ML20094M413

Proposed Tech Specs Re RPT Operability & Surveillance Requirements

ML20094M413
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold
Issue date:	11/15/1995
From:	IES UTILITIES INC., (FORMERLY IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT
To:
Shared Package
ML20094M411	List: ML20094M413 NG-95-2969, Application for Amend to License DPR-49 Re RPT Operability & Surveillance Requirements
References
NUDOCS 9511270048
Download: ML20094M413 (8)

Text

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RTS-286 to NG 93 2969 Page1of1 PROPOSED CHANGE RTS-286 TO THE DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The holders oflicense DPR-49 for the Duane Arnold Energy Center propose to amend Appendix A (Technical Specifications) to said license by deleting certain current pages and replacing them with the attached, new pages. The List of Affected Pages is given below.

LIST OF AFFECTED PAGES 3.2-34 3.2 35 3.2 36 3.2-47

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES:

The following list of proposed changes is in the order that the changes appear in the Technical Specifications (TS).

Eage Description of Chances 3.2-34 Editorial clarification in paragraph 3.2.G.1, "(EOC)-RIYT."

3.2.-35 Revise note "d" to clarify requirement that inputs are required from both the Turbine Stop Valves and the Turbine Control Valves. Add note "f" to the specified Applicable Operating Mode for "(EOC)RfrT Logic."

Add new note "f" to clarify that (EOC) RPT OPERABILITY requirement is dependent on reactor power. Revise " Action 81" to require that when (EOC) RPT is not OPERABLE, operating limit MCPR penalty is to be applied.

3.2-36 Change "(EOC) RIYT Logic"" Channel Functional Test" frequency from monthly to quarterly. Clarify " Operating Modes for Which Surveillance Required" for "(EOC) RPT Logic" and "RPT Breaker" by adding notes ""*" and "#," respectively. Revise " Response Time" test acceptance criteria to specify appropriate values for the two (EOC) RPT inputs and clarify the method of measuring that response time.

3.2-47 Revise Bases to reflect above changes.

9511270048 951115 PDR ADOCK 05000331 P

PDR

4 DAEC-1 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS G.

RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP-(BPT) AND G.

RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP fRPT) AND ALTERNATE ROD INSERTION (ARI)

ALTERNATE ROD INSERTION (ARI)

INSTRUMENTATION INSTRUMENTATION 1.

(ATWS)

.RPT/ARI 1.

Fech RPT and ARI instrumentation-channel shall be demonstrated The instrumentation that trips OPERABLE by the performance of the-the recirculation pumps and CHANNEL CHECK, FUNCTIONAL TEST and initiates ARI as a means of CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at limiting the consequences of a the frequencies shown in Tableg4.2-failure to scram.during an G.

anticipated transient shall be

. OPERABLE as shown in Table 2.

LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and 3.2-G.

simulated automatic operation of all ATWS-RPT/ARI instrumentation channels shall be performed at least (EOC)-RPT once per operating cycle.

1 The instrumentation that trips 3.

Timo. response testing of the RP' the recirculation pumps during breakers shall be performed at'least stop valve or control valve fast once per operating cycle.

closure for,Lgapsiant_ margin improvem

'- =-fidili-> t end-of-cycl 1 be OPERABLE as shown in Table 3.2-G with the RPT SYSTEM TIME RESPONSE as shown in Table-4.2-G.

Acolicability:

As shown in Table 3.2-G Actions' With one or more'(ATWS)RPT/ARI or

'(EOC)-RPT instrument channels 1

inoperable, take the ACTION required by Table 3.2-G.

l R ~fS - 2 8 6 Amendment No. bey NS W 'I93 3.2-34

g

sg 5

Table 3.2-G fATWS)RPT/ARI AND EOC-RPT INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM OPERABLE APPLICABLE u)

CHANNELS PER OPERATING TRIP FUNCTION TRIP LEVEL SETTING TRIP SYSTEM" MODE ACTION (ATWS) RPT/ARI s 1140 peig

~2*

1

.80 Reactor High Pressure (ATWS) RPT/ARI 2 +119.5 inches 2*

1 80 Reactor Water Level-Low-Low N

(EOC) RPT Logic NA 1*

1 81

."y (a)

'There shall be one OPERABLE trip system for each parameter.

If this cannot be met. cae w

indicated ACTION shall be taken.

on (b)

There are 2 trip systems. The instruments are arranged in a two-out-of-two once lixJ c.

i (c)

If an instrument (s) is(are) inoperable, it may be considered to be OPERABLE if plaevi in a l

tripped condition.

1 (d)

Two (EOC)RPT systems exist, either of which'will trip.both recirculation _,

a SIX (e)

If the duration of required surveillance testing for a RPT system exceeds 4wo-onsecutive hours em shall be ab (O

(G'00 R PT is r crej +o be O PERABLE dary yeae.r opera %n greah,- %n or egwI fo 30 9* r*A*A SS f*W*

a

=

x ACTION 80 - a.

q With one instrument channel inoperable, restore the inoperable instrument channel to

\\g OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

.c '

b.

Wi % both instrument channels inoperable, restore at least one instrument channel to N

OPE BLE status wit.hin 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be i at least HOT STANDBY.within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

(

Esd O

ACTION 81 - If bot systems re-inope_rab_le or if on_'RPT system is inoperab_

ronser hour _ :r crderP; p rr rrfurtirr rErli M initiited - p more_than 72

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rrrrter prrr r__rll br lerr n 4 hourg appl A,peramg store ' Mepg 7,,,g4y s pe c,t e,_;

7, A,

cot g, y

t.ygy. 6 #

j RTS-286 INSERT Each TRIP SYSTEM consists of two channels monitoring inputs which sense Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure or Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) closure, respectively. A minimum of one CHANNEL monitoring each (EOC)RPT input (TCV fast closure or TSV closure) shall be OPERABLE to ensure initiation of(EOC)RFr for either a turbine trip or load reject event.

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i RT5 - ? Blo il/95

P N

Table 4.2-G F

,ArWSiRPT/ARI AND EOC-RPT INSTRunENTATION SuRvEIttANCE REOu1RExENTS

.:s ct B

OPERATING CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH z

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL SURVEILLANCE P

TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION REQUIRED w

M (ATWS) RPT/ARI NA A

A 1

. Reactor High Pressure w

(ATWS) RPT/ARI NA A

A 1

Reactor Water Level-Low-Low (EOC) RPT Logic NA 4t-Q NA 1*

RPT Breaker NA R

NA

'K#

w

'o r,

wos END-OF-CYCLE ( EOi RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME TRIP FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME

_N RPT Syste_n_d(Ticbrne Confrol %be. (as f (/me,)

s.140 ms R FT S stem (Tur bine Sfep Wise Clo s* ra)

& 12 o msec. 4* '

y

)

wergisakien of he [ssf o.x.Kn3 go la n e tel This response time is from iritiatier of Turbine Centrcl '/cl;c Fcct Clecure cr Turbir.c Stcp '/cl cc 7

,j Clcourc to actuation of the breaker secondary (auxiliary)' contact.

3 Ug RPr

-t + This res po n se b e-is frown ac.habe n of % TwcYns SVoy Vtte y ibn SUIbb h " S'NI*

• Y 7

ndarf

(*-wsiliary). Conheh j

of KPT breaker se c o E

reg w:r J o.* l J rt.,3 4kose.

Pert *Js whe n fL. Eoc(itPT) eyste.*1

& O PE R 4 ErLE.

• e TMs s uvstile m Ts y

to b' P*rI*"'d E*';"3 h

I*f"el OJ~g e p ete r

+o

%s eq :<ed

1. TVs s u r ve;ila n ce is OPERATIMf-CYCLE Jarro) 4;ch (r.od RPT will ke.

OPE R A BL E.

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DAEC-1 l For each parameter monitored, as listed in Table 3.'2.F, there are at least two (2) channels of instrumentation.

By comparing readings between the two (2) channels, a near continuous surveillance of instrument performance is available.

Any deviation in readings will initiate an early recalibration, thereby maintaining the quality of the instrument readings.

On July 26,.1984 the NRC published their final rule on Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS), (10 CFR=550.62).

This rule requires all BWR's to make certain plant modifications to mitigate the consequences of the unlikely occurrence of a failure to scram during an anticipated operational transient.

The bases for these modifications are described in NEDE-31096-P-A,

" Anticipated Transients Without Scram; Response to NRC ATWS Rule, 10 CFR 50.62," December, 1985. The Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS) was modified for two-pump operation to provide the minimum required flowrate and boron concentration required by the ATWS rule (see section 3.4 Bases). The existing ATWS Recirculation Pump Trip (RPT) was modified from a one-out-of-two-once logic to trip each recire. pump to a two-out-of-two-once logic to trip both recire. pumps, ("Monticello" design).

This logic will also initiate the Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) system, which actuates solenoid valves that bleed the air off the scram air header, causing the control rods to insert.

The instrument setpoints are chosen such that'the normal reactor. protection system (RPS) scram setpoints for reactor high pressure or low water level will be exceeded before the ATWS RPT/ARI setpoints are reached.

Because ATWS is considered a very low' probability event and is outside the normal. design basis j

for the DAEC, the surveillance frequencies and LCO requirements are less stringent than for safety-relat.skjnstr==nt.*ti A

g;n ne C re 4$r.Has L1rath Pr*r* (C'd) f The End-of-Cycle (EOC) recir 1

on pump trip was added to the plant to improve the operating margin o uel thermal limits, in particular Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR).

h EOC-RPT trips the recire. pumps to lessen l

the severity of the power inc a es caused by either a closure of turbine stop

_ valve = ar F==t closure of the u bine control valves with reactor power "k[', --- open!sr tneS930% and a simulta us _{ailurs of he turbine bypass valves to The operating limit MCP.ws,f ::;qien 3.12.0 s calculated assuming an OC-T tom.

If the requirement. of able 3.2-G are not met, then th: ::::t: ;:r : 1 ::1 1: c':du ? d tE r I S 95t 5f rit' d; 7.i 5 till :Erl :

th:t th: full per : "C""

limit: Of :::ti:r 2.12.0 xill net b; cicle;ed if

.m.

in fhe NR Is.o r t MerR renal 47 spe-c r/t.J o pe ratr ) l

,1 tra::irnt.:::: t: ;;;ur. the

%e f-*

th 8 r rH A l f/m th A r c.

ri e f violefrd Tn s h a.Il Le im po s ed to 4 ss'w re.

fhat or lead regeet tr n s re a +.

'A even+

of

4. 'to c h rn, trty I/IE o f(e rA + i %

Sk,wid 4 be Jeb mmed

+Lat ceupting Oe-c M I*+el co6) RFr Tn McPR gena 14y a

more J edirA k k tb*n oracAffnj with

+We be kyp4n,J.

Ps.s c r g f be-pe r ia.J den ibe (C M RfT se rv r.e. 3

+k, (E c c) P. P T

,%.y b p Anel, A Se vn:ll ance Rs pir, u nf.s need n ef h<_ p,r(er.~ J, is y

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The accident monitoring instrumentation listed in Table 3.2-H were specifically added to comply with the requirements of NUREG-0737 and Generic Letter 83-36.

The instrumentation listed is designed to provide plant status

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for accidents that exceed the design basis accidents discussed in Chapter 15 of the DAEC UFSAR.

l Action 94 of Table 3.2-H deviates from the guidance of Generic Letter 83-36 as continued operation for 30 days (instead of 7 days as recommended in the j

is allowed with one of two torus water level monitor (TWLM) l generic letter)

I channels inoperable.

Redundancy is available in that at least one channel of Amendment No.193 3.2-47 RTS-28G ll / 'IS

RTS-286 to NG-95-2%9 Page1ofi e

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ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION 10 CFR Section 51.22(c)(9) identifies certain licensing and regulatory actions which are eligible for categorical exclusion from the requirement to perform an environmental assessment. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility requires no environmental assessment if operation of n

the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant hazards consideration; (2) result in a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; and (3) result in a significant increase in individual or j

cumulative occupational radiation exposure. IES Utilities Inc. has reviewed this request and determined that the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Section 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment needs to be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment. The basis for this determination follows:

Basis 4

1

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The change meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Section S t.22(c)(9) for the following reasons:

1.

As demonstrated in Attachment I to this letter, the proposed amendment does not involve a

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I significant hazards consideration.

l 2.

The proposed amendment includes changes which affect the End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip ((EOC)RPT) system operability and surveillance requirements. The result will still be operation of the DAEC with no reduction in margin to the safety limit Minimum 1

i Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) for reactor fuel. Thus, there will be no significant change in j

. the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.

i 3.

The proposed amendment includes changes which affect the End of Cycle Recirculation j

Pump Trip system operability and surveillance requirements. The result will still be i

operation of the DAEC with no reduction in margin to the safety limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) for reactor fuel. Thus, there will be no significant increase in either individual or cumu!ative occupational radiation exposure.

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RTS-286 to NG-95-2969 Pageiof1 l

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

1.. Introduction By letter dated November 15,1995, IES Utilities Inc, requested changes to the Duane Amold Energy Center (DAEC) Technical Specifications (TS), Section 3.2.G. The requested changes would clarify

" Applicable Operating Mode," " Minimum Operable Channels per Trip System," and the " Operating Mode for which Surveillance Required," and revise the " Action" for End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip ((EOC)RPT) inoperable, surveillance interval and Allowed Out of service Time (AOT) and response time test acceptance criteria. These changes will assure that the (EOC) RPT continues to perform as designed to mitigate the turbine trip transients and, in the event (EOC) RPT is not OPERABLE, require that additional margin be applied to the operating limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) to preclude exceeding the safety limit MCPR during the postulated transients.

These changes are consistent with the Improved Standard Technical Specifications for BWR-4 Plants, NUREG-1433, Revision 1.

2. Assessment The proposed changes will clarify the functional requirements which must be satisfied in order to call the (EOC) RPT OPERABLE. They will also provide a new Action for those times when (EOC)

)

RPT is inoperable. The result will be TS requirements which assure that the DAEC is operated with adequate margin to the safety limit MCPR under all conditions.

Other changes are proposed to provide editorial clarifications and to revise the surveillance interval and AOT. These changes are consistent with the argument used for the same changes to the RPS TS as documented in GE Topical Report NEDC-30851P-A," Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Reactor Protection System" and " Technical Specification Improvement Analysis 4

for BWR Control Rod Block Instrumentation," NEDC-30851P-A, Supplement 1, October 1988.

These changes have been accepted as evidenced by their inclusion in NUREG-1433.

These changes will result in no degradation of operational safety of the DAEC, nor will they result in a reduction in the margin to any fuel limits for normal operation or transients.

i Based upon the above assessment, we conclude that this request is acceptable.

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