U-600602, Responds to Item 3 of IE Bulletin 86-001, Min Flow Logic Problems That Could Disable RHR Pumps. Util Does Not Have Single Failure Vulnerability W/Min Flow Bypass Valve Logic for Reasons Provided in Encl

Responds to Item 3 of IE Bulletin 86-001, Min Flow Logic Problems That Could Disable RHR Pumps. Util Does Not Have Single Failure Vulnerability W/Min Flow Bypass Valve Logic for Reasons Provided in Encl

ML20205T583
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	06/06/1986
From:	Spangenberg F ILLINOIS POWER CO.
To:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
IEB-86-001, IEB-86-1, U-600602, NUDOCS 8606160069
Download: ML20205T583 (2)

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U-600602 LO8-86(06-06)-L i

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/LLINDIS POWER 00MPANY CLINTON POWER STATION, P.o. BOX 678. CLINTON. ILLINOIS 61727 June 6, 1986 Docket No. 50-461 Mr. James G. Keppler Regional Administrator, Region III U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Subject:

IE Bulletin 86-01 Minimum Flow Logic Problems That Could Disable RHR Pumps

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter constitutes Illinois Power (IP) Company's response to IE Bulletin 86-01, Item 3 which requires all General Electric BWR Facilities provide a written report to the NRC which identifies whether or not the minimum flow logic problem exists at our facility. Illinois Power Company does not have the single failure vulnerability with the minimum flow bypass valve logic for the reasons provided in Attachment 1.

I hereby affirm that the information in this letter and the attachment is correct to the best of my knowledge.

Please contact me if you should have any questions on this matter.

Sincerely yours, N./

W F. A. Spangenberg Manager - Licensing and Safety SMK/pj r Attachment cc:

B. L. Siegel, NRC Clinton Licensing Project Manager h7C Resident Office Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety NRC Document Control Desk l

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8606160069 860606 PDR ADOCK 05000461 lI J G

PDR j8 JUN 9 1986

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• to U-600602 Page 1 of 1 IE Bulletin 86-01 The design of the Emergency Core Cooling System will preclude the single failure vulnerability for the reasons stated below:

High Pressure Core Spray - The minimum flow valve for this system will open only when flow is below the setpoint and the discharge pressure is above the setpoint. The minimum flow valve closes when the flow is above the setpoint or the discharge pressure is below the setpoint.

Low Pressure Core Spray - The minimum flow valve for this system will open only when the flow is below the low flow setpoint and pump running signals are present. The minimum flow valve closes when the flow is above the low flow setpoint.

Low Pressure Coolant Injection - The minimum flow valve for this system will open only when flow is below the setpoint and pump running signals are present. The minimum flow valve closes when flow is above the setpoint. This system utilizes three separate pumps. Each pump has its own separate minimum flow recirculation line, valve and control circuitry.

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