

.Design Features 4.0 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES

'-4:2 Reactor Core (continued) 4.2.2 Control Rod Assemblies The reactor core shall contain. 29 control rod assemblies.

The control material shall be silver indium cadmium.

~4".3 Fuel Storage

-4:3.1

~CHti 4;3.1. 1 The spent fuel storage racks are designed. and shall be maintained -with:

a.

Fuel assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of 5.05 -weight percent;

.b.

. k,<< s 0;95 if fully flooded with unborated water,

-which includes. an allowance for uncertainties as described in. Section 9.1 of the UFSAR;

-"c ~

Consolidated rod storage canisters may.be stored in the spent fuel storage racks provided that the fuel assemblies from which the rods were removed meet

.all the requirements of LCO 3;7.13 for the region in which the canister is to be stored.

The average decay heat, of the fuel assembly from which the rods were removed for all consolidated fuel assemblies must also be-~ 2150 BTU/hr.

-4.3.1.2 The new fuel storage dry racks are:designed and shall;be

-maintained with:

'a.

"Fuel, assemblies having a maximum U-235 enrichment of 5.05 weight percent;

-b.

k.<<w 0;95 if fully flooded-with unborated water,

• which includes an allowance for uncertainties as

.described in Section 9.1 of the UFSAR; and c.

k, c 0.98 if moderated by aqueous foam, =which includes-an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section

9. 1 of the UFSAR.

(continued)

R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 4.0-2 Amendment No. Pf

Design Features 4.0 3'>

-4.0 DESIGN FEATURES (continued)

-4.'3 Fuel Storage (continued)

.4;3.2

~Draiea e

The spent fuel pool is designed and shall be maintained to prevent inadvertent draining of the pool below elevation 257'0" (mean sea level).

-4.3."3

~Ca acct The spent fuel pool is designed and.shall be-maintained with.a storage capacity limited to.no-more than 1879 fuel assemblies and 1369 storage'locations.

R.E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 4.0-3 Amendment No. g

Attachment IV R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Spent Fuel Pool Re-racking Licensing Report February 1997

0