ML20246A534

Insp Rept 50-395/89-13 on 890701-31.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Monthly Surveillance Observations,Monthly Maint Observation,Operational Safety Verification,Action on Previous Insp Findings & Other Areas

ML20246A534
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	08/04/1989
From:	Cantrell F, Hopkins P, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246A526	List: ML20246A524 ML20246A527 ML20246A534
References
50-395-89-13, NUDOCS 8908230003
Download: ML20246A534 (8)

See also: IR 05000395/1989013

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101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323

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> Report No.':: 50-395/89-13: A

Licensee:. South Carolina Electric & Gas Company ^

Columbia, SC 29218

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Docket No.:":50-395 License No.: NPF-12.

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Facility Name': V. C. Summer

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Inspection Conducted:.-July;1 .31,<1989

Inspectors:

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P. C'. Hopkins Date Signed. -

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Approved by: Ms

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' Division of Reactor Pr ects

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SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine inspection was conducted.by the resident inspectors onsite in the

areas of' monthly surveillance, observations, monthly maintenance observation,

operational: safety verification, action' on previous inspection findings,' and:

other areas.' Certain tours were conducted'on backshifttor weekends. Backshift

or weekend tours were conducted on July 11, 12, 13, 18, 19. 23,'24, 25 .and 26,

1989.-

Results:

The unit began the month at 100 percent power. A trip from 100 percent power

occurred.on July 11, 1989, as the result.of a maintenance technician shorting.

+ ' out a power supply- for the generator stator water cooling system. The unit

trip and SCE&G grid heavy loading resulted in a loss of offsite power with a

transfer. of the. safety related buses to the emergency diesel generators,

paragraph 4.b. The unit was restarted and returned to power on July 13, 1989.=

l , It ' operated at full ' power for the remainder of the' month.- The areas of

maintenance and: surveillance continue to' perform satisfactorily. A violation

for failure to control the temporary installation of portable demineralizers

was identified, paragraph 4.c. The licensee's evaluation 'of this event

determined that' although a seismic event could effect the operation of safety

equipment, the affected systems would still continue to operate satisfactorily.

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REPORT DETAILS

1.- Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

W. Baehr, Manager, Chemistry and Health Physics

C. Bowman, Manager, Scheduling and Modifications  !

• 0. Bradham, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

M. Browne, Manager, Systems Engineering & Performance

W. Higgins, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance

S. Hunt, Manager, Quality Systems

• A. Koon, Manager, Nuclear Licensing

G. Moffatt, Manager, Maintenance Servic2s

D. Moore, General Manager, Engineering Services

• K. Nettles, General Manager, Nuclear Safety

C. Price, Manager, Technical Oversite '

M. Quinton, General Manager, Station Support

J. Shepp, Associate Manager, Operations

J. Skolds, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations

• G. Soult, General Manager, Operations and Maintenance

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G. Taylor, Manager, Operations

D. Warner, Manager, Core Engineering and Nuclear Computer Services

• M. Williams, General Manager, Nuclear Services

K. Woodward, Manager, Nuclear Operations Education and Training

Other licensee employees . contacted included engineers, technicians,

operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

• Attended exit interview

Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the

last paragraph.

2. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance activities of safety related systems

and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in

accordance with license requirements. The inspectors observed portions of

35 selected surveillance tests including all aspects of Reactor Building  !

Closecut Inspection, STP 109.001. The inspectors verified that required

administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the test,

testing was accomplished by qualified personnel, required test instruments-

tion was properly calibrated, data met TS requirements, test discrepancies

were rectified, and the systems were properly returned to service. The

licensee demonstrated good communication between test technicians and i

control room personnel during performance of test procedures. The

materials, parts, components and test equipment used were found to be l

correct and documented properly. Technicians had procedures available at

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all times and utilized them properly.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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3. . Menthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspectors observed maintenance activities of safety related systems

and components to ascertain that these activities were conducted in

accordance with approved procedures, TS, industry codes and standards.

The inspectors determined that the procedures used were ' adequate to

control the activity, and that these activities were accomplished by

qualified personnel. The inspectors independently verified that the

equipment was properly tested before being returned to service.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed several outstanding job orders to

determine that the licensee was giving priority to safety related

l: maintenance and not developing a backlog which might affect a given

system's performance. The operational maintenance activities observed by

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the inspectors during this report were judged.to be satisfactory. It

appears that with the installation of control room barriers and a new

tagging desk in the control room, the traffic in the critical areas of the

-control room has been reduced. This has also resulted in ' smoother

processing of MWR's, STP's and other maintenance activities through. the

control room. The following specific maintenance activities were

observed:

MWR 87C00it Replace regulator for demineralized instrument air

supply

MWR 8901080 Repair controller on hydrogen analyzer

MWR 8901211 Calibrate pressurizer control channels 444C & 444D

PMTS 115543 Repair air intake transmitter for SW building

MWR 89G0095 Repair smoke detectors

PMTS 112043 Repair discharge flow transmitter on C FW booster pump

PMTS 116745 Calibrate heater coil temperature controller in

auxiliary building supply plenum

PMTS 118844 Calibrate temperature element on SW building pump room

MWR 88E0125 Repair flexible conduit to smoke analyzer

MWR 88E0108 Test and replace smoke analyzer

PMTS 117045 Calibrate temperature alarm on SW booster pump

MWR 8956808 Remove necessary parts and reinstall torque motor j

PMTS 122056 Perform inspection on open cycle cooling water booster

pump A 1

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PMTS 122063 Rotate turbine on closed cycle cooling water pump A

PMTS 121916 Verify alignment of 480V breakers

PMTS 121917 Electrical adjustment on 7.2kV switchgear treaker

PMTS 119740 Inspection of FW pump turbine

MWR 8901221 Repair posit.an indication circuitry on pressurizer

sample header isolation valve

MWR 87G0095 Repair sample detection line

PMTS 122395 Vibration analysis check on RHR pump A

PMTS 121729 Vibration analysis check on EFW pump A

PMTS P122139 Audit misalignment log

PMTS P122104 Inspect 7.2kV switchgear breakers

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

a. The inspectors toured the control room, reviewed plant logs and

records and held discussions with plant staff personnel to verify

that the plant was being operated safely and in conformance with

applicable requirements. Specific items inspected in the control

room included: adequacy of staffing and attentiveness of control room

personnel, TS and procedural adherence, operability of equipment and

indicated control room status, control room' logs, tagout books,

operating orders, jumper / bypass controls, computer printouts and

annunciators. Tours of other plant areas were conducted to verify

equipment operability, control of ignition sources and co,mbustible

materials, the condition of fire detection and extinguishing

equipment, the control of maintenance and surveillance cctivities in

progress, the implementation of radiation protective controls and the i

physical security plan. Tours were conducted during normal and

random off-hour periods.

b. On July 11,1989, at 2:35 p.m., the unit tripped from 100 percent

power. The trip resulted from an I&C technician shorting a wire

while reconnecting a thermocouple inside the stator water cooling

control cabinet. The short circuit blew the power supply fuses and

resulted in a low flow signal on stator water cooling. The normal

l protective action would have resulted in a turbine run back. This

! circuit did not function correctly and resulted in a turbine trip and

reactor trip.

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At the time of.the' reactor trip the utility. grid was' experiencing.a

high load of approximately 3100.MW's. This loss of-the 900 MW's

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being generated by Summer resulted in allarge voltage oscillation

which actuated protective relays that 'also ' tripped 4 pumped storage

units at the Fairfield Pumped Storage Facility (approximately 250MW) -

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3 units'~ at the. Saluda Hydro (approximately 135MW), and both fossil

generating ' units at~ McMeekin Station (approximately 250MW). '.These

losses resulted in the 230kV offsite power source to Summer dropping

-to approximately 203kV and the 115kV source dropping to approximately-

100kV. .This . low voltage condition actuated the undervoltage' relays -

l which automatically separated the 7200 volt ESF buses from offsite

power. This started the emergency diesel' generators and placed the

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safety related buses on the' diesel generator. The non-safety service

buses remained connected to the degraded offsite power source and

continued to operate throughout the event. at reduced voltages, . An

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unusual event was declared at 3:10 p.m. due to the loss of both

offsite power sources. The system voltage was returned to normal and.

thel safety related buses were reconnected to offsite power at

approximately 5:00 p.m. The DG's'were' secured and the unusual event

was terminated at 5:11 p.m.

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Further investigation by the licensee revealed that the MVAR loading

of Summer, the, grid MVAR distribution at the time of the unit trip

and lower.than normal setpoints on some generator back-up protection.

relays: may have led to this event. The licensee has developed

administrative - guidelines to . provide for - improved system MVAR

distribution that should reduce the probability of future similar

occurrences. After completing all necessary repairs and implementing

the'above step, the unit was restarted.on July 12, 1989, and returned

to power operation on July 13,1989. The licensee is currently

preparing a LER on this event.- The event will also be discussed.

during a meeting scheduled for August 1, 1989. at NRC headquarters.

c. While. conducting a routine walkdown of the plant on July 6, 1989 -the

inspectors discovered two temporary demineralizers on the 412

elevation of the intermediate building. These units are 24 inches in

diameter and approximately six feet high and are configured to stand 'l

in an upright position. The weight of each of the components is

approximately 1750 lbs. The support for.these units was a 1/2-inch

sisal' rope which attached these units to two EFW line supports and a

SW line support. A concern with the effects of this installation on

the operability of the SW and EFW system and nearby safety-related

components during a seismic event was immediately discussed with the

operations shift supervisor. The shift supervisor immediately had

these units removed from the area and documented this in off-normal

occurrence 89-058 and NCN 3386.

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Further investigation into this item revealed that these units had

been installed on June 1, 1989, to permit draining of the SG while the

plant was in Mode 5. This installation was accomplished without a

MWR as required by the Station Housekeeping and plant Inspection

Program Procedure SAP 142, and Conduct of Maintenance Procedure

SAP-300. The unit was restarted on June 11,-1989 with the units

still in place. This installation had been noted by plant management

and directions had been given to remove the units on or around June 20,

1989.

In this instance personnel were deficient in not performing this work

under the licensee MWR program. No documentation to require

engineering review of this temporary installation was performed as

required by SAP 142. The above procedure was also inadequate in that

it did not insure that a seismic evaluation of the installation be

performed and that time limits were established to insure removal of

this hazard prior to plant start-up. This is contrary to the

requirement of TS 6.8.1.a which requires that procedures be

established, implemented and maintained for activities referenced in

Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2 February 1972.

This is 'a violation, " Failure to Control Temporary Installations,"

89-13-01.

The licensee has performed an evaluation which determined that a

seismic event could have resulted in the portable demineralized

becoming mobile and possibly damaging two FW line supports and

shearing off a test connection on a CCW line and a drain line'in the

SW system. The failure of the EFW supports would not have resulted in

the system becoming inoperable and the loss of flow in the SW and CCW

system would not have degraded system flow below the worst case

analyzed values. The potential flooding from the lines were well

within the capacity of space dewatering equipment. This analysis

determined that all systems would remain operable.

This event is similar to a licensee identified violation that was

documented in inspection report 89-03. In that event temporary

scaffolding had been erected for shielding of RHR piping to reduce

personnel radiation exposure while the plant was in a refueling

outage. Due to procedural deficiencies and personnel errors the

scaffolding was not removed prior to plant start-up. That

installation had the potential to impact on system operability.

The licensee, in their response to this violation, should address

procedural changes made to insure that temporary installations are

controlled and that dates or mode restraints are established to

insure that temporary installations which are required while the

plant is shutdown are removed prior to unit start-up.

Violations cr deviations were identified.

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5. Action on Prev ous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)

(Closed) TI2513/94, Inspection for verification of licensee changes made

to comply with PWR moderator dilution requirements, multi-plant action

item 13-03. The inspector reviewed inspection requirements specified.in

this instruction and reviewed the V. C. Summer Safety Evaluation Report and

supplements to determine what requirements had been established. This

review identified that dilution events and- preventive measures were

discussed and resolved in section 15 of the SER and in supplements 1 and 3

to the SER. However, multi-plant action item B-03 was not specifically

discussed. Discussion with Mr. L. Kopp, the NRR lead contact for.this

item, indicates thut this item is not applicable for V. C. Summer. The

SIMS open item list for V. C. Summer also does not list this item. Further

discussion with Mr. Kopp revealed that since V.C. Summer was licensed in

1982, this issue would have been resolved in the normal licensing process

for V. C. Summer and all other plants licensed after 1979. Based on the

above, this item is administratively closed.

6. Other Areas

The inspectors-toured the licensee's lead dispatch center in Columbia, SC

on July 25, 1989. Computer control and indication systems and procedures

that are used to operate' and control SCE&G's grid was discussed in detail.

This tour was very beneficial and provided the inspectors with a better

understanding of this tystem.

7. ExitInterview(30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 31, 1989, with

those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspectors described the

areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings. The plant trip and

the resulting offsite power loss event which occurred on July 11, 1989, was

discussed in detail. This included the short term corrective measures and

the current investigation into root cause and long term corrective action.

The violation which resulted from the failure to control the temporary

installation of portable demineralizers in the intermediate building was

attributed to procedural inadequacies and a failure to follow procedures.

It was also noted that the violation was similar to LIV 89-03-01 when the

plant was restarted without removing scaffolding that contained temporary

shielding. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The

licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to

or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.

8. Acronyms and Initialisms

CCW Component Cooling Water

l DG Diesel Generator ,

EFW Emergency Feedwater

FW Feedwater

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I&C Instrumentation and Control

MW Megawatt.

- MWR Maintenance Work Request

MVAR Million Volt Amps Reactive

NCN Non-Conformance Notice

i NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRR Nuclear Reactor Regulation

PMTS Preventive Maintenance Task Sheet

- QC Quality Control

RHR Residual Heat Removal

SAP Station Administrative Procedure

SCE&G South Carloina Electric & Gas Company

SER Safety Evaluation Report

SG Steam Generator

SIMS Safety Issues Management Systems

STP Surveillance Test Procedures

SW Service Water

TS Technical Specifications

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