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{{#Wiki_filter:Development of Risk-Informed and Performance-Based (RIPB) Standards Opening Remarks by Mike Franovich, Division Director, NRR/DRA
{{#Wiki_filter:Development of Risk-Informed and Performance-Based (RIPB) Standards Opening Remarks by Mike Franovich, Division Director, NRR/DRA Session Chair: Matthew Humberstone, Senior Reliability and Risk Analyst, RES/DRA/PRB Panelists/Speakers:
 
Session Chair: Matthew Humberstone, Senior Reliability and Risk Analyst,R ES/DRA/PRB
 
Panelists/Speakers:
Prasad Kadambi (ANS)
Prasad Kadambi (ANS)
David Grabaskas (ASME/ANS JCNRM)
David Grabaskas (ASME/ANS JCNRM)
Line 26: Line 22:
Tom Basso (NEI)
Tom Basso (NEI)
Eric Thornsbury (EPRI)
Eric Thornsbury (EPRI)
Overview of ANS Activities to Support RIPB Standards N. Prasad Kadambi Chair, Risk-informed, Performance-Based Principles and Policy Committee (RP3C)
Presented to:
Presented to:
2023 NRC Standards Forum September 13, 2023 Overview of ANS Activities to Support RIPB Standards
2023 NRC Standards Forum September 13, 2023 2


N. Prasad Kadambi Chair, Risk-informed, Performance -Based Principles and Policy Committee (RP3C)
The ANS Standards Board Supports RIPB Standards To Modernize Nuclear VCS*
The ANS Standards Board Supports RIPB Standards To Modernize Nuclear VCS*
* Creation and operation of RP3C
* Creation and operation of RP3C
* Current activities of RP3C
* Current activities of RP3C
* ANS Standards Board (SB) has directed committees (CCs) to incorporate RIPB principles w hereANS consensus appropri ate.
* ANS Standards Board (SB) has directed ANS consensus committees (CCs) to incorporate RIPB principles where appropriate.
* All eight CCs provide reports at every SB meeting.
* All eight CCs provide reports at every SB meeting.
- The SB recognizes the varied application and applicability of suc hprinciples to each portfolio of standards.
- The SB recognizes the varied application and applicability of such principles to each portfolio of standards.
- Relative to advanced reactors, the Joint Committee on RiskManagement (JCNRM) plays a central role in supporting modernizati on relative to RIPB standards development
- Relative to advanced reactors, the Joint Committee on Risk Management (JCNRM) plays a central role in supporting modernization relative to RIPB standards development
* Voluntary consensus standard as defined in OMB Circular A -119 [1]. NOTE: Numbers in brackets refer to corresponding reference numbers on slide 11.
*Voluntary consensus standard as defined in OMB Circular A-119 [1]. NOTE: Numbers in brackets refer to corresponding reference numbers on slide 11.
3
 
ANS Has Been a Leader in Promoting RIPB VCS
ANS Has Been a Leader in Promoting RIPB VCS
* Recent experience with conventional VCS shows that products that have detai led shall statements give rise to system requirements that are unnecessary or too conservative.
* Recent experience with conventional VCS shows that products that have detailed shall statements give rise to system requirements that are unnecessary or too conservative.
- Frequently the motivation is driven by convenience for verification of compliance to requirements established by regulatory authorities.
Frequently the motivation is driven by convenience for verification of compliance to requirements established by regulatory authorities.
* Conventional VCS often do not support economic deployment of advanced reactors m andated by the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA) and supported by industry investments.
* Conventional VCS often do not support economic deployment of advanced reactors mandated by the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA) and supported by industry investments.
- RIPB VCS provide a more logical fit with NEIMA than conventional ones.
RIPB VCS provide a more logical fit with NEIMA than conventional ones.
- ANS is in a good position to advocate for RIPB VCS by articulating specific aspects of the value proposition to move away from prescription.
ANS is in a good position to advocate for RIPB VCS by articulating specific aspects of the value proposition to move away from prescription.
- ANS is actively tackling the challenges of creating guidance for RIPB VCS.
ANS is actively tackling the challenges of creating guidance for RIPB VCS.
4
 
Current Activities Toward RIPB VCS
Current Activities Toward RIPB VCS
* ANS has recognized the need to create an infrastructure to support RIPB VCS.
* ANS has recognized the need to create an infrastructure to support RIPB VCS.
- Part of this is to focus on structured performance objectives such that varied levels of detail can be accommodated rigorously.
- Part of this is to focus on structured performance objectives such that varied levels of detail can be accommodated rigorously.
* The most visible of these activities are related to creating one or more internally consistent and coherent suites of standards that could foster further development of RIPB VCS within and outside of ANS.
* The most visible of these activities are related to creating one or more internally consistent and coherent suites of standards that could foster further development of RIPB VCS within and outside of ANS.
* An existing example is the suite of seismic standards ANS-2.26 [2]*, 2.27 [3],
* An existing example is the suite of seismic standards ANS-2.26 [2]*, 2.27 [3],
2.29 [4], and ASCE 43- 05 [5].
2.29 [4], and ASCE 43-05 [5].
* Currently, ANS efforts are focused on the series ANS-30.1 [6], 30.2 [7], and 30.3 [8].
* Currently, ANS efforts are focused on the series ANS-30.1 [6], 30.2 [7], and 30.3 [8].
* ANS views these standards within a structure where success in issuing ANS -30.1 as a Guidance Standard, developing ANS-30.2, and obtaining regulatory endorsement of ANS -
ANS views these standards within a structure where success in issuing ANS-30.1 as a Guidance Standard, developing ANS-30.2, and obtaining regulatory endorsement of ANS-30.3 would be major accomplishments toward RIPB VCS.
30.3 would be major accomplishments toward RIPB VCS.
*Titles of standards are provided on slide 11.
* Titles of standards are provided on slide 11.
5
What ANS-2.26 Does
 
Figure from Appendix A:


AN S-2.26:
What ANS-2.26 Does ANS-2.26:
Assign a Seismic Design Category (SDC):
Assign a Seismic Design Category (SDC):
Given the potential consequences of failure, assign a performance criterion:
Given the potential consequences of failure, assign a performance criterion:
specifically, a failure probability criterion.
specifically, a failure probability criterion.
The other standards then tell you how to go about engineering satisfaction of this criterion.
The other standards then tell you how to go about engineering satisfaction of this criterion.
ANS Standards Committee Hierarchy For Advanced Reactors
Figure from Appendix A:
6


AN S-30.1*
ANS-30.1*
Risk and Performance Objectives (Linn)
Risk and Performance Objectives (Linn)
 
ANS-20.2 Liquid Molten Salt Reactor (Holcomb)
AN S-30.2 Categorization of Structures, Systems and Components (Diaconeasa)
ANS-53.1 Modular Helium Cooled Reactor (August)
 
ANS-54.1 Liquid Sodium Cooled Reactor (Flanagan)
AN S-20.2 AN S-53.1 AN S-54.1 AN S-30.3 Liquid Molten Salt Modular Helium Cooled Liquid Sodium Cooled Advanced Light-Water Reactor Reactor Reactor Reactor (Holcomb) (August) (Flanagan) (Welter)
ANS-30.3 Advanced Light-Water Reactor (Welter)
 
ANS-30.2 Categorization of Structures, Systems and Components (Diaconeasa)
Advanced Reactor Large Light Water Rx
 
ANS and other SDO standards as needed:
ANS and other SDO standards as needed:
- Cross cutting topics
- Cross cutting topics
*ANS-30.1 is now being prepared as an ANS guidance standard, - Reactor technology specific issues not as an ANSI consensus standard NRC activities support RIPB, but more can be done.
- Reactor technology specific issues Advanced Reactor Large Light Water Rx ANS Standards Committee Hierarchy For Advanced Reactors
* Commission approval of SECYsignificance for RIPB standards as an example of 0096 [9] on Functional Containment has majorperformance-based principles.
*ANS-30.1 is now being prepared as an ANS guidance standard, not as an ANSI consensus standard 7
 
- This clears the way for standards development organizations (SDOs) to consider all generaldesign criteria from a performance-based perspective.
* Similarlytechnology-inclusive for addressing certain major safety issues., issuance of RG 1.233 [10] has significance because it is meant to be
 
- Logicallyacceptable way to implement relevant regulations., it means that light water reactors should also be able to use its provisions as one
* NRC should recognize that industry and SDOs alike look for regulatory cues that mayencourage or discourage RIPB VCS.
* NRC can do more to clarify how the provisions of NEIMA relative to a technology -inclusive regulatory framework will use appropriate VCS for conforming with OMB Circular A-119 [1].
- Federal policy clearly favors performance-based requirements instead of prescriptive ones.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The ANS Standards Committee


Standards Board (Top-level committee)
NRC activities support RIPB, but more can be done.
Risk-informed, Performance-based Principles and Policy Task Groups Committee (RP3C)
* Commission approval of SECY-18-0096 [9] on Functional Containment has major significance for RIPB standards as an example of performance-based principles.
- This clears the way for standards development organizations (SDOs) to consider all general design criteria from a performance-based perspective.
* Similarly, issuance of RG 1.233 [10] has significance because it is meant to be technology-inclusive for addressing certain major safety issues.
- Logically, it means that light water reactors should also be able to use its provisions as one acceptable way to implement relevant regulations.
* NRC should recognize that industry and SDOs alike look for regulatory cues that may encourage or discourage RIPB VCS.
* NRC can do more to clarify how the provisions of NEIMA relative to a technology-inclusive regulatory framework will use appropriate VCS for conforming with OMB Circular A-119 [1].
- Federal policy clearly favors performance-based requirements instead of prescriptive ones.
8


Large Research Nonreactor Safety & Joint Nuclear Fuel, Light and Nuclear Radiological Committee Criticality Environmental Waste, and Water Advanced Facilities Analyses on Nuclear Safety and Siting Decommissioning Reactors Reactors Consensus Consensus Risk Management Consensus Consensus Consensus Consensus Consensus Committee Committee (JCNRM*) Committee Committee Committee Committee Committee (NRNFCC) (SRACC) Consensus (NCSCC) (ESCC) (FWDCC)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 9
(LLWRCC) (RARCC) Committee


Subcommittees
The ANS Standards Committee Standards Board (Top-level committee)
Large Light Water Reactors Consensus Committee (LLWRCC)
Research and Advanced Reactors Consensus Committee (RARCC)
Safety &
Radiological Analyses Consensus Committee (SRACC)
Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities Consensus Committee (NRNFCC)
Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (JCNRM*)
Consensus Committee Nuclear Criticality Safety Consensus Committee (NCSCC)
Environmental and Siting Consensus Committee (ESCC)
: Fuel, Waste, and Decommissioning Consensus Committee (FWDCC)
Subcommittees Working Groups Task Groups Risk-informed, Performance-based Principles and Policy Committee (RP3C)
*The JCNRM is a joint ANS and ASME committee.
10


Working Groups
* The JCNRM is a joint ANS and ASME committee.
Risk-informed, Performance-based Principles and Policy Committee (RP3C)
Risk-informed, Performance-based Principles and Policy Committee (RP3C)
The ANS Standards Board established the RP3C to support modernizing of ANS standards. Activities for training and knowledge sharing of RIPB principles and practices are part of the scope. The RP3C is responsible for the identification and oversight of the development and implementation of RIPB approaches in ANS standards. The RP3C Community of Practice (CoP) is one of the more successful ongoing training activities. The CoP is held on the last Friday of a month and is open to all professionals interested in RIPB principles and practices. Nearly 40 CoP recordings since February 2020 are available at https://www.ans.org/standards/rp3c/cop/. Contact standards@ans.org for questions or to get on the list to receive announcements of upcoming presentations.
The ANS Standards Board established the RP3C to support modernizing of ANS standards. Activities for training and knowledge sharing of RIPB principles and practices are part of the scope. The RP3C is responsible for the identification and oversight of the development and implementation of RIPB approaches in ANS standards. The RP3C Community of Practice (CoP) is one of the more successful ongoing training activities. The CoP is held on the last Friday of a month and is open to all professionals interested in RIPB principles and practices. Nearly 40 CoP recordings since February 2020 are available at https://www.ans.org/standards/rp3c/cop/. Contact standards@ans.org for questions or to get on the list to receive announcements of upcoming presentations.
Titles of Cited Documents and Standards
11
 
[1] OMB Circular A-119, Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and i n Conformity Assessment Activities
 
[2] ANSI/ANS-2.26-2004 (R2021), Components for Seismic Design Categorization of Nuclear Facility Structures, Systems, and Components for Seismic Design
 
[3] ANSI/ANS-2.27-2020, Criteria for Investigations of Nuclear Facility Sites for Seismic Hazard Assessments
 
[4] ANSI/ANS-2.29-2020, Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis
 
[5] ASCE/SEI 43-05, Seismic Design Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Facilities
 
[6] ANS-GS-30.1-202X, Integrating Risk and Performance Objectives into New Reactor Nuclear Safety Designs
 
[7] ANS-30.2-202X, Classification and Categorization of Structures, Systems, and Components for New Nuclear Power Plants


[8] ANSI/ANS-30.3-2022, Light Water Reactor Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Design
[1]
OMB Circular A-119, Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities
[2]
ANSI/ANS-2.26-2004 (R2021), Components for Seismic Design Categorization of Nuclear Facility Structures, Systems, and Components for Seismic Design
[3]
ANSI/ANS-2.27-2020, Criteria for Investigations of Nuclear Facility Sites for Seismic Hazard Assessments
[4]
ANSI/ANS-2.29-2020, Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis
[5]
ASCE/SEI 43-05, Seismic Design Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Facilities
[6]
ANS-GS-30.1-202X, Integrating Risk and Performance Objectives into New Reactor Nuclear Safety Designs
[7]
ANS-30.2-202X, Classification and Categorization of Structures, Systems, and Components for New Nuclear Power Plants
[8]
ANSI/ANS-30.3-2022, Light Water Reactor Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Design
[9]
SECY-18-0096, Functional Containment Performance Criteria For Non-Light-Water-Reactors
[10]
RG 1.233, Guidance for a Technology-Inclusive, Risk-Informed, and Performance-Based Methodology to Inform the Licensing Basis and Content of Applications for Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Non-Light Water Reactors Titles of Cited Documents and Standards 12


[9] SECY-18-0096, Functional Containment Performance Criteria For Non-Light-Water-Reactors
ASME/ANS NON-LWR PRA STANDARD IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE Dave Grabaskas Manager, Licensing and Risk Assessments Group, Argonne National Laboratory Chair, ASME/ANS Non-LWR PRA standard working group Former Chair (current Vice Chair), NLWR PRA standard working group 13


[10] RG 1.233, Guidance for a Technology -Inclusive, Risk-Informed, and Performance-Based Methodology to Inform the Licensing Basis and Content of Applications for Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Non-Light Water Reactors ASME/ANS NON-LW R P R A S TA N D A R D IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE
JCNRM Background
* Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (JCNRM) oThe JCNRM is the PRA Standards development and maintenance consensus committee - formed by combining:
§ ANS RISC committee - originally developing the hazard PRA standards (e.g., Seismic, Fire, Flooding, etc.)
§ ASME CRNM committee - developed the internal events requirements.
oCommittees both started in the late 1990s, and officially merged around 2009, and issued the combined standard for LWRs covering L1 PRA, endorsed in RG 1.200.
oOversees two issued PRA standards (LWR - L1 and Non-LWR) and five under development.
14


Dave Grabaskas Manager, Licensing and Risk Assessments Group, Argonne National Laboratory Chair, ASME/ANS Non -LWR PRA standard working group Former Chair (current Vice Chair), NLWR PRA standard working group JCNRM Background
* Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (JCNRM) o The JCNRM is the PRA Standards development and maintenance consensus committee - formed by combining:
§ ANS RISC committee - originally developing the hazard PRA standards (e.g., Seismic, Fire, Flooding, etc.)
§ ASME CRNM committee - developed the internal events requirements.
o Committees both started in the late 1990s, and officially merged around 2009, and issued the combined standard for LWRs covering L1 PRA, endorsed in RG 1.200.
o Oversees two issued PRA standards (LWR - L1 and Non -LW R )
and five under development.
Standard Background
Standard Background
* Non-LW R P R A S t a n d a r d D e v e l o p m e n t o Working grouped formed in 2006 o Trial use standard issued in 2013 o New version formally approved by ASME, ANS, and ANSI in 2021
* Non-LWR PRA Standard Development oWorking grouped formed in 2006 oTrial use standard issued in 2013 oNew version formally approved by ASME, ANS, and ANSI in 2021
§ ASME/ANS/ANSI RA -S-1.4-2021 o Endorsed by the NRC in trial use RG 1.247 in 2022 o An integrated standard:
§ ASME/ANS/ANSI RA-S-1.4-2021 oEndorsed by the NRC in trial use RG 1.247 in 2022 oAn integrated standard:
§ Covers from initiating events to offsite consequence
§ Covers from initiating events to offsite consequence
§ Can include any radionuclide source at the plant
§ Can include any radionuclide source at the plant
§ From conceptual design to operation Implementation Experience
§ From conceptual design to operation 15
* NRC Endorsement Process o NRC staff involved throughout the standard development process, which greatly expedited NRC endorsement o Some disagreement regarding certain NRC positions; many resolved through collaboration, others further explored as part of RG trial use period
* User Feedback o Multiple non -LWR vendors are currently utilizing the standard as part of risk-informed performance-based design and licensing approaches, such as the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) o Continual feedback from vendors regarding implementation experience Implementation Experience
* Standard and Applications o As further experience is gained using the standard for risk-informed applications, potential discrepancies between standard requirements and application requirements are being identified
* Seismic Requirements o Gaining further insight regarding the practicality and implementation details of risk-informed seismic design
* Innovative Uses o Vendors utilizing deterministic or partially risk-informed approaches have been able to leverage certain elements of the standard (initiating events, mechanistic source term, radiological consequence, etc.)
Treatment of extremes in RIPB design


Andrew Whittaker, Ph.D., S.E.
Implementation Experience
SUNY Distinguished Professor, University at Buffalo Chair, ASCE Nuclear Standards Committee Board of Directors, TerraPraxis Standardization of design and licensing
* NRC Endorsement Process oNRC staff involved throughout the standard development process, which greatly expedited NRC endorsement oSome disagreement regarding certain NRC positions; many resolved through collaboration, others further explored as part of RG trial use period
* User Feedback oMultiple non-LWR vendors are currently utilizing the standard as part of risk-informed performance-based design and licensing approaches, such as the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) oContinual feedback from vendors regarding implementation experience 16


Li censed desi gn spaces
Implementation Experience
* Standard and Applications oAs further experience is gained using the standard for risk-informed applications, potential discrepancies between standard requirements and application requirements are being identified
* Seismic Requirements oGaining further insight regarding the practicality and implementation details of risk-informed seismic design
* Innovative Uses oVendors utilizing deterministic or partially risk-informed approaches have been able to leverage certain elements of the standard (initiating events, mechanistic source term, radiological consequence, etc.)
17


Pre-bi nned sei smi c hazard (6 zones, 2 soils)
Treatment of extremes in RIPB design Andrew Whittaker, Ph.D., S.E.
SUNY Distinguished Professor, University at Buffalo Chair, ASCE Nuclear Standards Committee Board of Directors, TerraPraxis 18


Li censed i solati on systems
Standardization of design and licensing Licensed design spaces Pre-binned seismic hazard (6 zones, 2 soils)
: 1) Si te selected. 2) Pi ck a li censed heat source (M We). 3) Pi ck a li censed i solati on soluti on.
Licensed isolation systems
: 4) Pri ce ti me and constructi on. 5) Evaluate alternati ves and i terate on 2, 3, and 4.
: 1) Site selected. 2) Pick a licensed heat source (MWe). 3) Pick a licensed isolation solution.
3 Right sizing the treatment of extremes for next generation nuclear
: 4) Price time and construction. 5) Evaluate alternatives and iterate on 2, 3, and 4.
19


TerraPower and GEH Luci d Catalyst
3 Lucid Catalyst TerraPower and GEH Right sizing the treatment of extremes for next generation nuclear BWXT 20


B WX T Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design
Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design
* Load effects
* Load effects Wind-borne missile impact Normal impact of high-velocity missiles Schedule 40 steel pipe Simple but why normal impact?
* Wi n d-borne missile impact
Any evidence in non-nuclear sectors of such damage?
* Normal impact of high-velocity missiles
Aircraft impact Extreme ground shaking
* Schedule 40 steel pipe
* Acceptable risk Stephenson, Terranova et al.
* Si mple but why normal i mpact?
21
* Any evidence in non-nuclear sectors of such damage?
* Aircraft impact
* Extreme ground shaking
* Acceptable risk


Stephenson, Terranov a et al.
Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design
Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design
* Load effects: aircraft impact
* Load effects: aircraft impact Aircraft cockpits secured for 20 years Hijacking of aircraft in US since 2001 = 0 Strike a RC box and not a political target? No.
* Aircraft cockpits secured for 20 years
Could you hit the RC box if you wanted to? No. See below.
* Hijacking of aircraft in US since 2001 = 0
MAF of aircraft impact on a RC box in the US = 0 Guaranteed fatalities from an aircraft strike? Yes Missing target = 250+ dead on B787, all on the plane Boeing 22
* Strike a RC box and not a political target? No.
* Could you hit the RC box if you wanted to? No. See below.
* MAF of aircraft impact on a RC box in the US = 0 Boei ng
* Guaranteed fatalities from an aircraft strike? Yes
* Missing target = 250+ dead on B787, all on the plane Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design
* Load effects: incredible ground shaking
* Consider Seismic Design Category 4, Clinch River
* 100% DRS (PHA=0.53g, RP=5,300 years), 200% DRS (1.06g, 25,000), 400% DRS (2.12g, 150,000), 600% DRS (3.18g, 490,000), 800% DRS (4.24g, 1,250,000)


0.4 4.5 8 DRS
Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design
* Load effects: incredible ground shaking Consider Seismic Design Category 4, Clinch River 100% DRS (PHA=0.53g, RP=5,300 years), 200% DRS (1.06g, 25,000), 400% DRS (2.12g, 150,000), 600% DRS (3.18g, 490,000), 800% DRS (4.24g, 1,250,000) 0 1
2 3
4 Period (sec) 0 0.5 1
1.5 Sa (g)
Horizontal Vertical 2008 Mt. Carmel, IL, 0.2 g 2011 Greenbrier, AR, 0.4 g 2011 Mineral, VA, 0.2 g 1982 Miramichi, 0.4 g 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0
2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 PGA, H (g)
Record sequence number (RSN) 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 0
2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 PGA, H (g)
Record sequence number (RSN)
DRS 2 DRS 4 DRS 6 DRS 8 DRS 23


1.5 1982 Miramichi, 2011 Greenbrier, AR, 4.0 Horizontal 0.4 g Vertical 0.4 g 3.5 0.3 6 DRS 2008 Mt. Carmel, 3.0
7 Outcomes of extreme: nuclear-related fatalities = 0 Fukushima Daiichi, 2011 TMI, 1979 24


1 0.2 IL, 0.2 g 2.5 2011 Mineral, VA, 0.2 g 2.0 4 DRS
Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design
* Societal tolerable risk MAF of death in a car accident 1/10000 (1E-4)
MAF of building collapse 1/5000 (2E-4)
MAF of death due to dam failure 1/10000 (1E-4), existing dam 1/100000 (1E-5), new, major dam
* Need to right size the F-C chart 25


0.5 1.5 0.1 1.0 2 DRS 0.5 DRS
awhittak@buffalo.edu 26


0 0.0 0.0 0 1 2 3 4 Period (sec) 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 140000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 Record sequence number (RSN) Record sequence number (RSN) 7 Outcomes of extreme: nuclear-related fatalities = 0
Treatment of risk in other sectors: dams Existing dams New dams Munger et al. (2009), USACE 27


TMI, 1979
Approach for Risk-Informing IEEE Standards Rebecca Steinman, PhD, PE Chair: SC-3, WG 3.4 and WG 2.10 09-13-2023 28
 
Fukushima Daiichi, 2011 Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design
* Societal tolerable risk
* MAF of death in a car accident
* 1/10000 (1E-4)
* MAF of building collapse
* 1/5000 (2E-4)
* MAF of death due to dam failure
* 1/10000 (1E-4), existing dam
* 1/100000 (1E-5), new, major dam
* Need to right size the F-C cha rt awhittak@buffalo.edu Treatment of risk in other sectors: dams
 
Munger et al. (2009), USA CE
 
Exi sti ng dams New dams Approach for Risk-Informing IEEE Standards
 
Rebecca Steinman, PhD, PE Chair: SC-3, WG 3.4 and WG 2.10 09-13-2023 Nuclear Power Engineering Committee (NPEC)


5 Technical Subcommittees Qualification (SC-2)
Operations, Maintenance, Aging, Testing & Reliability (SC-3)
Auxiliary Power (SC-4)
Human Factors, Control Facilities and Human Reliability (SC-5)
Safety Related Systems (SC-6)
Nuclear Power Engineering Committee (NPEC)
SC-2, 18, 35%
SC-3, 8, 16%
SC-4, 11, 21%
SC-5, 7, 14%
SC-6, 7, 14%
SC-6, 7, 14%
5 Technical Subcommittees
51 IEEE 336 IEEE 692 IEEE 338 IEEE 933 IEEE 352 IEEE 1205 IEEE 577 IEEE 1819 29
* Qualification (SC-2) SC-2, 18, 35%
* Operations, Maintenance, Aging, SC-5, 7, 14%
Testing & Reliability (SC-3) 51
* Auxiliary Power (SC-4)
* Human Factors, Control Facilities and Human Reliability (SC-5)
SC-4, 11, 21%
* S afet y Re l ate d System s ( S C-6) SC-3, 8, 16%
 
IEEE 336 IEEE 692 IEEE 338 IEEE 933


IEEE 352 IEEE 1205 IEEE 577 IEEE 1819 NPEC Standards Approach
NPEC Standards Approach
* Majority of standards focused on design &
* Majority of standards focused on design &
qualification of electrica l and electronic equipment
qualification of electrical and electronic equipment
* Class 1E or not, as determined by IEEE 308, 603, and 497
* Class 1E or not, as determined by IEEE 308, 603, and 497
* Class 1E: Safety classification of the electrical equipment and systems that are essential to emergency reactor shutdown, containment isolation, reactor core cooling, and containment and reactor heat removal, or are otherwise essential in preventing significant release of radioactive material to the environment.
* Class 1E: Safety classification of the electrical equipment and systems that are essential to emergency reactor shutdown, containment isolation, reactor core cooling, and containment and reactor heat removal, or are otherwise essential in preventing significant release of radioactive material to the environment.
IEEE 1819
30


Risk-Informed Categorization & Treatment of Electrical Equipment
Risk-Informed Categorization & Treatment of Electrical Equipment
* alternate treatments: Those licensee -defined requirements applied to electrical and electronic systems a nd components (EESCs) that provide reasonable confidence that 1)
* alternate treatments: Those licensee-defined requirements applied to electrical and electronic systems and components (EESCs) that provide reasonable confidence that 1)
RISC-3 EESCs are capable of performing their Class 1E functions under design basis conditions; and 2) RISC -2 EESCs perform their functions consistent with the key assum ptions in the categorization process that relate to their assume d performance, as applicable.
RISC-3 EESCs are capable of performing their Class 1E functions under design basis conditions; and 2) RISC-2 EESCs perform their functions consistent with the key assumptions in the categorization process that relate to their assumed performance, as applicable.
* reasonable assurance: A justifiable level of confidence used to satisfy regulatory requirements, based upon objective and/or measurable evidence.
* reasonable assurance: A justifiable level of confidence used to satisfy regulatory requirements, based upon objective and/or measurable evidence.
* reasonable confidence: A level of confidence base d on facts, actions, knowledge, experience, and/or observations, whic h is deemed to be adequate. Reasonable confidence is a lower leve l of confidence than reasonable assurance.
* reasonable confidence: A level of confidence based on facts, actions, knowledge, experience, and/or observations, which is deemed to be adequate. Reasonable confidence is a lower level of confidence than reasonable assurance.
IEEE 1819 31
 
Usage and Status of IEEE Standards
Usage and Status of IEEE Standards
* 10 year revision policy of IEEE
* 10 year revision policy of IEEE
Line 243: Line 236:
* Operating plants stick to their original licensing basis (mostly the 70s and 80s versions)
* Operating plants stick to their original licensing basis (mostly the 70s and 80s versions)
* Near-term attempts to apply the updated standards often ended up reverting to prior versions because licensing the old standards was "easier"
* Near-term attempts to apply the updated standards often ended up reverting to prior versions because licensing the old standards was "easier"
* So even when we try to modernize a standard to the current state of knowledge we struggle with getting new reactor vendors or other users to commit to their use
* So even when we try to modernize a standard to the current state of knowledge we struggle with getting new reactor vendors or other users to commit to their use The decision to develop a single standard to "bridge the gap" as opposed to significant revision of 50 standards remains the right approach for IEEE.
 
32
The decision to develop a single standard to "bridge the gap" as opposed to significant revision of 50 standards remains the right approach for IEEE.
NEI Codes and Standards Task Force
 
NRC Standards Forum 2023
 
Thomas Basso Sr. Director Eng & Risk September 13, 2023
 
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute A Risk-Informed Journey
 
Risk informed approaches have provided a better safety focus, improved safety and enabled efficiencies As we look to the future fleet, there are opportunit ies for risk-informing the regulatory fabric that come with both promise and attention Navigating this change will require embracing uncertaint ies and discipline in responding
 
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute 1995 PRA Policy Statement


The use of PRA technology should be increased in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state-of -the-art in PRA methods and data and in a manner that complements the NRCs deterministic approach and supports the NRCs traditional defense-in-depth philosophy.
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute NRC Standards Forum 2023 Thomas Basso Sr. Director Eng & Risk September 13, 2023 NEI Codes and Standards Task Force 33


©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute Risk-informed Regulatory Decision-making
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute Risk informed approaches have provided a better safety focus, improved safety and enabled efficiencies As we look to the future fleet, there are opportunities for risk-informing the regulatory fabric that come with both promise and attention Navigating this change will require embracing uncertainties and discipline in responding A Risk-Informed Journey 34


Uncertainties PRA Conservative Realism Safety Decisions
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute The use of PRA technology should be increased in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data and in a manner that complements the NRCs deterministic approach and supports the NRCs traditional defense-in-depth philosophy.
1995 PRA Policy Statement 35


Improving the State of the Know ledge
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute Risk-informed Regulatory Decision-making PRA Realism Conservative Safety Decisions Uncertainties Improving the State of the Knowledge 36


©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute ASME Section XI Code Activities
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute ASME Section XI Code Activities


Code Case N-752 Ris k-informed Repair/Replacement
Code Case N-752 Risk-informed Repair/Replacement NRC Endorsement and Approval of 50.55a(z) Submittals
* NRC Endorsement and Approval of 50.55a(z) Submittals


I WA-4000 Repair /Replacement Optimization
IWA-4000 Repair/Replacement Optimization


Alternative VT-2 Quali fication
Alternative VT-2 Qualification Establish appropriate training hours requirements
* Establish appropriate training hours requirements


IWE General Visual Examinations (Category E-A, Ite m E1.11) Insulation Removal - Industry Survey
IWE General Visual Examinations (Category E-A, Item E1.11) Insulation Removal - Industry Survey


Application of EPRI Tech Bases using PFM for Relief to Extend SG/PRZ Nozzle Weld Inspections
Application of EPRI Tech Bases using PFM for Relief to Extend SG/PRZ Nozzle Weld Inspections 37


©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute ASME OM Code Activities
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute ASME OM Code Activities


Valve Exercising and Testing Requirements
Valve Exercising and Testing Requirements Valve Manual Exercising Frequency Extension Revise Testing of Passive Valve Quarterly Valve Stroking Extension
* Valve Manual Exercising Frequency Extension
* Revise Testing of Passive Valve
* Quarterly Valve Stroking Extension


Risk-informed Applications
Risk-informed Applications
Line 291: Line 268:
Replacement of Operability Term in OM
Replacement of Operability Term in OM


(OM-2) Code on Component Testing Requirements
(OM-2) Code on Component Testing Requirements 38
 
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute ASME Section III CSTF Activities
 
TG Alternative Treatment Requirements
* Code Case on Alternate Requirements for NDE and Testing of Items Commensurate with their Contribution to Safety and Risk
 
ASME III CC N-907 and Code Change on Preservice Inspection Requirements


Regulatory Engagement on ASME Section III Priorities
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute TG Alternative Treatment Requirements
* Code Case on Alternate Requirements for NDE and Testing of Items Commensurate with their Contribution to Safety and Risk ASME III CC N-907 and Code Change on Preservice Inspection Requirements Regulatory Engagement on ASME Section III Priorities ASME Section III CSTF Activities 39


©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute NEI CSTF Regulatory Activities
©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute NEI CSTF Regulatory Activities


10 CFR 50.55a Rulemaking Review (NRC-2018-0289)
10 CFR 50.55a Rulemaking Review (NRC-2018-0289)


Reg Guides 1.147, 1.84, 1.192, and 1.193 Comments (NRC-2018 -0291)
Reg Guides 1.147, 1.84, 1.192, and 1.193 Comments (NRC-2018-0291)
Extension of 10-year ISI/IST Program Updates Extension of ISI Intervals from 10 to 12 Years
 
Response to NRC RIS 2022- 02 on Operational Leakage NEI 18-03 Operability Guidance


©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute EPRI Activities Supporting RIPB Standards 2023 NRC Standards Forum
Extension of 10-year ISI/IST Program Updates


Eric Thornsbury Principal Technical Leader
Extension of ISI Intervals from 10 to 12 Years


September 13, 2023
Response to NRC RIS 2022-02 on Operational Leakage


www.epri.com © 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
NEI 18-03 Operability Guidance 40
Introduction


EPRI participates in many activities related to the development of standards across the nuclear industry Interest in Risk-Informed, Performance-Based applications (including standards) has been increasing, and is getting additional attention due to activities related to our Advanced Nuclear Technology program Key Question for Advanced Reactors:
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
- How to meet current regulations, standards, and other expectations that were developed from a light water reactor perspective?
w w w. e p r i. c o m Eric Thornsbury Principal Technical Leader September 13, 2023 EPRI Activities Supporting RIPB Standards 2023 NRC Standards Forum 41


© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Examples of EPRI Activities for the Current Fleet
Introduction EPRI participates in many activities related to the development of standards across the nuclear industry Interest in Risk-Informed, Performance-Based applications (including standards) has been increasing, and is getting additional attention due to activities related to our Advanced Nuclear Technology program Key Question for Advanced Reactors:
- How to meet current regulations, standards, and other expectations that were developed from a light water reactor perspective?
42


RPV Threads in Flange (EPRI Report #3002010345)
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
N715 for Streamlined RI -ISIN (EPRI Report
Examples of EPRI Activities for the Current Fleet RPV Threads in Flange (EPRI Report #3002010345)
#3002003026 on BWR and PWR Lessons Learned)
N715 for Streamlined RI-ISIN (EPRI Report
#3002003026 on BWR and PWR Lessons Learned)
ASME Section XI - Appendix R, Supplement 2 was included in the last rulemaking on 50.55a N711 for Inservice Inspection (EPRI Report
ASME Section XI - Appendix R, Supplement 2 was included in the last rulemaking on 50.55a N711 for Inservice Inspection (EPRI Report
#3002010353 )
#3002010353 )
Risk-informed Repair / Replacement (EPRI Report
Risk-informed Repair / Replacement (EPRI Report
#3002013126) 10CFR50.69 (EPRI Reports #3002012984, 3002012988, 3002012990, 3002022453, 3002015999, )
#3002013126) 10CFR50.69 (EPRI Reports #3002012984, 3002012988, 3002012990, 3002022453, 3002015999, )
 
43
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Strategic Elements of the EPRI/NEI AR Roadmap
 
Regulatory Efficiency Technology Readiness Project Execution


Licensing Fuel Cycle Project Management 7 Actions 3 Actions 4 Actions
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Strategic Elements of the EPRI/NEI AR Roadmap Regulatory Efficiency Licensing 7 Actions Environmental 7 Actions Oversight 2 Actions Technology Readiness Fuel Cycle 3 Actions Plant/SSC Design 3 Actions Supply Chain 7 Actions Nuclear Beyond Electricity 3 Actions Codes & Standards 2 Actions Project Execution Project Management 4 Actions Engineering & Procurement 2 Actions Construction & Commissioning 3 Actions Initial Operations & Maintenance 1 Actions Workforce Development 4 Actions 44


Environmental Plant/SSC Design Engineering & Procurement 7 Actions 3 Actions 2 Actions
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
 
Oversight Supply Chain Construction & Commissioning 2 Actions 7 Actions 3 Actions
 
Nuclear Beyond Electricity Initial Operations & Maintenance 3 Actions 1 Actions
 
Codes & Standards Workforce Development 2 Actions 4 Actions
 
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
EPRIs Strengths
EPRIs Strengths
Plant Operation & Maintenance Component Manufacturing
* Technical Process Guidance
* Technical Process Guidance
* Technical Methods Development
* Technical Methods Development
* Efficient Tools and Software
* Efficient Tools and Software
* Technology Transfer and Member Support
* Technology Transfer and Member Support Standards Development Regulatory Guidance & Interface Plant Operation & Maintenance Component Manufacturing 45
 
Standards Development Regulatory Guidance & Interface
 
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Example: Fuel Qualification from NUREG-2246


© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Example: Fuel Qualification for an Advanced Reactor
Example: Fuel Qualification from NUREG-2246 46


© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Geometry for a Liquid Fueled Reactor isdifficult to define!
Geometry for a Liquid Fueled Reactor isdifficult to define!
The fuel does not have a defined geometry of its own What are we really ensuring?
The fuel does not have a defined geometry of its own What are we really ensuring?
If the intent is to show that we can cool the fuel, perhaps the underlying purpose is that we show that the fuel is in a coolable form (but not necessarily a fixed geometry)
If the intent is to show that we can cool the fuel, perhaps the underlying purpose is that we show that the fuel is in a coolable form (but not necessarily a fixed geometry)
Prescriptive interpretation of this requirement could break down, but RIPB can satisfy the intent!
Prescriptive interpretation of this requirement could break down, but RIPB can satisfy the intent!
Example: Fuel Qualification for an Advanced Reactor 47


© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Options for Fuel Qualification for a Liquid Fueled Reactor
Options for Fuel Qualification for a Liquid Fueled Reactor We could meet it prescriptively with sufficient data, or flexibly with a RIPB approach Prescriptive: global margins based on highest uncertainty RIPB: locally large margins tied to specific uncertainty
 
*Prescriptive provides certainty; RIPB provides flexibility to meet the same intent 48
We could meet it prescriptively with sufficient data, or flexibly with a RIPB approach


Prescriptive: global RIPB: locally large margins based on margins tied to specific highest uncertainty uncertainty
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Prescriptive provides certainty; RIPB provides flexibility to meet the same intent
 
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
EPRI Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods & Tools for ARs
EPRI Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods & Tools for ARs
: 1. Determine the readiness of current PRA* methods and tools for use in Advanced Reactors and identify technical gaps that can be resolved through EPRI research
: 1. Determine the readiness of current PRA* methods and tools for use in Advanced Reactors and identify technical gaps that can be resolved through EPRI research
: 2. Develop an EPRI research roadmap to guide EPRI research in this area over the next several years to ensure readiness of PRA methods and tools for Advanced Reactor community implementation
: 2. Develop an EPRI research roadmap to guide EPRI research in this area over the next several years to ensure readiness of PRA methods and tools for Advanced Reactor community implementation
: 3. Perform research and development based on the first two objectives to resolve key technical gaps in PRA methods and tools for the Advanced Reactor community.
: 3. Perform research and development based on the first two objectives to resolve key technical gaps in PRA methods and tools for the Advanced Reactor community.
PRA terminology represents a broad range of Risk approaches 49


PRA terminology represents a broad range of Risk approaches
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
 
EPRI Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods & Tools for ARs
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Common methods, tools, and data that support realistic risk analysis in support of design and licensing activities
EPRI Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods & Tools for ARs Challenges Solutions
* Streamlined risk analysis approaches, results, and insights that are appropriate for advanced reactors Challenges
* Risk analysis is an important input to final designs and initial* Common methods, tools, licensing and data that support
* Risk analysis is an important input to final designs and initial licensing
* New technologies used in advanced reactor designs present newrealistic risk analysis in challenges to the existing risk analysis toolset support of design a nd licensing activities
* New technologies used in advanced reactor designs present new challenges to the existing risk analysis toolset
* Risk analysis for advanced reactors is expected to produce* Streamlined risk analysis different results and insights than the current fleet a nd approaches, results, and regulators are familiar with insights that are
* Risk analysis for advanced reactors is expected to produce different results and insights than the current fleet and regulators are familiar with
* The current risk-informed decision-making approaches may notappropriate for advanced be a realistic approach for advanced reactors reactors
* The current risk-informed decision-making approaches may not be a realistic approach for advanced reactors Solutions 50


© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
EPRI Support for the AR Roadmap Action:
EPRI Support for the AR Roadmap Action:
Demonstrate Risk-Informed & Performance-Based Approach
Demonstrate Risk-Informed & Performance-Based Approach 2023 Human Reliability Analysis Methods for ARs Guidance for Very Low Freq.
 
External Events Evaluate Risk Methods & Tools Risk Assessments with Digital I&C Systems Guidance for Selecting Risk Metrics Common Approaches for Passive System Reliability Methods for Economic Risk Analysis Data Needs for Advanced Reactor Risk Analysis EPRI Report - 3002026495 - Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods & Tools for Advanced Reactors 51
Risk Assessments with Digital I&C Systems Data Needs for Evaluate Risk Common Approaches Advanced Reactor Methods & Tools for Passive System Risk Analysis Reliability 2023
 
Guidance for Guidance for Human Reliability Methods for Selecting Risk Very Low Freq. Analysis Methods Economic Risk Metrics External Events for ARs Analysis
 
EPRI Report - 3002026495 - Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods & Tools for Advanced Reactors
 
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
Summary
 
EPRI supports the development of RIPB standards and related activities RIPB approaches offer the needed focus and flexibility for Advanced Reactors to safely and efficiently design, license, and operation Uncertainties, both technical and regulatory, need to be acknowledged and addressed as part of any RIPB application


© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
TogetherShaping the Future of Energy
Summary EPRI supports the development of RIPB standards and related activities RIPB approaches offer the needed focus and flexibility for Advanced Reactors to safely and efficiently design, license, and operation Uncertainties, both technical and regulatory, need to be acknowledged and addressed as part of any RIPB application 52


© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.}}
© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
TogetherShaping the Future of Energy 53}}

Latest revision as of 08:56, 25 November 2024

Session 3 - Development of Risk-Informed and Performance-Based (RIPB) Standards
ML23251A059
Person / Time
Issue date: 09/13/2023
From: Robert Roche-Rivera
NRC/RES/DE
To:
References
Download: ML23251A059 (1)


Text

Development of Risk-Informed and Performance-Based (RIPB) Standards Opening Remarks by Mike Franovich, Division Director, NRR/DRA Session Chair: Matthew Humberstone, Senior Reliability and Risk Analyst, RES/DRA/PRB Panelists/Speakers:

Prasad Kadambi (ANS)

David Grabaskas (ASME/ANS JCNRM)

Andrew Whittaker (ASCE)

Rebecca Steinman (IEEE)

Tom Basso (NEI)

Eric Thornsbury (EPRI)

Overview of ANS Activities to Support RIPB Standards N. Prasad Kadambi Chair, Risk-informed, Performance-Based Principles and Policy Committee (RP3C)

Presented to:

2023 NRC Standards Forum September 13, 2023 2

The ANS Standards Board Supports RIPB Standards To Modernize Nuclear VCS*

  • Creation and operation of RP3C
  • Current activities of RP3C
  • ANS Standards Board (SB) has directed ANS consensus committees (CCs) to incorporate RIPB principles where appropriate.
  • All eight CCs provide reports at every SB meeting.

- The SB recognizes the varied application and applicability of such principles to each portfolio of standards.

- Relative to advanced reactors, the Joint Committee on Risk Management (JCNRM) plays a central role in supporting modernization relative to RIPB standards development

  • Voluntary consensus standard as defined in OMB Circular A-119 [1]. NOTE: Numbers in brackets refer to corresponding reference numbers on slide 11.

3

ANS Has Been a Leader in Promoting RIPB VCS

  • Recent experience with conventional VCS shows that products that have detailed shall statements give rise to system requirements that are unnecessary or too conservative.

Frequently the motivation is driven by convenience for verification of compliance to requirements established by regulatory authorities.

RIPB VCS provide a more logical fit with NEIMA than conventional ones.

ANS is in a good position to advocate for RIPB VCS by articulating specific aspects of the value proposition to move away from prescription.

ANS is actively tackling the challenges of creating guidance for RIPB VCS.

4

Current Activities Toward RIPB VCS

  • ANS has recognized the need to create an infrastructure to support RIPB VCS.

- Part of this is to focus on structured performance objectives such that varied levels of detail can be accommodated rigorously.

  • The most visible of these activities are related to creating one or more internally consistent and coherent suites of standards that could foster further development of RIPB VCS within and outside of ANS.
  • An existing example is the suite of seismic standards ANS-2.26 [2]*, 2.27 [3],

2.29 [4], and ASCE 43-05 [5].

  • Currently, ANS efforts are focused on the series ANS-30.1 [6], 30.2 [7], and 30.3 [8].

ANS views these standards within a structure where success in issuing ANS-30.1 as a Guidance Standard, developing ANS-30.2, and obtaining regulatory endorsement of ANS-30.3 would be major accomplishments toward RIPB VCS.

  • Titles of standards are provided on slide 11.

5

What ANS-2.26 Does ANS-2.26:

Assign a Seismic Design Category (SDC):

Given the potential consequences of failure, assign a performance criterion:

specifically, a failure probability criterion.

The other standards then tell you how to go about engineering satisfaction of this criterion.

Figure from Appendix A:

6

ANS-30.1*

Risk and Performance Objectives (Linn)

ANS-20.2 Liquid Molten Salt Reactor (Holcomb)

ANS-53.1 Modular Helium Cooled Reactor (August)

ANS-54.1 Liquid Sodium Cooled Reactor (Flanagan)

ANS-30.3 Advanced Light-Water Reactor (Welter)

ANS-30.2 Categorization of Structures, Systems and Components (Diaconeasa)

ANS and other SDO standards as needed:

- Cross cutting topics

- Reactor technology specific issues Advanced Reactor Large Light Water Rx ANS Standards Committee Hierarchy For Advanced Reactors

  • ANS-30.1 is now being prepared as an ANS guidance standard, not as an ANSI consensus standard 7

NRC activities support RIPB, but more can be done.

  • Commission approval of SECY-18-0096 [9] on Functional Containment has major significance for RIPB standards as an example of performance-based principles.

- This clears the way for standards development organizations (SDOs) to consider all general design criteria from a performance-based perspective.

  • Similarly, issuance of RG 1.233 [10] has significance because it is meant to be technology-inclusive for addressing certain major safety issues.

- Logically, it means that light water reactors should also be able to use its provisions as one acceptable way to implement relevant regulations.

  • NRC should recognize that industry and SDOs alike look for regulatory cues that may encourage or discourage RIPB VCS.
  • NRC can do more to clarify how the provisions of NEIMA relative to a technology-inclusive regulatory framework will use appropriate VCS for conforming with OMB Circular A-119 [1].

- Federal policy clearly favors performance-based requirements instead of prescriptive ones.

8

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 9

The ANS Standards Committee Standards Board (Top-level committee)

Large Light Water Reactors Consensus Committee (LLWRCC)

Research and Advanced Reactors Consensus Committee (RARCC)

Safety &

Radiological Analyses Consensus Committee (SRACC)

Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities Consensus Committee (NRNFCC)

Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (JCNRM*)

Consensus Committee Nuclear Criticality Safety Consensus Committee (NCSCC)

Environmental and Siting Consensus Committee (ESCC)

Fuel, Waste, and Decommissioning Consensus Committee (FWDCC)

Subcommittees Working Groups Task Groups Risk-informed, Performance-based Principles and Policy Committee (RP3C)

  • The JCNRM is a joint ANS and ASME committee.

10

Risk-informed, Performance-based Principles and Policy Committee (RP3C)

The ANS Standards Board established the RP3C to support modernizing of ANS standards. Activities for training and knowledge sharing of RIPB principles and practices are part of the scope. The RP3C is responsible for the identification and oversight of the development and implementation of RIPB approaches in ANS standards. The RP3C Community of Practice (CoP) is one of the more successful ongoing training activities. The CoP is held on the last Friday of a month and is open to all professionals interested in RIPB principles and practices. Nearly 40 CoP recordings since February 2020 are available at https://www.ans.org/standards/rp3c/cop/. Contact standards@ans.org for questions or to get on the list to receive announcements of upcoming presentations.

11

[1]

OMB Circular A-119, Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities

[2]

ANSI/ANS-2.26-2004 (R2021), Components for Seismic Design Categorization of Nuclear Facility Structures, Systems, and Components for Seismic Design

[3]

ANSI/ANS-2.27-2020, Criteria for Investigations of Nuclear Facility Sites for Seismic Hazard Assessments

[4]

ANSI/ANS-2.29-2020, Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis

[5]

ASCE/SEI 43-05, Seismic Design Criteria for Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Facilities

[6]

ANS-GS-30.1-202X, Integrating Risk and Performance Objectives into New Reactor Nuclear Safety Designs

[7]

ANS-30.2-202X, Classification and Categorization of Structures, Systems, and Components for New Nuclear Power Plants

[8]

ANSI/ANS-30.3-2022, Light Water Reactor Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Design

[9]

SECY-18-0096, Functional Containment Performance Criteria For Non-Light-Water-Reactors

[10]

RG 1.233, Guidance for a Technology-Inclusive, Risk-Informed, and Performance-Based Methodology to Inform the Licensing Basis and Content of Applications for Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Non-Light Water Reactors Titles of Cited Documents and Standards 12

ASME/ANS NON-LWR PRA STANDARD IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE Dave Grabaskas Manager, Licensing and Risk Assessments Group, Argonne National Laboratory Chair, ASME/ANS Non-LWR PRA standard working group Former Chair (current Vice Chair), NLWR PRA standard working group 13

JCNRM Background

  • Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (JCNRM) oThe JCNRM is the PRA Standards development and maintenance consensus committee - formed by combining:

§ ANS RISC committee - originally developing the hazard PRA standards (e.g., Seismic, Fire, Flooding, etc.)

§ ASME CRNM committee - developed the internal events requirements.

oCommittees both started in the late 1990s, and officially merged around 2009, and issued the combined standard for LWRs covering L1 PRA, endorsed in RG 1.200.

oOversees two issued PRA standards (LWR - L1 and Non-LWR) and five under development.

14

Standard Background

  • Non-LWR PRA Standard Development oWorking grouped formed in 2006 oTrial use standard issued in 2013 oNew version formally approved by ASME, ANS, and ANSI in 2021

§ ASME/ANS/ANSI RA-S-1.4-2021 oEndorsed by the NRC in trial use RG 1.247 in 2022 oAn integrated standard:

§ Covers from initiating events to offsite consequence

§ Can include any radionuclide source at the plant

§ From conceptual design to operation 15

Implementation Experience

  • NRC Endorsement Process oNRC staff involved throughout the standard development process, which greatly expedited NRC endorsement oSome disagreement regarding certain NRC positions; many resolved through collaboration, others further explored as part of RG trial use period
  • User Feedback oMultiple non-LWR vendors are currently utilizing the standard as part of risk-informed performance-based design and licensing approaches, such as the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) oContinual feedback from vendors regarding implementation experience 16

Implementation Experience

  • Standard and Applications oAs further experience is gained using the standard for risk-informed applications, potential discrepancies between standard requirements and application requirements are being identified
  • Seismic Requirements oGaining further insight regarding the practicality and implementation details of risk-informed seismic design
  • Innovative Uses oVendors utilizing deterministic or partially risk-informed approaches have been able to leverage certain elements of the standard (initiating events, mechanistic source term, radiological consequence, etc.)

17

Treatment of extremes in RIPB design Andrew Whittaker, Ph.D., S.E.

SUNY Distinguished Professor, University at Buffalo Chair, ASCE Nuclear Standards Committee Board of Directors, TerraPraxis 18

Standardization of design and licensing Licensed design spaces Pre-binned seismic hazard (6 zones, 2 soils)

Licensed isolation systems

1) Site selected. 2) Pick a licensed heat source (MWe). 3) Pick a licensed isolation solution.
4) Price time and construction. 5) Evaluate alternatives and iterate on 2, 3, and 4.

19

3 Lucid Catalyst TerraPower and GEH Right sizing the treatment of extremes for next generation nuclear BWXT 20

Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design

  • Load effects Wind-borne missile impact Normal impact of high-velocity missiles Schedule 40 steel pipe Simple but why normal impact?

Any evidence in non-nuclear sectors of such damage?

Aircraft impact Extreme ground shaking

  • Acceptable risk Stephenson, Terranova et al.

21

Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design

  • Load effects: aircraft impact Aircraft cockpits secured for 20 years Hijacking of aircraft in US since 2001 = 0 Strike a RC box and not a political target? No.

Could you hit the RC box if you wanted to? No. See below.

MAF of aircraft impact on a RC box in the US = 0 Guaranteed fatalities from an aircraft strike? Yes Missing target = 250+ dead on B787, all on the plane Boeing 22

Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design

  • Load effects: incredible ground shaking Consider Seismic Design Category 4, Clinch River 100% DRS (PHA=0.53g, RP=5,300 years), 200% DRS (1.06g, 25,000), 400% DRS (2.12g, 150,000), 600% DRS (3.18g, 490,000), 800% DRS (4.24g, 1,250,000) 0 1

2 3

4 Period (sec) 0 0.5 1

1.5 Sa (g)

Horizontal Vertical 2008 Mt. Carmel, IL, 0.2 g 2011 Greenbrier, AR, 0.4 g 2011 Mineral, VA, 0.2 g 1982 Miramichi, 0.4 g 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0

2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 PGA, H (g)

Record sequence number (RSN) 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 0

2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 PGA, H (g)

Record sequence number (RSN)

DRS 2 DRS 4 DRS 6 DRS 8 DRS 23

7 Outcomes of extreme: nuclear-related fatalities = 0 Fukushima Daiichi, 2011 TMI, 1979 24

Extremes we must rethink in support of RIPB design

  • Societal tolerable risk MAF of death in a car accident 1/10000 (1E-4)

MAF of building collapse 1/5000 (2E-4)

MAF of death due to dam failure 1/10000 (1E-4), existing dam 1/100000 (1E-5), new, major dam

  • Need to right size the F-C chart 25

awhittak@buffalo.edu 26

Treatment of risk in other sectors: dams Existing dams New dams Munger et al. (2009), USACE 27

Approach for Risk-Informing IEEE Standards Rebecca Steinman, PhD, PE Chair: SC-3, WG 3.4 and WG 2.10 09-13-2023 28

5 Technical Subcommittees Qualification (SC-2)

Operations, Maintenance, Aging, Testing & Reliability (SC-3)

Auxiliary Power (SC-4)

Human Factors, Control Facilities and Human Reliability (SC-5)

Safety Related Systems (SC-6)

Nuclear Power Engineering Committee (NPEC)

SC-2, 18, 35%

SC-3, 8, 16%

SC-4, 11, 21%

SC-5, 7, 14%

SC-6, 7, 14%

51 IEEE 336 IEEE 692 IEEE 338 IEEE 933 IEEE 352 IEEE 1205 IEEE 577 IEEE 1819 29

NPEC Standards Approach

  • Majority of standards focused on design &

qualification of electrical and electronic equipment

  • Class 1E or not, as determined by IEEE 308, 603, and 497
  • Class 1E: Safety classification of the electrical equipment and systems that are essential to emergency reactor shutdown, containment isolation, reactor core cooling, and containment and reactor heat removal, or are otherwise essential in preventing significant release of radioactive material to the environment.

30

Risk-Informed Categorization & Treatment of Electrical Equipment

  • alternate treatments: Those licensee-defined requirements applied to electrical and electronic systems and components (EESCs) that provide reasonable confidence that 1)

RISC-3 EESCs are capable of performing their Class 1E functions under design basis conditions; and 2) RISC-2 EESCs perform their functions consistent with the key assumptions in the categorization process that relate to their assumed performance, as applicable.

  • reasonable assurance: A justifiable level of confidence used to satisfy regulatory requirements, based upon objective and/or measurable evidence.
  • reasonable confidence: A level of confidence based on facts, actions, knowledge, experience, and/or observations, which is deemed to be adequate. Reasonable confidence is a lower level of confidence than reasonable assurance.

IEEE 1819 31

Usage and Status of IEEE Standards

  • 10 year revision policy of IEEE
  • Desire for global harmonization of standards
  • Operating plants stick to their original licensing basis (mostly the 70s and 80s versions)
  • Near-term attempts to apply the updated standards often ended up reverting to prior versions because licensing the old standards was "easier"
  • So even when we try to modernize a standard to the current state of knowledge we struggle with getting new reactor vendors or other users to commit to their use The decision to develop a single standard to "bridge the gap" as opposed to significant revision of 50 standards remains the right approach for IEEE. 32

©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute NRC Standards Forum 2023 Thomas Basso Sr. Director Eng & Risk September 13, 2023 NEI Codes and Standards Task Force 33

©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute Risk informed approaches have provided a better safety focus, improved safety and enabled efficiencies As we look to the future fleet, there are opportunities for risk-informing the regulatory fabric that come with both promise and attention Navigating this change will require embracing uncertainties and discipline in responding A Risk-Informed Journey 34

©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute The use of PRA technology should be increased in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data and in a manner that complements the NRCs deterministic approach and supports the NRCs traditional defense-in-depth philosophy.

1995 PRA Policy Statement 35

©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute Risk-informed Regulatory Decision-making PRA Realism Conservative Safety Decisions Uncertainties Improving the State of the Knowledge 36

©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute ASME Section XI Code Activities

Code Case N-752 Risk-informed Repair/Replacement NRC Endorsement and Approval of 50.55a(z) Submittals

IWA-4000 Repair/Replacement Optimization

Alternative VT-2 Qualification Establish appropriate training hours requirements

IWE General Visual Examinations (Category E-A, Item E1.11) Insulation Removal - Industry Survey

Application of EPRI Tech Bases using PFM for Relief to Extend SG/PRZ Nozzle Weld Inspections 37

©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute ASME OM Code Activities

Valve Exercising and Testing Requirements Valve Manual Exercising Frequency Extension Revise Testing of Passive Valve Quarterly Valve Stroking Extension

Risk-informed Applications

Replacement of Operability Term in OM

(OM-2) Code on Component Testing Requirements 38

©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute TG Alternative Treatment Requirements

  • Code Case on Alternate Requirements for NDE and Testing of Items Commensurate with their Contribution to Safety and Risk ASME III CC N-907 and Code Change on Preservice Inspection Requirements Regulatory Engagement on ASME Section III Priorities ASME Section III CSTF Activities 39

©2023 Nuclear Energy Institute NEI CSTF Regulatory Activities

10 CFR 50.55a Rulemaking Review (NRC-2018-0289)

Reg Guides 1.147, 1.84, 1.192, and 1.193 Comments (NRC-2018-0291)

Extension of 10-year ISI/IST Program Updates

Extension of ISI Intervals from 10 to 12 Years

Response to NRC RIS 2022-02 on Operational Leakage

NEI 18-03 Operability Guidance 40

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

w w w. e p r i. c o m Eric Thornsbury Principal Technical Leader September 13, 2023 EPRI Activities Supporting RIPB Standards 2023 NRC Standards Forum 41

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

Introduction EPRI participates in many activities related to the development of standards across the nuclear industry Interest in Risk-Informed, Performance-Based applications (including standards) has been increasing, and is getting additional attention due to activities related to our Advanced Nuclear Technology program Key Question for Advanced Reactors:

- How to meet current regulations, standards, and other expectations that were developed from a light water reactor perspective?

42

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

Examples of EPRI Activities for the Current Fleet RPV Threads in Flange (EPRI Report #3002010345)

N715 for Streamlined RI-ISIN (EPRI Report

  1. 3002003026 on BWR and PWR Lessons Learned)

ASME Section XI - Appendix R, Supplement 2 was included in the last rulemaking on 50.55a N711 for Inservice Inspection (EPRI Report

  1. 3002010353 )

Risk-informed Repair / Replacement (EPRI Report

  1. 3002013126) 10CFR50.69 (EPRI Reports #3002012984, 3002012988, 3002012990, 3002022453, 3002015999, )

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© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

Strategic Elements of the EPRI/NEI AR Roadmap Regulatory Efficiency Licensing 7 Actions Environmental 7 Actions Oversight 2 Actions Technology Readiness Fuel Cycle 3 Actions Plant/SSC Design 3 Actions Supply Chain 7 Actions Nuclear Beyond Electricity 3 Actions Codes & Standards 2 Actions Project Execution Project Management 4 Actions Engineering & Procurement 2 Actions Construction & Commissioning 3 Actions Initial Operations & Maintenance 1 Actions Workforce Development 4 Actions 44

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

EPRIs Strengths

  • Technical Process Guidance
  • Technical Methods Development
  • Efficient Tools and Software
  • Technology Transfer and Member Support Standards Development Regulatory Guidance & Interface Plant Operation & Maintenance Component Manufacturing 45

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

Example: Fuel Qualification from NUREG-2246 46

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

Geometry for a Liquid Fueled Reactor isdifficult to define!

The fuel does not have a defined geometry of its own What are we really ensuring?

If the intent is to show that we can cool the fuel, perhaps the underlying purpose is that we show that the fuel is in a coolable form (but not necessarily a fixed geometry)

Prescriptive interpretation of this requirement could break down, but RIPB can satisfy the intent!

Example: Fuel Qualification for an Advanced Reactor 47

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

Options for Fuel Qualification for a Liquid Fueled Reactor We could meet it prescriptively with sufficient data, or flexibly with a RIPB approach Prescriptive: global margins based on highest uncertainty RIPB: locally large margins tied to specific uncertainty

  • Prescriptive provides certainty; RIPB provides flexibility to meet the same intent 48

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

EPRI Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods & Tools for ARs

1. Determine the readiness of current PRA* methods and tools for use in Advanced Reactors and identify technical gaps that can be resolved through EPRI research
2. Develop an EPRI research roadmap to guide EPRI research in this area over the next several years to ensure readiness of PRA methods and tools for Advanced Reactor community implementation
3. Perform research and development based on the first two objectives to resolve key technical gaps in PRA methods and tools for the Advanced Reactor community.

PRA terminology represents a broad range of Risk approaches 49

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

EPRI Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods & Tools for ARs

  • Common methods, tools, and data that support realistic risk analysis in support of design and licensing activities
  • Streamlined risk analysis approaches, results, and insights that are appropriate for advanced reactors Challenges
  • Risk analysis is an important input to final designs and initial licensing
  • New technologies used in advanced reactor designs present new challenges to the existing risk analysis toolset
  • Risk analysis for advanced reactors is expected to produce different results and insights than the current fleet and regulators are familiar with
  • The current risk-informed decision-making approaches may not be a realistic approach for advanced reactors Solutions 50

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

EPRI Support for the AR Roadmap Action:

Demonstrate Risk-Informed & Performance-Based Approach 2023 Human Reliability Analysis Methods for ARs Guidance for Very Low Freq.

External Events Evaluate Risk Methods & Tools Risk Assessments with Digital I&C Systems Guidance for Selecting Risk Metrics Common Approaches for Passive System Reliability Methods for Economic Risk Analysis Data Needs for Advanced Reactor Risk Analysis EPRI Report - 3002026495 - Evaluation of Risk Analysis Methods & Tools for Advanced Reactors 51

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

Summary EPRI supports the development of RIPB standards and related activities RIPB approaches offer the needed focus and flexibility for Advanced Reactors to safely and efficiently design, license, and operation Uncertainties, both technical and regulatory, need to be acknowledged and addressed as part of any RIPB application 52

© 2023 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.

TogetherShaping the Future of Energy 53