NRC-90-0130, Application for Amend to License NPF-43,clarifying Ref Points for Setting Uptravel & Downtravel Stops on Refueling Platform Hoists.Requests Review & Approval of Proposal Prior to Second Refueling Outage Scheduled for Mar 1991

Application for Amend to License NPF-43,clarifying Ref Points for Setting Uptravel & Downtravel Stops on Refueling Platform Hoists.Requests Review & Approval of Proposal Prior to Second Refueling Outage Scheduled for Mar 1991

ML20058M879
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	08/01/1990
From:	Orser W DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML20058M881	List: ML20058M884 NRC-90-0130, Application for Amend to License NPF-43,clarifying Ref Points for Setting Uptravel & Downtravel Stops on Refueling Platform Hoists.Requests Review & Approval of Proposal Prior to Second Refueling Outage Scheduled for Mar 1991
References
CON-NRC-90-0130, CON-NRC-90-130 NUDOCS 9008130107
Download: ML20058M879 (9)

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't August 1,1990 NIC-90-0130

- U. S. Ibclear Begulatory Commission Attn Docunent Control Desk

.i' Washington, D. C.

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Peferences: 1)

Fermi 2 NIC Docket No. 50-341 NBC License No. N F-43 I

2). NIC Inspection Peport 89025, dated Novenber 1,1989

Subject:

Proposed Technical Specification Change (License Amandnen t) - Refueling Platform (3/4.9.6) 5-Pursuant to 10CFR50.90, Detroit Edison Conpany hereby proposes to anend Operating License NF-43 for the Fermi 2 plant by incorporating the enclosed changes. into.the Plant' Technical Specifications.- -The proposed changes will clarify the reference points for cett!ing the uptravel' and downtravel stops on the refueling platform's hoists.

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This change will preclude. inconsistent application and differing '

interpretations.

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' No are requesting your. review and approval of'this proposal prior to j

4 our second refueling outage which is currently scheduled for March, l

-1991.;

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Detroit'. Edison has evaluated the proposed Technical Specification y against the criteria of.10CFR50.92 and determined that no.significant

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" hazards consideration is involved. The Fermi 2 Onsite Review

. Organization has= approved and'the Nuclear Safety Feview Group has.

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reviewed; the propose.d Technical-Specification and concurs with the.

' enclosed determinations. - In cocordance with 10CFR50.91, Detroit 1

- Fdison has provided a copy of this let ter to th6 Ftate of Michigan.

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. NIC-90-0130 '

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If you'.have any questions, please contact Mr. Gordon Nader at (313).

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.586-4513.

Sincerely, Enclosure-cci A. B. Davis i.

R. W. DeFayette W. G.-Rogers J. F. Stang Supervisor, Electric Operators, Michigan.

Public -Service Cminission - J. -Padgett

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US!GC August 1,'1990 i

100-90-0130 Page 3 i

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i I, WILLIAM S. ORSER, do hereby affirm that the foregoing statments j

are based on facts and circunstances which are true and a:: curate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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i W4 WILLIAM S. ORSER 3

Senior Vice President Ch this day of

, 1990, before ne

. personally'appeated William S. Orser[/being first duly sworn and

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says that he executed the foregoing as his free act and deed.

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't0C-90-0130 Page 1 JMrmatlCTICR4 The refueling platform provides a means for noving fuel bundles betwen the fuel storage pool and the reactor vessel. It allows spent fuel to be renoved from the reactor and trmspetted underwater to the fuel storage pool, and allows new fuel to be loaded into the reactor.

Additionally, the various hoists nounted on the refueling platform are used in a variety of vessel servicing activities including installation and renoval of coni.rel blades, blade guides, fuel support pieces, etc. Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.9.6 ' REFUELING PIRWOWa" r s]uires that the Refueling Platform be CPEIABLE during the handling of fuel assenblies or control rods withu the reactor pressure vessel. The refueling platform is equipped with three notor-driven hoists for the handling of fuel assenblies or control rods: (1) the nain fuel gr@ple boist, (2) the frane counted auxiliary hoist, and (3) the nonorail auxiliary hoist. The main fuel gr @ple hoist consists of an electrically operated triangular telescoping mast and built-in gr@ple book for engaging the bail handle of a fuel assembly. The frane nounted and nonorail auxiliary hoists are electrically operated single cable hoists to which refueling tools are attached. Each hoist has uptravel and downtravel adjustable position switches which automatically stop the hoist. The uptravel stop prevents liiting of fuel assenblies and control rods beyord the

- specified TS level of 6 feet 6 inches below the refueling platform tracks. The uptravel stops maintair ;hese irradiated components under sufficient water shielding for perscnnel safety. The downtravel stops prevent over extension of the hoists for equipment ard load protection. The purpose of this proposal is to clarify the reference points for setting the uptravel and downtravel stcps to preclude inconsistent @ plication and differing interpatations. Reference 2 nentions that an interpretation concern has occ arrsd in the past.

The uptravel stop surveillanco requirennt (TS 4.9.6.b, see attached) is not specific on the Itference points that s'.ould be used to set the refueling platform hoists uptravel stops. Specifically, when using the main fuel gr@ple hojst thu uptravel stop is set such that the distance from the refueling platform tracks iown to the end of the fuel gr@ple is 6 feet 6 inches. This maintab: the load aA least 6 feet 6 inches below the reibeling platform tmks which corresponds to 5 feet 6 inches of water s hielding (essuming normal reactor cavity water level during refueling operation). However, when centrol rods are being removed or rep 1xed, the frane nounted or nonorail auxiliary hoist nust be used and EDufstgr1 to a contrcl rug gr@ple or control rcd latch tool. Since the length of the tool increases the distence the control rod is below the refueling platform, the settings of the stops for these hoists nest coupensate for the added length of these tools. 'Jhis consideration is very critical when noving contro? rurls

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'Ehclosure to

'100-90-0130 Page 2 through the refu. ling canal because there is not suf ficient clearance between the control rod and the bottom of the refueling canal if the uptravel stops are set without conpensating for the length of the tool. 'the current settings of these stops do not conpensate for the length of the tool. Ttus, control rods are not able to be transferred through t** refueling canal without bypassing the uptravel stops.

This problem does not exist for the transfer of fuel assenblies using the nein fuel grgple hoist because the grapple (tool) is integrated into this hoist's nest.

In order to nove contIV1 rods through the refueling canal without bypassing the uptravel stops and naintain the rcds 6 feet 6 inches below the refueling platform tracks (TS limit), the uptravel stop settings on the frane noonted and nonorail auxiliary hoists nust be neasured ard set from the top of the refueling platform tracks to ttm i

point of attachnent of the control rod to t.he refueling tools. Ttus,

for thu frane nounte and nonorail auxiliary hoists the refueling tool l

length nust be included as part of the TS length of 6 feet 6 inches.

Setting the uptravel stops in this manner will allow the transfer of i

the control rods through the refueling canal and still naintain the TS required shielding because the control rods will be 6 feet 6 inches below the top of the refueling platform tracks. Additionally, setting the frane nounted and nonot til auxiliary hoists in this manner will be consistent with the nethod f setting the main fuel grapple hoist, which has its grgple (tool) integrate 3 into its nef t.

The current wording of TS 4.9.6.b doea not clearly define the s tting reference points for these stops. The proposed changes to TI 4.9.6.b ard the Bases clarify this situation.

Surveillance 4.9.6.c (see attached) ensures that the nein fuel gr@ple hoist and the frame nounted and nonorail auxiliary hoists downtravel stops are CPERABLE. The downtravel stop for the main fuel grapple

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provides indication to refueling personnel that a fuel assenbly is conpletely inserted into the core and prevents exterding the boist's mast below the fuel's top guide to prevent damage during refueling platform notion. The downtravel stops for the frane nounted and i

nonorail auxiliary hoists are provided to prevent unraveling of their cables off the boist's wrap-up druns. The current wording of TS 4.9.6.c does not clearly define the setting reference position for these stops. The proposed changes clarify this situation.

A final clarification to TS 3/4.9.6 is the deletion of the word i

'" crane" from the Surveillance Requirenents and Bases. The refueling platform's lifting devices, as briefly described above, are all conmonly referred to as tv:>ists, not cranes.

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L mC-90-0130 L

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ESMBIEN Fuel.assenblies and control rods are raised to the uptravel stop position in order to clear the refueling canal. It has been estinated for irradiated fuel assenblies in this position that the dose rate at the floor of the operator's cab of the refueling platform will be about 14 nhe/hr. This is based on nornal reactor cavity water level l

during refuel operations which corresponds to 5 feet 6 inches of water and 6 feet additional distarce from the water surface to the j

operator's cab abc.ve the top of the fuel assenbly bail handle.

During the repimenrnt of 20 control rods at Fermi 2 (first refueling outage) a maxinum water surface dose rate of 80 nmen/hr was observed.

The top of the subject control rod was approxinately 5 feet 6 inches under tie surface of the water. This dose rate would correspond to t

about 20 nmer/hr at the floor of the operator's cab. This configuration (e.g., 5 feet 6 inches of water and 6 feet of additional length above the top of the control rod bail hadle) is consistent with the configuration specified by the proposed Technical Specification 4.9.6.b.

During Fermi 2's secen3 refueling outage we currently plan on replacing all the renaining control rods which contain pins and rollers made out of cobalt alloy material in order to reduce future p? ant ra$iation levels from the accunulation of Co-60. me l

hundred-sixty five control rods (out of 185) vill be replaced with c

rods that c onte.in non-cobalt pins and rollers. For the control rods p

which are scheduled to be removed from the core during the second l

refueling outage, the source strengths and dose rates otill be different from the first refueling values. The highest-activity i

control rods will be the 17 control rods containing the cobalt alloy material which were used in control cell core locations during cy:le two. It is estimated that for these 17 control rods the dose rate at i

the floor of the operator's cab will be about 40 nmen/hr with a nomal water depth of 5 feet 6 inches. In considering these values, it should be noted that the actual trmsit tine with the control rods at the uptravel stop position is short (0.5-2 minutes per control rod) and the done rate from the majority of the control rods will be less than 40 nmen/hr because their accunulative egosures are snaller.

Additionally, future control rod replacenent (following replacenent of control rods with pins and rollers containing the cobalt alloy naterial) will not have as high Cobalt-60 activities.

Setting of the frane nounted and/or nonorail hoists uptravel stop based on a specific tool length will require additional administrative control. Administrative controls will be established to properly natch refueling tools with a hoist's uptravel stop setting to ensure l

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' tac-90-0130 Page 4 the TS uptravel stop limit is correctly established (i.e., to ensure that the tool length plus the lengtn of the hoist's cable, based on the existing uptravel stop setpoint, is greater than or equal to 6 feet 6 inches below the top of the refueling platform tracks). The Bases have been nodified to specifically state that the point of attc:hnent is where the bail handle rests in the fuel grgple.

The reference points used for setting the downtravel stops on rll the refueling platform hoists are the top of the platform tracks cnd the end of each hoist. For the nein fuel grapple the length is 52 feet 3 inches from the top of the refueling platform tracks to the end of the hoist's built-in gr@ple. For the frane nountM and nonorail auxiliary hoists this length is 85 feet from the top of the refueling platform tracks to the end of the hoists (i.e., without e. refueling tool attached).

In conclusion, the intmt of the current TS is note accurately and clearly specified by the proposed TS chinges. The proposed change to TS 4.9.6.b clarifies the reference poir.ts for the setting of the uptravel stops. This change /clarificacion will result in re-adjustnent of the frane nounted and/or nonorail auxiliary hoist's uptravel setpoint but it will not redtce the shielding of the transferred control roda as currently required by the TS. The transferred control rods will still be maintained 6 feet 6 inches below the top of the refueling platform tracks (TS limit) which is consistent ylth the transfer configuration of fuel assent) lies using the main fuM grapple hoist. The proposed change to TS 4.9.6.c clarifies the reference points for the setting of the downtravel stops. This clarification does not change the downtravel stop setpoint. Finally,. the refueling platform's lifting devices are all consonly referra:1 to as " hoists"; thus, the deletion of the word

" crane" from the surveillance requirenents and Bases clarifies this TS.

El(BEIFICMir MEMOS CKBEMEIRTICBI In accordance with 10CFR50.92, Detroit Edison has made a determination that the proposed anendnent involves no significant hazards considerations. To nake this determination, Detroit Riison nust establish that operation in accordance with the proposed anendnent would not: 1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or 2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or 3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

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The proposed changes do not significantly increase the proLability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated beca se the proposed changes do not change or affect any accident or. transient analysis and they do not significantly nodify the plat or introduce a tw namner of plat operation. These changes do not affect the postulated drop height of a fuel

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assenbly; thus,' the consequences of the Fuel Hedling Accident is unaffacted. ' The proposed changes clarify the reference points for setting the uptravel and downtravel stops on the refaeling platform hoists. These changes will preclude inconsistent application and differing interpretations. The proposed chmges to the uptravel stop surveillance requirenant and Bases do not reduce the anount of shielding currently required by '14chnical Epocificailon. The proposed change to the dowitravel stop surveillan:e requirenent does not change the setting of the e

downtravel stops.

Additionally, the refueling platform's lifting devices are all consonly referred to as " hoists"; thus, the deletion of the word " crane" from the surveillance r

requirenents and Bases clarifles this TS.

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The proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accxdent from any accident previously evaluatal becalse the proposed change does not significantly nodify tre plant or introduce a new manner of plant operation.

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Administrative controls will be established to properly match refueling tools and. hoists to ensure that the TS uptravel stop setting is established.

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The proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety becalse, as nentioned in item 1, the change does not significantly modify. the plant or introduce a new manner of plant operation. The proposed changeu do not change any safety limit or limiting safety system setpoint. The proposed change to the uptravel stop surveillance does nct reduce the anount of I

water shielding currently requireC by the TS. The proposed change to the downtravel stop surveillance requirenent does not f

change the setting of the downtravel stops. Additionally, the refueling platform's lifting devices are all comnonly referred to L

as " hoists"; thus, the deletion of the word "crme" from the surveillance requirenents and Bases clarifies this TS.

Based on the above, Detroit B31 son has determined that the proposed anendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

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' NIC-90-0130 Page 6 ENVIMEREAN, IWACT Detroit Edison has reviewed the proposed Tecinical Specification changes against the criteria of 10CFR51.22 for environnental considerations. The proposed change does not involve a significat hazards consideration, nor significantly change the types or significantly increase the anounts of effluents that say be released offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cunulative occupational radiation exposures. In considering ra31ation exposures, it nust be noted that the actual transit tine with the control rods at the uptravel stop position is short (0.5-2 minutes per control rod) and future control rod replacenent (following replacenent of control rods with pins and rollers containing the Cobalt alloy material) will not have the high activity due to the Cobalt. Therefore, e>posures will not significantly increase. Based on the foregoing, Detroit Edison concludes that the proposed Technical Specifications do neet the criteria given in 10CFR51.22(c)(9) for a categorical exclusion from the requirenants for an Environnental Inpact Statenent.

GBCilEICM Lase 5 on the evaluation above: 1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and 2) such activities will be conducted in conpliance with the Comniission's regulations and prcposed anendnents will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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