ML20198P401

Rev 2 to Document 90022, Susceptibility of RCS Alloy 600 Nozzles to Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking & Replacement Program Plan

ML20198P401
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	10/31/1997
From:	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
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ML20198P399	List: ML20198P393 ML20198P401
References
90022, NUDOCS 9711070143
Download: ML20198P401 (49)

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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

' Units 2 and 3 October 31,1997 Document 90022 Revision 2 Quality Class III Susceptibility of Reactor Coolant System Alloy 600 Nozzles To Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking and Replacement Program Plan t

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Document 90022-Revision 2 Record of Revisions Rev.

Date Description /Affected Pages 0

9/9/93-Reference Documentation. InitialIssue 1-1/11/95 Reference Documentation. Full document revision: Incorporates Cycle 7 refueling outage experience, CEDM nozzle strategic plan, Alloy 690 material ordering information, stuck PZR heater evaluation, and nozzle repair corrosion evaluation. ' Adds Attachments 2. 3, and 4. Changes Attachment I to ' Tables".

2 10/31/97 Reference Documentation. Full document revision: incorporates Cycle 8 and 9 refueling outage experience. Adds spreadsheet and drawings detailing Alloy 600 component locations. Provides detailed plan for each Alloy 600 component location.

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Document 90022 Revision 2 Table of Contents.

SECTION PAGE i.0 I n trod u c tion.................................................... :.... 2 2.0 - - Di sc u ss i on............................................................ 3 2.1 M echanics o f PWSCC............................................. 3 -

2.2 :

Pressurizer Instrument Nozzles...................................... 4

' 2.3

- RCS Piping Instrument Nozzles..................................... 5 -

- 2.4 '

Steam Generator Instrument Nozzles................................. 5 2.5 Pressurizer Heater Sleeves........................................... 5 2.6 Control Element Drive Mechanism /Incore Instrument Nozzles............. 6 2.7 _

Safety Significance............................................... 8 3.0:

SONGS Inconel Inspection Program........................................ 8 3.1 Inspection Proced ure.............................................. 9 3.2 Inspec tion Freq uency.............................................. 9

~ 4.0 Repair Techn iques..................................................... 10 4.1 Half nozzle repair................................................ 10 4.2 Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly................................... I 1 4.3 Non Destructive Examination Inspections............................. I 1 5.0 Hist orical S u mmary.................................................... 12 6.0 Curren t Pl an.......................................................... 13 6.1 Pressurizer Instrument Nozzles..................................... 14 6.2 RCS Piping Instrument Nozzles.................................... 14 6.3 Steam Generator Instrument Nozzles................................ 14 6,4 Pressurizer Heater Sleeves......................................... 14 6.5 Control Element Drive Mechanism /Incore Instrument Nozzles............ 15 7.0 -

R e fe re n c es........................................................... 16 8.0 -

Attachments 8.1 Ta ble 1........................................................ 1 7 8.2 Ta b l e 2........................................................ 1 8 8.3

. Fig u re s........................................................ 1 9 1

t Document 90022 Revision 2 1.0 Introducticn This program plan describes the current level of understanding of Primary Water Stress -

Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) in Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Alloy 600 components and the implications of this industry problem to San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS). His plan provides for an effective program management strategy, including inspection timing, scope, and repair options and planning, to maintain nuclear safety and plant reliability. The plan identifies all Alloy 600 pressure boundary components and details the appropriate inspection and/or repair activities for each location.

Alloy 600 was selected as the preferred material for Reactor Coolant Systems (RCS) penetration applications due to its corrosion resistance and thermal expansion characteristics. Penetrations in the RCS are required for instrumentation, venting, heater insertion in the Pressurizer, and Control Element insertion through the reactor head.

- Industry experience has shown Alloy 600 to be susceptible to Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC). Industry PWSCC experience was first reported in Steam Generator tubes, despite lower operating temperatures tlum the pressurizer. Steam Generator tubes will not be discussed further in this document; they are addressed in the Steam Generator Strategic Management Plan. Pressurizer instrument and heater penetrations were the next to experience leakage due to PWSCC. PWSCC in Alloy 600 instrument nozzles in RCS piping has recently experienced increased failure rates. Experience has demonstrated that all Alloy 600 components are susceptible to PWSCC and that an aggressive inspection and repair program is required to properly address this issue.

An aggressive Alloy 600 penetiation repair' plan has been implemented for the RCS piping instrument nozzles. These repairs are scheduled for completion prior to the start of Cycle 10.

This document will be reviewed and updated at least once during each fuel cycle. The review will incorporate lessons teamed, site specific experience, and data which becomes available from the industry and research related Alloy 600 materials. Any repairs required due to identification of evidence ofleakage, proactive repairs, and future planned repair activity will also be updated during this review.

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Document 90022 '

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Revision 2-12.0

^ Dissussion :

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A' 2.1 -

Mechanics of PWSCC

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' Root'cause evaluations of failed Alloy 600 nozzles throughout the industry have revealed

. the presence of intergranular cracks caused by Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC). SCC -

requires three components to be present in' order to occur, these are high tensile stresses -

- (residual and/or applied), a harsh environment, and a susceptible material. For Alloy 600,

a harsh environment contributing to SCC is pure water (Iow Chlorides, Oxygen, F.luorides, caustics, etc.) at high temperatures, the environment found in the primary coonng system of pressurized water reactors, hence the name PWSCC, 1

e De installation of RCS penetration nozzles results in high residual circumferentially oriented tensi.le stresses. De~ Alloy 600 noz.lc, or sleeve, is attached to the piping or.

pressure vessel inside diameter with a J groove partial penetration attachment weld (see

~ Attachment 8.3, Figure 1). During installation as the weld cools to ambient m

ternperatures, the _ weld material contracts and deforms the alloy 600 material radially.

The result is high residual circumferential tensile stress in the vicinity of the attachment Lweld. The residual stresses resulting from t. veld contraction can exceed the yield strength of the material. Yield strength is discussed in more detail below. Operating pressure also produces stress in the material. For cylindrical penetrations such as the Alloy 600 components, the magnitude of the hoop stress in the circumferential direction is twice' the magnitude oflongitudinal stress due to operating pressure. These stresses are well below the yield strength of the material and are considerably lower than residual stresses resulting from the attachment weld. Since the primary stresses are criented circumferentially, cracking within the stress field will be in the axial direction.

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' The yield strength of the Alloy 600 material is another factor which contributes to PWSCC susceptibility.1A material's ability to retain stresses without plastic deformation

-is quantified by the yield strength. In some cases, residual stresses resulting from the attachment weld can be higher than the yield strength of the material, increasing the susceptibility to PWSCC. Originally there was a perception that a threshold yield strength existed, at ~40 ksl, below which Alloy 600 would not be susceptible to PWSCC, Industry experience, both at SONGS and other utilities, has demonstrat:d taat all Alloy.

600 material, regardless of yield strength, is susceptible to PWSCC, High yield strength

. material can retain more residual stress than low yield streng'h material, resulting in faster crack initiation and propagation.

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Both field experience and laboratory tests have confirmed that the primary factors 3

contributing to PWSCC in Alloy 600 include temperature and stress. The effect of temperature onl time to cracking due to PWSCC can be described by an Arrhenius type h

relatienship, which predicts a two-fo:d increase in time to crack initiation'for each 18*F L

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Document 90022 Revision 2 decrease in temperature.'d Empirical data on stress shows that time to cracking due to PWSCC varies inversely with residual stress raised to the fourth power. He known information relating to temperature and stresses can be used to make an initial determination of PWSCC susceptibility. Other factors that contribute to PWSCC are less tangible. These factors in:hde the material fabrication and installation process, material irregularities, the depth of cold work present in the material, the annealing temperature and subsequent heat treatment, and microstructural characteristics including carbon content, carbide dis'ribution, and grain size.

Of the less tangible factors contributing to PWSCC susceptibility, cold work is perhaps the most critical and well documented it is generally accepted that a cold work layer on the ins >Je diameter of an Alloy 600 penetration will accelerate the initiation of PWSCC.7.2 This cold work layer is characterized by a microstructure that has few intergranular carbides, resulting in initiation locations for the corrosion mechanism. This type of surface typically results from the machining process of the Alloy 600 bar stock material (SB-166). Depending on the machining process employed, the cold work layer will vary in depth making some nozzles more susceptible than others. Although the depth of the cold work layer can be controlled when machining new, replacement nozzles, the extent of cold work in existing nozzles is not quantifiable. The amount of cold work present in material fabricated from Alloy 600 drawn tube, or pipe, material (SB-167), is generally less than that found in machined bar stock. The drawn tube form was used for pressurizer heaters and incore instrumentation nozzles in the reactor head, while the forged bar wa:

used for all other Alloy 600 applications.

These factors may significantly affect the initiation and propagation of flaws due to PWSCC. Current modeling techniques do not quantitatively account for all of the factors discussed above, and therefore cannot accurately predict leakage due to PWSCC in a particular nozzle location.

2.2 Pressurizer Instrurnent Nozzles The occurrence of through wall cracking in Alloy 600 penetrations due to PWSCC was first discovered in Pressurizer applications, where typical operating temperatures are approximately 650 F. This is consistent with research data showing that PWSCC is accelerated when high temperature is coupled with the less tangible contributors discussed above.

SONGS 2 & 3 pressurizers are both designed with a total of seven instrument nozzles; four vapor space nozzles in the upper head, one water space nozzle in the lower shell and two water space nozzles in the lower head. Reference 7.3 identifies a condition in which SCC susceptibility increases as a result of contaminant accumulation in vapor space interface locations. Additionally, hydrogen in a vapor environment has been shown to be 4

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Document 90022 Revision 2

contributor to SCC. These two environmental effects are not present in the lower pressurizer instrument nozzles nor eny of the other RCS nozzles (hydrogen is present but not in a gaseous form). Consequently, vapor space nozzles were expected to develop leakage first. This expectation was confirmed as the majority of early PWSCC experience in the U.S. industry was in the vapor space region of the pressurizers versus '

the water space regions of the remainder of the RCS. However, since the temperature effect is considered a dominant factor, pressurizer vapor and water space nozzles (both operate at a temperature of ~650*F) are the locations with the highest susceptibility to PWSCC.

2.3 RCS Piping Instrument Nozzles Recent industry experience, particularly at SONGS in the Unit 3 Cycle 9 refueling outage, has included a higher than expected number ofleaking RCS piping instrument nozzles.

Each unit at SONGS has 32 not leg instrument nozzles (service temperature is 608*F) and 12 cold leg nozzles (service temperature is 554'F). These nozzles are used for measurement of temperature, differential pressure, sampling, and spares. The hot leg nozzles are installed at the i45*,i90', and 135' crientations with respect to the 12 o' clock position. The cold leg nozzles (three per loop) are installed at 12 o' clock and 145*. To date, one hot leg nozzle at Unit 2, ten hot leg nozzles at Unit 3, and one cold leg nozzle at Unit 3 have been replaced due to identificat cn of evidence ofleakage.

8 Although leakage was uat confirmed for each case, for purposes of this plan all replaced nozzles are assumed to have been leaking, 2.4 Steam Generator Instrument Nozzles There are four pressure instrument tap nozzles on each Steam Generator. These nozzles are insta!!ed in the Steam Generator in the cold side of the lower head in a similar configuration to the RCS piping nozzles. Since the outlet temperature of the Steam Generator is lower (553*F), the susceptibility to PWSCC is low for these nozzles. Since they are installed in a pressure vessel, a weld pad build up would be required to perform the half nozzle repair.

2.5 Pressurizer IIcater Sleeves 1

SONGS 2 & 3 pressurizers are both designed with 30 heater sleeves in addition to the seven instmment nozzles discussed above. The heater sleeves are fabricated from the drawn tube form (SB-167) of Alloy 600 and as a result, heater sleeves are considered less susceptible to PWSCC than instrument nozzles in the pressurizer. CE performed a susceptibility study of heater sleeves at all CE plants. This study ranked SONGS' heater sleeves in the " low susceptibility" category based on material yield strength and the machining process prior to and following installation."

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Document 90022 Revision 2 i

There have been three occurrences ofleakage from heater sleeves due to PWSCC in the -

U.S.'; Calvert Cliffs, Unit 1 (two found leaking in 1994), Calvert Cliffs, Unit 2 (20 found l

leaking in 1989), and Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (one found leaking in 1987). All three of these incidents involved additional contributing factors. In the case of Calvert Cliffs, Units 1 and 2, root cause evaluations concluded that pre weld teaming performed on the heater sleeves substantially cold worked the inner surface of the sleeves, increasing -

the yield strength and contributing to PWSCC initiation. One of the sleeves at Calvert Cliffs, Unit I had both circumferential and axial crack orientations due to the forcible removal of a stuck teamer, which imposed axial residual stresses. At Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2, the failure was attributed to stresses and cold work in the sleeve imposed by a failed heater, which had swelled due to wetting of the heater intemals.

When heaters fail electrically, a breach of the heater sheath can occur allowing water to come into contact with the heater internals. When wetted, the magnesium oxide (MgO) insulation material will react with water, producing magnesium hydroxide, which can expand to 152% ofits dry volume." This can cause swelling of the heater and possibly-rupture the heater sheath. If this swelling occurs near, or within, the Alloy 600 heater sleeve, the potential exists for cold working and cracking of the sleeve. Due to the tight clearance between the outside diameter of the heater and the inside diameter of the sleeve

(.01510.032 inches), even minor swelling in this region can cause cold work and mtroduce additional tensile stress in the heater sleeve, in addition, removing a failed heater can cold work the inside surface of the sleeve if attempts are made to pull the swelled portion of the heater through the sleeve. Cold work on the inner surface will reduce the time to initiation of PWSCC.

Attempts to remove three electrically failed pressurizer heaters at SONGS, Unit 3 have been unsuccessful. Because a pulling force greater than that allowed by the Prem Izer Instruction Manual (20 lbs.)" was exerted, there was a concern that the heaters swelled and the removal attempts may have cold worked the inside surface of the sleeves. A "go-no go" gauge was used during the Unit 3 Cycle 8 refueling outage to verify that swelling of the heater sheath had not occurred in the area just above the heater sleeve, indicating that the heaters may be stuck in the support plates.

Five additional heaters have failed electrically at Unit 3. Removal of all eight failed heaters is scheduled for the Cycle 9 mid-cycle outage. All heater sleeves with stuck or difficult to remove heaters will be eddy current tested to ensure that crack initiation has not resulted from cold work done on the inside surface of the sleeve.

2.6 CEDM and ICI Nozzles in the Reactor Head l

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L SONGS 2 & 3 each have 91 Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) nozzles and 10 In-Con: Instrumentation (ICI) nozzles. The yield strengths of the CEDM and ICI nozzles 6

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Document 90022 Revision 2 vary between 35 and 60 ksi. These nozzles differ from the penetrations discussed above in that they are much larger in diameter and they are installed with a 0.000 to 0.003 inch interference fit. They are installed in the reactor head, which is a hemispherical vessel.

This installation configuration results in another factor which contributes to PWSCC susceptibility, the " hillside angle" at which the nozzle is installed in the reactor head.

Hillside angles increase from the central nozzles to the periphery nozzles. The ICI nozzles are located on the periphery of the reactor head, thus they have the steepest hillside angles. As the hillside angle increases, the length of the attachment weld also increases, ne attachment weld for reactor head nozzles follows the path of a three dimensional curve, resulting in uneven residual stresses, which "ovalize" the Alloy 600 penetration.

To date, SONGS has not experienced any leakage due to PWSCC of Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) or incore Instrument (ICl) nozzles. The potential for such an occurrence, however, has become an issue since cracking of CEDM nozzles was first discovered in a French PWR in September,1991. The NRC issued Generic Letter 97-01 in April of 1997" to raise the U.S. industry's awareness of the NRC concerns and encourage inspections of reactor head penetrations for PWSCC. The Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG) developed a generic response to Generic Letter 97-01" which describes the CEOG integrated inspection plan and provides a detailed explanation of the CEOG timing model. The integrated inspection program includes the ICI inspections at Palisades, the 100% inspection at Millstone, and the planned 100%

inspection at SONGS 3. These three plants are ranked highest by the CE timing model.

Although not ranked high with respect to CE plants, SCE plans to perform a 100%

inspection of SONGS 2. This would provide additional data for the CE integrated inspection plan, the US industry and provide condition assessment information for all reactor head penetrations at SONGS. The CE integrated inspection plan also credits the reactor head vent cddy current exam at Calvert Cliffs, Unit 2.

The following inspections have been performed in the United States:

DC Cook 2 inspected 71 of 78 CRDM nozzles and one nozzle revealed 3 axial indications, ne deepest crack was weld repaired after a subsequent inspection.

Oconee 2 inspected all of their CRDM housings and only one nozzle had axial indications (21 surface flaws identified of no measurable depth). These flaws were accepted as is, Point Beach 1 inspected 49 nozzles and found no indications.

a North Anna 1 inspected periphery nozzles in the highest stress regions and found no indications.

Palisades inspected ICI nozzles on the periphery of the reactor head and found no indications.

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i Document 90022 Revision 2 l

Millstone 2 performed a 100% inspection and found one sliallow cluster of short arial flaws in one penctration. These flaws were subsequently removed with a mechanical buf0ng process.

As additional inspections are performed and more informat on becomes available, the t

results will be incorporated into this plan.

2.7 Safety Significance ne safety significance of PWSCC has been addressed by both the NRC and the U.S.

nuclear industry. The location with the highest safety significance in which Alloy 600 penetratioas are in service is the CEDM nozzles, due to the possibility of a control rod ejection associated with catastrophic failure of a CEDM nozzle. CE performed a safety evaluation of this possibility" which concluded that this issN does not constitute an immediate safety concem. The B&W and Westinghouse owners groups' safety evaluations carne to similar conclusions. These safety evaluations were submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). An independent assessment of control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzle cracking was performed for the NRC.alch also reached the conclusion that CRDM nozzle cracking is not a short-term safety issue.*

All evaluations of the stress field in Alloy 600 penetrat.ons attached with a partial penetration attach.nent weld to date hava predicted prixarily circumferential stresses. A circumferential stress Deld will result in a crack oilentation which is axial.

Reference 7.4 contains a technical assessment of safety concerns related to pressurizer heater sleeves. Fracture mechanics studies performed by BG&E have shown that the potential for PWSCC does not pose a significant threat to the stmetural integrity of the pressurizer. Sudden axial mpture due to plastic tearing would not be expected to occur.

Additionally, the potential for circumferential cracking leading to catastrophic failure of a heater sleeve from a guillotine break is not considered a credible failure mode.

Independent evaluation by CE supports this conclusion.

Reference 7.1 discusses circumferential cracking in pressurizer heaten sleeves and instmment nozzles. Catastrophic failure from a guillotine break is judged not to be a credible failure mode. His analysis also applies to instmment nozzles in the RCS piping and Steam Generators.

3.0 SONGS InconelInspection Program in order to perform bare metalinspections around each nozzle, the RCS piping insulation has been modified. During the Cycle 7 refueling outage Iwilation plugs were fabricated which are casily removed for inspection purposes. He insulate n the bottom head of the pressurizer 8

Docutnent 90022 Revision 2 around the heater penetrations and the lower level nozzles is removable, and is removed each refueling outage to perform inspections.

De reactor head is inspected during refueling operations, during the time it is on the reactor head stand. De insulation on the periphery of the reactor head is removed, however the central portions are not, primarily due to the restricted accessibility and ALARA concerns related to the central nozzles. De central nozzles are observed with the insulation in place. He removable portion exposes 24 CEDM nozzles and all 10 ICI nmles for bare metal visual inspections.

Rese 34 periphery nozzles have the highest hillside angles. External visual inspections are not required when eddy current exarninations are performed on the inside surface of the reactor head penetrations.

3.1 Inspecilon Procedure 5023-%8.16 " Reactor C ; mt System Inconel Nozzle Inspection"'" controls and documents the inspections of Alloy 600 penetrations. The following requirements have been implemented for the Unit 3 Cycle 9 refueling outage and future Inconel inspections.

A minimum of two qualined inspectors, familiar with the nozzle locations, installation conDguration, and the types ofindications resulting from PWSCC (extrer.ily small leakrates) inspect each nozzle. All obstructions impairing direct observation of the crevice between the Alloy 600 penetration and the piping or vessel are removed, with the exception of the central nozzles on the reactor head.

Acceptance criteria were established and incorporated into the inspection procedure to identify a potential nozzle leak. Any brown, nist type stains on a nozzle or the base metal, or the accumulation of boric acid and/or corrosion products are indicative of a potential nozzle leak. An additional criterion is the presence oflocalized carbon steel degradation of the annular region adjacent to the nozzle. Should any of these observations be made during the inspection, an evaluation of the deposits is performed by Chemistry to assist in the determination of whether the leakage is from the RCS, and approximately when it initiated. Any ditcrepancies found during the inspection are documented with photographs and a description is provided in the procedurc. An evaluation is performed to determine if repair activities are required. Caution is taken when using radio isotopic analysis results, particularly during or after a signiDeant boration or dilution of the RCS. The completed inspection procedure is filed with Corporate Document Management following the refueling outage.

3.2 Inspection Frequency A complete inspection of every Alloy 600 penetration and completion of the inspection procedure is performed at least once each refueling outage. Similar inspections are also perfonned at the beginning of any Mode 5 out ge. Additionalinspections are performed 9

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Revision 2 I

after the RCS pressurization during startup, ensuring that there is no pressure boundary

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leakage upon entering power operations, as required by the Technical Specifications.8 4.0 Repair Techniques l

Bree repair techniques have been used or are planned for use at SONGS. De pressurizer steam space nozzles have all been replaced with Alloy 690 nozzles, installed with an internal J groove weld in accordance with the original design. Pressurizer water space and RCS piping nozzles can be repaired with the half tazzle technique, or they can have a Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly (MNSA) installation.

To adequately prepare for nozzle replacement activities SCE has purchased SB 166 Alloy 690 material manufactured to an optimized material specification.7 88 Forged bar stock may also be obtained from the CEOO and machined to replace any pressurizer or RCS nozzles, or a heater sleeve should leaksge occur. He CEOG material should be used only in an emergent situation.

4.1 Ilulf Nozzle Repair Technique

%e half nozzle repair technique has been used for all hot leg repairs and on three nozzle locations in the pressurizers (two vapor space nozzles were temporarily repaired with this technique, one water space nozzle has this repair configuration in service). His repair option does not require entry into the piping or vessel to perform the work, significantly reducing the dose required to complete repair activities. The original nozzle is cut off outside the piping or vessel and a temporary plug is installed deep in the nozzle to prevent foreign material from entering the RCS. The outer portion of the nozzle is then machined out by drilling. The inner portion of the nozzle is abandoned in place and a new Alloy i

690 " half nozzle" is installed and welded to the piping or vessel outside diameter. This new exterior weld meets ASME Code Section XI requirements and is structurally qualified for the life of the plant. llowever, there is a small gap left between the original nozzle and the new Alloy 690 half nozzle. This gap allows borated reactor coolant to be in direct contact with the low alloy carbon steel parent material in the piping or vessel Borated water in contact with carbon steel has the potential of developing corrosion. To address the corrosion concerns of the hot leg nozzle repair, B&W Nuclear Tccinologies has performed an analysis of the carbo'n steel exposed to RCS in the 1/16 inch Jap between the Alloy 600 and 690 nozzles.' 88 Dis analysis determined an expected corrosion rate of 0.0017 inches per year for stagnant conditions and 0.0036 inches per year under non stagnant conditions in the pressurizer, Rese corrosion rates were evaluated for the remaining plant life, including a license extension to 2023, and were considered acceptable. An inspection of a repaired location will be performed to

- verify that the calculated corrosion rates are conservative. His inspection will be performed during the Unit 2 Cycla 9 mid-cycle outage ne half nozzle repair technique 10

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Document 90022 Revision 2 will continue to be used unless corrosion rates are found to be significantly higher than expected.

4.2 Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly (MNSA)

CE has provided htNSA's designed for temperature measurement nozzles in the RCS hot leg piping and the water space nozzles in the pressurizer %csc locations were chosen since the water space pressurizer nozzles are the most susceptible to PWSCC (highest operating temperature) and there are spare temperature nozzles installed on the bottom of the hot legs which would force a core off load in order to perform a half oozzle repair.

He MNSA design can be installed with water in the system, however the RCS should be depressurized prior to installation fc personnel safety. 'He MNSA can be installed in approximately two shifts, reducing the time required to repair a leaking nozzle.

Installation is accomplished by drilling and tapping four shallow holes in the piping or vessel parent material around the leaking nozzle. A grafoil seal is compressed against the nozzle to piping or vessel crevice and the assembly is retained by the threada in the piping or vessel. De pressure boundary is essentially moved from the original attachment weld to the grafoil seal on the outside diameter of the piping or vessel. Concurrence from the NRC is being sought price to installation of the MNSA design during the Units 2 & 3 Cycle 9 mid cycle outages. After inillal discussions with the NRC, they requested that a code relief request be submitted to address all outstanding issues associated with this design. Pending NRC approval, SCE plans to install the MNS A on the pressurizer water space nozzles as well as any nozzle locations found to be leaking which are not planned for replacement during the Cycle 9 mid cycle outages. After installation, visual inspection of the MNSA each refueling outage is required in accordance with SO23 V-8.16 and the MNS A grafoil seal and attachment threads would be added to the ten year in service inspection program.

4.3 Non Destructive Examination Inspectidiis Mock ups of the pressurizer and hot leg instrument nozzles and the pressurizer heaters are being fabricated to improve eddy current testing ability for these penetrations. Any penetration identified as leaking should be eddy current tested to confirm the length and orientation of the flaw. His tesdag should be performed during the repair process. To date pressurizer flaws have been characterized using penetrant test (PT), eddy current (EC), and ultrasonic (UT) techniques.

Eddy current test mock ups for the CEDM nozzles in the reactor head have been fabricated and used to qualify eddy current testing equipment. Westinghouse, Framatome and CE have all successfully qualified their eddy current equipment on these mock ups in accordance with EPRI standards and guidelines.

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Document 90022 Revision 2 5.0 SONGS PWSCC llistorical Summary The first through wall instrument nozzle leak at SONGS occurred in 1986 when a pressurizer steam space nozzle was discovered to be leaking. A root cause evaluation was performed which identified that the source of the leak wu intergranular cracking caused by PWSCC. He evaluadon concluded that the high yield strength of the material (heat 54318) made it highly susceptible to PWSCC. All of the remaining penetrations 8

fabr cated from heat 54318 were scheduled for replacement. There were two Unit 3 steam space nozzles, one Unit 3 lower stall nozzle and one Unit 2 lower shell nozzle made from this heat. Replacement activides were completed in 1988 using Alloy 600 material that was thought to have good characteristics with respect to resistance to PWSCC.

The next nozzle leak was found in 1992 during the Unit 3 Cycle 6 refueling outage in one of the steam space nozzles which was replaced in 1987 as a result of the first nozzle leak.

During repair activities inside the pressurizer, cracking was identified in two addidonal nozzles by irr exams. It was decided to replace all four steam space nozzles with Alloy 690 nozzles, however the weld material used was similar in composition to Alloy 600, since the Alloy 690 weld material had not yet been accepted by the code.

During a forced outage of Unit 2 in 1992, two steam space nozzles were found to be leaking. A half nozzle repair was installed on both of these nozzles. In 1993, during the Unit 2 Cycle 7 refueling outage, all four steam space nozzles were replaced with Alloy

.690 nozzles using weld material similar in composition to Alloy 690. The first evidence ofleakage from a hot leg nozzle (2PDT0978-1) was found during this 1993 refueling outage. This nozzle was repaired using the half nozzle technique.

In 1995 during the Unit 3 Cycle 8 refueling outage, two hot leg nozzles and one pressurizer steam space nozzle were found with evidence ofleakage. During repair acdvities in the pressurizer, defects were identified in the weld material of two of the four steam space nozzles. All four steam space nozzles were replaced with Alloy 690 nozzles using weld material similar in composition to Alloy 690. He two hot leg nozzles were repaired using the half nozzle technique.

During the return to service of Unit 2 after the Cycle 9 refueling c,utage in 1997, the pressurizer lower shell nozzle (2TE0101) was found to be leaking. His nozzle had been proactively replaced in 1987 as a result of the first nozzle leak in 1986. This nozzle was repaired using the half nozzle repair technique in 1997 with a weld pad build up on the etterior of the pressurizer using Alloy 690 material.

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Docutnent 90022 Revision 2 A self assessrrent team reviewed SONGS pWSCC experience as of the Unit 2 Cycle 9 refueling outage. He team recommendation was to enhance the inspection procedure and re-evaluate replacement recommendations after the Unit 3 Cycle 9 refueling outage." Document 90022, Revision 2 provides the results of this re-evaluation.

At the beginning of the Unit 3 Cycle 9 outage, five nozzles (four hot leg and one cold leg) were identified for repair. As the unit was being retumed to service, four additional hot leg nozzles were identified for repair. Of the nine nozzles repaired during this outage, five had enough boric acid residue to obtain a relevant sample. Results of radio-isotopic analysis were not consistent with expected results at the end of the refueling outage due to the large volume of water exchanged between the refueling water storage tanks and the RC3 during refueling operations.

Until the Cycle 9 refueling outages, it was expected that pWSCC could be effectively managed with a rigorous inspection program at the beginning of each refueling outage.

The assumption was that all pWSCC that had prcpagated through wall could be identified early in the outage, allowing time to implement repair activities without impacting the outage schedule. His strategy also minimized radiation exposure associated with nozzle repair activities. He Unit 2 pressurizer lower shell nozzle leak was not identified during the initial inspection. His location had been bored to a slightly larger diameter during the replacement of the nozzle in 1987. His condition required the installation of shims between the nozzle and the bore with a bolted clamp assembly around the nozzle to hold the shims in place. Here is a possibility that, had the clamp assembly been removed, early indications of the leak might have been identified during the initial walkdown.

Enhancements to the inspection process were implemented during the Unit 3 Cycle 9 refueling outage, including the removal of all shim clamp assemblics on Alloy 600 penetrations. Despite these efforts, the recent Unit 3 experience proved that thorough inspections at the beginning of an outage will not guarantee that there will be no new pressure boundary leakage developed during startup operations, in order to eliminate delays in retum to service due to PWSCC in RCS nozzles, a more aggressive strategy is required than has been previously implemented. This new strategy includes preventive repair or non destmetive eumination of all Alloy 600 components. A mock up of RCS piping nozzles ivas fabricated to assist in training construction personnel, minimizing the time required to complete repair activities and radiation exposure. Additionally, shielding has been designed to lower the radiation exposure and ALARA concems associated with nozzle repairs.

6.0 Current Plan The following sections discuss planned repair activities for the Units 2 & 3 Cycle 9 mid-cycle outages and recommended inspection and repair activities for future outages.

13

Document 90022 Revision 2

/

6.1 Pressurizer Instrument Nozzles All of the steam space nozzles at Foth units have been replaced with Alloy 690 nozzles and comparable weld material. Rese nozzles are inspected on a refueling outage interval. Removal of the shim clamps installed on these nozzles is not required since indications ofleakage will be rust stains from condensed vapor running down the side of die pressurizer. Indications of very minute kakage evidenced by boric ncid residue will not be present on vapor space nozzles.

He Unit 2 lower shcIl nozz!c has been repaired with the half nozzle technique. Plans are in place to install MNS A's on the remaining water space nozzles during the Cycle 9 mid-cycle outages. Here are five remaining Alloy 600 water space nozzles in the pressurizers, the lower shell nozzle at Unit 3 and both lower head nozzles in both units.

6.2 RCS Piping Instrument Nozzles All RCS piping instrument nozzles are scheduled for half nozzle repairs during both the Cycle 9 mid cycle outages and the Cycle 10 refueling outage. He scope of repair activities for the mid-cycle outages will be limited to those which are accessible while i

maintaining a level of 26 inches in the hot leg. All upper 45' nozzles in the hot legs and all cold leg nozzles will be available and scheduled for repair. The remaining RCS piping instmment nozzles at the 90' and 135' orientations will be repaired during the Cycle 10 cere off load window. Any nozzle locations identified with evidence ofleakage during the mid cycle outages that are not scheduled for repair will have a MNSA installed.

6.3 Steam Generator Instrument Nozzles ne susceptibility of steam generator nozzles is considered to be low since they operate at cold leg temperatures. To be prepared for identification of evidence ofleakage during an inconel inspection, MNSA's designed for these nozzles are being purchased and contingency FCN's prepared for their installation.

6.4 Pressurizer IIcater Sleeves Although the pressurizer heater sleeves were fabricated from drawn tube, reducing the amount of cold work present in these penetrations, they are still susceptible. Visual inspections are performed during each refueling outage if a heater fails and becomes stuck within the sleeve, it may impose abnormal stresses and introduce a cold worked surface on the inside diameter of the sleeve. All sleeves with stuck heaters will have the internals of the heater removed during the next available work window to reduce further 14

Document 90022 Revision 2 damage to the sleeve until the heater can be removed from the pressurizer. When a stuck heater is removed from a heater sleeve, the inside surface of the sleeve will be tested for flaws with eddy current equipment in the areas adjacent to the J. groove partial penetration attachment weld. SCE will monitor the performance of heater sleeves within the industry and use available information to determine when additloin! mitigation or inspection activities are appropriate.

6.5 Control Element Drive Mechanism / Incore Instrument Nozzles

'Ihe CEDM and ICI nozzles are visually inspected each refueling outage with insulation removed to the extent possible. The exception to this is during outages when non destructive examinations (eddy current with additional UT and PT as appropriate) are performed on the inside of the nozzles in the areas adjacent to the J groove partial penetration attachment weld. These exams can be performed with remotely controlled robotic equipment staged underneath the reactor head. Units 2 & 3 are scheduled for 100% inspections in the Cycle 10 refueling outages.

4 15

l Document 90022 l

Revision 2

]

7.0 REFERENCES

l 7.1

" Evaluation of Pressurizer Penetrations and Evaluation of Corrosion After UnidentlSed Leakage Develops", CEOG Task 700, January 1992.

7.2

" SONGS 3 Pressurizer Level Instrument Nonle Leakage". RCE 92 019, June 1992.

7.3 Material Technology Institute,"Guldelines For Control of Stress Corrosion Cracking of Nickel.

Desring Stainless Steels and Nickel. Base Alloys". Manual No.1 Columbus,011,1978.

7.4

" Evaluation of Pressurizer lleater Sleeve Susceptibility to Primary Water Stress Corrosion i

Crocking". CEOO CEN 393 P, November 1989.

7.5 "Fallure Analysis of ANO-2 Ruptured Pressurizer lleater and Cracked Sleeve" CE NSPD-406, July,1987.

7.6

" Instruction Manual. Pressurizer, San Onofre Unit 2", 5023 919-68 Rev.1 April,1977.

7.7 "NRC Generle Letter 97-01: Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nonle and Other Vessel Closure llead Penetrations", April 1,1997.

7.8 "CEOG Response to NRC Generic Letter 97-01, Degradation of CEDM Nozzle and Other Vessel Closure llend Penetrations", CEOG Task 992, CE NPSD-1085, July 1997.

7.9

" Safety Evaluation of the Potential For and Consequence of Reactor VesselIIcad Penetration A!!oy 600 ID Initiated Nozzle Cracking", CEOO Task 744, CEN-607, May 1993.

7.10

" Assessment of Pressurized Water Reactor Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nonle Cracking",

NUREG/CR-6245, October 1994.

7.11

" Reactor Coolant System inconel Nonle Inspection", SO23 V-8.16, June 7,1993.

7.12

" Unit 2 Operating License & Technical Specifications" LCO 3.4.13.a.

7.13

" Material Specification for Alloy 690 Dar Stock". SO23 41156, Rev.0, May 31,1996.

7.14 "RCS Ilot Leg Pressure Tap Nonle" M.DSC 279, July 29,1993.

7.15 - ;" Corrosion Evaluation for Base Metal Exposure within RCS Nonles",1814.AA008 M001 Revision 1 B & W Nuclear Technologies Document Identifier 51 1235153 00, March 15,1995.

7.16

" Assessment of the Inconel.600 Nozzle inspection & Replacement Program and Decision Process Leading to the March,1997 Nonle Failure in Unit 2", SEA 97-002, April 9,1997.

16

Document 90022 Revision 2.1 Table 1 17

UNIT 2 ALLOY 600/690 NOZZLES PRESSURIZER Procedure ID Equipment ID PC No.

IIcar No.

Nominal size On.)

Drawing No.

Ilistory 20 S2-1201-407-13 NX 4411 1.062 x 6.86 SO23-919-16; DCNs 2 & 4 ML-316 SO23-919-46 2I S2-1201-407-13 NX 4411 1.062 7.6.86 5023-919-16; DCNs 2 & 4 I

MI-315 5 023-919-46 22 21T0101 407-07 54318 1.315 x 13.625 SO23-919-16; DCNs 3 & 7 1937-Preventative replacement with A600 material.

K 248 SO23-919-46; DCNs I & 4 Original A600 material heat had high susceptibility Alloy 690 to cracking. C. Chin letter to IT Reilly. I 1/05/86.

MO 87032254000. FCN S309SM.

1997 - Replaced nozzle with Alloy 690 IIalf nozzle, weld pad and exteriorj-groove weld. NCR 97030fD)2; MO 97030334 23 S2-1201-407-10 NX 4411 1.062 x 7.86 SO23-91916. DCNs 2.5 & 6 1992-Boric acid indications found. Temporary MI 313 B

Alloy 690 5023-919-46; DCN 2 replacement with A690. from outside, weld pad.

NCR 920300153.NCR 920300154. MO 93012200000. FCN l'6420M.

1993-Replaced nozzle per original design with Alloy 690 nozzle and I-52 weld material.

24 S2-1201-407-10 NX 4411 1.062 x 7.26 SO23-919-16. DCNs 2 & 6 1993-Replaced nozz!c per original design with MI 31I C

Alloy 690 SO23-919-46; DCN 2 Alloy 690 nozzle and I-52 weld traterial.

23 S2-1201-407-10 NX 7630 1.062 x 7.86 SO23-919-16. DCNs 2.5 & 6 1992-Crack indications found Temporary MI 314 D

A!!oy 690 SO23-919-46; DCN 2 replacement with A690 from outside, weld pad.

NCR 920300153.NCR 920300154. MO 93012200000. FCN IL*20M.

1993-Replaced nozzle per original design with A!!oy 690 r,zzle and I-52 weld material-26 S2-1201-407-1J NX4411 1.062 x 7.86 SO23-919-16. DCNs 1.2 & 6 1993-Replac.x! nozzle per original design with M1 312 A

Alloy 690 SO23-919-46; DCN 2 Alloy 690 aozzle and I-52 weld material.

Table 1, page I

^

UNIT 2 ALLOY 600/690 NOHLES Procedure ID Equipment ID PC No.

IIcat No.

Nominal size (irt)

Drawing No.

Ifistory RCS PIPING: E059 IIOT LEC (#1) 13 2PDT0978-4 506-11 NX 7630 0.993 x 8.875 SO23-923-5. I3.15 16 2PDT0978-1 506A-NX 7630 0.993 x 8 US S023-923-5. DCN I; 1993-Replaced with A690. Replaced from outside.

I1 replaced by SO23-923-13. DCN 2; weld pad _ NCR 930600133; MO 93061906000-Alloy 690 SO23-923-15 MO 93061876000. I'CN F3375M.

18 2PDTD978-2 506-11 NX7 W 0.993 x 8.875 S 0 23-923-5. I3. 15 21 2PD7U)78-3 506-11 NX7630 0.993 x 8.875 S O 23-923-5.!3.15 20 S2-1201-506-14 NX7630 1.050 x 8.875 S O 23-923-5.13.15 ML-023 12 2TE0112-3 509-05 9294 0.993 x 8375 S O 23-923-5.15.19 I4 2TE0112-4 509-05 9294 0.993 x 8375 S O 23-923-5.15.1) 15 2TE0lllX-1 509-05 9294 0.993 x 8375 S O 23-923-5.15.19 17 2TE0112-2 509-05 9294 0.993 x 8375 S O 23-923-5.15. 19 19 27E0112-1 509-05 9294 0.993 x 8375 5 023-923-5.15.19 22 2TWOI38A 717-02 NX 9915 0.993 x 837.i SO23-923 49,70 23 2BV0138B 717-02 NX 9915 0.993 x 8375 SO23-923 49.70 24 2TW0138C 717-02 NX 9915 0.993 x 8375 5023-92349.70 25 2TW0138D 717-02 NX 9915 0.993 x 8375 SO23-923 4 9,70 26 2TW0138E 717-02 NX 9915 0.993 x 8375 SO23-923 49.70 27 2TW0138F 717-02 NX 9915 0.993 x 8375 S023-923 49,70 RCS PIPING: E088 IIOT LEC (#2) 1I 2PDT-0979-3 506-11 NX 7630 0.993 x 8.875 l S O 23-923-5. 13.15 14 2FDT-0979-4 506-11 NX 7630 0.993 x 8.875 S O 23-923-5. 13. 15 15 2PDT-0979-2 506-11 NX 7630 0.993 x 8.875 S O 23-923-5.13.15 Table 1, page 2

UNIT 2 ALLOY 600/690 NOZZLES Procedure ID Equipa ent ID PC No.

IIeat No.

Nominal size (in.)

Drawing No.

IIistory 17 2PDT-$ i9-1 506-11 NX 7630 0.993 x 8.875 S O 23-923-5. 13.15 I8 S2-1201 506-14 NX 7630 1.050 x 8.875 S 023-923-5.I3.15 Mi 065 10 2TE-0122-2 509-05 7617-4 0.993 x 8375 S O 23-923-5.15.19 12 2TE-0122-1 509-05 7617-4 0.993 x 8 375 5 023-923-5.15.19 13 2TE-0121X2 509-05 7617-4 0.993 x 8375 S O 23-923-5.15.19 16 21E-0122-3 509-05 7617-4 0.993 x 8375 S O 23-923-5.15.19 19 2TE-0122-4 50945 7617-4 0.993 x 8.375 S O 23-923-5.15. 19 20 2TW-0139A 717-02 NX 9915 0.993 x 8375 S023-923-69.70 21 ITW-0139B 717-02 NX 9915 0.993 x 8375 S O23-973 4 9.70 22 2TW-0139C 717-02 NX 9915 0.993 x 8375 SO23-923 49.70 23 21W-0139D 717-02 NX 9915 -

0.993 x 8375 SO 23-923-69.70 24 2TW-0139E 717-02 NX 9915 0.993 x 8375 SO23-923 49.70 25 2TW.0139F 717-02 NX 9915 0.993 x 8.375 SO23-923 49,70 RCS PIPING: P001 COLD LEG (504-01) 15-P001-Rx 2TE-9178-3 509-05 7760 4 0.993 x 8375 SO23-923 4.16 16-P001-Rx

'ITE-Oli lY1 509-05 7617-4 0.993 x 8375 SO23-923 4.16 17-P001-Rx 2TE-9178-1 509-05 7617-4 0.993 x 8375 l SO23-9234.16 RCS PIPING: P002 COLD LEG (505-04)

Il-P002-Rx 2TE-9179-2 50945 7760 4 0.993 x 8375 SO23-923-7.16 12-P002-Rx 2TE-0121Y2 509-05 7760 4 0.993 x 8375 SO23-923-7.16 13-P002-Rx 2TE-9179-4 509-05 7760 4 0.993 x 8375 SO 23-923-7.16 Table 1, page 3

~

UNrr2 ALLOY 600/690 NOZZLES Procedure ID Equipment ID PC No.

IIcat No.

Nominal size (in.)

Drawing No.

IIistory RCS PIPING: P003 COLD LEG (505-01) 13-P003-Rx ZTE-9178-2 509-05 7760-4 0.993 x 8375 S O23-923-7.16 14-P003-Rx 2TE-0115-2 509-05 7760-4 0.993 x 8375 SO23-923-7.16 15-P003-Rx 2TE>)l78-4 509-05 77(0-4 0993 x 8375 S O23-923-7.16 RCS PIPING: P904 COLD LEG (504-04) 13 -P004-Rx 2TE-9179-1 509-05 7617-4 0.993 x 8375 5 023-923-6.16 14 -P004-Rx 2TE-0125-1 509-05 7617 4 0993 x 8375 SO23-923-6.16 15 -P004-Rx 2TE-9179-3 509-05 7617-4 0993 x 8375 SO23-923 4.16 STEMI GENERATOR PDT Nozzles E088 23 2PDTU)79-1 110-11 NX 6296-2 1.019 x 9 %;

5023-915-14.36.40.139 1.050 x 6 1

24 2PDT0979-2 I10-1I NX 6296-4 1.619 x 9 %;

S O 23-915-14.36,40.139 1.050 x 6 25 2PDT0979-3 110-11 NX 6294 1.019 x 9 %;

SO23-915-14,36,40.139 1.050 x 6 26 2PDT0979-4 110-11 NX 6296-7 1.019 x 9 %;

SO23-915-14.36.40.139 1.050 x 6 E089 23 2PDT0978-1 110-11 NX 6296-1 1.019 x 9 %;

SO23-915-14.35.39.139 1.050 x 6 24 2PDT0978-2 110-11 NX 6296-3 1.019 x 9 %;

SO23-915-14.35,39,139 1.050 x 6 25 2PDT0978-3 110-1I NX 6296-5 1.019 x 9 %;

SO23-915-14,35,39,139

~

1.050 x 6 26 2PDT0978-4 110-11 NX 6296-8 1.019 x 9 %;

S O23-915-14.35,39,139 1.050 x 6 Table 1, page 4

UNIT 2 Au.OY 600/690 N0ZZI.ES PRESSURIZER IIEATR St.EEVES tecation -

PC No.

Ilest No.

NominalSize (in.)

Drawine No.*:

IIistory At 420-19 NX 4886 1.660 x 14 '/s S O23-919-I.2.30.33.46.85 A2 420-19 NX 4886 1.660 x 14'/s S O23-919-1.2.30.33.46.85 A3 420-19 NX 4886 1.660 x I4 /s S O 23-919-1.2.30.33.46.85 8

A4 420-19..

NX 4886 1.660 x 14 '/s S O23-919-1.2.30.33.46.85 B1 420-19 NX 4886 1.660 x 14'Is S O 23-919-1.2.30,33.46,85 B2 420-19 NX 4886 1.660 x 14 '/s SO23-919-l.2.30.33.46,85 C1 420-19 NX 4886 1.660 x 14 '/s SO23-919-1. 1 30,33,46,85 C2 420-19 NX 4886 1.660 x 14 '/s S O 23-919-1,2.30,33,46,85 C3 420-19 NX 4886 1.660 x 14 'Is SO23-919-1.2.30.33,46.85 C4 420-19 NX 4886 1.660 x 14 '/s SO2'-919-1.2.30.33.46.85 DI 420-20 NX 4886 1.660 x 15 S O23-919-1.2.30.33.46,85 D2 420-20 NX 4886 1.660 x 15 S O 23-919-l.2.30.33.46,85 D3 420 20 NX 4836 1.660 x 15 SO 23-919 1.2.30,33.46,85 D4 420-20 NX 4886 1.660 x 15 S O23-919-1.2.30.33.46.85 El 420-21 NX 4886 1.660 x 15 '/s S O 23-919-1.2.33,33,46.85 E2 420-21 NX 4886 1.660 x 15 %

S O23-919-1.2.30,33,46,85 FI 420-21 NX 4886 1.660 x 15 '/s S O23-919-1.2.30.33. 16,85 F2 420-21 NX 4886 1.660 x 15 '/s S O23-919-1.2.30.33.46.35 F3 420-21 NX 4886 1.660 x 15 '/s SO23-919-1.2.30.33.46.85 F4 420-21 NX 4386 1.660 x 15 '/s S O23-919-1.2.30,33,46,85 G1 420-22 NX 4886 1.660 x 16 %

S O23-919-1.2.30,33.46,85 Table 1. page 5 i

.m

UNIT 2 Atl.ov600KMNormrs G2 420-22 NX 4886 1.660 x 16 %

S O23-919-1.2.30.33,46.35 G3

, 420-22 NX 4886 1.660 x 16 %

S O23-919-1.?.30.33,46,85 G4 420-22' NX 4886 1.663 x 16 %

SO23-9191.2.30.33,46, h5 11I 420-23 NX 4886 1.660x16 %

S O 23-919-1.2.30.33,46.15 112 420-23 NX 4886 1.660 x 16 %

S O 23-919-1.2.30.33.46.85 10 420-23 NX 4886 1.660 x I6 %

S O23-919-1.2.30.33,46,85 II4 420-23 NX 4886 1.660x16 %

S O 23-919-1.2.30.33,46.85 J!

420-24 NX 4886 1.660 x 18 %

S O 23-919-1.2.30,33,46.85 J2 420-24 NX 4886 1.660 x 18 %

S O23-919-1.2.30,33,46.85 Note There are two 2"x 18 %* nozzles in the warelmuse, mat. code 027-70964, Table 1. page 6

~

~

UNrr2 ALLov 600/690 NOZZLES CEDM NOZZLES CEDM Nonle No.

IleaI No.

Code No.

Yleid Strength Crbon Anneal Temperatum Tangent Angle

~~

1 A6777 C-6441-1

- 35000 0.M 1625F 0

2 A6777 C4441-1 35000 0.04 1625F 7.73 3

A6785 C4441-7 56000 0.065 1625F 7.73 4

A6777 C4441-1 35000 0.M 1625F 10.97 5

A4542 C4441-2 52000 0.05 1625F 10.97 6

A5980 C4441-3 39000 0.06 1625F 10.97 7

A6926 C4441-4 52000 i

0.068 1625F 10.97 8

A5849 C44414 59000 0.054 1625F 15.61 9

A5980 C4441-3 39000 0.06 1625F 15.61 10 A5980 C-6441-3 39000 0.06 1625F 15.61 11 A3849 C-6441-6 59000 0.054 1625F 15.61 12 A5980 C4441-3 39000 0.06 1625F 17.50 13 A5980 C4441-3 39000 0.06 1625F 17.50 14 A5980 C-6441-3 39000 0.06 1625F 17.50 15 A5980 C4441-3 39000 0.06 1625F 17.50 16 A6926 C4441-4

- 52000 0.068 1625F 17.50 17 A6926 C4441-4 52000 0.068 1625F 17.50 18 A6926 C4441-4 52000 0.068 1625F 17.50 19 A6926 C4441-4 52000 0.068 1625F 17.50 20 A6777 C-6441-1 35000 0.04 1625F 2236 21 A6777 C-6441-1 35000 0.M 1625F 22.36 Table 1, page 7

UNrr 2 AL18Y 600/690 NOZZLES CEDM Nozzle No.

IIcat No.

Code No.

Yield Strength l Carbon AnnealTemperature Tangent Angle 22 A6777 C4441-1 35000 0.04 1625F 22.36 23 A6777 C-6441-1 35000 0.04 1623F 22.36 24 EOIO88 C-6449-4 39000 0.083 NOT AVAIL 23.80 25 EO1088 C44404 39000 0.083 NOTAVAIL 23.80 26 EO1547 C-6449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 23.80 27 EO1547 C-6449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 23.30 28 EO1090 C-6449-6 38500 0.063 NOTAVAIL 25.17 29 EO1547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 25.17 30 A09321 C-6449-5 48000 0.06 NOTAVAIL 25.17 31 EO1547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 25.17 32 EO1547 C-6449-1 49000 0.078 NOT AVAIL 25.17 33 A09321 C4449-5 48000 0 06 NOTAVAIL 25.17 34 EO1547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOT AVAIL 25.17 35 EO1547 C-6449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 25.17 36 EO1547 C-6449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 29.01 37 EO1547 C-6449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 29.01 38 EO1547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOT AVAIL 29.01 39 EOI547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOT AVAIL 29.01 40 EOl547 C-6449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 29.01 41 EO1429 C4449-9 39000 0.072 NOTAVAIL 29.01 42 EO3045 M-4119-4 37500 0.075 NOTAVAIL 29.01 43 R1948 C-6449-10 45000 0.063 NOT AVAIL 29.01 Table 1, page 8

UNrr2 ALLOY 600/690 NOZZLES CEDM Nozzle No.

IIeat No-Code No.

Yield Strength Carbon AnnealTemperature Tangent Angle 44 EO1429 C4449-9 39000 0.072 NOTAVAIL 32.55 45 EO!547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 32.55 46 EO1547 C4449-1 49000 0.0'S NOTAVAIL 32.55 47 E01429 C4449-9 39000 0.072 NOTAVAIL 32.55 48 EOI144 C4449-8 47000 0.07 NOTAVAIL 33.68 49 EOII44 C4449-8 47000 0.07 NOTAVAIL 33.68 50 EOII44 C4449-8 47000 0.07 NOT AVAIL 33.63 51 EOl547 C-6449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 33.68 52 EOII42 C4449-7 54000 0.08 NOT AVAIL 33.68 53 EOII42 C4449-7 54000 0.08 NOT AVAIL 33.68 54 EOlI42 C4449-7 54000 0.08 NOT AVAIL 33.68 55 EO1547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 33.68 56 EO1547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOT AVAIL 34.80 57 EO1547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 34.80 58 E01547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 34.80 59 EO1547 C-6449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 34.80 60 EO1547 C-6449-1 49000 0.078 NOT AVAIL 36.98 61 EO1547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOT AVAIL 36.98 62 EO1547 C-6449-1 490G3 0.078 NOT AVAIL 36.98 63 EO1547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOT / VAIL 36.98 64 EO1547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 36.93 65 EO1547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 36.98 Table 1, page 9 7

USTr 2 ALLOY 600/690 NOZZLES CEDM Nozzle No.

IIcat No.

Code No.

Yield Strength Carbon AnnealTemperature Tangent Angle 66 E01547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 36.98 67 EO1547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 36.98 68 EOl547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 42.27 M

EO1429 C-6449-9 39000 0.072 NOT AVAIL 42.27 70 EO1547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOFAVAIL 42.27 71 EO1429 C4449-9 39000 0.072 NOT AVAIL 42.27 72 EOl364 C4449-2 52000 0 08 NOT AVAIL 42.27 73 EO1364 C4449-2 52000 0.08 NOT AVATL 42.27 74 EO1429 C4449-9 39000 0.072 NOT AVAIL 42.27 75 EOI429 C4449-9 39000 0.072 NOT AVAIL 42.27 76 EO1429 C-6449-9 39000 0.072 NOT AVAIL 42.27 77 EO1429 C-6449-9 39000 0.072 NOT AVAIL 42.27 78 E01429 C-6449-9 39000 0.072 NOTAVAIL 42.27 79 EO1547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 42.27 80 EO1364 C4449-2 52000 0.08 NOTAVAIL 4331 81 EOl547 C-6449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 4331 82 EO1547 C-6449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 4331 83 EO1547 C-6449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 4331 84 EOll77 C-6449-3 36000 0.088 NOTAVAIL 4331 85 EO1547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 4331 86 EOl364 C-6449-2 52000 0.08 NOTAVAIL 4331 87 EO1547 C-6449-1 49000 0.078 NOT AVAIL 4331 Table 1, page 10

UNIT 2 ALLOY 600/690 NOZZLES CEDM Nozzle No.

IIcat No.

Code No.

Yield Strength Carbon AnnealTemperature Tangent Angle 88 EO1547 C4449-1 49000 0.073 NOTAVAIL 49.55 89 EOl749 M-4119-1 43000 0.07 NOTAVAIL 49.55 t

49.55

(

90 EO1547 C4449-1 49000 0.078 NOTAVAIL 9I EO1547 C-6449-1 49000 0.078 NOT AVAIL 49 55 ICI NOZZLES ICI Nozzle No.

IIcat No.

Code No.

Yield Strength Carbon AnnealTemperature Tangent Angle 92 NX 2718 C4406-1 38000 0.07 NOT AVAIL

$5.06 93 NXN18 C-64061 38000 0.07 NOTAVAIL 55.06 94 NX 27:0 C44061 38000 0.07 NOT AVAIL

'M 95 NX 2718 C-6406-1 38000 0 *T7 NOTAVAIL

.o.Cb 96 NX 27I8 C-6406-1 38000 0.07 NOTAVAIL 55.06 i

l 97 NX 2718 C-6406-1 38000 0.07 NOTAVAIL 55.06 l

98 NX 27I8 C-6406-1 38000 0.07 NOTAVAIL 55.06 99 NX 2718 C4406-1 38000 0.07 NOTAVAIL 55.06 100 NX 2718 C-6406-1

.38000 0.07 NOT AVA" 55.06 101 NX 2718 C-6406-1 38000 0.07 NOTAVAIL 55.06 Table I, page 11

Document 90022 Revision 2.2 Table 2 18

i UsTr3 Allov60&%90NozzIIs Pressurizer Procedure 10 Equipment ID PC-No.

IIcat No.

Nominal size (in.)

Drawing No.

Ifistory 20 S3-1201-407-13 NX 7630 1.062 x 6.86 S023-919-77; MI 316 83 DCN's 1,2,4 21 S3-1201-407-13 NX 7630 1.062 x 6.86 SO23-919-77; M1 315 83 DCN's 1,2,4 22 3TE0101 407-07 54318 1.315 x 13.625 S O 23-919-77;83;103 1988-Preventive replacement with A600 material K248 II at 54318 had high susceptibility to PWSCC 23 S3-1201-407-I0B 54318 1.062 x 8.25 SO23-919-77;83,103 1987-Preventive replacement with A600 material MI 312 94758 Ileat $4318 had high susceptibility to PWSCC.

A690 */A600 1992-Evidence of leakage found, nozzle replaced.

filler 1995-Preventive replacement of A600 weld material l

A690 24 S3-1201-407-10C 54318 1.068 x 8.25 SO23-919-77;83,103 1986-Evidence ofleakage found, nozzle replaced MI 3I4 NX 0571 from ID per original design. NCR 3-1482 A690 */A600 1992-PT exam identified cracks, nozzle replaced filler 1995-Preventive. replacement of A600 weld material A690 l

25 S3-1201-407-10D 54318 1.101 x 8.25 SO23-919-77;83,103 1987-Preventive replacement with A600 material Mi 313 94758 Ilest 54318 had high susceptibility to PWSCC.

A690 */A600 1992-Preventive replacement of nonie,3 of 4 steam filler space nozzles found to be cracked.

A690 1995-Evidence of leakage found, nozzle replaced.

26 S3-1201-407-10A NX 7630 1.066 x 8.25 SO 23-919-77;83,103 1992-PT exam ideraified cracks, nozzle replaced.

M1 311 A690 */A600 1995-PT exam identified crack in weki material, filler replaced nozzle.

A690 Table 2, page 1

UNIT 3 A110Y60Gai90Nozztrs ProcedureID l EquipmentID PC-No.

IIcat No.

Nominal size (in.)

Drawing No.

liistory RCS PIFING: E089 IIOT LEG (#1)

I8 3PDTU)78-1 506-11 NX 7630 0.993 x 8 '/s

! SO 23-923-29.71.73 1997-I!alf nozzle repair Alloy 690 16 3PDT0978-2 506-11 NX 7630 0.993 x 8 '/s SO23N-29.7I.73 13 3PDT0978-3 506-11 NX 7630 0.993 x 8 '/s S0 23-923-29,71.73 21

- 3PDT0978-4 506-11 NX 7630 0.993 x 8 '/s S O23-923-29.71.73 20 S3-1201-506-14 NX 7630 1.050 x 8 '/s S O 23-923-29.71.73 MI,023 12 3TE0112-2 509-05 9294 0.993 x 8 '/s 5023-923-29,73.80 14 3TE0112-1 509-05 9294 0 993 x 8 'Is SO23-923-29.73.80 15 3TE0111X-1 509-05 9294 0.993 x 8 '/s S O23-923-29,73.80 17 311?D112-3 509-05 9294 0.993 x 8 '/s S 023-923-29.73.80 19 3TE0112-4 509-05 7760-4 0.993 x 8 'Is SO23-923-29.73.80 22 3TW0138A 717-02 NX 9915 0.993 x 8 '/s S O 23-923 4 9.70 1997-Italfnozzle plug repair Alloy 690 23 3TWO138B 717-02 NX 9915 0.993 x 8 '/a SO23-923 4 9.70 24 3TW0138C 717-02 NX 9915 0.993 x 8 'Is

!.023-923 49,70 25 3BV0138D 717-02 NX 9915 0.993 x 8 'Is SO23-923 49.70 26 3TW0138E 717-02 NX 9915 0.993 x 8 'Is S O23-923 4 9.70 1997-Italf nozzle plug repair Alloy 690 27 3TWO138F 717-02 NX 9915 0.993 x 8 '/s SO23-923 4 9.70 Table 2, page 2

UNIT 3 Anov60H90Nozzus Procedure ID Equipment ID PC-No.

IIcat No.

Nominal size (in.)

Drawing Nc.

IIistory RCS PIPING: E088 IlOT LEG (#2) 14 3PDT-0979-1 506-11 NX 7630 0.993 x 5 S O23-923-29.71.73 1997-1Ia1f nozzle repair Alloy 690 11 3PIyr-0979-2 506-11 NX 7630 0.993 x 5 S 023-923-29,71.73 1997-1Ialf norzle repait Alloy 690 15 3PDT-0979-3 506-11 NX 7630 0.993 x 5 SO 23-923-29.71,73 1997-1121f nozzle repair A!!oy 690 17 3PDT-0979-4 506-11 NX 7630 0.993 x 5 S O 23-923-29.71.73 1995-Ilalf nozzle repair Alloy 690 18 S3-1201-506-14 NX 7630 1.050 x 5 S O23-923-29,71,73 ML-065 16 3TE-0122-2 509-05B 9294 0.993 x 8 '/s 5023-923-29.73.

1997-Ilalf nozzle repair Alloy 690 80 DCN #3 19 3TE-0122-1 50945A 9294 0.993 x 8 '/s S O 23-923-29.73.80 1995-lialf nozzle repair Alloy 690 13 3TE-0121X2 509-05E 9294 0.993 x 8 'Is S O23-923-29.73.80 1997-1Ialt nozzle repair Alloy 690 10 3TE4122-3 50945 9294 0.993 x 8 '/s 5023-923-29.73.80 12 3TE-0127 4 509-05 9294 0.993 x 8 '/s S O 23-923-29.73.80 20 3TW-0139A 717-02 K 259 0.993 x 8 '/s 5023-92349.70 21 3TW-0139B 717-02 K 259 0.993 x 8 'Is SO23-923 49.70 22 3TW-0139C 717-02 K 259 0.993 x 8 'is SO 23-923-69.70 23 3TW-0139D 717-02 NX 9915 0.993 x 8 '/s 5023-92349.70 24 3TW-0139E 717-02 K 259 0.993 x 8 '/s S O23-923 4 9.70 25 3TW-013f I' 717-G2 K 239 0.993 x 8 '/s S O23-923-69,70 Table 2, page 3

UNIT 3 Anov600M90Nozzus Procedure ID Equipment ID PC-No.

Heat No.

Nominal size (in.)

Drawing No.

History RCS PtPtNG:P901 COLD LEG (504-0l) 15 3TE-9178 509-05 9294 0.993 x 8 'Is S O23-923-30.72.80 16 3TE-0111YI 509 4 9294 0.993 x 8 '/s SO23-923-30.72.80 17 3TE-9178-3 509 4 9294 0.993 x 8 '/s SO23-923-30.72.8G RCS P! PING: P002 COI.D LEG (505-04) 11 3TE-9179-4 509-05 9294 0.993 x 8 %s S O23-923-31.72.80 12 37E-0121Y2 509-05 9294 0.993 x 8 '/s SO23-923-31.72.80 1997-1lalf nozzle repair A690 13 3TE-9179-2 5')94 9294 0.993 x 8 '/s SO23-9 3 -31.72.80 RCS PIPING: P903 COLD LEG (505-01) 13 3TE-9178-4 509-05 9294-0.993 x 8 '/s SO23-923-31.72.80 l

14 3TE-0115-2 Sm_oS 9294 0.993 x 8 'Is SO23-923-31.72.80 15 3TE-9178-2 509-05 9294 0.993 x 8 '/s SO23-923-31.72.80 RCS PIFING: P904 COLD LEC (504-04) f 13 3TE-9179-3 509 4 9294 0.993 x 8 'Is SO23-923-30,72.80 14 3TE 0125-1 509 4 9294 0.993 x 8 '/s SO 23-923-30.72.80 15 3TE-9179-1 09 4 9294 0.993 x 8 '/s 5023-923-30.72.80 STEAM GENERATOR PDT Nozzles 5

E08R 23 3PD71)979-1 110-11 NX 3703 G 3 1.019 x 9 %:

S O 23-915-42.138,139 1.050 x 6 l

24 3isi(679-2 110-11 NX 3703 G-7 1.019 x 9 %:

3 O 23-915-42.138,139 1.050 x 6 1

1 Tabic 2. page 4 1

l

thTr3 AuCY600590 nozzles Procedure ID Equipmem ID PC-No.

IIcat No.

Nominal size (in.)

Drawing No.

IIistory 25 3PDT0979-3 110-11 NX 3703 G-5 1.019 x 9 %;

S O 23-915-42.138.139 1.050 x 6 26 3PDT0979-4 110-11 NX 3703 G-1 1.019 x 9 %;

S O23-915-42.138,139 1.050 x 6 E089 23 3PDT0978-1 110-11 NX 3703 G-2 1.019 x 9 %;

S O23-915-41,138.139 1.050 x 6 24 3PDT0978-2 110-11 NX 3703 G-4 1.019 x 9 M; SO23-915-41.138.139 1.050 x 6 25 3PDIV978-3 110-11 NX 3703 G-6 1.019 x 9 %;

S O23-915-41.138.139 1.050 x 6 26 3PDTD978-4 110-11 NX 3703 G-8 1.019 x 9 %;

S O 23-915-41,138.139 1.050 x 6 Table 2, page 5

UNTT3 Au.oy600M90Nozn.Es i

PRESSURIZER IIEATER SLEEVES Location PC-No IIcat No-Nozzle Size. inches Drawing No.

IIistory Al 420-19 NX 7545 1.660 x 14 'Is S 0 23-919-74.77 A2 420-1)

NX 7545 1.660 x I4'Is S 023-919-74.77 A3 420-19 NX 7545 1.660 x 14 '/s S O23-919-74.77 A4 420-19 NX 7.E45 1.660 x 14 '/s S O23-919-74.77 B1 420-19 NX 4886 1.660 x 14 '/s S O23-919-74.77 B2 420-19 NX 7545 1.660 x 14 '/s S O 23-919-74.77 CI 420-19 NX 7545 1.660 x 14 'Is SO23-919-74.77 C2 420-19 NX 7545 1.660 x I4 '/s S 023-919-74.77 C3 420-19 NX 4836 1.660 x 14'Is 5023-919-74.77 C4 420-19 NX 7545 1.660 x 14 '/s S O 23-919-74.77 D1 420-20 NX 4886 1.660 x 15 SO23-919-74.77 D2 420-20 NX 4886 1.660 x 15 SO23-919-74.77 D3 420-20 NX 4886 1.660a15 S O 23-919-74.77 D4 420-20 NX 4886 1.660 x 15 S O23-919-74.77 El 420-21 NX 7545 1.660 x 15 'Is S O 23-919-74.77 E2 420-21 NX 4886 1.660 x 15 '/s S O 23-919-74.77 FI 420-21 NX 7545 1.660 x 15 '/s S O23-919-74.77 F2 420-21 NX 7545 1.660 x 15 '/s S O 23-919-74.77 F3 420-21 NX 7545 1.660 x 15 'Is 5 023-919-74.77 F4 420-21 NX 7545 1.660 x 15 '/s S O23-919-74.77 Table 2, page 6

Eum UmT3 ALLov600Ni90NozzIIs l

G1 420-22 NX 4886 1.660 x 16 %

SO23-919-74.77 G2 420-22 NX 4886 1.660 x 16 %

S O 23-919-74,77 G3 420-22 NX 4886 1.660 x 16 %

SO23 >l9-74,77 G4 420-22 NX 4886 1.660 x 16 %

S O 23-919-74,77 111 420-23 NX 4886 1.660 x 16 %

S O23-919-74.77 112 420-23 NX 4886 1.660 x 16 %

S O 23-919-74,77 l

113 420-23 NX 4886

. 660 x 16 %

S O23-919-74,77 l

114 420-23 NX 4886 1.60 x 16 %

S O23-919-74,77 Jl 420-24 NX 4886 1.660 x 18 %

i 3 023-919-74.77 J2 420-24 L NX 7545 1.660 x 18 %

S O23-919-74.77 Note: There are two 2" x 18 %" nozzles in the warehouse, mat. code 027-70964.

Table 2, page 7 a

UNrr3 Au.ny 600490 NOZZ1.ES CEDM NOZ7,LES CEDM

}{ eat No.

Code No.

Yield Strength Carbon AnnealTemperature

. Tangent !.agle

+

NotzS No.

I A6785 C4441-7 56000 0.065 1625F 411R 0

2 A6926 C-6441-4 39500 0.068 1625F 411R 7.73 3

A6926 C4441-4 39500 0.068 1625F 411R 7.73 4

A6926 C4441-4 39500 0.068 1625F 411R 10.97 5

A6926 C4441-4 39500 0.068 162SF 4tIR 10.97 6

A6926 C4441-4 39500 0.068 1625F 411R 10.97 7

A6926 C-6441-4 39500 0.068 1625F 4IIR 10.97 8

A5849 C44414 59000 0.054 1625F 411R-15.6I 9

A5849 C-6441-6 59000 0.054 1625F 4tIR 15.61 10 A5980 C-64 41-3 39000 0.06 1625F 41TR 15.61 11 A5980 C-6441-3 39000 0.06 1625F 411R 15.61 i

i 12 A6926 C-6441-4 39500 0.068 1625F 411R 17.50 13 A6926 C4441-4

'39500 0.068 1625F 411R 17.50 14 A6926 C-6441-4 39500 0.068 1625F 411R 17.50 15 A5811 C-6441-5 44500 0.06 1625F 411R

-17.50 16 A58tl C-6441-5 44500 0.06 1625F 411R 17.50 17 A5811 C4441-5 44500 0.06 1625F 41IR 17.50 18 A6926 C-6441-4 39500 0.068 1625F 411R 17.50 1

19 A5811 C-6441-5 44500 0.06 1625F 411R 17.50

{

20 A6785 C-6441-7 56000 0.065 1625F 411R 22.36 i

Table 2, page 8 i

{

UNIT 3 Anov600M90N0ZZI.ES l

CEDM

}{ eat No.

Code No.

Yield Strength Carbon AnnealTemperature Tangent Angle Hanne na.

21 A6785 C-6441-7 56000 0.OrG 1625F 411R 22.36 22 A6777 C-6441-1 35000 0.04 1625F 411R 22.36 23 A6777 C-6441-1 35000 0.04 1625F 4IIR 22.36 24 EO3189 C4848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 23.80 25 EO3189 C4848-3 55000 0.084 NOTAVAIL 23.80 26 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOTAVAIL 23.80 27 EO3189 C-6848-3

.55000 0.084 NOTAVAIL 23.80 28 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 25.17 29 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 25.17 30 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 25.17 31 EO3189 C4848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 25.17 32 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOTAVAIL 25.17 33 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOTAVAIL 25.17 34 AO9965 C-6848-5 44000 0.08i NOTAVAIL 25.17 35 AO9965 C-6848-5 44000 0.081 NOTAVAIL

} 5.17 36 E03189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 29.01 37 E 33189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 29.01 38 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 29.01 39 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 29.01 40 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 29.01 41 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 29.0I Table 2, page 9

-- - ~

-= -

UNrr3 Auoy600M90 Nomis GN IIeat No.

Code No.

Yield Strength Carbon A mealTemperature Tangent Angle 42 E03189 C4848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 29.01 43 EO3189 C4848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 29.01 44 EO3189 C-6848-3 55M0 0.084 NOT AVAIL 32.55 45 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 32.55 46 EO3189 C4848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 32.55 47 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 32.55 48 EO3045 C-6848-I

$2000 0.075 NOTAVAIL 33.68

~

49 EO3045 C4848-1 52000 0.075 NOT AVAIL 33.68 50 EO3N5 C-6843-1 52000 0.075 NOT AVAlL 33.68 5I EO3045 C-6848-1 52000 0.075 NOT AVAIL 33.68 52 EO3045 C4848-1 52000 0.075 NOT AVAIL 33.68 53 EO3MS C-6848-1 52000 0.075 NOT AVAIL 33.68 54 EO3045 C-6848-1 52000 0.075 NOT AVAIL 33.68 55 EO3045 C-6848-1 52000 0.075 NOT AVAIL 33.68 56 R1948 C-6848-2 42500 0.062 NOT AVAIL 34.80 57 R1948 C4848-2 42500 0.062 NOT AVAIL 3430 58 R1948 C4848-2 42500 0.062 NOT AVAIL 34.80 59 R1948 C4848-2

'42500 0.062 NOT AVAIL 34.80 60 EO3045 C-6848-1 52000 0.075 NOT AVAIL 36.98 6I E03045 C-6848-1 52000 0.075 NOT AVAIL 36.98 62 EO3045 C-6848-1 52000 0.075 NOT AVAIL 36.98 Table 2, page 10

UNIT 3 Anov 600M90 Nozzus M

IIcat No.

Code No.

Yield Strength Carbon AnnealTemperature Tangent Angle 63 EO3045 C4848-1 52000 0.075 NOT AVAIL 36.98 64 EO3045 C-6848-1 52000 0.075 NOT AVAIL 36.98 65 EO3045 C-6848-1 52000 0.375 NOT AVAIL 36.98 66 EO3045 C-6848-1 52000 0.075 NOT AVAIL 36.98 67 EO3045 C4848-1 52000 0.075 NOT AVAIL 36.98 68 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOTAVAIL 42.27 69 EO3189 C4848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 42.27 70 E03189 C4848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 42.27 71 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOTAVAIL 42.27 72 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 42.27 73 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL '

42.27 74 EO3189 C4848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 42.27 75 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 42.27 76 EO3189 C4848-3 55000 0.084 NOTAVAIL 42.27 77 EO3189 C4848-3 55000 0.084 NOTAVAIL 42.27 78 EO3189 C4848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 42.27 79 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 42.27 80 EO3189 C4848-3 55000 0.084 NOTAVAIL 4331 81 EO3189 C4848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 4331 82 EO3189 C-6848-3 55000 0.084 NOTAVAIL 4331 83 EO3189 C4848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 4331 Table 2, page !1

UsTr3 Anoy/40590Nozz1_r3 GDit IIcat No.

Code No Yiek! Strength Carton

. ArnealTemperature Tangent Angle uank Ns S4 EO31S9 C4843-3 55000 0.084 NOTAVAIL 4331 85 EO3189 C4848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVA1L 4331 36 EO1547 C4848-4 35000 0.0S8 NOT AVAIL 4331 87 E01547 C4848-4

-35000 0.038 NOTAVAIL 4331 88 EO3189 C4848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 4935 89 EO3189 C4848-3 55000 024 NOT AVAIL 49.55 90 EO3189 C4848-3 55000 0.0S4 NOT AVAIL 49.55 91 EO3189 C4848-3 55000 0.084 NOT AVAIL 49.55 ICI NOZZLES 10 Nm*

IIcat No.

Code No.

Yield Strength Carton Anrret Temperature Tangent Angle Na 92 NX S006G C4857-1 40500 0.06 r;OTAVAIL 55.06 l

93 NX 8006G C4857-1 40500 0.06 NOTAVAIL 55.06 94 NX 8006G C4857-1 40500 0.06 NOTAVAIL 55.06 95 NX 8006G C4857 t 40500 0.06 NOT AVAIL 55f6 NX S006G C4857-1 40500 0.06 NOTAVAIL 55.06 97 NX 8006G C4857-1 40500 0.06 NOT AVAIL 55.06 98 NX 8006G C4857-1 40500 0.06 NOT AVAIL 55.06 99 NX 8006G C4857-1

'40500 0.06 NOTAVAIL

$5.06 100 NX 8006G C4857-1 40500 0.06 NOT AVAIL 55.06 101 NX 8006G C4857-1 40500 0.06 NOT AVAIL 55.06 Table 2, page 12

Document 90022 Revision 2.3 Figures 19

TYPICAL ALLOY 600 PENETRATION INSTALLATION CONFIGURATION man - 7

==.

l

~

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i PIPING OR VESSEL I

PARENT MATERIAL i

CLADDING n

SUSCEPTIBLE CRACK AREA LL i

I u

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